CORNYN, Justice,
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
In this premises liability case, we decide whether a shopping center’s former property [53]*53manager owed a legal duty to a tenant’s customer who was killed during an armed robbery. Winona Old, whose husband was shot and killed at Shipley Do-Nuts & Flour Supply Company, Inc., sued Shipley DoNuts, the Fairbanks Shopping Center, and Leftnark Management Company, the former property manager hired by the shopping center’s owner.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Lefmark and then severed that judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. 908 S.W.2d 16. We determine that Leftnark owed no legal duty to Old under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment for Lefmark.
From 1991 to 1993, a variety of crimes, including several robberies and burglaries, occurred at the Fairbanks Shopping Center, located in Harris County, Texas. On January 19, 1993, the risk manager at a Kroger Food Store located in the same shopping center wrote to Leftnark asking that it conduct a security risk assessment for the property. Before the shopping center’s owner terminated its services on April 13, 1993, Leftnark had not conducted such an assessment.
On June 27, 1993, about two months after the owner terminated Lefmark, an armed robbery occurred at the Shipley Do-Nuts in the shopping center. Shipley’s was robbed again on July 13, 1993, and during this incident Old’s husband was shot and killed.
Old claims that Lefmark knew or should have known that the prevalence of criminal activity, coupled with other physical conditions on the shopping center’s premises, was a dangerous condition that exposed her deceased husband to an unreasonable risk of harm. Old alleged that Leftnark breached its duty of due care by failing to eliminate, protect against, or warn others of this condition. Old further alleged that Leftnark created a dangerous condition on the premises because it did not (1) conduct the security risk assessment Kroger Food Stores requested; (2) notify the successor management company about the Kroger letter and the criminal activity at the shopping center; (3) establish a satisfactory security program for the center; and (4) repair a hole in the fence behind Shipley’s that allowed criminals easy access to the property.
In its motion for summary judgment, Lef-mark claimed that it owed no duty to protect against criminal acts of third parties because when Old’s husband was killed, Leftnark did not own, occupy or control the premises. In response, Old contended that even if Lef-mark was not in control of the premises on the date in question, Lefmark nevertheless created the dangerous condition, failed to remedy the condition, and failed to give notice of the condition to its successor.
Tort liability depends on both the existence of and the violation of a duty. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.1990). Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide under the facts surrounding the occurrence in question. Centeq Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197.
As a general rule, a landowner or one who is otherwise in control of the premises must use reasonable care to make the premises safe for the use of business invitees. See Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425, 431 (1950). This duty includes warning invitees of known hidden dangers that present an unreasonable risk of harm. City of Beaumont v. Graham, 441 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex.1969). Ordinarily, this duty does not include the obligation to prevent criminal acts of third parties who are not subject to the premises occupier’s control. Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.1996); Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1993); El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 313-14 (Tex.1987). This rule, however, is not absolute. One who controls the premises does have a duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees from criminal acts of third parties if he knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee. Centeq Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197; Exxon, 867 S.W.2d at 21; Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex.1985). This duty, we have emphasized, is commen[54]*54surate with the right of control over the property. See Exxon, 867 S.W.2d at 21.
Under certain circumstances, however, even one not in control of the property at the time of the injury may owe a duty to make the premises safe. One who agrees to make safe a known dangerous condition of real property owes a duty of due care. City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.1986) (citing Gundolf v. Massman-Johnson, 473 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1971), writ refd n.r.e., 484 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.1972) (per curiam)). And a person who creates a dangerous condition owes the same duty. Id. (citing Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.1962)).
The summary judgment evidence reveals that until April 13, 1993, Lefmark was the property manager for the Fairbanks Plaza Shopping Center. In that capacity, we assume that Lefmark had sufficient control over the premises for a duty of care to arise to invitees like Old. See City of Denton, 701 S.W.2d at 835. But on the date of the incident, Lefmark did not own, occupy, manage, possess or otherwise have any control of the shopping center. Absent the essential element of control on the date in question, Lefmark owed no duty under the general rule to keep the shopping center safe. For a duty to exist, Lefmark must have owed a duty under some exception to the general rule.
