FRANK A. KAUFMAN, District Judge.
In an unverified two-count complaint, four former employees of a subsidiary of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (Winn-Dixie) seek under Count I damages1 against [839]*839Winn-Dixie for failure to make payments to them allegedly due under the “Employers Profit Sharing Program of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.” (Program) and under Count II recovery under 29 U.S.C. § 308(b) for Winn-Dixie’s alleged failure to provide statutorily required information concerning that Program. 29 U.S.C. § 308(b), a section of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309, provides:
(b) Any administrator of a plan who fails or refuses, upon the written request of a participant or beneficiary covered by such plan, to make publication to him within thirty days of such request, in accordance with the provisions of section 307 of this title, of a description of the plan or an annual report containing the information required by sections 305 and 306 of this title, may in the court’s discretion become liable to any such participant or beneficiary making such request in the amount of $50 a day from the date of such failure or refusal.
Plaintiffs invoke federal jurisdiction under Count I pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1),2 and under Count II pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1355 and 29 U.S.C. § 308(c).3 The District Court entered summary judgment for Winn-Dixie on both counts, holding: (1) that, as to Count I, the undisputed record shows that no one of the four employees has more than $10,000 in controversy and thus diversity jurisdiction is lacking with regard thereto; and (2) that, as to Count II, Winn-Dixie is not an “administrator” of the Program as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1) and thus is not liable for failing to provide information concerning that Program under 29 U.S.C. § 308(b).
I
It is first incumbent upon us to discuss herein the basis for jurisdiction as to Count II. 28 U.S.C. § 1355 provides :
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any Act of Congress.
No jurisdictional amount requirement exists with regard to Section 1355. See Woods v. Kern, 87 F.Supp. 383, 384 (E.D.Pa.1949); Sampson v. Thomas, 76 F.Supp. 691, 693 (E.D.Mich.1948); Powell v. Rhine, 71 F.Supp. 953, 954 (M.D.Pa.1947). See also Daniel v. First National Bank, 227 F.2d 353, 354, reh. denied, 228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1956), citing at 227 F.2d 354 n. 2, First National Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 144, 10 S.Ct. 37, 33 L.Ed. 282 (1889). However, in order for jurisdiction in this case to exist under Section 1355, 29 U.S.C. § 308(b) must permit a “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” as those words are used in Section 1355. No case known to this Court holds that Section 1355 jurisdiction exists with regard to any Section 308(b) claim on the ground that that latter section permits the imposition of a ‘fine, penalty or forfeiture’ within the meaning of Section 1355.
* * * Appellant quite properly does not rely upon this section [28 U. S.C. § 1355], The tenant’s action for damages by way of compensation for the injury suffered by him individually is not a proceeding for the recovery of a “penalty” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1355. Fields v. Washington, 3 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 701, 703. It if were so regarded, then consistently with § 1355, the federal district courts would have jurisdiction exclusive of the courts of the states. But under § 205 of the Housing and Rent Act, the tenant may sue “in any Federal, State, or Territorial court of competent jurisdiction”.
The tests for determining whether a statute authorizes the imposition of a “penalty” are set forth in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892), and have been subsequently discussed in other cases including Porter v. Montgomery, 163 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1947); McCrae v. Johnson, 84 F.Supp. 220 (D.Md.1949) (Chesnut, J.). “The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary sense, is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public or a wrong to the individual.” Huntington v. Attrill, supra at 668. In Fields v. Washington, supra at 703, the importance of who sues and who collects and retains any judgment is stressed. And in Porter v. Montgomery, supra at 215, a distinction is drawn between damages which “must flow out of the wrong and be its natural and proximate consequence” and a “penalty [which] need have no causal connection with the wrong inflicted”.
In this case, it is not necessary to determine whether Section 308(b) authorizes the imposition of a penalty. This is so because although not asserted by plaintiffs, jurisdiction exists as to Count II under 28 U.S.C. § 1337. That section provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.
