OPINION
FABE, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
These consolidated appeals raise the issue of whether the Fairbanks North Star Borough’s decision to require successful bidders on a construction project to enter into a project labor agreement with local labor unions violated the Alaska Constitution and the borough’s procurement code. The superior court struck one provision of the agreement and enjoined enforcement of another under the state constitution, but upheld the remainder. We affirm in part and reverse in part, holding that no portion of the agreement violates the state constitution or the borough’s procurement code.
[427]*427II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 1993 the Fairbanks North Star Borough (Borough) decided to renovate Lathrop High School (Lathrop High Project). The $20 million project in downtown Fairbanks, funded in part by an $8.6 million bond issue approved by Borough voters and in part by grants from the state, was the largest construction project ever undertaken by the Borough. The schedule for the project required that contractors complete a certain amount of work by the end of the summer of 1996, continue work during the school year without disrupting classes for about 1,400 students, and complete the project in the summer of 1997.
Before starting the bidding process, the Borough mayor, James Sampson, approached the Fairbanks Building and Construction Trades Council (Trades Council), an organization representing fourteen local craft unions, to investigate the possibility of a project labor agreement1 (PLA) for the Lathrop High Project and another school project. After negotiations, the mayor and the Trades Council produced a PLA to be entered into by the unions and the successful bidders on the project. The Borough Assembly approved a resolution to “support[] the Borough Mayor in his use of a project labor agreement on [the] Lathrop High [Project],” 2 and the mayor issued an “Executive [428]*428Order” authorizing the inclusion of the PLA as a bid specification in the Lathrop High Project. The bid specification provided:
The CONTRACTOR shall sign and comply with all terms and conditions of the Project Labor Agreement. The CONTRACTOR shall sign and return the Project Labor Agreement within ten (10) calendar days after receipt of Notice of Award. CONTRACTOR shall assure that all subcontractors also sign the Project Labor Agreement prior to their employment on the project and comply with all of its terms and conditions for the duration of the project.
Under the PLA, contractors retained their rights to “direct the working force” and control construction but recognized “the Unions as the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives with respect to rates of pay, hours and other conditions of employment.” The PLA required the employer to be bound by the “job referral systems” contained in the “master agreements” between the particular unions and union employers (Hiring Hall Provision). The PLA stated that the
selection of applicants for referral to jobs shall be on a non-diseriminatory basis and in accordance with the President’s Executive Order 11246 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and shall not be based on, or in any way affected by, union membership, or the lack thereof.3
The PLA further stated that these “job referral systems must be operated in accordance with federal and state law and the conditions set forth in the [PLA].” The employer retained the right under the PLA and the master agreements to reject any job applicant referred by the union upon “written notification or cause.”
Employees under the PLA were required to become members in good standing in the respective Unions within eight (8) days following the beginning of their employment or the effective date of this Agreement, whichever is later. Good standing shall be defined as the tendering of periodic dues and fees as uniformly required by the Unions.
The PLA also established grievance procedures, wages, hours, and working conditions and required employers to “make contributions to the established fringe benefit funds in the amounts designated by the appropriate Local Union” (Fringe Benefits Provision). The PLA eliminated shift differentials, double pay on Sundays, premium pay, and some paid holidays. It also permitted flexible scheduling. Finally, the PLA provided that there would “be no strikes, picketing, work stoppages, slowdowns or other disruptive activity against signatory contractors” during the term of the PLA.
The Borough issued its invitation for bids, including the specification requiring successful bidders to sign the PLA, on March 7, 1996. On April 1,1996, Deborah Lampión et al. (collectively, Lampión), a group of nonunion employees, taxpayers, and employers, filed a complaint against the Borough. The complaint alleged that the Borough’s inclusion of the PLA bid specification violated the Alaska and United States Constitutions, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and Borough and state procurement law. Along with the complaint, Lamp-ión filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a consolidated trial on the preliminary injunction and the merits.
