NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 129,341
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
ANGELIINA LYNN LAWSON,
Appellant,
v.
JONATHAN DAVID LAWSON,
Appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; JOHN J. BRYANT, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed August 21, 2026. Reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded with directions.
Angeliina Lynn Lawson, appellant pro se.
No appearance by appellee.
Before COBLE, P.J., BRUNS and HURST, JJ.
PER CURIAM: In Anderson County District Court case No. 2020 DM 131, the district court issued a modified child custody order in the parties' divorce action. Angeliina Lynn Lawson subsequently filed a pro se document in the Leavenworth County District Court, seeking to vacate or otherwise collaterally challenge the Anderson County custody order. The district court ultimately dismissed Angeliina's claims without prejudice. Angeliina appeals, raising several challenges to various court rulings. But because this court lacks appellate jurisdiction over this appeal, we cannot address the merits of those challenges. We do, however, reverse the district court's order for the
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attorney fees imposed as a sanction against Angeliina as it is unclear whether her filings were frivolous on this record.
BACKGROUND
In 2020, the Anderson County District Court dissolved the marriage between Angeliina and Jonathan David Lawson in Anderson County District Court, case No. 2020 DM 131. Though the record in this appeal does not contain any documents from that case, the parties apparently have a minor child, and the divorce proceedings included a child custody order. The Anderson County District Court subsequently modified its child custody order in 2023 and 2024, apparently in favor of Jonathan.
On March 7, 2025, Angeliina filed a pro se document with a different district court—the Leavenworth County District Court—titled: "Void Judgement and Restore Full Custody Demand for Jury Trial Under Common Law No ADR—Common Law Jurisdiction." In the document, Angeliina sought to vacate a modified child custody order issued by the Anderson County District Court. She claimed that the order was void under K.S.A. 60-260(b) for violating her right to due process. She further contended that Jonathan unconstitutionally interfered with her right to parent her child and claimed that Jonathan retaliated against her for asserting her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by making allegations regarding her disability as a basis for depriving her of her parental rights, to restrict her access to the court, and to impose excessive financial burdens on her. She further suggested that the child custody order violated her equal protection rights by discriminating against her because of her disability.
Jonathan, through counsel, filed an answer to Angeliina's motion on April 17. In his answer, Jonathan alleged that the Leavenworth County District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because a case involving the same matter was pending in Anderson
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County and because the Leavenworth County District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Jonathan. He also requested attorney fees as a sanction for being forced to defend a frivolous lawsuit. Jonathan then filed a motion to dismiss the following day, alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction and res judicata, and repeated his request for attorney fees.
After Jonathan filed his motion to dismiss, Angeliina responded with a notice of procedural default based on the alleged untimely filing of Jonathan's answer and the procedural irregularity of filing the motion to dismiss after filing an answer. Jonathan filed a motion for leave to file his answer out of time, which Angeliina opposed. Later, Angeliina renewed her objection to the late filing. The record does not reveal an order by the district court explicitly ruling on the motion to file a late answer.
Angeliina also filed a memorandum opposing Jonathan's motion to dismiss. She claimed that venue was appropriate in Leavenworth County without addressing the jurisdictional arguments relating to the pending proceedings in Anderson County.
In May 2025, the district court held a nonevidentiary hearing on Jonathan's motion to dismiss. Jonathan's arguments focused on the pending litigation in Anderson County. His attorney also argued that Angeliina's ADA retaliation claim against him could not stand because, as an individual, not an employer or common carrier, Jonathan was not subject to the ADA. He also argued that Jonathan has no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he did not act under color of law. Angeliina responded that her petition did not seek to relitigate the family law matters but raised new and ongoing harm, including ADA retaliation and a denial of due process. She contended that venue was appropriate in Leavenworth County because she resided there.
The day after the hearing, Angeliina filed a flurry of additional pro se documents.