No jurisdictional amount requirement exists as to Section 1337. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure § 38, pp. 200-03 (Wright ed. 1961); 7B J. Moore, Federal Practice J.C. 518 (1966), and cases cited thereat. The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309, imposes a duty upon the administrator of a plan subject to that Act. The imposition of that duty in favor of a person employed by another engaged in commerce or whose activities affect commerce was enacted by the Congress pursuant to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. In 29 U.S.C. § 301(a) the Congress stated its finding that pension plans have become “an important factor in commerce”, arid that it is in the interest of the “free flow of commerce” that disclosure of the terms of such plans be made. In 29 U.S.C. § 301(b) the Congress declared that it is the policy of the Act “to protect interstate commerce”. The imposition of duties running in fa[841]*841vor of such persons has been held, in connection with other statutes, to constitute an “Act of Congress regulating commerce” within the meaning of Section 1337. In Imm v. Union R. Co., 289 F.2d 858, 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 833, 82 S.Ct. 55, 7 L.Ed.2d 35 (1961), Judge Goodrich, in holding that the Federal Employees’ Liability Act was an act “regulating commerce” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1337, quoted from and adopted Professor Charles Bunn’s view that “ ‘[a]cts regulating commerce’ [as that phrase is used in Section 1337] are coming rapidly to mean all acts whose constitutional basis is the commerce clause”. See also Ballard v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 285 F.Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y.1968), holding similarly as to the Jones Act. Lieberman v. Cook, 343 F.Supp. 558 (W.D.Pa.1972), and Moyer v. Kirkpatrick, 265 F.Supp. 348 (E.D.Pa.1967), aff’d per curiam, 387 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1968), are not to the contrary. Those cases hold only that the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act does not itself give rise to any cause of action other than one challenging the administrator’s exercise of his disclosure duties. Thus, any failure to comply with the provisions of the Program, as alleged in Count I in this case, does not present, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, claims “arising under” that Act. McCorkle v. First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co., 459 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1972); Barlow v. Marriott Corporation, 328 F.Supp. 624 (D.Md.1971). However, claims, such as those stated in Count II, which relate to a duty of disclosure to an employee, do arise under the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, and constitute assertions of federally created rights which have been created for the purpose of “regulating commerce” as those words are used in Section 1337. Thus, regardless of the absence of the jurisdictional amount under Section 1331(a), or whether or not jurisdiction exists under Section 1355, jurisdiction as to Count II is present pursuant to Section 1337. Upon remand the District Court shall afford to plaintiffs, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653, the opportunity timely to amend their jurisdictional allegations with respect to Count II by alleging jurisdiction as to that count, under 28 U.S.C. § 1337.
II
The Program of Winn-Dixie and its subsidiaries (hereinafter sometimes called “the Employers”) relates to certain qualified participating employees. The four plaintiffs in this case fall within that group. The Employers contribute funds to a trust fund and retain no right to assert any claim to ownership over any of the assets of the trust fund. The Program provides for its administration by a Profit Sharing Committee (Committee), composed of from three to seven members, the majority of whom are required to be participating employees. All Committee members are appointed and subject to removal by Winn-Dixie’s Board of Directors. Although all monies contributed to the Program are paid to a trust fund, the Committee rather than the Trustees seems to play the primary role in administering the Program. Among the extensive powers, duties and responsibilities of the Committee are allocation of forfeitures and of contributions made by each employer to participating employees; allocation of annual profits or losses from the trust fund to the accounts of participants; establishment of a trust fund contingency account to provide against losses or certain other costs; determination of whether participating employees should forfeit their rights because of misconduct; notification of all employees of the Program’s existence and its general provisions; directing the trustees of the trust fund to make certain investments; keeping various records and informing employees annually of their trust fund accounts; and determining the manner in which employee accounts should be distributed. It is also important to note that the Program gives Winn-Dixie’s Board of Directors the power to appoint and remove Committee members as well as the trustees of the trust fund, and to amend, [842]*842modify, or even terminate both the Program and the trust fund 4 and to amend the trust5 from time to time.
29 U.S.C. § 308(b) exposes, subject to the discretion of the Court, “any administrator” of a welfare and pension plan such as the Program involved in this case, who fails or refuses upon written request of a participant to make publication to him within thirty days of such request of a description of the plan and an annual report containing information required by statute, to a penalty of $50 a day from the date of such failure or refusal. The term “administrator” is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1) as follows:
(b) The term “administrator” whenever used in this chapter, refers to—
(1) the person or persons designated by the terms of the plan or the collective bargaining agreement with responsibility for the ultimate control, disposition, or management of the money received or contributed; * * *
In Count II of the complaint, plaintiffs allege “[t]hat more than thirty (30) days prior to the filing of this action each plaintiff has individually requested in writing from the defendant a copy of the description of said plan \i. e., the Program], including all amendments and modifications thereto” and “[t]hat defendant, as administrator of said plan, has failed and refused to provide the requested information to the plaintiffs in accordance with the disclosure provisions contained in the Act”, i. e., 29 U.S.C. § 308(b). Thus, plaintiffs allege that on the date they filed the complaint none of them had received the requested information. However, none of plaintiffs has stated in any document, verified or unverified, filed in this case on what specific date or from what specific person he requested such information, or the mode or content of any such request made by him, except that one of the four plaintiffs, Hales, in an affidavit filed in this case, has stated:
That in May of 1972, in a further attempt to determine his rights under defendant’s profit sharing plan, he requested in writing from Mr. James Cameron, Vice-Chairman of the defendant’s Profit Sharing Committee, a copy of the plan. That he has not received said copy as of this date, but instead received a letter from Mr. Cameron advising him that such a copy was available for him to examine at the Committee headquarters in Jacksonville, Florida.
