MOORE, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether article II, section 18 of the Alaska Constitution mandates a two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature for the passage of a tax statute containing a retroactive provision.
We hold that it does not.
The facts in this case are uncontested. Appellants,
as producers of oil in Alaska, are subject to oil production taxes under AS 43.55.011-.013. An oil producer’s tax liability is calculated by multiplying an amount defined in AS 43.55.011 by the economic limit factor (ELF) as determined by a complex formula set out in AS 43.55.013.
In 1989, a bill modifying the ELF formula was introduced in the state legislature.
On March 22, 1989, the House of Representatives passed the bill by a simple majority vote. A separate roll was taken on a clause of the bill providing for an immediate effective date but, because it failed to garner the two-thirds vote necessary for passage, the effective date clause was not adopted.
On May 8, 1989, the Senate passed the bill by a simple majority vote.
The Governor signed the bill into law on the same day.
Section 4 of the act provided that “[t]his Act is retroactive to January 1, 1989, and applies to oil produced after December 31, 1988.” Ch. 25, § 4, SLA 1989. Because the House vote on the immediate-effective-date provision failed, the effective date of the statute was listed as August 6, 1989, or ninety days after the Governor signed the bill. Ch. 25, SLA 1989.
On July 28, 1989, the companies sued the State of Alaska, the Commissioner of Revenue, and the Commissioner of Administration (State), challenging the retroactive application of the ELF amendments as a violation of article II, section 18 of the Alaska Constitution.
. While the action was pending, the parties stipulated that the companies would pay, under protest, the oil production taxes under the new statute for the period between January 1, 1989 and August 6, 1989. In return, the State agreed to provide a credit against future tax payments should the companies ultimately prevail in their suit. As a result of the retroactive application of the ELF amendments, the companies paid approximately $100,-000,000 in additional oil production taxes.
On April 5, 1990, the State filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Five days later, the companies moved for partial summary judgment. The superior court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and denied the companies’ motion. This appeal followed.
The companies argue that the retroactive date included in the ELF amendments constitutes “another effective date” under article II, section 18, thereby triggering the two-thirds vote requirement. They contend that because no provision of the act received more than a simple majority vote of either legislative house, the retroactive application of the ELF amendments violates article II, section 18.
As a constitutional question, the issue before the court is a question of law to which we apply our independent judgment.
Sonneman v. Knight,
790 P.2d 702, 704 (Alaska 1990). Constitutional provisions should be given a reasonable and practical interpretation in accordance with common sense.
Kochutin v. State,
739 P.2d 170, 171 (Alaska 1987). The court should look at the plain meaning and purpose of the provision and the intent of the framers.
Id.
We have observed that one of the purposes of article II, section 18 is to provide a fair opportunity to those people affected by legislation to learn of the new laws by which they must live.
State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary,
606 P.2d 769, 772 (Alaska 1980);
Anchorage Mun. Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage,
618 P.2d 575, 580 (Alaska 1980). We believe the framers envisaged that article II, section 18 would afford those affected an opportunity to react to the new legislation by challenging it either through the referendum process or through the courts, as occurred in this case.
A careful review of the record of the constitutional convention reveals the relationship between article II, section 18 and the referendum powers as provided in article XI, sections 1-7 of the Alaska Constitution.
As originally proposed by the framers, the effective date provision closely paralleled the referendum provisions.
After the framers debated and amended article 11, section 18 to accommodate various concerns of the delegates,
the final version no longer coincided perfectly with the referendum provisions. However, there is no indication in these deliberations that the framers intended the amendments to article II, section 18 to expand its scope to encompass retroactive laws.
The companies concede that the delegates to the constitutional convention did not discuss retroactive laws during their deliberations on article II, section 18. Nonetheless, they argue that the delegates understood and intended the provision to encompass retroactive laws. The thrust of this argument is that this provision was intended by the delegates to provide a substantive constitutional safeguard against retroactive laws. We disagree.