The superior court scheduled a hearing for April 5, 1996. Before the hearing, the Borough filed a notice of removal to federal court, and Laborers Local 942 and the Trades Council (collectively, Unions) filed motions to intervene. After considering Lampkin’s amended complaint eliminating all claims under federal law, the federal district court granted Lampkin’s motion to remand to state superior court on April 11, schedul[429]*429ing certification to state court for April 25 so as to retain jurisdiction over the Borough’s motion for reconsideration.
Upon oral notification of the remand on April 12, the superior court granted Lamp-kin’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a combined hearing on the preliminary injunction and the merits, setting the hearing for April 17. The Borough objected to the court’s decision to grant a trial on the merits with only five days’ notice and without giving it a chance to oppose the request. It also objected to Lampkin’s failure to join the unions that had signed the PLA.
The federal court denied the Borough’s motion for reconsideration and issued an order transferring jurisdiction to the state court on April 16. The state court received this order on the morning of the one-day combined trial and hearing on the preliminary injunction. At the beginning of this proceeding, the Unions notified the trial court of their pending motions to intervene. The superior court denied the motions and proceeded with the trial.
The superior court entered its decision on April 22, 1996, holding that the “restrictive hiring hall” provisions of the PLA “violate[d] the equal protection rights of non-union workers in the construction field.” It also ruled that the PLA’s requirement that workers contribute “to separate pension funds which contain onerous vesting requirements impermissibly requires the non-union workers to fund programs which are of no benefit to either the Borough or the affected workers.” As a remedy, the superior court ordered that the PLA “be modified to clarify the fact that any contractors working on the Lathrop High School Remodeling Project may hire workers from either union or nonunion sources” and that the Borough not enforce the portion of the PLA requiring payments into pension programs. The court then concluded that the modified PLA complied with the procurement provisions of state and Borough law.
The Borough moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s finding that the state procurement code applied to the project. The trial court issued an order stating that the state procurement code “does not likely cover the Lathrop High School project” but declined to issue final judgment on this issue without “more specific evidence as to exactly what the sources of funds were for the La-throp project.” Finally, the superior court, finding that both parties prevailed on a main issue, denied motions by both parties for attorney’s fees and costs.
The Borough appeals the superior court’s order striking the Hiring Hall Provision from the PLA. The Unions appeal the superior court’s denial of their motion to intervene and the court’s order striking the requirement that employers contribute to union pension funds. Lampkin cross-appeals the superior court’s ruling that the PLA as modified by the court’s order did not violate state or Borough law and the court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Borough’s Action Did Not Violate the Equal Protection Rights of Nonunion Workers.4
The Borough challenges the superior court’s ruling that the PLA violated “the equal protection rights of non-union workers in the construction field.” The superior court reasoned that while the Borough had important and legitimate reasons to require the successful bidder to sign the PLA, the “nexus between this requirement and the Borough’s important reasons” was not sufficient to justify infringing the right of nonunion construction workers “to work in the construction industry.”
Analysis of claims under the equal protection clause embodied in article 1, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution requires a sliding scale approach that often affords greater protection to individual rights than that provided by the federal constitution. See State, Dep’t of Transp. & Labor v. En-[430]*430serch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 631 (Alaska 1989). Under this approach,
we first determine the importance of the individual interest impaired by the challenged enactment. We then examine the importance of the state interest underlying the enactment, that is, the purpose of the enactment. Depending upon the importance of the individual interest, the equal protection clause requires that the state’s interest fall somewhere on a continuum from mere legitimacy to a compelling interest. Finally, we examine the nexus between the state interest and the state’s means of furthering that interest. Again depending upon the importance of the individual interest, the equal protection clause requires that the nexus fall somewhere on a continuum from substantial relationship to least restrictive means.
Id. at 631-32 (citing Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984)). In Enserch, we held that “the right to engage in economic endeavor” is an important right that the government may impair only if its interest in taking the challenged action is important and the nexus between the action and the interest it serves is close.5 See id. at 633.
