OPINION
RABINOWITZ, Justice.
Lazy Mountain Land Club (LMLC), a limited partnership, appeals the denial of a conditional use permit by the Matanuska-Susit-na Board of Adjustment and Appeals. LMLC argues that MSB 17.60, the borough zoning ordinance requiring the permit, is invalid because it was not adopted “in accordance with” or “in order to implement” a validly enacted comprehensive plan as required by AS 29.40.040. Alternatively, LMLC argues both that MSB 17.60 is unconstitutionally vague, and that by its own terms it is not applicable to LMLC’s proposed land use.
I.
FACTS & PROCEEDINGS
Lazy Mountain Land Club owns a 16.9 acre tract of land near the intersection of the Parks Highway and Hyer Road.
This tract is located in the Twinook subdivision of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough (Mat-Su or Borough).
LMLC intends to operate the land as a private commercial refuse area doing business as the Dead Building Cemetery. The facility would function primarily as a disposal site for construction and demolition wastes. According to LMLC, the site was chosen because of its proximity to Anchorage as well as to numerous gravel pits and other sources of construction materials. With a low enough tipping fee it would be an economically viable disposal site for demolition waste from buildings which had been tom down in Anchorage. On their return trip “[tjrucks bringing debris to the new burial site could back-haul sand and gravel to the profitable Anchorage market.”
In July 1989, LMLC applied to the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for the necessary solid waste disposal
permit.
A permit was issued by DEC on June 28, 1990.
LMLC also applied to the Mat-Su Planning Commission for a conditional use permit. Mat>-Su Borough Code (MSB) 17.60.030 (1990) states that a conditional use permit is required for land uses which are “potentially damaging to the property values and usefulness of adjacent properties and/or potentially harmful to the public health, safety and welfare.” The only enumerated land uses for which a permit is required under this section are “junkyards and refuse areas.” MSB 17.60.030(A)(1).
After a public hearing, on November 27, 1989, the Planning Commission issued a resolution denying LMLC’s permit application.
LMLC appealed this decision to the Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals (BOAA).
The BOAA dismissed the appeal, finding that MSB 17.60 was a legal and binding ordinance and that it did not have jurisdiction to pass on the ordinance’s constitutionality.
In December 1990, LMLC reapplied to the Planning Commission for a conditional use permit. With the exception of some minor changes, this application was substantially similar to the application which had been denied in 1989. The 1990 application was in two parts, requesting first that the Commission determine whether LMLC’s proposed use required a permit under MSB 17.60. Second, if the Commission determined that MSB 17.60 was applicable, LMLC requested that the permit be granted. The Planning Commission found that MSB 17.60 was applicable and once again denied LMLC a conditional use permit.
LMLC appealed this decision to the BOAA.
A hearing was held, and this time the BOAA reversed the Planning Commission’s determination.
However, the BOAA determined that approval of the conditional use permit application was subject to the fulfillment of eleven conditions. These conditions were aimed primarily at ensuring that LMLC obtained the necessary state and federal permits, that there would be no groundwater contamination, and that adequate assurance was provided of LMLC’s capability to finance remediation efforts in the event of inadvertent contamination.
The Borough moved for reconsideration of the BOAA decision. After a hearing on the issue, on November 6, 1991, the BOAA reversed its earlier decision and denied the conditional use permit. In its findings of fact, the Board found,
inter alia,
that LMLC had operated the landfill without fulfilling the conditions required by either the DEC permit or the BOAA’s resolution. The BOAA’s Notice of Decision states, “There exists no evidence, on the record, that will substantiate a finding that Lazy Mountain Land Club will operate in a manner that is not harmful to either the public welfare or health. Therefore, ... the conditional use permit can not be granted.”
LMLC filed a notice of appeal to the superior court.
It challenged the validity of
MSB 17.60 due to Mat-Su’s alleged lack of a comprehensive plan, argued that MSB 17.60 was void for vagueness, and argued that MSB 17.60 was not applicable to its proposed land use. The superior court affirmed BOAA’s denial of the conditional use permit, holding for the Borough on all issues except Mat-Su’s claim that laches barred the suit. LMLC now appeals and Mat-Su cross-appeals.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Laches
Initially, we address the Borough’s argument on cross-appeal that LMLC was barred from challenging Mat-Su’s comprehensive plan by laches. Laches prevents a plaintiff from bringing a claim if the defendant can show “(1) that the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in bringing the action, and (2) that this unreasonable delay has caused undue harm or prejudice to the defendant.”