The district court then issued its order of dismissal with prejudice, denying Angeliina's request to void the Anderson County custody order, concluding it lacked the authority to
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serve as a reviewing court of another district court in the state. The court also denied Angeliina's due process claim for lack of personal jurisdiction over Jonathan, because section 1983 does not apply to Jonathan, who, under the best facts of the case, has not acted under color of state law, and because the facts do not support her claim for a violation of due process. The district court similarly dismissed her claim for interference with her parental rights because her claim demanded a jury trial to determine child custody and the position lacked legal support. The court dismissed the ADA retaliation claim because the evidence did not show Jonathan to be in a class subject to the ADA; there were no facts that showed Jonathan provided a public service with respect to Angeliina's claims, and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Jonathan. The court issued a sanction of Jonathan's reasonable attorney fees against Angeliina for a violation of K.S.A. 60-211(b)(2) and (3) in filing a frivolous motion devoid of factual support.
Angeliina filed a timely pro se motion for reconsideration and relief from judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b). She also filed a written opposition to Jonathan's request for attorney fees, raising multiple procedural and substantive challenges to the imposition of fees. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration but amended the order of dismissal to alter its preclusive effect—changing the dismissal with prejudice to a dismissal without prejudice.
After Jonathan's attorney filed a motion for attorney fees and an affidavit regarding those fees, Angeliina responded with another pleading in opposition. This pleading raised some of the earlier arguments in opposition to fees but also raised several new arguments. In a written decision, considering the applicable billing factors as well as Angeliina's arguments, the district court imposed a sanction against Angeliina of $4,239.66 in Jonathan's attorney fees.
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Angeliina filed her notice of appeal on the same date as the court's written decision regarding attorney fees was filed. The court subsequently issued its journal entry on attorney fees, including a payment schedule.
ANALYSIS
I. Does this court possess jurisdiction over Angeliina's appeal?
Angeliina has raised multiple issues challenging rulings by the Leavenworth County District Court on various matters. She has not addressed the propriety of the district court's reasoning in dismissing her claims. This court, however, must first address its jurisdiction over her appeal—that is, this court's statutory power to decide this dispute. See In re Parentage of E.A., 319 Kan. 748, 757, 560 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2024) ("[A]ppellate courts only exercise jurisdiction in circumstances the Legislature permits; they do not have discretionary power to hear appeals from all district court orders."); Black's Law Dictionary 1015 (12th ed. 2024) (appellate jurisdiction is the "power of a court to review and revise a lower court's decision").
An appellate court exercises unlimited review over jurisdictional issues and has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative; and, when the record discloses a lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court must dismiss the appeal. Wiechman v. Huddleston, 304 Kan. 80, 84-85, 370 P.3d 1194 (2016). Even if jurisdiction has not been challenged, the court has the duty to ensure it has power to consider the matter it is addressing. Otherwise, its only recourse is to cease its review and dismiss the matter. State v. Barnes, 320 Kan. 147, 157, 563 P.3d 1255 (2025). Here, we question our power to consider this matter because the district court's judgment is not final, as we next explain.
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A. Finality of Judgment
An appellate court's jurisdiction is derived from statute. The Kansas Constitution provides that the Kansas Supreme Court has such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law. Kan. Const. art. 3, § 3. The Kansas Court of Appeals is not a constitutional court but created entirely by statute. See K.S.A. 20-3001. Accordingly, this court may only exercise jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by the Kansas Legislature. City of Mission v. VanHorn, 321 Kan. 378, 381, 579 P.3d 966 (2025); Flores Rentals, LLC v. Flores, 283 Kan. 476, 480-81, 153 P.3d 523 (2007). When the record discloses a lack of appellate jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. In re I.A., 313 Kan. 803, 805- 06, 491 P.3d 1241 (2021).
Apart from a few well-delineated exceptions not applicable to Angeliina's appeal, K.S.A. 60-2102(a)(4) requires a final judgment before an appellate court may exercise jurisdiction. A final decision is one that decides and disposes of the entire merits of the controversy and reserves no other questions or directions for the future or further action by the court. Flores Rentals, LLC, 283 Kan. at 481-82. The dismissal of an action without prejudice is not a final appealable order within the meaning of K.S.A. 60-2102(a)(4) because the party may refile the same or a similar action. Where, as here, the dismissal is involuntary, a narrow exception applies when the applicable statute of limitations period for an action would bar a subsequent refiling of a dismissed action. See King v. Schwert, 322 Kan. __, 589 P.3d 596, 597-98 (2026) (citing Bain v. Artzer, 271 Kan. 578, 581, 25 P.3d 136 [2001]); Cohen v. Battaglia, 41 Kan. App. 2d 386, 390-91, 202 P.3d 87 (2009), rev'd on other grounds 296 Kan. 542, 293 P.3d 752 (2013); Brown v. Kansas City Archdiocese, No. 98,213, 2008 WL 624703, at *3 (Kan. App. 2008) (unpublished opinion). So, because the district court dismissed Angeliina's claims without prejudice, we must consider whether this exception applies to permit us to consider her claims even if the district court's order was not final.