We are aware of only one published opinion addressing the equal protection implications of a project labor agreement. In that opinion, an Ohio appellate court ruled that a project labor agreement very similar to that at issue here did not discriminate on the basis of union affiliation. See State ex rel. Associated Builders & Contractors, Cent. Ohio Chapter v. Jefferson County Bd. of Comm’rs, 106 Ohio App.3d 176, 665 N.E.2d 723, 726 (1995). However, the superior court found in this case that the “union referral systems which the contractor must use exclusively are most assuredly affected by union membership or the lack thereof.”6 Although the parties discuss at length whether the PLA discriminates against non-union workers, we conclude that we need not address this question. Instead, for the purpose of our analysis, we assume that the PLA impairs the right of non-union workers to engage in an economic endeavor. Therefore, we proceed, as we did in Enserch, to determine whether the Borough’s interest in requiring successful bidders to sign the PLA was important and whether the nexus between that interest and the PLA was close.7
In his executive order directing the use of the PLA, Mayor Sampson identified several interests that he believed the PLA would advance. These included the benefits to the Borough of being able to “negotiate and secure, prior to the bidding process, meaningful labor concessions.” He further relied on the Borough’s interest in “ensuring] the ready and adequate supply of highly trained and skilled craft workers, labor stability, timely and efficient completion of the project, and uniform grievance procedures.”8 The [431]*431Borough Assembly also cited these advantages in adopting its resolution supporting the use of the PLA.
We think it clear that the Borough, in undertaking the largest and most complex construction project in its history, a project involving a school with more than 1,400 students located in downtown Fairbanks, had a significant interest in assuring that the project would be completed on schedule and within budget. Indeed, such goals are at the heart of the effective management of a construction project, whether the owner of the project is a private party or a public entity acting in a proprietary capacity. See Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 282, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 122 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993) (Boston Harbor) (noting that the “legitimate” incentives “to ensure an efficient project that would be completed as quickly and effectively as possible at the lowest cost” are identical whether the project owner is public or private). The Borough’s failure to achieve these goals would affect not just the interests of one narrow portion of the Borough but would harm all residents, especially students at the high school and Borough taxpayers. Therefore, we agree with the superior court that the Borough’s interests in using the PLA were “important” for the purpose of equal protection analysis.
Furthermore, we conclude that the nexus between those interests and the challenged PLA satisfies the demands of equal protection. First, the terms of the PLA demonstrate its close relationship to the special requirements of the Lathrop High Project, especially the need to perform construction with as little disruption of classes as possible. The PLA standardized and reduced the number of holidays, allowed for flexible work weeks and starting times, and assured that the project would not be slowed or halted by strikes or other labor disturbances. It lowered the cost of the project’s tight scheduling requirements by eliminating travel pay, shift differentials, weekend overtime pay, paid holidays, and premium pay for special duties. Finally, as the superior court noted, the PLA promoted labor stability and implemented uniform grievance procedures on the large and complex project.9
Moreover, the Borough’s use of the PLA is supported by a long history of project labor agreements in both public and private construction, including projects such as federal hydroelectric dams and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Keeping the Government Out of the Way: Project Labor Agreements Under the Supreme Court’s Boston Harbor Decision, 12 Lab. Law. 69, 69-70 (1996); see also George Harms Constr. Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 644 A.2d 76, 95 (1994) (listing projects using project labor agreements). This history provides compelling evidence of the usefulness of these agreements in achieving the Borough’s objectives.
Finally, federal law expressly recognizes the effectiveness of project labor agreements in accomplishing the goals of construction project owners. Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1959 specifically to allow private employers in the construction industry to enter into this type of agreement, including provisions for union recognition, compulsory union dues or equivalents, and mandatory use of union hiring halls. See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 230, 113 S.Ct. at 1197. The United States Supreme Court, in rejecting a challenge to project labor agreements under the NLRA, has also unanimously endorsed them as an effective tool for public owner-developers in dealing with conditions in the construction industry. See id. at 230-33, 113 S.Ct. at 1197-99; see also George Harms, 644 A.2d at 95 (noting that project labor agreements “serve important purposes on major long-term construction projects”).