The court of appeals held that, although Lefmark was no longer in control of the premises, it owed a duty to disclose to the subsequent management company any dangerous conditions affecting the shopping center, including the prevalence of criminal activity, and the contents of the Kroger letter. For this holding, the court of appeals relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 (1965), which provides:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and
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CORNYN, Justice,
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
In this premises liability case, we decide whether a shopping center’s former property [53]*53manager owed a legal duty to a tenant’s customer who was killed during an armed robbery. Winona Old, whose husband was shot and killed at Shipley Do-Nuts & Flour Supply Company, Inc., sued Shipley DoNuts, the Fairbanks Shopping Center, and Leftnark Management Company, the former property manager hired by the shopping center’s owner.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Lefmark and then severed that judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. 908 S.W.2d 16. We determine that Leftnark owed no legal duty to Old under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment for Lefmark.
From 1991 to 1993, a variety of crimes, including several robberies and burglaries, occurred at the Fairbanks Shopping Center, located in Harris County, Texas. On January 19, 1993, the risk manager at a Kroger Food Store located in the same shopping center wrote to Leftnark asking that it conduct a security risk assessment for the property. Before the shopping center’s owner terminated its services on April 13, 1993, Leftnark had not conducted such an assessment.
On June 27, 1993, about two months after the owner terminated Lefmark, an armed robbery occurred at the Shipley Do-Nuts in the shopping center. Shipley’s was robbed again on July 13, 1993, and during this incident Old’s husband was shot and killed.
Old claims that Lefmark knew or should have known that the prevalence of criminal activity, coupled with other physical conditions on the shopping center’s premises, was a dangerous condition that exposed her deceased husband to an unreasonable risk of harm. Old alleged that Leftnark breached its duty of due care by failing to eliminate, protect against, or warn others of this condition. Old further alleged that Leftnark created a dangerous condition on the premises because it did not (1) conduct the security risk assessment Kroger Food Stores requested; (2) notify the successor management company about the Kroger letter and the criminal activity at the shopping center; (3) establish a satisfactory security program for the center; and (4) repair a hole in the fence behind Shipley’s that allowed criminals easy access to the property.
In its motion for summary judgment, Lef-mark claimed that it owed no duty to protect against criminal acts of third parties because when Old’s husband was killed, Leftnark did not own, occupy or control the premises. In response, Old contended that even if Lef-mark was not in control of the premises on the date in question, Lefmark nevertheless created the dangerous condition, failed to remedy the condition, and failed to give notice of the condition to its successor.
Tort liability depends on both the existence of and the violation of a duty. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.1990). Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide under the facts surrounding the occurrence in question. Centeq Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197.
As a general rule, a landowner or one who is otherwise in control of the premises must use reasonable care to make the premises safe for the use of business invitees. See Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425, 431 (1950). This duty includes warning invitees of known hidden dangers that present an unreasonable risk of harm. City of Beaumont v. Graham, 441 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex.1969). Ordinarily, this duty does not include the obligation to prevent criminal acts of third parties who are not subject to the premises occupier’s control. Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.1996); Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.1993); El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 313-14 (Tex.1987). This rule, however, is not absolute. One who controls the premises does have a duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees from criminal acts of third parties if he knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee. Centeq Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197; Exxon, 867 S.W.2d at 21; Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex.1985). This duty, we have emphasized, is commen[54]*54surate with the right of control over the property. See Exxon, 867 S.W.2d at 21.
Under certain circumstances, however, even one not in control of the property at the time of the injury may owe a duty to make the premises safe. One who agrees to make safe a known dangerous condition of real property owes a duty of due care. City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.1986) (citing Gundolf v. Massman-Johnson, 473 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1971), writ refd n.r.e., 484 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.1972) (per curiam)). And a person who creates a dangerous condition owes the same duty. Id. (citing Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.1962)).
The summary judgment evidence reveals that until April 13, 1993, Lefmark was the property manager for the Fairbanks Plaza Shopping Center. In that capacity, we assume that Lefmark had sufficient control over the premises for a duty of care to arise to invitees like Old. See City of Denton, 701 S.W.2d at 835. But on the date of the incident, Lefmark did not own, occupy, manage, possess or otherwise have any control of the shopping center. Absent the essential element of control on the date in question, Lefmark owed no duty under the general rule to keep the shopping center safe. For a duty to exist, Lefmark must have owed a duty under some exception to the general rule.
The court of appeals held that, although Lefmark was no longer in control of the premises, it owed a duty to disclose to the subsequent management company any dangerous conditions affecting the shopping center, including the prevalence of criminal activity, and the contents of the Kroger letter. For this holding, the court of appeals relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 (1965), which provides:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in Subsection (1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Otherwise the liability continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to take such precautions.