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King is instructive. A pro se litigant had ongoing disputes with her homeowners'
association, resulting in litigation. The district court dismissed all of King's claims against the association except one in November 2023. King attempted to appeal, but the appeal was dismissed because of the outstanding claim. The case returned to the district court, which dismissed King's final claim without prejudice. King then appealed all the dismissed claims except the claim dismissed without prejudice, but this court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the final claim could be refiled.
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed this court's involuntary dismissal of the claims dismissed in November 2023. 322 Kan. at __, 589 P.3d at 598. The opinion does not provide much analysis of the November 2023 claims, but the court noted that King was not seeking appellate review of the claim dismissed without prejudice. The court concluded that the November 2023 claims were adjudications on the merits, presumably, therefore, constituting dismissals with prejudice. King also asserted that her November 2023 claims could not be refiled because of the applicable statute of limitations. The King court did not discuss any of these aspects of the case but apparently concluded that the November 2023 claims were final, appealable orders. 322 Kan. at __, 589 P.3d at 598.
This case is distinguishable from King. Angeliina's "petition" raised four claims:
(1) The Anderson County District Court's modified custody order was void for constitutional violations of due process and procedural fairness; (2) Jonathan took away her constitutional right to her child without due process; (3) Jonathan interfered with her right to parent her child; and (4) Jonathan has intentionally and unlawfully retaliated against Angeliina for asserting her rights under the ADA by using her disability as a pretext to deprive her of her parental rights, restrict her access to the courts, and impose excessive financial burdens.
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The district court dismissed all four of these claims without prejudice. While Angeliina has not established the applicable statute of limitations for her claims, the claims clearly stem from Angeliina's child custody battle with Jonathan. This court lacks an adequate record of the child custody litigation because the litigation occurred in Anderson County. From the assertions of Jonathan's counsel (which were not disputed by Angeliina), the Anderson County District Court modified its child custody order in 2023 and 2024. The Leavenworth County district court's dismissal without prejudice was entered in May 2025. We must examine each claim to determine whether a refiling would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
1. Void Judgment
A claim that a judgment is void for lack of due process may be raised at any time.
Miller v. Glacier Development Co., 293 Kan. 665, 672, 270 P.3d 1065 (2011). A judgment is void, and a nullity, if a court lacked jurisdiction to render it or acted inconsistent with due process. In re Adoption of A.A.T., 287 Kan. 590, 598, 196 P.3d 1180 (2008). But even though the judgment may be challenged at any time, the party asserting that a judgment is void must bring the challenge in an appropriate procedural vehicle. State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, 905, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013).
The United States Supreme Court has recently interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to apply the "reasonable time" requirement to claims alleging that a judgment is void. See Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, Trustee, 607 U.S. 155, 162, 146 S. Ct. 579, 223 L. Ed. 2d 438 (2026). But the Kansas Supreme Court has not yet overturned long-standing precedent interpreting "reasonable time" within the context of K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) to mean any time. In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 58 (1997). While Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b) may have nearly identical language to K.S.A. 60-260(b), federal law interpreting a federal provision does not govern Kansas courts' interpretation of a Kansas provision. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520
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U.S. 911, 916, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 138 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1997) ("Neither this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State."). This court is bound to apply Kansas Supreme Court precedent absent some indication the court is departing from that precedent. Swope Lees Commercial Real Estate, LLC v. Slaten, 66 Kan. App. 2d 231, 239, 580 P.3d 1255 (2025). Accordingly, Angeliina would not be barred by any time limitation to refile a claim seeking to set aside a custody order on the basis it was imposed by a court without jurisdiction or imposed in violation of due process.
2. Due Process and Interference
It is difficult to characterize Angeliina's due process claim against Jonathan.