Given the relationship between the terms of the PLA and the special requirements of the Lathrop High Project, the established use of project labor agreements in the construction industry, and the express endorse[432]*432ment of these agreements by Congress and the Supreme Court, we determine that the nexus between the PLA and the Borough’s important interests is “close.” Therefore, we hold that even if the PLA impairs the right of non-union workers to engage in an economic endeavor, it does not violate then-equal protection rights under the Alaska Constitution.10
B. The Borough’s Action Did Not Violate the Borough’s Procurement Code.11
In defending the superior court’s decision to strike the Hiring Hall Provision and in arguing on cross-appeal that the court should have declared the PLA as a whole invalid, Lampkin contends that the Borough’s use of the PLA violates its procurement code.12 She specifically relies on the procurement code provisions enunciating the policy of “maximum practicable competition” and dealing with “sole source procurement.”13 The Borough responds that its procurement code provides sufficient discretion to allow it to include the bid specification at issue so as to “ensure legitimate, reasonable proprietary goals,” even if the specification affects competition. It rejects Lamp-kin’s claim that the Borough, before adopting the bid specification, “was required to establish: (1) that the PLA specifications promoted overall economy for the purposes intended; (2) that the PLA encouraged maximum free and open competition satisfying the Bor[433]*433ough’s minimum needs; and (3) that the PLA was not unduly restrictive.”
Resolution of this issue requires careful analysis of the Borough procurement code’s language. First, however, it is instructive to examine the decisions of other courts that have addressed the validity of project labor agreements under state procurement codes. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that such agreements “are neither absolutely prohibited nor absolutely permitted in public construction contracts” under the state’s procurement code. New York State Chapter, Inc. v. New York State Thruway Auth., 88 N.Y.2d 56, 643 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482, 666 N.E.2d 185, 187 (1996) (New York State Thruway). The court stated that a “PLA will be sustained for a particular project where the record supporting the determination to enter into such an agreement establishes that the PLA was justified by the interests underlying the competitive bidding laws.” Id. 643 N.Y.S.2d at 482-83, 666 N.E.2d at 187-88.
In that ease the court considered project labor agreements associated with two projects, one a four-year project to improve the Tappan Zee Bridge and the other a five-year project to modernize the facilities of a cancer institute. See id. at 485, 487, 666 N.E.2d at 190, 192. The agency in charge of the bridge project “determined that efficiency in completing the project, once commenced, is important to protect a major revenue-producing asset, maximize public safety, and minimize inconvenience to the traveling public.” Id. at 485, 666 N.E.2d at 190. A prior project on the bridge had been subject to a labor dispute, and the bridge had been picketed. See id. After a consultant estimated in a “detailed report” that a PLA would result in labor saving of at least $6 million, the state agency negotiated and signed a project labor agreement. Id. at 486, 666 N.E.2d at 191. The court of appeals held that the PLA for the bridge project did not violate state procurement laws because it was “directly tied to competitive bidding goals.” Id. It stated:
The Thruway Authority’s detailed focus on the public fisc — both cost savings and uninterrupted revenues — the demonstrated unique challenges posed by the size and complexity of the project, and the cited labor history collectively support the determination that this PLA was adopted in conformity with the competitive bidding statutes.
Id.
The court then turned to the project labor agreement for the cancer institute project. The court held that the PLA was not “consistent with the principles underlying the competitive bidding statutes.” Id. at 488, 666 N.E.2d at 193. It determined that the responsible agency failed to show any “cost savings ... or any unique feature of the project which necessitated a PLA,” and that the agency “had already let up to six contracts through competitive bidding on the project with no evidence of reduced efficiencies.” Id. The court stated that a “[p]ost hoc rationalization ... cannot substitute for a showing that, prior to deciding in favor of a PLA, the agency considered the goals of competitive bidding.” Id. The crux of the court’s concern was that the agency show “something more” than a generalized “desire for labor stability so that the work will be completed on time.” Id. at 488-89, 666 N.E.2d at 193-94.
