Legaux v. Mercer Investments, Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 3, 2021
• Docket: 3:20-cv-02041
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LUCRETIA LEGAUX, Case No. 20-cv-2041-BAS-AGS

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 14 MERCER INVESTMENTS, INC., JURISDICTION (ECF No. 11) 15 Defendant.

17 18 On October 15, 2020, Plaintiff Lucretia Legaux commenced this lawsuit against 19 Defendant Mercer Investments, Inc. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On December 15, 2020, 20 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as well as state anti-discrimination laws. (First Am. Compl. 22 (“FAC”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in racially 23 discriminatory practices and retaliation against her, forcing her to terminate her 24 employment as Defendant’s Operations Manager. (Id. ¶ 6.) 25 Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s action for 26 lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. (Mot., ECF No. 11.) 27 Defendant argues that dismissal is warranted because the claims brought do not require an 28 1 application of federal law and because the state law claims predominate over the federal 2 law claims. (Id.) Plaintiff opposes. (Opp’n, ECF No. 14.) 3 The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 4 without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following 5 reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter 6 jurisdiction. 7 8 I. BACKGROUND1 9 A. Factual Allegations Against Defendant 10 Plaintiff Lucretia Legaux is an individual with her primary residence in San Diego, 11 California. (FAC ¶ 5.) Defendant Mercer Investments, Inc. is “in [the] business of real 12 estate [and] providing brokerage and property management services to the public” and is a 13 corporation with its principal place of business in California. (Id. ¶ 6.) Prior to her 14 employment with Defendant, Plaintiff had over thirteen years of operations and real estate 15 management experience. (Id. ¶ 23.) In October 2018, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a 16 Receptionist and Administrative Assistant. (Id. ¶ 22.) Barbara Mercer, co-owner of 17 Mercer Investments, hired Plaintiff with a promise of growth within the company. (Id. ¶ 18 25.) 19 1. Discrimination Regarding Compensation 20 In August 2019, there was a new opening for the Operations Manager position at 21 Mercer Investments. (FAC ¶ 27.) Kelli Mercer-Chandler, Barbara Mercer’s daughter, 22 temporarily filled the position and was compensated at a rate of $32.00 per hour. (Id. ¶ 23 80.) The former Operations Manager, Kristen Carter, was compensated at a similar rate of 24 $31.95 per hour. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 76.) Both women are white. (Id. ¶ 52.) 25 26

27 1 These facts are all taken from the Complaint. For this Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 28 1 Only after unsuccessfully outsourcing a permanent manager, Barbara Mercer then 2 met with Plaintiff to discuss a possible promotion. (Id. ¶ 71.) The following month, 3 Barbara Mercer orally offered Plaintiff the managerial position. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 88.) Included 4 in this oral offer was the promise of a pay raise from $22.00 to $25.00 per hour, with a 5 stipulation that Plaintiff would be on a 90-day probationary period as manager prior to 6 receiving the pay raise. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 85, 87.) 7 During the probationary period, Plaintiff assumed the responsibilities of Operations 8 Manager. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 91.) Plaintiff also continued to assist as Receptionist and assumed 9 the role of Leasing Agent due to understaffing. (Id. ¶¶ 96, 151.) Her compensation 10 throughout this period remained at $22.00 per hour. (Id. ¶ 96.) Plaintiff did not receive 11 any of the benefits typically offered to Leasing Agents, such as reimbursements for work 12 expenses and leasing bonuses, nor did she take lunch breaks because of her increased 13 workload. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 152, 155.) 14 In October 2019, Plaintiff met with Barbara Mercer to discuss terminating the 15 probationary period early given Plaintiff’s extensive managerial background. (Id. ¶ 97.) 16 Plaintiff also requested a salary increase to $31.95 per hour, matching that of the previous 17 manager. (Id. ¶ 98.) The probationary period was not terminated, and Barbara Mercer 18 never gave Plaintiff a definitive answer regarding the requested salary increase. (Id. ¶¶ 19 99–100.) 20 2. Retaliation for Engaging in a Protected Activity 21 Following Plaintiff’s probationary period, Barbara Mercer instructed Plaintiff to 22 speak to Mercer’s son-in-law, Michael Chandler, regarding Plaintiff’s promised raise. 23 (FAC ¶¶ 41, 126.) Plaintiff spoke to Chandler shortly after. (Id. ¶ 43.) She also attempted 24 to speak to Barbara Mercer and Kelli Mercer-Chandler regarding the raise, but the “request 25 . . . was never taken seriously nor accomplished.” (Id. ¶ 59.) 26 In January 2020, Chandler demoted Plaintiff from the Operations Manager position. 27 (Id. ¶¶ 44, 138.) Plaintiff argues the demotion was in retaliation for the protected activity 28 of opposing the wage discrimination. (Id. ¶ 192.) Chandler said the “salary increase was 1 never offered[,]” and that Plaintiff’s “current pay was generous” without providing further 2 explanation. (Id. ¶ 45.) 3 3. Discrimination Regarding Image 4 Plaintiff also asserts that Barbara Mercer and her husband, Olen Mercer, treated 5 other employees, all of which are or appear to be white, like family. (FAC ¶¶ 103–04.) 