Jordan Ramos v. San Diego County Superior Court

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 27, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01701
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JORDAN RAMOS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01701-JES-LR Booking #6977025, 11 ORDER GRANTING MOTION Plaintiff, 12 TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS vs. AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 13 FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

14 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUPERIOR §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND § 1915A(b) 15 COURT,

16 Defendant. [ECF No. 5] 17 18 Plaintiff Jordan Ramos, currently detained at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 19 Department’s (“LASD”) Men’s Central Jail (“MCJ”), and proceeding without counsel, has 20 filed an amended civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, together with a 21 motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF 22 Nos. 4, 5. In both his original and amended complaints, Plaintiff claims his constitutional 23 rights were violated by the San Diego County Superior Court in Criminal Case No. 24 SCD304625. See ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 4 at 1, 5. He requests “exoneration through 25 dismissal or reductions to misdemeanors” and $947 million in damages. ECF No. 4 at 6. 26 For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP 27 but DISMISSES the case. 28 1 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 5 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). However, all 7 prisoners who proceed IFP must pay any remaining balance in “increments” or 8 “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 83–84 (2016), regardless of whether their 9 action is ultimately dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)&(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 10 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002). 11 To proceed IFP, plaintiffs must establish their inability to pay by filing an affidavit 12 regarding their income and assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 13 Cir. 2015). A prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of 14 the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period 15 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 16 King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 17 Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account 18 for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six 19 months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has insufficient assets. See 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(b)(1)&(4); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84. 21 Plaintiff’s LASD jail certificate shows he had average monthly deposits of $24.34 22 to his trust account for the 6-months preceding the filing of his case, and an available 23 balance of $35.40 at the time of filing. See ECF No. 5 at 3. Therefore, the Court GRANTS 24 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 27 fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The administrative fee does not apply to 28 1 Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and assesses a $4.86 initial partial filing fee pursuant to 2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). This initial fee need be collected, however, only if sufficient funds 3 are available in Plaintiff’s account at the time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 5 civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner 6 has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d 7 at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal 8 of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds 9 available to him when payment is ordered.”). The LASD, or any agency later having 10 custody, will thereafter collect the balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case and 11 forward payments to the Clerk of Court as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 12 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) AND 1915A(b) 13 A. Standard of Review 14 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) and is proceeding 15 IFP, his complaint requires preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 16 § 1915A(b). “On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the 17 complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 18 be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 19 Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); see also Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2024) 21 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). “The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at screening is the 23 same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 24 Long v. Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 25 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) 26 (Section 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the contest of 27 failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 28 / / / 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “prescribes the information a plaintiff must 2 provide about the merits of his claim at the outset of litigation.” Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. __, 3 __ S. Ct. __, No. 24-440, 2026 WL 135974, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026). Thus, Rules 8 and 4 12(b)(6) together require a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 5 to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 6 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Detailed 7 factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 8 action supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Dismissal “under Rule 9 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails 10 to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Valame v. Trump, 157 F.4th 11 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 2025) (per curiam) (citing Somers v. Apple, Inc. 729 F.3d 953, 959 12 (9th Cir. 2013)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of 13 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 15 “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 16 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 17 386, 393–94 (1989) (citation omitted). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 18 allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 19 United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 20 acting under the color of State law.” Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 21 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 22 2006)). 23 B. Factual Allegations 24 The allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint are jumbled and confusing, but in 25 both his operative and original pleadings he makes clear that he seeks both $947 million in 26 damages and an “exoneration through dismissal or reductions to misdemeanors” for 27 unspecified counts and/or a conviction entered in San Diego Superior Court Criminal Case 28 /// 1 /// 2 No. SCD304625.2 See ECF No. 4 at 1, 6; ECF No. 1 at 1. Both pleadings also center on a 3 Superior Court judge’s refusal to set aside a plea deal which appears to have involved 4 resisting arrest charges or “felony strike” resulting from his interaction with a Wells Fargo 5 Bank security guard named Alex Campos.3 See ECF No. 4 at 6; ECF No. 1 at 3, 6–7. 6 C. Discussion 7 Plaintiff’s pleadings are subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) without leave to amend because it is clear from their face 9 that suit is barred by both the Eleventh Amendment and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 10 (1994). 11 1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 12 First, to the extent Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit seeks monetary damages and names only 13 the San Diego County Superior Court as a Defendant, it must be dismissed pursuant to 28 14 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2). See Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 15 1167–69, (9th Cir. 2016) (noting § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) “mandates early review” and requires 16 dismissal if it is clear from the face of the complaint that the governmental defendants are 17