The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a PLA was invalid under the state procurement laws in George Harms Construction Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 137 N.J. 8, 644 A.2d 76 (1994). George Harms involved a project to widen the New Jersey Turnpike. Id. 644 A.2d at 79. The plaintiff contractor submitted the lowest bid on the project, and a week later the agency in charge of the project adopted a resolution to require “as a condition of all contracts” that successful bidders “enter into project labor agreements with the appropriate affiliated locals of the Building and Construction Trades Council of the AFL-CIO of the State of New Jersey.” Id. In concluding that this PLA requirement was invalid, the court considered the policy underlying the procurement code, focusing on three factors: (1) the “unfettered competition” fostered as “[t]he paramount policy of [the state’s] pub-lie-bidding laws”; (2) its concern that the legislature had not addressed the policy issues implicated by the agreement; and (3) its interpretation of the agreement as a “sole [434]*434source” contract for construction services. Id. at 95; see also Tormee Constr., Inc. v. Mercer County Improvement Auth., 143 N.J. 143, 669 A.2d 1369 (1995).
Finally, an intermediate appellate court in Ohio upheld a project labor agreement in State ex rel. Associated Builders & Contractors, Central Ohio Chapter v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, 106 Ohio App.3d 176, 665 N.E.2d 723 (1995). The court held that the agreement did not conflict with the purpose of the competitive bidding statutes, which it stated was “to enable a public contracting authority to obtain the best work at the lowest possible price while guarding against favoritism and fraud.” Id. 665 N.E.2d at 727.
In considering the application of these precedents, we first turn to the interests underlying the procurement code at issue. The Borough’s code states that its purpose “is to provide for the fair and equitable treatment of all persons involved in public purchasing by the borough, to maximize the purchasing value of public funds in the procurement, and to provide safeguards for maintaining a procurement system of quality and integrity.” FNSB 16.21.010 (1993). The code further enunciates a “policy” of “maximum practicable competition,” providing that “[a]ll specifications shall be drafted so as to promote overall economy for the purposes intended and encourage maximum free and open competition in satisfying the borough’s minimum needs, and shall not be unduly restrictive.”14 FNSB 16.35.010.
While we have never addressed the interests underlying the Borough’s procurement eode, we have stated generally that the purposes of competitive bidding are
to prevent fraud, collusion, favoritism, and improvidence in the administration of public business, as well as to insure that the [state] receives the best work or supplies at the most reasonable prices practicable.
... [T]he requirement of public bidding is for the benefit of property holders and taxpayers, and not for the benefit of the bidders; and such requirements should be construed with the primary purpose of best advancing the public interest.
McBirney & Assocs. v. State, 753 P.2d 1132, 1135-36 (Alaska 1988) (quoting Gostovich v. City of West Richland, 75 Wash.2d 583, 452 P.2d 737, 740 (1969)). In light of these principles, we are not persuaded that this case calls for the highly restrictive approach applied to project labor agreements by the New Jersey Supreme Court.15
First, although the Borough’s procurement code states the policy objective that specifications should be written so as to encourage “maximum practicable competition,” this policy does not require the “unfettered competition” that the George Harms court found required by the procurement code at issue there. 644 A.2d at 95. Indeed, close textual analysis of the procurement code reveals that “encouraging] maximum free and open competition” must be balanced against “satisfying the borough’s minimum needs.” FNSB 16.35.010. In this case, as discussed above, the Borough’s minimum needs included performance of the school construction with as little disruption of classes as possible, flexible scheduling, and elimination of the potential for strikes.16 Considered in the context of [435]*435such “minimum needs,” the PLA is not an “unduly restrictive” specification.