The superior court summarily dismissed the Borough’s defense of laches. The court stated:
The parties have thoroughly briefed the underlying issue, and resolution of the underlying issue by the courts probably will benefit the parties and the public. The court also rejects the borough’s assertions that estoppel and laches should preclude consideration of the underlying issue.
Without addressing the merits of the Borough’s argument regarding LMLC’s delay, we note that we agree with the superior court that a decision on the underlying issues will benefit the parties and the public by determining the validity of the Borough’s planning process. Because we resolve these issues in favor of the Borough, it was not prejudiced by the superior court’s decision that laches did not bar the suit and any error would be harmless.
B. Was
MSB 17.60 Validly Enacted?
LMLC’s primary argument is that MSB 17.60 was not validly enacted because the Borough does not have a comprehensive plan. Alternatively, LMLC argues that even if the Borough’s 1970 plan could be considered a comprehensive plan, this document was adopted by resolution rather than ordinance as required by the enabling statute, and is therefore invalid. Because AS 29.40.040 would seem to require the adoption of a comprehensive development plan prior to the adoption of zoning ordinances, LMLC contends that the adoption of such an ordinance without a validly adopted plan is
ultra vires.
1.
Adoption of a comprehensive plan must precede enactment of zoning
ordinances
The planning and zoning process as enacted by the Alaska Legislature is typical of most state zoning statutes. It envisions a hierarchical process in which the comprehensive plan serves as a “long-range policy guide for development of the [municipality] as a whole.”
The plan is then implemented through zoning decisions.
Additionally, the existence of a comprehensive plan helps to “guard against prejudice, arbitrary decision-making, and improper motives” by providing
substantive standards against which to measure individual zoning decisions.
This vision of land use regulation is evident in Alaska’s statutory language.
The requirement that the municipality adopt a comprehensive plan is found in AS 29.40.030(b), which states that “[w]ith the recommendation of the planning commission,
the assembly shall adopt
by ordinance a comprehensive plan.”
(Emphasis added.) The statute defines a comprehensive plan as
a compilation of policy statements, goals, standards, and maps for guiding the physical, social, and economic development, both private and public, of the first or second class borough, and may include, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) statements of policies, goals and standards;
(2) a land use plan;
(3) a community facilities plan;
(4) a transportation plan; and
(5) recommendations for implementation of the comprehensive plan.
AS 29.40.030(a).
The authority to enact zoning regulations such as MSB 17.60 is found in AS 29.40.040(a), which states:
In accordance with a comprehensive plan
adopted under AS 29.40.030
and in order to implement the plan,
the assembly by ordinance shall adopt ... provisions governing the use and occupancy of land that may include, but are not limited to
(2) land use permit requirements designed to encourage or discourage specified uses ... or to minimize unfavorable effects of uses....
(Emphasis added.) LMLC cites numerous cases in which other state courts interpreted similar statutory language and found that “the adoption of a comprehensive development plan is a necessary prerequisite ... for the adoption of county zoning regulations.”
’ This court has endorsed this view of the relative roles of planning and individual land use decisions in a separate but analogous context — public land management. In
Alaska Survival v. State, Department of Natural
Resources,
we invalidated the classification and disposal of public land for agricultural homesteading because the decision to dispose of the land had preceded the adoption of a regional plan. As we stated in
Alaska Survival:
To interpret these provisions to allow classification and disposal before regional planning defies logic. It makes little sense to require comprehensive regional planning after the relevant land use decisions already have been made....
Mat-Su is correct in pointing out that the public lands planning requirement in AS 38.04.065 is more specific than the municipal planning requirement in reference to the substantive standards which the planners should apply.
However, this in no way alters the “logic” of requiring planning to precede the individual land use decisions.
We therefore hold: (1) that the plain language of AS 29.40.030(b) is mandato
ry and requires that the municipality adopt a comprehensive plan;
(2) that AS 29.40.040 requires that the plan be adopted prior to zoning regulations; and (3) where zoning is enacted prior to the adoption of a comprehensive plan, these statutory sections require that a legal remedy be imposed.
2.
Maf-Su’s comprehensive
plan
LMLC’s next argument challenging the validity of the Borough’s planning process is that the document entitled “The Ma-tanuska-Susitna Borough Comprehensive Development Plan,” adopted by resolution in 1970 (the 1970 plan), along with the other documents which Mat-Su offered as evidence, do not constitute a “comprehensive” plan as required by AS 29.40.030(a).