18 19 2 The Court acknowledges that “[n]ormally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint,” Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Comms., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 456 n.4 (2009), but 20 in this case finds it necessary to consult both Plaintiff’s pleadings in order to better 21 understand and liberally construe his claims. See Harris v. Muhammad, __F.4th __, No. 24-3307, 2026 WL 292420, at *4 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026) (“The Supreme Court has 22 instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading[s]’ of pro se 23 litigants.”) (quoting Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted)). 24

25 3 The Court notes Plaintiff’s amended complaint also appears to challenge the dismissal of another § 1983 civil rights suit he filed against Alex Campos in Ramos v. Campos, S.D. 26 Cal. Case No. 3:25-cv-01700-JO-BLM. See ECF No. 4 at 1. That case was dismissed sua 27 sponte for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because Campos, a private security guard, is not a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 1 immune). 2 “In our constitutional scheme, a federal court generally may not hear a suit brought by any 3 person against a nonconsenting State.” Allen v. Cooper, 589 U.S. 248, 254 (2020). This 4 prohibition applies when either the “state or the ‘arm of a state’ is a defendant.” Munoz v. 5 Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); 6 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (holding that “‘arms of the 7 State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not liable under § 1983). “The State of 8 California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims 9 brought under § 1983 in federal court,” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 10 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), and the Supreme Court has held that “§ 1983 was not 11 intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. (citing Kentucky v. 12 Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.17 (1985)). Thus, “[b]ecause the Superior Court is an arm of 13 the state—and no exception applies to the rule prohibiting suits against the state—it has 14 Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Munoz, 91 F.4th at 980; see also Simmons v. Sacramento 15 County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a claim 16 against the Sacramento County Superior Court (or its employees), because such suits are 17 barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). 18 2. Heck’s “Favorable Termination” Requirement 19 Second, Plaintiff seeks to challenge the constitutional validity of his criminal 20 conviction in SCD304625 based on claims that it was obtained by way of a “faulty plea 21 deal” achieved through coercion and duress by way of § 1983, but does not also show that 22 conviction has already been invalidated. See ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 4 at 6. Thus, even if 23 he named a proper Defendant, a Heck bar is “obvious from the face of his complaint,” and 24 his suit also requires sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 25 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). See Hebrard, 90 F.4th at 1007 (citing Washington 26 v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that a 27 court may properly dismiss a Heck-barred claim [for failing to state a claim “if there exists 28 an ‘obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.’”)). 1 /// 2 The Heck-bar, or “required favorable termination rule, is a rule of preclusion named 3 after Heck v. Humphrey—the Supreme Court case that outlined the doctrine.” Hebrard, 90 4 F.4th at 1007. In Heck, the Supreme Court held: 5 [W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply 6 the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be 7 dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the 8 plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any 9 outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit. 10 11 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis in original). 12 In short, “Heck’s ‘favorable termination’ rule is based on the ‘hoary principle that 13 civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding 14 criminal judgments.’” King v. R. Villegas, 156 F.4th 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 15 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 & n.5). Thus, if a prisoner seeks relief in federal court based on 16 claims that fall “within the core of habeas corpus,” Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 160 17 (2022) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005)), and a grant of relief would 18 “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” a habeas corpus petition, 19 and not a civil rights suit, serves as the “exclusive remedy.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 20 475, 487–89 (1973) (“[A] state prisoner challenging his underlying conviction and 21 sentence on federal constitutional grounds in a federal court is limited to habeas corpus.”); 22 accord McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 118 n.6 (2019) (noting “Congress has 23 determined that a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action, is the appropriate 24 remedy for state prisoners attacking the . . . fact or length of their confinement”); Nettles v. 25 Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The Court has long held that habeas 26 is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of 27 habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 action.”) (citations omitted). 