Furthermore, contrary to the determination of the George Harms court, we do not believe that the use of the PLA amounts to sole source procurement. See 644 A.2d at 95. The provision of the procurement code governing sole source procurement is implicated only when a contract is “awarded without competition.” FNSB 16.80.040. Even assuming that the PLA affected competition as Lampión asserts, it cannot be construed as limiting bidding to any particular contractor. See New York State Thruway, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 486, 666 N.E.2d at 191 (stating that “[t]he fact that certain nonunion contractors may be disinclined to submit bids does not amount to the preclusion of competition”). Indeed, the record indicates that an invitation to bid on another Borough project that included a project labor agreement drew an above-average number of bidders.
Rather, we conclude that the correct approach to this issue is that taken by the New York and Ohio courts, as modified by the deferential standard appropriate to a review of the Borough’s own interpretation of its procurement code. Thus, the question in this case is whether the Borough had a reasonable basis to determine that the PLA furthered the interests underlying the Borough’s procurement code. After reviewing the record, we hold that it did.17 The project unquestionably presented special challenges to the Borough. Located in downtown Fairbanks, the Lathrop High Project was the biggest construction project ever undertaken by the Borough. Furthermore, the project required flexible scheduling so that construction would not interfere with classes. As discussed above, the PLA helped the Borough to meet these challenges by allowing for flexibility in scheduling, assuring that such scheduling would add as little as possible to the cost of the project, and eliminating the potential for strikes or other labor difficulties. Collectively, these considerations support the determination by both Mayor Sampson and the Borough Assembly, made prior to the adoption of the PLA bid specification, that the use of the PLA accorded with the objectives of the procurement code. Specifically, the Borough had a reasonable basis to find that the PLA would operate “to maximize the purchasing value of public funds in the procurement” for the project, while encouraging “maximum free and open competition in satisfying the [B]orough’s minimum needs.”18 FNSB 16.21.010 & 16.35.010.
As even the George Harms court noted in striking down a project labor agreement, the policy choice presented by the use of such agreements is a “close” one. See 644 A.2d at 95. While such an agreement may restrict competition, “the lessened competition may produce other aspects of efficiency.” Id.; see also Libby v. City of Dillingham, 612 P.2d at 45 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (noting that “there are contexts in which a requirement of competitive bidding impedes rather than enhances the efficiency of municipal government”). In this case, both the Borough’s administrative and legislative branches considered the advantages of the PLA for the Lathrop High Project and decided that it would best serve the Borough’s interests.19 [436]*436After examining the Borough’s procurement code and the interests underlying it, we hold that the Borough’s use of a PLA for the Lathrop High Project does not violate the mandates of its procurement code.
C. The PLA Did Not Violate Other Constitutional Rights of Non-union Workers or Contractors.
Lampkin argues on cross-appeal that the Borough violated the equal protection rights of non-union contractors by forcing them “to sign an unwanted, unnegotiated bargaining agreement,” barring them “from utilizing an experienced work force with known qualities,” subjecting them “to unfamiliar work rules,” and binding them by “other alien, undisclosed internal union provisions.” We disagree. The provisions of the PLA apply equally to all contractors on the project, whether union or non-union. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Boston Harbor, when contractors are confronted by a bid specification requiring them to enter a project labor agreement, they “are faced with a choice. They may alter their usual mode of operation to secure the business opportunity at hand, or seek business from purchasers whose perceived needs do not include a project labor agreement.” 507 U.S. at 231, 113 S.Ct. at 1198; see also Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. City of Seward, 966 F.2d 492, 499 (9th Cir.1992) (upholding city’s requirement that contractors bidding on public project sign a labor agreement with a union against a federal equal protection challenge by non-union contractors alleging that the clause constituted state action favoring union contractors). We find no authority for the proposition that nonunion contractors have a constitutionally protected right to be free of such bid specifications. Therefore, we hold that the PLA does not violate the equal protection rights of nonunion contractors.