Nor has any one of the four plaintiffs stated the precise number of days for which he seeks the award of the $50 per day amount set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 308(b).
The District Court concluded that Winn-Dixie was not the “administrator” of the Program within the meaning of Section 304(b)(1), concluding that the Program designates the Committee as [843]*843having responsibility for the ultimate control, disposition or management of the money received or contributed to the Program and that the Program places a duty on the Committee to “[n]otify all employees in writing of the existence and general provisions of the Program . ” The District Court also commented upon Hales’ statement in his affidavit that he directed his request for information to “Mr. James Cameron, Vice-Chairman of the defendant’s Profit Sharing Committee”, and not to the defendant, Winn-Dixie.
Winn-Dixie’s power, specifically given by the terms of the Program, to appoint and to remove Committee members and trustees of the trust fund and to amend, modify, or terminate the Program and trust instruments related thereto gives it ultimate control over how the Program monies will be managed and disposed of. If Winn-Dixie does not approve of the way the Program monies are being managed and disposed of, it may either change the terms of the Program or trust instruments or replace existing Committee members and trustees with persons more to Winn-Dixie’s liking. Thus, Winn-Dixie seems clearly to fall within the language of Section 304(b)(1) as the person designated by the terms of the Program “with responsibility for the ultimate control, disposition, or management” of the Program monies received or contributed. (Emphasis supplied). Accordingly, this Court concludes that, consistent with the express policies and remedial purposes of the Act, a corporate employer is itself the “administrator” within the meaning of Section 304(b)(1) when it reserves to itself powers over welfare and pension fund plans such as Winn-Dixie possesses under the Program. Cf. Wirtz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 239 F.Supp. 483, 486 (E.D.Pa.1965).6 Harrold v. Coble, 261 F.Supp. 29, 38 (M.D.N.C.1966), aff’d, 380 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1967), is not to the contrary. [844]*844In that case, an action was brought under 29 U.S.C. § 308(b) against the members of a profit-sharing administration committee which administered the pension and profit-sharing plan of the H. L. Coble Construction Company (Coble). That committee was responsible for the general administration of the plan and was also charged with the responsibility of communicating the principal provisions of the plan to the employees of Co-ble. However, the board of directors of Coble appointed the committee members who served at the board’s pleasure and also reserved the right at any time to amend the plan, and a trust agreement related thereto, in any manner the board deemed desirable, or to terminate the plan and trust agreement completely. The defendant committee members contended the Coble rather than the Committee was the “administrator” of the plan under Section 308(b). The District Court rejected that argument for the following two reasons (at 37):
* * * In the first place, the individual defendants, as members of the profit-sharing administration committee, are charged with the responsibility of administering the plan and carrying out its provisions. It can logically be argued that they, rather than the H. L. Coble Construction Company, are the administrators. Secondly, and even more important the plaintiff brought suit against the persons certified by Mr. Honaker [a committee member], in his letter of June 24, 1965, as being the administrators of the plan. Since there had been a failure to furnish plaintiff with a copy of the plan and trust agreement so that he could make an independent determination with respect to the identity of the administrator, the plaintiff was certainly entitled to rely and act upon the representation and certification made to him by Mr. Honaker.
Thus, the District Court held that the members of the administration committee of Coble were estopped to deny that they were the “administrators”. But the District Court in Coble, after so holding, refused, in the exercise of its discretion, to award any statutory penalty under Section 308(b) finding that Mr. Honaker had furnished certain information to plaintiff and that “any violation of the statute [29 U.S.C. § 308(b)] was purely technical” (at 38). On appeal by the plaintiff, this Court, finding no abuse of discretion by the Court below, affirmed in a per curiam opinion.