Mat-Su argues that “[t]he 1970 comprehensive plan is but one element of the plan that, along with the other documents drafted by Mat-Su, encompass the elements of Mat-Su’s comprehensive planning process.” “The other documents” referred to by Mat-Su are catalogued in an affidavit by John Duffy, the Borough Planning Director. These include comprehensive transportation and public facilities plans,
city plans for Houston,
Palmer,
and Wasilla,
as well as numerous other area and facilities plans.
LMLC argues that a “comprehensive plan” must be of “wide scope.” It states that the presence of city plans does not diminish the obligation of the Borough to adopt a single area-wide plan which covers the entire municipality. Without such a plan in place there is no guarantee that city plans will not conflict with each other. Finally, LMLC argues that the single most important part of
the plan, the borough-wide land use plan, was never adopted by ordinance.
As discussed above, AS 29.40.030(a), which defines “comprehensive plan,” states that the plan “may include, but is not limited to,” numerous different elements including,
inter alia,
a statement of policies, a land use plan, and a community facilities plan. Thus, while the Borough is required to adopt a plan, the statute leaves it within the Borough’s discretion what elements to include within that plan. This allows planners to fashion the plan to the needs of the community, which in turn will be affected by such factors as population ' density, topography, and the local economy. In light of these factors, it may make sense, and would be statutorily permissible, to engage in more detailed land use planning of population centers in the borough, while limiting the planning efforts with regard to the entire borough to a statement of policies.
Nor does the fact that the various elements of the plan were adopted in a piecemeal fashion affect our determination as to whether, as a whole, they comprise a comprehensive plan.
While Alaska’s statute is silent on this issue, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, as well as the planning acts of California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Connecticut, all explicitly authorize piecemeal adoption of the comprehensive plan.
Such an approach recognizes the limited budgets of municipal entities, the ongoing nature of the planning process, and the fact that in certain instances different elements of the plan are dependent on each other and therefore that sequential enactment might be desirable.
In light of the broad discretion left to the municipality in the composition of the plan and the substantial evidence in the record regarding the Borough’s planning efforts, we hold that Mat-Su has satisfied the requirement that it enact a comprehensive plan.
3.
The enactment of Mah-Su’s comprehensive plan
LMLC’s final argument regarding the planning process is that the Borough failed to adopt by ordinance the-1970 plan and some of the other documents which it claims comprise the plan. Because the enactment of an ordinance allows the public an opportunity for notice and comment, LMLC contends that the Borough may not rely on “resolutions” to adopt its comprehensive plan.
Alaska Statute 29.25.010 requires that certain acts by a municipality must be done by ordinance.
Among those acts which are enumerated is the adoption, modification or repeal of a municipality’s comprehensive plan.
Alaska Statute 29.25.020 provides detailed procedural requirements which must be followed in the adoption of an ordinance. These include,
inter alia,
that the ordinance be introduced in writing,
that notice of the proposed ordinance be published,
and that a public hearing be held before its adoption at which all interested persons may speak.
Because it must be enacted as an ordinance, the adoption of a comprehensive plan must
satisfy all of the procedural requirements listed in AS 29.25.020.
Mat-Su makes two arguments as to why the court should uphold the validity of the 1970 plan despite the fact it was never adopted as an ordinance. First, it argues that there is a presumption of validity as to all municipal actions and that the burden of proving otherwise is on the person trying to show their invalidity. Because LMLC has not provided any evidence that notice and hearings were not held on the 1970 plan, the court must presume it was validly enacted.
The Borough relies heavily on
Liberati v. Bristol Bay
Borough
for this argument. In
Liberati,
this court applied the presumption of validity and concluded that a public hearing that was noticed was actually held, and therefore that the challenged ordinance was validly enacted. In contrast, in the present case the Borough is trying to use this presumption to metamorphize a resolution into an ordinance. Professor McQuillin notes that the enactment of a resolution generally does not require the same formal procedures which are required to enact an ordinance. Therefore, “a municipal corporation cannot accomplish by resolution ... that which, under its charter, it can do only by an ordinance.”
This distinction is evident in our statutes. The procedural requirements for enacting an ordinance are detailed
supra.
The only requirement with regard to resolutions, on the other hand, is that the governing body maintain a permanent file of all resolutions which have been adopted.