Lampkin also argues that the superior court erred in its ruling with regard to the Fringe Benefits Provision. The superior court ruled that the PLA could not require employers to make contributions to funds that did not vest during the project. It thus prohibited the enforcement of the requirement that employers contribute to union pension funds, but upheld the requirement that employers contribute to other health and welfare funds. Specifically, Lampkin argues that requiring employers to contribute to any particular fringe benefit fund constitutes an unconstitutional taking under article I, section 18 of the Alaska Constitution.20 The Unions, on the other hand, contend that the trial court erred by modifying the effect of the Fringe Benefits Provision with respect to pension funds.
The first step in analyzing Lampkin’s argument under the takings clause is to identify the property interest at issue. See DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 440 (Alaska 1987). Under AS 36.05.010, all employers, union and non-union, must pay at least the “prevailing wage” on public construction projects. The prevailing wage includes the “basic hourly rate” and fiñnge benefits, 8 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 30.900(16) (1996), which are to be paid “into the appropriate union trust, approved private pension plan, or other approved fringe benefit plan.” 8 AAC 30.900(6)(B).
However, according to Lampkin and testimony at trial, many non-union employers, rather than contributing to health insurance or pension funds, pay fringe benefits directly to employees. She argues that non-union employees therefore have a protected property interest in receiving the fringe benefit portion of their wages as cash rather than as a contribution by the employer to a benefit plan or union trust. This is not correct. Workers on public projects have no right to receive their fringe benefits directly from the employer rather than in the form of employer contributions to approved fringe benefits plans, regardless of whether those plans will [437]*437vest during the project.21 Thus, the PLA’s requirement that employers make such contributions does not affect a protected property interest. Therefore, the Fringe Benefits Provision does not violate the takings clause of the Alaska Constitution, and the superior court erred in modifying it so as not to require employers to contribute to pension funds.
Finally, Lampkin challenges the provision of the PLA requiring all workers under the agreement to pay “periodic dues and fees as uniformly required by the Unions.” She argues that this requirement violated her right under article I, section 6 of the Alaska Constitution22 to be free of “forced association.” As Lampkin points out, the United States Supreme Court has held that unions may not require members to provide funds “for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representatives.” Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236-36, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1800, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). The Court has made clear that unions representing public employees must finance their political expression only “from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.” Id. at 236, 97 S.Ct. at 1800. However, the Court has also established that the government may constitutionally require government employees to pay union dues to support “[t]he tasks of negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agreement and representing the interests of employees in settling disputes and processing grievances.” Id. at 221, 97 S.Ct. at 1792; see also AS 23.40.110(b)(authorizing a public employer to make “an agreement with an organization to require as a condition of employment ... payment by the employee to the exclusive bargaining agent of a service fee to reimburse the exclusive bargaining agent for the expense of representing the members of the bargaining unit”).
We conclude that Lampkin’s argument on this issue fails because she has not established or even clearly alleged that any dues paid under the PLA will be used by the Unions to support political expression. The only testimony on this issue was that of Jay Quakenbush, a union representative. He testified that the political activities of his union are financed by a separate fund created from the voluntary contributions of members, not by union dues. In the absence of any evidence supporting Lampkin’s claim, we refuse to assume that the Unions would exact dues beyond those “necessary to ‘performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.’”23 Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762-63, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 2657, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988) (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1892, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984)).
D. The Superior Court Erred In Denying the Unions’ Motion to Intervene.24
Finally, we consider whether the superior court erred in denying the Unions’ motions [438]*438to intervene. The superior court stated that it denied the motions because it “did not feel that the individual unions were indispensable parties to this declaratory judgment action, nor that their presence was necessary to resolve the issues before it.”
