Johnson v. Tony's Town Mister Quik

1996 OK 138, 915 P.2d 355, 67 O.B.A.J. 1260, 1996 Okla. LEXIS 56, 1996 WL 162432

• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
• Decided: April 9, 1996
• Docket: 83283
• Status: Published

Opinions

OP ALA, Justice.

The single issue tendered by Tony’s Town Mister Quik’s [respondent or employer] quest for dismissal is whether the claimant’s petition for review can be deemed filed when mailed and hence timely. We answer in the affirmative and deny the motion to dismiss with prejudice to renewal.

I

THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

Judy Johnson [claimant or Johnson] filed her Form 3 for cumulative-trauma injury occasioned by on-the-job stress. The trial tribunal heard the case on February 17,1994 and entered its order denying the claim on February 28. A copy of the tribunal’s memorial was sent to the parties that day.

Claimant mailed her petition for review on March 21, 1994 — the last day to bring her proceeding in this court.¹ Her paperwork was received by this court’s clerk on March 22, 1994 — more than twenty days after the February 28 order was sent. Employer moved for dismissal in its response to the petition for review and later pressed a formal motion.

II

THE TEMPORAL FRAMEWORK FOR BRINGING PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT DECISIONS

The provisions of 85 O.S. 1991 § 3.6(B)² require that a petition to review a Workers’ Compensation Court’s decision be brought within twenty days of the day a copy of the tribunal’s decision was sent to the parties. Ireton v. Saint Francis Hosp.3 holds that the mailbox rule⁴ — which is authorized by the provisions of 12 O.S.Supp. 1998 § 990A(B)⁵ —does not govern the commencement of proceedings to review a Workers’ Compensation Court’s decision. Today we overrule Ireton as an incorrect exposition of our statutory law.

Ill

THE PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY COMMANDED BY ART. 5, § 46, OKL. CONST., REQUIRES (A) THAT THE § 990A(B) MAILBOX RULE BE APPLIED TO THE REVIEW PROCESS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DECISIONS AND (B) THAT IRETON BE OVERRULED

Our sole concern here is whether the mailbox provisions of § 990A(B) — a general statutory rule of appellate procedure⁶ — should apply to proceedings for review of compensation decisions. The terms of Art. 5, § 46⁷ command that general rules of appellate process be symmetrical and apply across the board.⁸ Unless contrary reasons be clearly shown, proceedings filed in this court for review of decisions made by inferior courts and tribunals comprise but one class. To single out for less favorable treatment those who seek review of workers’ compensation decisions by denying them the benefit of the mailbox rule — legislatively fashioned and judicially implemented — would create a dichotomous division in the general adjective law governing this court’s reviewing cognizance. A disparate procedural treatment is neither explicitly nor implicitly contemplated by the statute under construction. Extending the mailbox rule to proceedings brought under § 3.6(B)⁹ would plainly satisfy the constitutional call for uniformity. More importantly, the provisions of § 990A(B)(1) do not prohibit the mailbox rule’s application to proceedings for review of compensation decisions, (2) create no burden on this court’s operation and (3) facilitate filings by persons who reside outside this court’s immediate situs. Ireton offends the umformity-of-procedure strictures demanded by Art. 5, § 46.¹⁰ It is hence overruled.

IV

SUMMARY

Fundamental fairness can only be dispensed within the framework of orderly process. General rules of appellate practice must satisfy the uniformity-of-procedure mandate of § 46. Ireton,¹¹ which created a dichotomous division in the general rule that proceedings for review are deemed filed when mailed, offends this State’s fundamental law. The mailbox rule — now recognized as applying to appeals from district court decisions¹² — must equally govern petitions for review brought under the terms of § 3.6(B).

The motion to dismiss is accordingly denied with prejudice to renewal. This appeal shall proceed to the decisional stage.

KAUGER, V.C.J., and HODGES, SIMMS and HARGRAVE, JJ., concur. ALMA WILSON, C.J., concurs in result. LAVENDER, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., dissent.

1 . Twenty days from February 28, 1994 fell on a Sunday. The petition for review was mailed the next business day — Monday, March 21.

2 . The pertinent terms of 85 O.S. 1991 § 3.6(B) are:

"The order, decision or award of the Court shall be final and conclusive upon all questions within its jurisdiction between the parties, unless, within twenty (20) days after a copy of such order, decision or award has been sent ... to the parties affected, an action is commenced in the Supreme Court of the state, to review such order, decision or award.” [Emphasis added.]

3 . Ireton v. Saint Francis Hosp., Old., 844 P.2d 151 (1992).

4 . The so-called mailbox rule was first articulated in Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng.Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818), where the court held that an offer is accepted at the moment acceptance is posted to the offeror in a correctly addressed envelope with postage prepaid. Id. at 251.

5 . The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 990A(B) are:

"The filing of the petition in error may be accomplished either by delivery or by certified mail with return receipt requested to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The date of filing or the date of mailing, as shown by the post mark affixed by the post office or other proof from the post office of the date of mailing, shall constitute the date of filing of the petition in error. If there is no proof from the post office of the date of mailing, the date of receipt by the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall constitute the date of filing of the petition in error." [Emphasis added.]

For application of the mailbox rule in Oklahoma’s extant jurisprudence, see Woods v. Woods, Okl., 830 P.2d 1372, 1374 (1992); Woody v. State ex rel. Dept, of Corrections, Old., 833 P.2d 257, 258 (1992).

6 . The mailbox rule's general impact is not diminished by the location given to § 990A(B) in Title 12, which is designated for Civil Procedure. Green v. Green, Okl., 309 P.2d 276, 278 (1957).

7 . The terms of Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const., state in pertinent part:

"The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing:

* * * * * *

Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of ... in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts ... or other tribunals_” [Emphasis supplied.]

See Reynolds v. Porter, Okl., 760 P.2d 816, 822 (1988); Maúle v. Independent School Dist. No. 9., Okl., 714 P.2d 198, 203-204 (1986).

8 . Brown v. Ford, Okl., 905 P.2d 223, 228 (1995); Simpson v. Dixon, Okl., 853 P.2d 176, 183 (1993); Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., Okl., 833 P.2d 1218, 1229 (1992); Reynolds, supra note 7 at 822; Johnson v. District Court of Oklahoma County, Old., 738 P.2d 151, 154 (1987) (Opala, L, concurring).

9 . For the pertinent terms of 85 O.S. 1991 § 3.6(B), see supra note 2.

10 . Our own jurisprudence, no less than the Legislature's enactments, must faithfully conform to the state fundamental law’s interdiction of nonuniform laws on prohibited subjects. Reynolds, supra note 7 at 822. Although directed to the Legislature, Art. 5, § 46, is no less binding on the courts. Southwestern Bell v. Okl. Corp. Com’n., Okl., 873 P.2d 1001, 1026-27 (1994) (Opala, J., dissenting.); Haynes v. Tulsa Public Schools Transit, Okl., 879 P.2d 128, 131 (1994) (Opala, J., concurring); Great Plains Federal S & L v. Dabney, Okl., 846 P.2d 1088, 1095-96 (1993) (Opala, J., concurring.).

11 . See supra note 3.

12 . See Woods and Woody, supra note 5.