In light of the fact that the 1970 plan was adopted as a resolution rather than an ordinance, and that the Borough presented no evidence that a hearing was held, there is no reason to believe that the requirements of AS 29.25.020 have been met.
Mat-Su’s second argument is that, even assuming that no hearing was held, it “substantially complied” with the requirement that it enact a comprehensive plan. Therefore the act should not be voided due to a minor procedural irregularity. We reject this argument as well. In
State v. First National Bank of Anchorage,*
the principle ease on which Mat-Su relies, the appellant challenged the adequacy of the notice of a proposed regulation. We rejected the appellant’s claim because the contents of the notice “gave members of the public sufficient information to decide whether their interests could be affected by the agency action.”
Similarly, in other jurisdictions where the enactment of zoning ordinances was upheld under a theory of “substantial compliance,” the procedural irregularities can all be characterized as minor.
Where, on the other hand, there is no opportunity for public comment on the plan before enactment because of a failure to hold public hearings, the Borough has not substantially complied with the requirement that it enact the plan by ordinance.
Nonetheless, we believe the 1970 plan was validly enacted when it was incorporated by reference into a later borough ordinance.
MSB 15.24.030(B) states that “[t]he following comprehensive plans have been adopted by the borough planning commission and the assembly as instruments of borough policy: (1) Matanuska-Susitna Borough Comprehensive Development Plan, adopted
1970, as amended....” This section was adopted by ordinance after a public hearing.
Generally, “the adoption by reference of documents in municipal ordinances is valid where the document adopted is sufficiently identified and is made part of the public record.”
In
Raymond v. Baehr,
the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the enactment by reference of a building code despite the fact that the code itself was not published as required by state law. In determining that the code qualified as a public record the Minnesota Supreme Court noted:
While the exact procedure followed by the city council in adopting the code is not clear, it appears ... that the code was drawn by the city engineer and a committee of the council, read to the entire body, and apparently approved. These actions appear to us to be sufficient to qualify it as a public record.
Similarly, the 1970 plan qualifies as a public record. It was drawn up by the Borough Planning Department and was adopted as a resolution by the Borough Assembly. Because the borough’s citizens had an opportunity for comment at a public hearing when MSB 15.24.030(B) was enacted in 1991, we hold that the 1970 plan was adopted by ordinance as required by AS 29.25.010(a)(6).
C. Due Process
LMLC’s next claim is that even assuming it was validly enacted, the definition for “junkyard/refuse area” in MSB 17.60.010(F) is unconstitutionally vague. This section defines a “junkyard/refuse area” as
a location which is commercially used for the purpose of the outdoor storage, handling, dismantling, wrecking, keeping or sale of used, discarded, wrecked or abandoned airplanes, appliances,' vehicles, boats, building and building materials, machinery, equipment, or parts thereof, including but not limited to, scrap metals, wood, lumber, plastic, fiber or other tangible materials.
MSB 17.60.010(F). LMLC argues that this definition encompasses such a wide range of potential land uses that many landowners would be unable to determine whether or not the zoning ordinance applied to them.
To show that the statute has been arbitrarily applied, LMLC points out that no conditional use permit was required for the municipal landfill, a use seemingly indistinguishable from LMLC’s proposal.
The United States Supreme Court long ago recognized, “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.”
First amendment concerns aside,
the U.S. Supreme Court has identified two im
portant due process values which are offended when a law is unconstitutionally vague:
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited_ Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.
In adopting this analytical framework, this court stated that it will examine “three principal considerations in determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague.”
The first, whether the statute “operate[s] to inhibit the exercise of first amendment rights,”
is not applicable to the present case. However, the second, whether the statute gives adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited, and the third, whether there “has been a history or a strong likelihood of uneven application,”
are applicable.
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
that a lower degree of exactitude is required for civil as opposed to criminal statutes. Justice Marshall wrote for the court:
The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates — as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement — depend in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action.
Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its oum inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process.
The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.
In accordance with this view, we have stated that with respect to civil statutes, “[a]ll that should be required is legislative language which is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be given meaning in the adjudication process.”
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that MSB 17.60 is not void for vagueness. First, as to the notice consideration, even a cursory reading of MSB 17.60 makes it clear that the ordinance is applicable to LMLC’s proposed use. In its permit application, LMLC indicated that seventy percent of its waste would be demolition waste including building debris and non-metallic residue from auto salvaging operations. LMLC would also engage in the dismantling of mobile homes at the site. This fits squarely within the definition of a junkyard under MSB 17.60.010(F) as a “location ... used for the purpose of outdoor storage,
handling, dismantling,
wrecking, keeping or sale of used,
discarded, wrecked
or abandoned ...
vehicles,
boats, building and
building materials....”