We apply a four-part test to determine whether a motion to intervene as of right should be granted:
(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must show an interest in the subject matter of the action; (3) it must be shown that this interest may be impaired as a consequence of the action; and (4) it must be shown that the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party-
State v. Weidner, 684 P.2d 103, 113 (Alaska 1984). Lampkin argues that the Unions’ .motions to intervene were not timely, that the Unions had no interest in the subject matter of the action, and that the Unions’ interests were adequately represented by the Borough.
We conclude that the Unions’ motions were timely filed. The Unions moved to intervene in federal court approximately one week after the complaint was filed. They brought their motions to the attention of the state superior court on the day that court received the certificate of remand from the federal court. Lampkin’s argument that the Unions should have filed earlier with the state court ignores that fact that the state court apparently did not have jurisdiction of the case prior to receiving the certified copy of the order remanding the case from federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994) (stating that when the federal district court remands to state court “[a] certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court” and the “State court may thereupon proceed with such case”). Indeed, the only reason that the motions to intervene might be considered untimely was the speed with which the trial court conducted the litigation, moving from complaint to trial in little more than two weeks. The quick scheduling of these proceedings, even if timed to accommodate the interests of Lampkin and the Borough, should not be held against the Unions.
We also conclude that the Unions had a direct interest in the subject matter of the action. Lampkin, relying on Weidner, contends that the interest of the Unions was “contingent” and therefore did not justify intervention as of right. In Weidner, we stated that “the requisite interest for intervention as a matter of right must be direct, substantial, and significantly protectable.” 684 P.2d at 113. In that case, we considered a motion to intervene in an action challenging the legality of a land lottery by the winners of the lottery. See id. at 106-07. The superior court had issued an interlocutory order permitting the lottery “to be conducted in the interest of administrative efficiency and convenience, but specifically ordered that no interest or title would vest in the lottery winners pending the outcome of [the] litigation.” Id. at 113. After the lottery, the winners moved to intervene on all counts, and the superior court denied the motion except as to one count. See id. The lottery winners appealed, and we affirmed, holding that the interest of the lottery winners was a “contingent” interest insufficient to justify intervention as of right. Id.
Lampkin is correct that the PLA did not become an executed bargaining agreement until the successful bidder signed it. However, the Unions’ interest in the PLA is broader than merely their contractual right to enforce the terms of the PLA and thus is distinguishable from the interest at issue in Weidner. The lottery winners in Weidner took their interest after the litigation in which they sought to intervene had begun and were thus on notice of the contingent nature of their interest prior to obtaining it. The Unions, on the other hand, participated in negotiating the PLA and were not merely beneficiaries of a challenged administrative process. Their stake in the implementation of the PLA, arising during their negotiation of the PLA and thus prior to Lampkiris challenge, was as direct, substantial, and significantly protectable as the Borough’s. Therefore, the Unions’ interest was sufficient to warrant intervention.
Finally, we determine that this interest was not adequately represented by the [439]*439Borough. As the Unions point out, Lamp-kin’s claim that the interests of the Borough and the Unions were “identical” is inconsistent with the fact that the PLA was a product of negotiations between the two entities. Clearly, the Borough’s interest in preserving the PLA, and hence the concessions on wages, hours, and working conditions it had won, did not coincide with the Unions’ interest in protecting other provisions of the agreement. This divergence in interests is demonstrated by the Borough’s failure to appeal the superior court’s decision to modify the Fringe Benefits Provision, a provision of considerable importance to the Unions on appeal.
Therefore, we hold that the superior court abused its discretion in denying the Unions’ motion to intervene as of right. The court’s ruling unfairly denied the Unions a full opportunity to defend their substantial interest in the PLA.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we conclude that the Borough’s decision to require successful bidders on the Lathrop High Project to sign the PLA did not violate state or Borough law.25 Therefore, we VACATE and REVERSE the superior court’s orders striking the Hiring Hall Provision and modifying the Fringe Benefit Provision and AFFIRM its ruling upholding the rest of the PLA
MATTHEWS, J., dissenting.