Though she responded to Jonathan's motion to dismiss, the response is not particularly helpful. She appears to challenge his deprivation of her constitutional right to parent without due process. It is a fundamental rule of constitutional law that due process protects individuals from government conduct, not the conduct of other individuals. Prager v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 271 Kan. 1, 40, 20 P.3d 39 (2001). An aggrieved party may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of constitutional rights by an individual acting under color of law. Moss v. Mamalis, 36 Kan. App. 2d 151, 161, 138 P.3d 380 (2006). But Angeliina does not explain how Jonathan's deprivation or interference with her constitutional right to parent her child was done under the authority of law, except in bringing motions to modify child support. Any violation of Angeliina's right to due process during the child custody determination renders the subsequent order void and challengeable at any time, but the process of obtaining a custody determination in court undermines a separate claim for a due process violation by Jonathan. See In re A.A.-F., No. 117,368, 2017 WL 6625230, at *10 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) (discussing basic due process requirements to protect constitutional right to parent).
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Kansas does not appear to recognize an independent tort claim for interference with parental rights. But to the extent such a claim exists, Angeliina's sole factual predicate for the claim appears to be Jonathan's motions for custody and parenting modifications through the Anderson County District Court. Her second and third claims—that Jonathan violated her due process rights by taking away her child, and that he interfered with her right to parent her child—therefore, appear indistinguishable from her first claim, which is that the Anderson County District Court's judgment was void for violating her due process rights. Regardless, any claim she might have regarding a violation of her due process rights in the custody case is challengeable at any time as noted above.
3. Equal Protection and ADA Claims
Finally, Angeliina claimed Jonathan violated her constitutional right to equal protection and violated her rights under the ADA by discriminating against her because of her disability. Again, though the claim is not clearly articulated, the claim appears to be related to the child custody dispute and Jonathan's allegations regarding her disability as a basis to restrict parenting time.
A challenge to the Anderson County District Court's judgment based on an equal protection violation would not necessarily render the judgment void, but Angeliina still could still presumably challenge the Anderson County judgment as a violation of her equal protection rights under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6). Seeking to set aside a judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6) is subject to the "reasonable time" restriction of K.S.A. 60-260(c). "The reasonable time frame is measured by determining when the movant came into possession of facts justifying the relief as compared to the time when he [or she] filed the motion seeking the relief." Wilson v. Wilson, 16 Kan. App. 2d 651, 659, 827 P.2d 788 (1992).
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What constitutes a reasonable time to file a motion to set aside a judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b) is a determination left to the discretion of the district court upon consideration of several factors, including the court's interest in finality, the reasons for the delay, the ability of the litigant to learn of the grounds for setting aside the judgment, and prejudice to the parties. In re Marriage of Larson, 257 Kan. 456, 464, 894 P.2d 809 (1995). In a situation like this where the litigant has sought to challenge a judgment, arguably within a reasonable amount of time, the dismissal of the action because it was filed in the wrong court should not factor into the delay considered by the district court on refiling.
B. Conclusion on Appellate Jurisdiction
As examined here, Angeliina has not demonstrated that any of her claims would be procedurally barred if she attempted to refile them. Consequently, King is distinguishable. In this case, Angeliina has not shown that any of her dismissed claims would be barred by the applicable statutes of limitation on refiling. As a result, the district court's dismissal of the claims without prejudice did not constitute a final appealable order, and so, our court did not obtain appellate jurisdiction over this appeal. We must dismiss it.
We note, though, that the district court dismissed Angeliina's claims based on its stated lack of a different type of jurisdiction—that is, subject matter jurisdiction. We briefly address this type of power to hear a case next without reaching the merits of the district court's decision, as our conclusion that the appellate court currently lacks appellate jurisdiction remains undisturbed.
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II. Subject matter jurisdiction and venue transfer option
As explained above, one of the district court's reasons for dismissing Angeliina's petition was that it concluded it lacked the authority to serve as a reviewing court of another district court in the state. The court reasoned, "Plaintiff fails to provide the court with any legal authority to convince this court that it has any jurisdiction over the Anderson County Court Order or any child involved in this dispute. The district courts do not operate as appellate courts regarding the decisions made in other district courts." (Emphasis added.) This was but one reason the district court dismissed Angeliina's case. We note that Jonathan only sought dismissal on two bases—that is, that the Leavenworth County court lacked jurisdiction over the claims and that the Anderson County court had already decided her claims, so they were barred by res judicata. No party requested a change in venue.