6 The Mercers posted regular updates on social media regarding new employees at Mercer 7 but made no mention of Plaintiff when she was initially hired or when she was promoted 8 to Operations Manager. (Id. ¶¶ 105–08.) Plaintiff was also expected to show rental 9 properties in addition to her normal responsibilities. (Id. ¶ 117.) She was primarily sent 10 to low-income neighborhoods or those with large minority demographics. (Id. ¶¶ 118–22.) 11 Plaintiff claims that these are examples of Defendant’s racially discriminatory practices 12 against her with respect to image. (Id. ¶ 185.) 13 In late January 2020, Plaintiff was “forced to resign from employment with 14 Defendant due to the unfulfilled promises and blatant discrimination at Mercer.” (Id. ¶ 60.) 15 B. Legal Allegations Against Defendant 16 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts the following thirteen causes of action: 17 (1) racial discrimination, violating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and section 12940 of the California 18 Government Code; (2) retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, violating section 19 12940 of the California Government Code; (3) creating a hostile work environment, 20 violating section 12940 of the California Government Code; (4) failing to prevent 21 discrimination, violating section 12940 of the California Government Code; (5) 22 constructive discharge; (6) failure to pay timely wages; (7) nonpayment of wages, violating 23 section 200 of the California Labor Code; (8) negligent misrepresentation; (9) breach of 24 oral contract; (10) unjust enrichment; (11) unfair business practices, violating section 25 17200 of the California Business & Professions Code; (12) intentional infliction of 26 emotional distress; and (13) negligent infliction of emotional distress. (FAC ¶¶ 158–315.) 27 Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over her first count pursuant to 28 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) Plaintiff asserts that this Court 1 thus has supplemental jurisdiction over her related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1367. (Id. ¶ 17.) Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, arguing that 3 Plaintiff does not properly assert a Title VII claim, thereby failing to invoke federal 4 question jurisdiction, that Plaintiff is forum-shopping, and that Plaintiff’s state law claims 5 substantially predominate over the federal law claim. (Mot.) 6 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss 9 a claim based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal 10 courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power authorized by 11 Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 12 (1994). Accordingly, “[a] federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case 13 unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 14 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). “[T]he burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 15 asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. 16 A plaintiff invoking this jurisdiction must show “the existence of whatever is 17 essential to federal jurisdiction,” and if the plaintiff fails to do so, the court “must dismiss 18 the case, unless the defect [can] be corrected by amendment.” Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a 19 Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting Smith v. McCullough, 20 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926)), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp v. Friend, 559 U.S. 21 77 (2010). 22 A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) can be either facial or 23 factual. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial attack, the 24 challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to invoke federal 25 jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). To 26 resolve this challenge, the court limits its review to the allegations in the complaint, 27 assumes the allegations in the complaint are true, and draws all reasonable inferences in 28 1 favor of the party opposing dismissal. Id.; see also Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 2 (9th Cir. 2004). 3 4 III. ANALYSIS 5 Defendant facially challenges Plaintiff’s Complaint and attacks jurisdiction over the 6 claims on two grounds. (Mot.) First, Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to assert a substantial 7 federal question. In the same vein, Defendant contends the original complaint, acting as a 8 judicial admission, demonstrates a lack of intent to assert federal question jurisdiction. 9 (Id.) Second, Defendant argues that, even if there is federal question jurisdiction, 10 Plaintiff’s state law claims predominate over the federal law claim, so the Court should 11 decline supplemental jurisdiction over them. (Id.) Although there are colorable grounds 12 for some of Defendant’s arguments, the Court finds that there is federal question 13 jurisdiction over the suit and exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims 14 is appropriate. 15 A. Federal Question Jurisdiction 16 Under the federal question statute, a district court has “original jurisdiction of all 17 civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 18 U.S.C. § 1331. A case necessarily “arises under” federal law when a plaintiff’s complaint 19 establishes “either that (1) federal law creates the cause of action or (2) that the plaintiff’s 20 asserted right to relief depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” 21 Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the 22 plaintiff’s complaint must be “well-pleaded” such that the claim itself involves a federal 23 question for the court to assert jurisdiction. See Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914). 24 There is no federal question jurisdiction when the claim asserted is “insubstantial.” 