(Emphasis added.) Additionally, the definition of “junk” in MSB 17.60.010(E) includes
“wrecked auto
mobiles,
tools, implements, rags,
used building materials,
rubber and paper.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Hoffman Estates,
because this statute was economic regulation, and because LMLC could, and did, avail itself of the administrative process to clarify the statute’s applicability, it is clear that LMLC had sufficient notice.
LMLC’s primary contention with regard to vagueness is that MSB 17.60 has been arbitrarily enforced. With regard to this final consideration, this court has stated that it “will not invalidate a statute on vagueness grounds absent evidence of a history of arbitrary or capricious enforcement.”
In other words, the court will, not engage in speculation to find instances where the statute might be arbitrarily applied. Instead it will look to see if there has been a history of arbitrary enforcement or if the language of the statute is “so conflicting and confused”
that arbitrary enforcement is inevitable.
LMLC fails to make such a showing in this case. LMLC provides no evidence that there are other private landfills or other similar land uses which the Borough has not required to obtain a conditional use permit. Nor is the Borough’s failure to require a permit for its public landfill evidence of arbitrary
enforcement,
because, as discussed in the next section, MSB 17.60 only applies to “commercial” junkyards and refuse areas. Because none of the considerations suggests that MSB 17.60 is vague, we conclude that the ordinance is constitutional.
D.
MSB 17.60’s Applicability to LMLC’s Proposed Land Use
LMLC’s final contention is that MSB 17.60 is not applicable to its proposed land use and therefore that no conditional ■use permit is required. LMLC argues that the ordinance by its own terms applies only to salvage operations and not to landfills where discarded materials are buried.
In support of this argument LMLC points to the fact that no conditional use permit was required for the municipal landfill, a use “virtually indistinguishable from” LMLC’s proposed use.
Whether the municipal landfill is required to obtain a conditional use permit depends on whether this use falls within the definition of “junkyard/refuse area” in MSB 17.60.010(F). Because the definition includes only “commercial” locations, the answer turns on the question of whether or not the city landfill is a commercial enterprise.
Resolution of this dispute requires the interpretation and application of MSB 17.60. This court has stated that “[w]hen a planning agency does, in fact, provide its interpretation of an ordinance within its area of expertise, we will give that interpretation considerable deference.”
Although we have not previously defined precisely what standard of review we will use in such cases, we believe that application of the “reasonable basis” test is appropriate.
Under this test, the court “need not find that [the Commission’s] construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result [the court] would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.”
Applying this standard, we conclude that the Planning Commission could reasonably find that the municipal landfill was not “commercial” and therefore that no permit was required.
Such an exception is justified because the operation of the borough landfill is regulated under other sections of the borough code.
Additionally, the under-' lying purpose of the conditional use permit requirement is to allow the Planning Commission to make a case by case determination about the appropriateness of placing a noxious use in a particular area, as well as the necessity of imposing particular conditions in order to mitigate the impact on neighboring property.
Because the Planning Commission can use other planning devices to ensure the appropriate siting of a municipal landfill, and can recommend measures be adopted to regulate the landfill’s operation,
the Commission could reasonably conclude that private and public facilities should be treated differently. Thus, there is no evidence that there is a conflicting contemporaneous construction of the statute by the Planning Commission. In light of the fact that the definition for junkyard in MSB 17.60 clearly encompasses LMLC’s proposed land use, we hold that the Commission could reasonably find that MSB 17.60 applies to LMLC’s proposed land use and therefore that a conditional use permit is required.
III.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the language in AS 29.40.040 requiring that zoning regulations be enacted “in accordance with” or “in order to implement” the comprehensive plan, requires that the Borough’s zoning regulations must be consistent with a validly enacted plan. The Borough has satisfied this requirement because the various documents which the Borough Assembly has adopted by ordinance together with the 1970 plan which was enacted by reference comprise a valid comprehensive plan. MSB 17.60 is not void
for vagueness and therefore does not violate LMLC’s right to due process of law. Finally, the BOAA could rationally have found that MSB 17.60 applies to LMLC’s proposed use and therefore that a conditional use permit is required.
We therefore AFFIRM the superior court’s decision.