K.S.A. 60-611 addresses the venue—that is, the location—where an action is filed:
"If an action is commenced in good faith and a subsequent timely objection to venue is sustained, or if before trial on the merit commences, it is found that no cause of action exists in favor of or against a party upon whom venue was dependent, the action shall be transferred to a court of proper jurisdiction of any county of proper venue. If there is more than one such county, the transfer shall be to the court of a county selected by the plaintiff. In accordance with K.S.A. 60-2001 and amendments thereto, the receiving district court shall require the payment of an appropriate docket fee from the movant." K.S.A. 60-611.
Based on a plain reading of this statute, a district court must transfer a case to a different venue when one of two circumstances is present: (1) a party lodges a timely objection to venue, or (2) no cause of action exists with respect to a party upon whom venue was dependent. If venue is improper, the remedy is to transfer the action to a court
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of proper venue, not to dismiss the case. Dollison v. Osborne County, 241 Kan. 374, 379, 737 P.2d 43 (1987) (holding that dismissal for forum non conveniens was no longer appropriate after statutory enactment directing transfer); Lee-Thornton v. Ogunmeno, No. 119,290, 2019 WL 2147725, at *3 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion).
But we see an important distinction between this case and other cases which require a case to be transferred to the proper venue instead of dismissal. The plain language of K.S.A. 60-611 only requires the district court to transfer the case to the appropriate venue when the requisite circumstances are present, and the first requirement is clearly not met in this case. No party objected on the grounds of venue, even though Jonathan argued that Angeliina was improperly attempting to collaterally attack a judgment from Anderson County, which he framed as a jurisdictional argument. Given that there was no venue objection, there was no attendant requirement for the district court to transfer the case.
While we find no error in the district court's failure to transfer the case to Anderson County instead of dismissing it without prejudice, we also acknowledge a transfer may have been a more judicially economic course of action, particularly where the discussion of the proceedings in the other county were so prevalent in the parties' filings. The Anderson County District Court possesses continuing jurisdiction over issues related to child custody. In re Marriage of Schoby, 269 Kan. 114, 121, 4 P.3d 604 (2000) ("'A district court has continuing jurisdiction to change or modify an order made in a divorce action concerning the custody and support of minor children when the facts and circumstances made modification proper."). We make no predictions on the merits of Angeliina's request to declare the current child custody order void because the Anderson County District Court violated her due process, but the claim is properly assessed by the district court who entered that order (or by an appellate court after a proper appeal). The other issues appear to relate to Angeliina's and Jonathan's interactions regarding their minor child. Because the Anderson County District Court retains continuing jurisdiction
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over child custody issues, these arguments are also best addressed by the Anderson County District Court.
In Johnson v. Zmuda, 59 Kan. App. 2d 360, 365, 481 P.3d 180 (2021), a panel of this court considered whether a habeas corpus action filed in the wrong district court should be dismissed or transferred to the correct district court. The State contended that K.S.A. 60-1501 established a specific filing venue. This court concluded that the venue requirements of K.S.A. 60-1501 are not inconsistent with the transfer authority of K.S.A. 60-611. 59 Kan. App. 2d 365-66.
Although Johnson did not specifically address the requirements of K.S.A. 60-611 in its analysis—including the requirement of an objection to venue—K.S.A. 60-1501 required the habeas corpus petition to be filed in the district court of the county in which the petitioner was held. This reasoning is not precisely analogous to the present case because a statutory venue requirement is not analogous to the continuing jurisdiction of a court with pending litigation. Nevertheless, the State's argument in Johnson touched on the fact that the venue requirement was not dependent on a specific party but on the location of the petitioner's confinement.
A reasonable expansion of the reasoning in Johnson suggests that, when an action is filed in a court without jurisdiction because of continuing jurisdiction in a sister jurisdiction, the proper remedy is to transfer venue to the court with continuing jurisdiction. That court can then more properly determine whether the claims have legal merit because the court is well-versed in the litigation history between the parties. Again, we find no error but suggest that, upon our dismissal of this appeal, the district court consider this option.
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II. Did the district court err in requiring Angeliina to pay Jonathan's attorney fees as a sanction under K.S.A. 60-211?