25 Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1974). A claim is insubstantial when “its 26 unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of [the Supreme Court] as to 27 foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be 28 raised can be the subject of controversy.” Id. at 538. 1 1. Federal Claim Arising Under Title VII 2 Here, Plaintiff alleges a Title VII violation arising under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.2 3 Plaintiff alleges Defendant unlawfully discriminated against her with respect to 4 compensation and public image, unlawfully retaliated against her for engaging in a 5 protected activity, created a hostile work environment, and failed to take reasonable steps 6 necessary to prevent discrimination. (FAC ¶¶ 1–2, 225.) 7 “[A]n employee makes out a Title VII violation by showing discrimination because 8 of race, sex, or another protected factor. Such discrimination is characterized by the statute 9 as ‘an unlawful employment practice.’” Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 847 10 (9th Cir. 2002). Title VII itself does not impose a heightened burden of proof on plaintiffs 11 claiming discrimination. Id. at 848. Accordingly, Plaintiff need only allege sufficient facts 12 to establish racial discrimination by a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 853. For the 13 following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, taking all alleged 14 facts to be true, sufficiently raises a federal question under Title VII so as to confer subject 15 matter jurisdiction. 16 First, Plaintiff, who is of African American descent, is a member of a protected class. 17 (FAC ¶ 54.) Second, Plaintiff brings forth several adverse employment actions she 18 allegedly suffered during her employment at Mercer. Namely, Plaintiff claims she was 19 20 2 Title VII provides: 21 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-- 22 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 23 discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 24 conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 25 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 26 any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 27 such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 28 1 undercompensated despite the variety of roles she simultaneously assumed during the 2 probationary period, says she was wrongly demoted from Operations Manager following 3 her request for a salary increase, received disparate treatment with respect to public image 4 on social media, and was given property showings only in minority-dominated 5 neighborhoods. (Id. ¶¶ 168–74, 186–87.) Third, Plaintiff asserts she was appropriately 6 qualified for both the Receptionist and Operations Manager positions. (Id. ¶ 24.) Lastly, 7 Plaintiff specifically highlights the higher wages and numerous benefits offered to both 8 Mrs. Mercer-Chandler and Ms. Carter, which were not offered to her when she assumed 9 the role of Operations Manager. (Id. ¶¶ 168–69.) Assuming the foregoing to be true, the 10 Court finds Plaintiff properly pleads a federal question in her Amended Complaint. 11 2. Amended Complaint Serving as a Judicial Admission 12 Defendant next points to Plaintiff’s original complaint, which only invoked state 13 law. Defendant claims this is “a judicial admission” that Plaintiff did not originally intend 14 to raise a federal question and is forum shopping. (Mot.) The Court is unconvinced and 15 finds that Plaintiff’s original complaint was neither a judicial admission nor evidence of 16 forum shopping. 17 As a matter of course, a party has the right to amend its complaint once before a 18 responsive pleading is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1); DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 19 833 F.2d 183, 185–86 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, courts generally offer plaintiffs a fair 20 opportunity to be heard before dismissing their claims for lack of jurisdiction, unless it is 21 evident that any deficiencies cannot be resolved by amendment. See May Dep’t Store v. 22 Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court finds that Plaintiff 23 remedied the lack of federal question jurisdiction in the original complaint when she 24 amended her complaint to arise under Title VII. Though the original complaint failed to 25 invoke a federal question, Plaintiff used her right to amend to appropriately address the 26 deficiency. 27 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s amended pleading, Defendant also argues that, per the 28 law of judicial admissions, Plaintiff’s original complaint serves as evidence of forum 1 shopping and is sufficient grounds for dismissal. (Mot.) Judicial admissions are 2 allegations or statements in the pleadings, which can withdraw facts from contention and 3 are legally binding on the party making them. Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 4 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court finds the judicial admission doctrine inapplicable. 5 Typically, this doctrine applies to factual allegations and statements made by parties and 6 attorneys in pleadings and filings. Id. Defendant incorrectly applies this doctrine to 7 Plaintiff’s legal claims and asserted basis for jurisdiction. 8 Further, it is well-established that amended pleadings ordinarily supersede prior 9 pleadings. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). “[W]hen a 10 plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts 11 look to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United 12 States, 549 U.S. 457, 473–74 (2007). Accordingly, when Plaintiff amended her complaint 13 to invoke federal question jurisdiction, the original complaint relying on diversity 14 jurisdiction was superseded.3 And given that her factual allegations remain largely 15 unamended, a federal question had previously existed based on the underlying dispute. The 16 Court therefore rejects Defendant’s judicial admission argument and confirms that it has 17 jurisdiction over the suit. 18 3. Plaintiff Is the Master of Her Claim 19 The Court similarly rejects Defendant’s argument that, because California’s Fair 20 Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) is supposedly more expansive than Title VII, 21 Plaintiff “loses nothing by proceeding solely in state court.” (Mot.) Per the “well-pleaded 22 complaint” rule, a plaintiff is the master of her claim, giving her the ability to file suit in 23 any appropriate forum. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The power 24 to choose among available fora rests with the plaintiff, not the defendant or the court. Id. 25 26 3 In her Opposition, Plaintiff explains that the original complaint had incorrectly relied on diversity 27 jurisdiction because “an improper party, with a similar name, had been named as the Defendant[.]” (Opp’n.) Plaintiff’s attorneys allegedly discovered the mistake after the original complaint had already 28 1 Because Plaintiff properly raised a federal question under Title VII in her Amended 2 Complaint, she has the choice of filing her claims in either federal or state court. Therefore, 3 it is of no matter that Plaintiff would purportedly lose nothing by proceeding in state court. 4 B. Supplemental Jurisdiction 5 The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides: 6 [I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 7 that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 8 that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 9

10 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Under § 1367(c), a district court may use its discretion to decline 11 supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if: 12 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which 13 the district court has original jurisdiction, 14 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 15 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 16 declining jurisdiction.

17 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Underlying the § 1367(c) inquiry are considerations of judicial 18 economy, convenience and fairness to litigants, and comity. “[I]f these are not present[,] 19 a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims[.]” United Mine 20 Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 21 Under § 1367(c), “a district court can decline jurisdiction under any one of [the 22 statute’s] four provisions.” San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of L.A., 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th 23 Cir. 1998). When a district court declines supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim 24 pursuant to one of the first three provisions of the statute—that is, § 1367(c)(1)–(3)—the 25 court need not state its reasons for dismissal. Id. However, when the court declines 26 supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to the statute’s “exceptional circumstances” provision 27 —that is, § 1367(c)(4)—the court must “articulate why the circumstances of the case are 28 exceptional,” and consider whether values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 1 comity provide compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Exec. Software N. Am., Inc. 2 v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1552 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Cal. 3 Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). 4 Further, the party invoking such discretionary analysis by the court should identify 5 the relevant subsections warranting dismissal. Discretionary Exercise of Supplemental 6 Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c), 13D Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3567.3 (3d ed. 7 2021). Here, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss points specifically to subsections (2) and (4), 8 arguing that Plaintiff’s twelve state law claims predominate over the single federal law 9 claim and that values of comity, fairness, and judicial efficiency justify this Court declining 10 supplemental jurisdiction. (Mot.) The Court finds that it retains the power to exercise 11 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s twelve state law claims under § 1367(a) and that 12 no ground enumerated in § 1367(c) is persuasive enough to decline jurisdiction. 13 1. Common Nucleus of Operative Fact 14 State and federal claims form part of the same case or controversy under § 1367(a) 15 when they share a common nucleus of operative fact. Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 16 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). The reference to a “common nucleus” suggests that courts need 17 only examine one factual scenario to understand all claims brought forth. Garcia v. Rite 18 Aid Corp., No. CV 17-02124 BRO (SKx), 2017 WL 1737718, at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 19 2017). In other words, claims should generally “arise from the same conduct on the part 20 of” the defendant. Id. As Plaintiff highlights, all her claims arise from the singular period 21 of her employment at Mercer. Though there are multiple incidents of alleged 22 discrimination during Plaintiff’s employment, the Court finds them all to arise from the 23 general and repeated pattern of discrimination Plaintiff allegedly faced. See id. (holding 24 that all of the plaintiff’s claims arose from the same relationship and treatment between the 25 defendant and the plaintiff so the court could assert supplemental jurisdiction); see also 26 Shanks v. N. Cal. Cement Masons Joint Apprenticeship Training Comm., No. C-93-0609 27 MHP, 1993 WL 150273, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 1993) (finding that a plaintiff’s state 28 law claims were sufficiently related to the federal law claims since they arose from the 1 same factual events). Therefore, the Court finds that it can assert supplemental jurisdiction 2 over Plaintiff’s twelve state law claims because they form part of the same case or 3 controversy as required by § 1367(a). 