28 Here, Plaintiff seeks damages and to set aside an allegedly unlawful sentence he 1 claims was the product of a “faulty” guilty plea. See ECF No. 1 at 1. Heck’s prohibition 2 applies to convictions resulting from a guilty plea. Martell v. Cole, 115 F.4th 1233, 1236 3 (9th Cir. 2024); see also Duarte v. City of Stockton, 60 F.4th 566, 571 (9th Cir. 2023) 4 (noting that “Heck speaks of challenges that would impugn ‘a conviction or sentence[.]’”) 5 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (emphasis added)). Because Plaintiff contends he 6 pleaded guilty to offenses in SCD304625 only due to coercion, “persuasive duress,” and a 7 “conspiracy” between the San Diego Superior Court and his former appointed counsel, see 8 ECF No. 1 at 1–2, and as a result is currently serving a term of custody in violation of the 9 First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, see 10 ECF No. 4 at 5, his suit necessarily attacks both the constitutional validity and length of 11 his confinement, and may not proceed pursuant to § 1983 unless he also shows his 12 conviction and/or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; see 13 also Boyle v. Nelson, No. 6:24-CV-01946-AA, 2025 WL 295142, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 24, 14 2025) (dismissing § 1983 suit sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) as Heck- 15 barred where plaintiff alleged “the District Attorney, counsel for Deschutes County, and 16 Detective Hudson engaged in a conspiracy to coerce the plaintiff into entering [an] Alford 17 plea.”). 18 He has not. Instead, Plaintiff refers only to an unsuccessful request he made to the 19 Superior Court to re-open his case and retract his plea, and admits he “has 14 months left 20 out of [a] two-year term.” See ECF No. 1 at 6. Nowhere in either of his pleadings does 21 Plaintiff contend his conviction in SCD304625 has been invalidated in his favor. A plaintiff 22 must first prove that his conviction or sentence has been favorably terminated—only then 23 may he bring suit for damages. See Roberts v. City of Fairbanks, 947 F.3d 1191, 1196–98 24 (9th Cir. 2020); Nettles, 830 F.3d at 928. “Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who 25 has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983[.]” 26 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489); 27 see also Pattillo v. Lombardo, No. 2:17-CV-01849-JAD-VCF, 2017 WL 3622778, at *4 28 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017) (“When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his 1 custody, raises a constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release (such 2 as ineffective assistance of counsel), or seeks damages for purported deficiencies in his 3 state court criminal case, which effected a conviction or lengthier sentence, his sole federal 4 remedy is the writ of habeas corpus.”). 5 3. Dismissal & Leave to Amend 6 Therefore, because the Court finds Plaintiff both fails to state a claim upon which 7 § 1983 relief may be granted, and seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is 8 immune, it DISMISSES his case sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 9 § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121; Chavez, 817 F.3d 10 at 1167. As Plaintiff cannot fix both these pleading deficiencies, the Court DENIES leave 11 to amend as amendment would be futile. See Beets v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 12 1038, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the filing of an amended complaint is futile if 13 claims are barred by Heck), disapproved of on other grounds by Lemos v. County of 14 Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002 (9th Cir. 2022); Bell v. Allison, No. 20-16880, 2022 WL 4077119, 15 at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2022) (affirming dismissal of Heck-barred claims without leave to 16 amend because “amendment would be futile”); Gallagher v. Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. 17 of the L., No. 01-cv-01277-PJH, 2001 WL 1006809, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2001) (“The 18 dismissal is without leave to amend because an amendment would be futile in view of the 19 court’s finding that the defendants enjoy sovereign immunity.” (citations omitted)). 20 III. CONCLUSION 21 Good cause appearing, the Court: 22 (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 23 (ECF No. 5). 24 (2) DIRECTS the Facility Commander at the LASD’s MCJ, or their designee, to 25 collect from Plaintiff’s trust account the $4.86 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are 26 available at the time this Order is executed, and forward whatever balance remains of the 27 full $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 28 preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account 1 |}exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 2 (3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order by U.S. Mail 3 ||on Watch Commander, MEN'S CENTRAL JAIL (MCJ), 441 Bauchet Street, Los Angeles, 4 ||90012. 5 (4) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte and in its entirety for failure to state 6 claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1), (111) 7 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2) without leave to amend. 8 (5) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 9 1128 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 10 (6) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment and close the file. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 3 Dated: February 27, 2026 “4 we Se 4, 14 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10