Our final issue to address is the sanction lodged against Angeliina. Although she does not brief a separate challenge to the fee award, she makes several "arguments" regarding the imposition of fees: (1) the court failed to consider her poverty affidavit before entering sanctions; (2) she was harmed by the dismissal of her claims without adequate process by the imposition of fees exceeding 80% of her income; (3) the court violated her procedural rights by imposing sanctions; and (4) the court issued sanctions in retaliation for Angeliina exercising her legal right to appeal.
As a threshold matter, we must again examine our jurisdiction to consider Angeliina's challenges to the fee sanctions. As already stated, an appellate court has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative. See Wiechman, 304 Kan. at 84-85. The question posed regarding the attorney fee award is whether a court lacking jurisdiction over—or power to consider—the substantive claims on appeal may exercise jurisdiction to review a district court's imposition of sanctions. The answer to that question is yes—an award of attorney fees is an independent inquiry. See Tharrett v. Everett, 321 Kan. 90, 96, 573 P.3d 680 (2025) (acquiescence in judgment rendered appeal moot but court must consider request for attorney fees independently); Gould v. Crawley, 65 Kan. App. 2d 814, 844-45, 573 P.3d 701 (2025) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 394-95, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 [1990], for the proposition that a dismissal of all substantive claims does not divest a court of jurisdiction to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11); Hernandez v. Pistotnik, 60 Kan. App. 2d 393, 407, 494 P.3d 203 (2021). Although we have found we lack jurisdiction to consider the district court's judgment and offer no opinion on the merits of Angeliina's claims, we may consider the propriety of the sanction order.
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All of the arguments Angeliina raises in this appeal were raised in her motions in opposition to attorney fees in one form or another. So, the issues are properly preserved for our review.
On appeal, Angeliina's primary argument appears to be that the district court failed to consider her poverty affidavit before imposing sanctions, and imposed a sanction exceeding 80% of her income, suggesting that a district court must consider a party's financial situation before imposing sanctions. While she cites no authority to support her contention, some grounds do exist for such an argument. Although no specific language in K.S.A. 60-211—the basis for the sanction—requires a court to consider the financial situation of a party who violates the filing prohibitions, appellate courts have required a district court to consider several factors, including what amount—given the financial resources of the responsible person—is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case. See Wood v. Groh, 269 Kan. 420, 431, 7 P.3d 1163 (2000) (identifying nine factors courts should consider when determining whether to sanction a party and what kind of sanction to impose); In re Marriage of Bergmann & Sokol, 49 Kan. App. 2d 45, 50-51, 305 P.3d 664 (2013) (finding that the district court's failure to consider the nine Wood factors alone was not an abuse of discretion since the requirements of K.S.A. 60- 211 were satisfied). And some federal courts have explicitly listed a party's ability to pay as a consideration in awarding attorney fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See King v. Fleming, 899 F.3d 1140, 1155 (10th Cir. 2018); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990). Kansas appellate courts have routinely relied on federal precedent applying Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11 when interpreting K.S.A. 60-211 because the statute was patterned from the federal rule. Back-Wenzel v. Williams, 279 Kan. 346, 349, 109 P.3d 1194 (2005); Kimmi v. Hollister, No. 109,582, 2014 WL 1096831, at *5 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion).
Although the district court addressed factors related to the reasonableness of the attorney fee request, it does not appear to have addressed the factors related to the
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propriety of sanctions and the amount of sanctions imposed under the Wood factors. The failure to explicitly address the Wood factors does not itself constitute reversible error if the record establishes that the court considered all the relevant evidence in the record when awarding sanctions. However, the record before us does not demonstrate that the district court considered the Wood factors in its sanctions decision.
Besides, the district court imposed the sanctions on Angeliina by finding her filings violated K.S.A. 60-211(b)(2) and (3)—that is, that her claims were frivolous and her factual contentions lacked evidentiary support. On the record presented, we are unable to determine as much, and as already explained, we lack jurisdiction over the merits of her claims and make no prediction as to the sufficiency of those claims.
Given that we are dismissing Angeliina's appeal and cannot discern the merits of her claims without appellate jurisdiction to do so, we reverse the district court's order awarding attorney fees and costs to Jonathan as a sanction against Angeliina and remand this case for further proceedings.
Reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded with directions to consider the Wood factors.