Even though Lefmark was not a “vendor,” the court of appeals held that Lefmark nevertheless “transferred” the right of possession and control to the new management company without disclosing the dangerous condition, thereby breaching its duty to disclose under section 353. 908 S.W.2d at 20.
We disagree with this conclusion for several reasons. First, we have never adopted section 353, even though it has been cited by and relied upon by several courts of appeals. See First Fin. Dev. Corp. v. Hughston, 797 S.W.2d 286, 290-91 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied); Davis v. Esperardo Mining Co., 750 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Moeller v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 610 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Beall v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 532 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1975, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Roberts v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 886 S.W.2d 363, 367-68 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (citing First Financial, 797 S.W.2d at 291).
But even assuming that we were to adopt section 353, it does not apply to these facts. Section 353 is limited in application to “vendors” of land. While section 353 does not define “vendor,” other sections of the Restatement employing that term refer only to a former owner of land. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 354 (discussing the ap[55]*55plicability of the rules stated in Restatement (SECOND) of TORTS §§ 351-53). As we have noted, Lefmark never owned the premises in question.
Old nevertheless urges us to adopt a more expansive meaning of the term “vendor” to include any “transferor” of land. She argues that because Lefmark transferred possession and control of the premises to its successor, it should be liable under section 353. None of the Texas eases citing section 353 supports this contention. Those cases involve either former owners, Roberts, 886 S.W.2d at 366; First Financial, 797 S.W.2d at 290-91; Davis, 750 S.W.2d at 888; Moeller, 610 S.W.2d at 858, or former occupiers who transferred exclusive physical possession, use, and control of the land back to the owner. Beall, 532 S.W.2d at 365. In contrast, Lefmark was not an owner or occupier with exclusive possession of the property.
Nor is Lefmark a “transferor” in the sense that Old urges and in the sense used by the courts of appeals cited above. For example, unlike Beall, in which a lessee was held liable for failing to warn the owner of a dangerous condition when the lessee transferred possession back to the owner, Old urges liability for a property manager’s failure to warn a subsequent manager. For Lefmark to be liable as a transferor, there must have been a transfer from Lefmark to its successor. Old’s own pleadings indicate that Lefmark did not transfer control of the property to the successor management company, and so no duty to warn that company could arise under section 353.
We also note that the American Law Institute’s articulated rationale for the duty placed on vendors under section 353 does not apply to a property manager like Lefmark. Section 353 is grounded on the premise that a vendor who does not inform a vendee about a latent dangerous condition is engaging in an “implied misrepresentation.” Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 354 cmt. b. Liability of a vendor who conceals a dangerous condition arises, at least in part, because the vendor likely intended to induce the buyer to make a purchase he or she would not have made with full knowledge of the danger. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 cmt. d. The same cannot be said of a nonowner property manager. Unless a manager has breached its contract by allowing a dangerous condition to persist, it has nothing to gain by misrepresenting the condition of the property at the end of its tenure, as it is merely relinquishing control of the premises to the owner. This rationale does not justify extending a duty to an independent property manager under these facts.
Old further argues two additional bases for Lefmark’s liability. Old asserts that even if Lefmark was not in control of the premises on the date of the armed robbery, Lefmark is nevertheless liable because it created the dangerous condition or because it agreed to make safe a known dangerous condition but failed to do so.
In this case, however, we fail to see the basis for the claim that Lefmark created the likelihood of the criminal activity at Shipley Do-Nuts that resulted in Mr. Old’s death. The allegations related to this theory of recovery were that Lefmark: (1) failed to conduct a security risk assessment at the shopping center after receipt of the Kroger letter; (2) failed to notify its successor of the Kroger letter or the history of criminal activity at the center; (3) failed to provide an adequate security program; and (4) failed to repair a three to four-foot-wide hole in the shopping center’s fence directly behind Shipley’s, thereby allowing easy access to the center by criminals. As a matter of law, even if true, these allegations do not raise a genuine issue of material fact that Lefmark created a condition that permitted or brought into being the criminal actions that resulted in Mr. Old’s death or that Lefmark had a continuing duty to make the alleged dangerous condition safe after its services were terminated by the shopping center’s owner.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment that Old take nothing from Lefmark.
OWEN, J., filed a concurring opinion.