Kochutin v. State
Opinion
OPINION
Jacob Kochutin is charged with first degree murder and first degree sexual assault of a minor. Acting pursuant to article IV, section 16 of the Alaska Constitution, 1 Chief Justice Jay A. Rabinowitz appointed District Court Judge William H. Fuld to preside as superior court judge pro tempore over Kochutin’s trial and attendant proceedings. Kochutin moved to disqualify Judge Fuld for cause, claiming that Chief Justice Rabinowitz had (1) exceeded his temporary assignment authority because of prior sequential assignments of *171 Judge Fuld to sit as superior court judge pro tempore, 2 and (2) abused his discretion by assigning Judge Fuld to preside over the Kochutin proceedings. Judge Fuld denied the motion. Superior Court Judge Peter A. Michalski affirmed Judge Fuld's ruling.
Kochutin next petitioned the court of appeals for review, 3 but it declined review and instead certified the question to this court. 4 We accepted the certification and granted review because the petition raises an important question of law under the state constitution. AS 22.05.015(b).
Constitutional provisions should be given a “reasonable and practical interpretation in accordance with common sense.” Warren v. Thomas, 568 P.2d 400, 401 (Alaska 1977). The court should look at the plain meaning and purpose of the provisions and the intent of the framers. 5 Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056 & n. 7 (Alaska 1981).
The temporary assignment power of the chief justice is intended to provide the flexibility necessary for efficient day-to-day administration of the court system. It includes the authority to assign district court judges to pro tempore service on the superior court. Oxereok v. State, 611 P.2d 913, 916 (Alaska 1980). The question in the instant appeal is whether consecutive short term appointments by the chief justice may rise to the level of permanence, thus exceeding the temporary assignment power. 6
What, then, is a temporary assignment? Kochutin argues that an assignment ceases to be “temporary” when it exceeds ninety days in a twelve-month period, because a non-consensual interdistrict assignment of a district or superior court judge by the presiding judge is limited to ninety days. Administrative Rule 24(d). 7 This argument is without merit. Rule 24(d) was promulgated to protect judges against long-term assignments far from home. Moreover, the obvious inference from the rule is that a temporary assignment may *172 exceed ninety days if the assigned judge consents or the chief justice so orders. Thus, we conclude that Administrative Rule 24 does not support Kochutin’s position.
“Temporary” has been defined as “[t]hat which is to last for a limited time only, as distinguished from that which is perpetual, or indefinite, in its duration. Opposite of permanent.” Black ⅛ Law Dictionary 1312 (5th ed. 1979). Each of the special orders assigning Judge Fuld is expressly limited in duration or subject matter. None purport to confer upon him all the benefits of regular superior court service. 8 These assignments do not interfere with the legislature’s power to fix the number of superior court judges, 9 nor do they prevent the governor and judicial council from filling a vacancy on the superior court. 10 The assignments of Judge Fuld were clearly not permanent. We therefore conclude that they were temporary assignments within the constitutional authority of the chief justice. 11
AFFIRMED.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
739 P.2d 170 (Kochutin v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.