Our review of the proceedings of the constitutional convention leads us to conclude that the framers, in enacting article II, section 18, did not intend to provide substantive protection of individual rights against retroactive legislation.
Had that been the intent of the framers, we believe
they would have done so explicitly.
Rather, in retaining the two-thirds vote requirement, the framers merely sought to assure that broad legislative support existed before the legislature deviated from the ninety-day post-enactment effective date.
Our decision finds further support in the plain meaning of the language of article II, section 18.
Webster’s New International Dictionary
(2d ed. 1948)
defined “effective” as:
1. Concerned in, or having the function of, producing an effect.
[[Image here]]
6. Law.
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MOORE, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether article II, section 18 of the Alaska Constitution mandates a two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature for the passage of a tax statute containing a retroactive provision.
We hold that it does not.
The facts in this case are uncontested. Appellants,
as producers of oil in Alaska, are subject to oil production taxes under AS 43.55.011-.013. An oil producer’s tax liability is calculated by multiplying an amount defined in AS 43.55.011 by the economic limit factor (ELF) as determined by a complex formula set out in AS 43.55.013.
In 1989, a bill modifying the ELF formula was introduced in the state legislature.
On March 22, 1989, the House of Representatives passed the bill by a simple majority vote. A separate roll was taken on a clause of the bill providing for an immediate effective date but, because it failed to garner the two-thirds vote necessary for passage, the effective date clause was not adopted.
On May 8, 1989, the Senate passed the bill by a simple majority vote.
The Governor signed the bill into law on the same day.
Section 4 of the act provided that “[t]his Act is retroactive to January 1, 1989, and applies to oil produced after December 31, 1988.” Ch. 25, § 4, SLA 1989. Because the House vote on the immediate-effective-date provision failed, the effective date of the statute was listed as August 6, 1989, or ninety days after the Governor signed the bill. Ch. 25, SLA 1989.
On July 28, 1989, the companies sued the State of Alaska, the Commissioner of Revenue, and the Commissioner of Administration (State), challenging the retroactive application of the ELF amendments as a violation of article II, section 18 of the Alaska Constitution.
. While the action was pending, the parties stipulated that the companies would pay, under protest, the oil production taxes under the new statute for the period between January 1, 1989 and August 6, 1989. In return, the State agreed to provide a credit against future tax payments should the companies ultimately prevail in their suit. As a result of the retroactive application of the ELF amendments, the companies paid approximately $100,-000,000 in additional oil production taxes.
On April 5, 1990, the State filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Five days later, the companies moved for partial summary judgment. The superior court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and denied the companies’ motion. This appeal followed.
The companies argue that the retroactive date included in the ELF amendments constitutes “another effective date” under article II, section 18, thereby triggering the two-thirds vote requirement. They contend that because no provision of the act received more than a simple majority vote of either legislative house, the retroactive application of the ELF amendments violates article II, section 18.
As a constitutional question, the issue before the court is a question of law to which we apply our independent judgment.
Sonneman v. Knight,
790 P.2d 702, 704 (Alaska 1990). Constitutional provisions should be given a reasonable and practical interpretation in accordance with common sense.
Kochutin v. State,
739 P.2d 170, 171 (Alaska 1987). The court should look at the plain meaning and purpose of the provision and the intent of the framers.
Id.
We have observed that one of the purposes of article II, section 18 is to provide a fair opportunity to those people affected by legislation to learn of the new laws by which they must live.
State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary,
606 P.2d 769, 772 (Alaska 1980);
Anchorage Mun. Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage,
618 P.2d 575, 580 (Alaska 1980). We believe the framers envisaged that article II, section 18 would afford those affected an opportunity to react to the new legislation by challenging it either through the referendum process or through the courts, as occurred in this case.
A careful review of the record of the constitutional convention reveals the relationship between article II, section 18 and the referendum powers as provided in article XI, sections 1-7 of the Alaska Constitution.