The fact that in this case Hales made demand on the Vice-Chairman of the Committee and not on the corporate defendant itself does not, so far as the record before this Court discloses, relate to the other three plaintiffs; nor does it, in and of itself, bar Hales’ Section 308(b) claim against Winn-Dixie. However, it will be relevant, in connection with the existence or nonexistence of the $10,000 jurisdictional amount under Count I, to establish upon remand the date of Hales’ request for information and the passage, or lack of passage, of the thirty-day period under Section 308(b).7
Ill
In Count I of the complaint, plaintiffs each respectively complain that they have been improperly denied amounts due to them under the Program. Diversity jurisdiction is alleged to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).8 With respect to Count I, it is necessary to review what the record in this casé does and does not disclose as to the claims of each of the former employees, Hales, Bridges, Eatmon and Tart, including the amounts of each of the four separate claims since those four amounts may not be aggregated for purposes of [845]*845determining the existence or nonexistence of the $10,000 jurisdictional amount under Section 1332(a)(1). Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). See Hughes v. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 199 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1952). Cf. Zahn v. Int’l. Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed,2d 511 (1973).
In Count I, Eatmon and Tart allege they are owed respectively $4850.00 and $2961.69 under the Program. The record would appear to indicate that the maximum amount Bridges may be able to recover under Count I is $5788.69.9 Thus, the individual claims asserted by those three plaintiffs under Count I do not seem by themselves to meet the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Hales alleges in Count I that he is owed more than $10,000 from Winn-Dix-ie under the Program. Hales also has stated in an affidavit that he expected to be credited with $12,000 under the Program when he terminated his employment with Winn-Dixie because of various representations made to him by agents and officials of Winn-Dixie and by the latter’s unspecified official publications, and that he honestly believed at the time he filed this suit that the amount in controversy between himself and Winn-Dixie exceeded $10,000. The record in this case shows that under the express terms of the Program, if not changed by equitable reformation or otherwise, Hales was entitled to $8631.-36. The record also seems to indicate that without Hales’ authorization or request, but seemingly in accord with the terms of the Program, the Committee purchased and sent to Hales an annuity contract costing $8631.36, presumably to discharge any liability to Hales under the Program.
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938), Mr. Justice Roberts stated:
* * * The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. The inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction. Nor does the fact that the complaint discloses the existence of a valid defense to the claim. But if, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed. [Footnotes omitted.]
Under Count I, Hales alleges he was due more than $10,000, apparently, from argument presented to this Court, either on a theory of quasi contract or pursuant to equitable reformation of the Program’s terms. Thus, Count I does not facially disclose to a “legal certainty” that Hales may not recover more than $10,000. Further, nothing in the record before this Court sets forth to any legal certainty that Hales is entitled only to $8631.36 or only to the annuity policy mailed to him; or that Hales is not entitled to claim additional amounts [846]*846under alleged representations and undertakings by or on behalf of Winn-Dixie. Under the test stated in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., supra at 289, this Court concludes that the District Court should not have granted summary judgment against Hales under Count I for failure to meet the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See also C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 33 at 111 (2d ed. 1970).
Additionally, and alternatively, even if it is determined on remand that Hales’ claim under Count I ab initio is limited to $8631.36 and that to a “legal certainty” his Count I claim is “really for less than” 10 $10,000, Hales may attempt to meet Section 1332(a)’s $10,000 jurisdictional requirement by adding to his diversity claim under Count I the amount of the recovery he is seeking under Count II. See Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1968); 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1588, at pp. 805-06 (1972). Counts I and II each involve claims which clearly qualify under . Section 1332(a) but for the jurisdictional amount requirement. Thus, the aggregation of those claims constitutes aggregation of diversity claims. The fact that Section 1337 jurisdiction is independently present as to Count II is, in that regard, incidental.