4 2. Predomination of State Law Claims 5 Invoking the discretionary grounds for declining supplemental jurisdiction, 6 Defendant first contends that Plaintiff’s state law claims “substantially predominate” over 7 the federal law claim because Plaintiff is seeking relief primarily through state law. (Mot.) 8 State claims substantially predominate over federal claims when they constitute the “real 9 body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. 10 In making this determination, federal courts typically consider whether the proof required, 11 scope of issues raised, or comprehensiveness of remedy sought warrant resolution by a 12 state court. Id. at 727–28. 13 In this case, the issues raised all turn on similar labor and employment laws under 14 Title VII, FEHA, and the California Labor Code. (FAC.) Plaintiff’s claim under the 15 California Business and Professions Code likewise is predicated on violations of these 16 laws. (Id.) And even though Plaintiff looks to state law for many of her claims, she also 17 references federal law for several of those claims. (See FAC ¶¶ 181–232 (invoking Title 18 VII in three additional discrimination causes of action).) 19 Further, in her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff draws on the same incidents of 20 Defendant’s allegedly discriminatory behavior to support her thirteen claims. As such, the 21 evidence required to prove Plaintiff’s claims would largely be identical for each claim 22 because they are so factually similar. Moreover, Defendant does not offer a convincing 23 explanation for why “the proof required” or “comprehensiveness of remedy sought warrant 24 resolution by a state court.” See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727; see also Chavez v. Suzuki, No. 25 05CV1569 BTM(BLM), 2005 WL 3477848, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2005) (noting “there 26 is nothing wrong with [a] [p]laintiff choosing to file suit in federal court because [she] 27 believes it is more favorable to [her]”). 28 1 In addition, Defendant offers a quantitative argument as to why Plaintiff’s state law 2 claims substantially predominate. The largely numerical contention points out that 3 Plaintiff’s twelve state law claims outnumber the single federal claim. However, 4 “[w]hether state law claims substantially predominate over federal claims is a qualitative— 5 not quantitative —inquiry . . . [and] [t]he mere fact that a plaintiff’s state claims outnumber 6 [her] federal claims, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the ‘substantially predominate’ 7 standard.” Navarro v. City of Fontana, No. EDCV 09-1525-VAP (DTBx), 2010 WL 8 11459998, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010). Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s 9 argument raising this basis for declining supplemental jurisdiction. 10 3. Exceptional Circumstances 11 The Court can also decline supplemental jurisdiction if there are exceptional 12 circumstances warranting dismissal. Exec. Software N. Am., Inc., 24 F.3d at 1558. 13 Typically, such circumstances must be compelling or unusual, extending “beyond the 14 circumstances identified in subsections (c)(1)–(3).” Id. In exercising discretion under § 15 1367(c)(4), courts evaluate the Gibbs factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to 16 the parties, and whether all claims would be expected to be tried together. See San Pedro 17 Hotel Co., 159 F.3d at 478. 18 In this case, all thirteen claims apply a virtually identical factual scenario and are 19 closely intertwined, so it would be an inappropriate use of judicial resources to bifurcate 20 trials in federal and state courts. Declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 21 claims would not only create a risk of multiplicity in litigation but also substantially 22 increase litigation costs for both parties. Further, there are no logistic inconveniences to 23 either party from the Court asserting supplemental jurisdiction; on the contrary, it would 24 appear to be more convenient to litigate all claims in a single forum. Defendant also does 25 not highlight any convincing reasons why it would be unfair for the Court to exercise 26 supplemental jurisdiction. On the other hand, Plaintiff’s expectation to try all claims 27 together weighs in favor of the Court retaining jurisdiction. See Parker v. Scrap Metal 28 Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 745 (11th Cir. 2006). 1 Defendant also advances forum shopping as a separate reason for declining 2 ||jurisdiction. (Mot.) However, given that Plaintiff has the power to choose her own forum 3 which to bring her claims, “[t]his sort of forum-shopping is . . . not an ‘exceptional’ 4 circumstance giving rise to compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction, as required by 5 || section 1367(c)(4).” See Chavez, 2005 WL 3477848, at *2. The Court concludes there are 6 ||no compelling reasons to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law 7 || claims. 8 9 CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Title VII claim poses a substantial federal 11 question and is not subject to dismissal. Further, the Court concludes that it has 12 ||supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. Thus, the Court DENIES 13 ||Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 A , 16 || DATED: August 2, 2021 Lin A (Lyohaa 6 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4A.