As originally proposed by the framers, the effective date provision closely paralleled the referendum provisions.
After the framers debated and amended article 11, section 18 to accommodate various concerns of the delegates,
the final version no longer coincided perfectly with the referendum provisions. However, there is no indication in these deliberations that the framers intended the amendments to article II, section 18 to expand its scope to encompass retroactive laws.
The companies concede that the delegates to the constitutional convention did not discuss retroactive laws during their deliberations on article II, section 18. Nonetheless, they argue that the delegates understood and intended the provision to encompass retroactive laws. The thrust of this argument is that this provision was intended by the delegates to provide a substantive constitutional safeguard against retroactive laws. We disagree.
Our review of the proceedings of the constitutional convention leads us to conclude that the framers, in enacting article II, section 18, did not intend to provide substantive protection of individual rights against retroactive legislation.
Had that been the intent of the framers, we believe
they would have done so explicitly.
Rather, in retaining the two-thirds vote requirement, the framers merely sought to assure that broad legislative support existed before the legislature deviated from the ninety-day post-enactment effective date.
Our decision finds further support in the plain meaning of the language of article II, section 18.
Webster’s New International Dictionary
(2d ed. 1948)
defined “effective” as:
1. Concerned in, or having the function of, producing an effect.
[[Image here]]
6. Law. In actual operation; —said of a statute or judicial order limited by its terms to begin at a designated time.
Id.
at 819. In light of these definitions, the “effective date” of a law, as that term is used in article II, section 18, is the date on which the law goes into actual operation or produces a legal effect.
The companies’ interpretation of article II, section 18 ignores, rather than accords with, common sense and the plain meaning of the language of the provision. According to their theory, the effective date of the ELF amendments was January 1, 1989. If correct, this would mean the statute was in actual operation over four months before the Governor signed the act. It defies common sense to say that a law can produce a legal effect or can be in actual operation prior to its enactment.
A law’s retroactive date and its effective date are distinctly different concepts. “A retroactive [retrospective] law is one which gives to pre-enactment conduct a different legal effect from that which it would have had without passage of the statute.”
Norton v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd.,
695 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Alaska 1985) (quoting Hochman,
The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation,
73 Harv.L.Rev. 692, 692 (I960)). Thus the retroactive date of the law serves to identify that conduct to which the law will apply. A retroactive law applies only to conduct which occurred on or after the retroactive date. While a retroactive law applies to pre-enactment conduct, the legal effect produced by the law occurs only after the law’s effective date.
The companies argue that our decision in
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State,
705 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1985) (hereinafter ARCO), confirms their position. Specifically, they rely on the following passage:
[B]ecause two-thirds of the legislature voted to make the [tax statute in question] immediately effective, a separate two-thirds vote for the act to be retroactive was not constitutionally required.
ARCO
at 438. The companies incorrectly interpret this dicta from
ARCO
to mean that a separate two-thirds vote is required to pass a retroactive provision when a two-thirds vote is not obtained for the immediate-effective-date provision. In this passage, however, we were merely pointing out that the procedure used by the legislature in that case was not constitutionally defective.
Elsewhere in our opinion in
ARCO
we pointed out that, with respect to retroactive statutes, “[a] two-thirds vote requirement does not appear in [AS 01.10.090],
nor elsewhere in Alaska law.”
Id.
at 438 (emphasis added). This includes the Alaska Constitution.
Courts of other jurisdictions which have faced this issue have similarly held that provisions in their state constitutions requiring a two-thirds vote of the legislature to deviate from the constitutionally-prescribed effective date do not apply to tax laws having retroactive dates.
See Mecham v. State Tax Commission,
17 Utah 2d 321, 410 P.2d 1008, 1009 (1966);
Homestake Mining Co. v. Johnson,
374 N.W.2d 357, 363-64 (S.D.1985).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that article
II,
section 18 does not require a two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature for the passage of laws containing retroactive provisions. The superior court properly granted summary judgment for the state.
AFFIRMED.