The maximum amount that Hales, or any other plaintiff in this case, can possibly seek under 29 U.S.C. § 308(b) is not presently known or even claimed by Hales or any other plaintiff herein in the light of their failure to allege sufficient details relating to their requests for information under that section. It may well be that the aggregation of the claims of each plaintiff under the two counts of the complaint exceeds $10,000. While the chances are less that Bridges, Eatmon and/or Tart as compared with Hales will be able to establish that they as individuals are claiming $10,000 in the aggregate under both counts, nevertheless, they should each be given the opportunity so to do. While many of the problems plaintiffs face in this appeal are of their own making, the policies which underlie and govern the application of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act require that plaintiffs be accorded the liberal and flexible opportunity inherent in this Court’s remand as to both Counts I and II.11
[847]*847IV
There remains the question as to whether in any event plaintiffs' Count I diversity claims are maintainable under the theory of pendent jurisdiction. The answer to that question is “no”. The record establishes beyond doubt that the Count I and Count II claims do not grow out of a “common nucleus of operative fact”. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). The Count II claims relate to alleged failure to furnish the information re[848]*848quired by 29 U.S.C. § 308(b). While plaintiffs may have sought that latter information in order to consider and/or assert their Count I claims, their causes of action under both Counts I and II are separately maintainable and determinable without any reference to the facts alleged or contentions stated in or with regard to the other count. Accordingly, as to Count I, pendent jurisdiction does not exist. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra; Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245, 53 S.Ct. 586, 77 L.Ed. 1148 (1933).12
V
During oral argument, this Court was informed that some of the claims asserted herein are the subject of proceedings in one or more Courts of the State of North Carolina, but that certain other of the claims asserted herein can no longer be effectively so asserted because of the running of limitations. On remand, the District Court will determine an orderly way for the federal and state court litigation to proceed. Cf. Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967).
For the reasons set forth above, the within case is hereby remanded for further proceedings in the Court below in accordance with this opinion.*
Circuit Judge WIDENER dissents from a portion of this opinion and files a dissenting opinion.
* ADDENDUM
Because the dissenting opinion in this case was filed after the opinion of the Court had been filed, there was no opportunity to include appropriate footnotes to this Court’s opinion with regard to certain statements set forth in the dissenting opinion.
Plaintiffs alleged jurisdiction under Count II pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1355. Accordingly, this Court examined that jurisdictional allegation, noted the complexity of the issue involved, and concluded not to make any determination with regard to it in view of the apparent presence of jurisdiction as to Count II under 28 U.S.C. § 1337. Instead, this Court suggested the presence of 1337 jurisdiction and required, upon remand, that the District Court afford to plaintiffs the opportunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653 timely to amend their jurisdictional allegations with respect to Count II by alleging jurisdiction as to that Count under 28 U.S.C. § 1337.
In Part I of his dissent, Judge Widener appears to differentiate, in terms of aggregation, this case from a case in which there are two diversity claims. Jurisdiction in this case either exists or does not exist, insofar as Count I is concerned, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, as to Count I, the sole basis for possible jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction. With regard to Count II, 29 U.S.C. § 308(c) provides that actions relating to 29 U.S.C. § 308 (b) may be brought in “any court of competent jurisdiction”. The fact that jurisdiction is concurrently vested by Section 308(b) in federal as well as state courts does not mean that diversity jurisdiction is not present when the parties are in fact diverse as to their respective citizenship.1 In other words, [849]*849the fact that the Congress conferred concurrent jurisdiction on the federal courts as well as on the state courts does not mean that when diversity is present, jurisdiction in a federal court cannot exist pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.2 It is therefore immaterial, in terms of the aggregation of the claims under Counts I and II, that concurrent federal ánd state jurisdiction is conferred by Section 308(c) as to Count II. What we have here are two diversity claims.
Insofar as Harrold v. Coble, supra, is concerned, when that case was before the District Court, a question was raised as to whether the defendants were the “administrator” of the profit-sharing plan and trust agreement. The District Court held alternatively that they were, but that in any event plaintiff sued the persons whom he had been told were the “administrator” when he inquired and as a consequence those persons were es-' topped to controvert the advice they had given. In this Court in Harrold v. Coble, the question was whether the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to award plaintiff penalties. In the opinion filed by this Court in that case there is no discussion of the question as to who was the “administrator” or which of either of the District Court’s theories in that case was the correct one in determining amenability of the defendant therein to suit.
Our opinion in this case is in conflict with the first of the District Court’s alternative holdings in Harrold. We do not agree with that alternative holding. That is not to say, however, that Judge Stanley, sitting in the District Court in that case, was not entirely correct in concluding that the defendant therein was estopped to deny that it was the proper defendant. Further, there would not appear to be any inconsistency between what is written in the opinion in this case and what this Court stated in Harrold.
. In Harrold v. Coble, 261 F.Supp. 29, 38 (M.D.N.C.1966), aff’d, 380 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1967), the District Court did describe an issue pending in that case with regard to Section 308(b) as “the matter of awarding the statutory penalty or forfeiture”. But that comment was not made in connection with any analysis of the jurisdictional requirements of Section 1355.