Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.
Separate opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS concurring in part and dissenting in part.
PER CURIAM:
Jane Doe, a minor, by her next friend, appeals the dismissal of her complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Doe sued the District of Columbia government and two of its employees for damages for injuries she allegedly received as a result of appellees’ failure to investigate and protect her from abuse and neglect. She contends that the district court erred in ruling that (1) she cannot enforce a provision of the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) (1994), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); (2) her claims under District of Columbia law are barred by her failure to provide notice of her claim pursuant to D.C.Code AnN. § 12-309 (1995); and (3) her procedural due process claim failed because she did not have a liberty interest under the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C.Code Ann. §§ 2-1351 to -1357 (1994), 6-2102 to-2127 (1995). We affirm the dismissal of the federal statutory claim and find no merit to Doe’s due process contention. In view of the absence of controlling precedent, we certify to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals pursuant to D.C.Code Ann. § 11-723 (1995) the issues relating to notice of claim under § 12-309 and accordingly, we reserve decision on the merits of Doe’s claim under District of Columbia law.
I.
According to the complaint and record,1 the District of Columbia government determined in August 1988 that Jane Doe’s mother might be unable to house and feed her three minor children, who were living with her. Because the mother had not paid the rent on her apartment since January 1988, a social worker in the Department of Human Services (DHS) concluded after a home visit that the mother and her children were in imminent danger of being evicted and would need counseling and assistance in resettling. The social worker recommended that the family be referred to the Continuing Services Branch. Although the mother subsequently was evicted from her apartment, Doe alleges that “no further efforts were made by the Continuing Service[s] Branch to provide services necessary to protect [Jane Doe].”
In early January 1989, the mother left the three children in the care of a friend. The mother’s friend lived in a public housing apartment with her four children, her sister, and her sister’s three children; the apartment allegedly was infested with roaches and rodents and had substantial housing code violations, which endangered Doe’s health and safety. On January 20, 1989, the children’s maternal grandmother found two of the children abandoned on her front porch. Unable to care for them herself, she called the police and DHS placed both children in a shelter care facility. Jane Doe remained in the care of her mother’s friend. Although DHS assigned a social worker to the neglect case involving all three children, the grandmother’s complaints, from late February to early March 1989, to the social worker and her supervisor about the improper care that Jane Doe was receiving in the home of the mother’s friend were unavailing; neither the worker nor the supervisor investigated Jane Doe’s living conditions or responded to requests that she be removed from the friend’s home. At the time, Jane Doe was two and one-half years old.
[864]*864On February 23, 1989, Jane Doe suffered severe burns, causing permanent disfigurement on more than one-third of her body, from scalding water in a tub in the mother’s friend’s home. When the grandmother saw the burns on March 2, 1989, she called an ambulance and Jane Doe was transported to the Children’s Hospital National Medical Center. The police interviewed the mother’s friend, who admitted that she had not obtained any medical treatment for Doe’s severe injuries, and arrested her for mayhem, to which she subsequently pleaded guilty. The following day, March 3, Doe was placed in the shelter care custody of DHS; a neglect petition, signed by the social worker, was filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, pursuant to D.C.Code Ann. § 16-2301(9)(A), (B) & (F), indicating that Jane Doe remained in the legal custody of her mother.
Jane Doe remained in the hospital for more than five months, continuing in the physical custody of DHS’s shelter care program. On August 11, 1989, the Superior Court authorized Doe’s conditional release to her grandmother. On December 11, 1989, the Superior Court found, as a result of Doe’s injuries, that she was an abused and neglected child.
On January 9, 1990, more than 10 months after Doe was injured but less than five months after she was released from the hospital, counsel representing Doe in the neglect proceedings wrote a letter to the Mayor of the District of Columbia purporting to give notice under D.C.Code § 12-309 of Jane Doe’s intent to file the instant lawsuit. The letter adverted to the February 23, 1989, burns allegedly suffered when the mother’s friend submerged Doe in scalding water, and alleged that prior to suffering her injuries, her grandmother and aunt had asked DHS to remove Doe from the mother’s friend’s home because it was an unfit place for children to reside. The letter referred to complaints made prior to Doe’s injuries to the social worker, her supervisor, and the Police Department, and stated that DHS had breached a special duty owed to Doe by failing to investigate her living conditions in a timely manner and to take adequate steps to protect her.
In May 1991, the Superior Court committed Doe to the care and custody of the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C.Code ANN. § 16-2320 (1989 & Supp.1994). Nearly one year later, in April 1992, the Superior Court appointed a guardian ad litem for Doe to investigate her legal claims. On January 13, 1993, Doe’s guardian filed suit in federal district court, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pendent jurisdiction over claims under District of Columbia law.
In the complaint, Doe alleged that if appel-lees had responded to her grandmother’s reports of abuse and neglect and investigated her case, they would have removed Doe from the home of the mother’s friend before she was injured. Her federal statutory claim rests on the contention that by receiving federal funding under CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106h, the District government was obligated to investigate reports of abuse and neglect promptly, as well as to have procedures, personnel, and facilities to address effectively child abuse and neglect cases.2 Her District of Columbia statutory claim was based on the deprivation of “a panoply of rights” conferred by the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977. Doe alleged that the District government’s failure to provide adequate staff that was sufficiently trained and supervised to investigate and to have adequate information systems constituted negligence or gross negligence and violated not only her statutory rights but also her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court ruled that Doe’s federal cause of action was foreclosed by Súber v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), in which the Supreme Court held that generalized duties [865]*865imposed on the states under the Adoption Act created neither a private right of action nor a right enforceable under § 1983. The district court concluded that CAPTA likewise imposed only generalized duties and envisioned that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, not individual beneficiaries, would enforce states’ compliance. The district court also dismissed Doe’s procedural due process claim, declining to rely solely on the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act as a source of liberty interests for a plaintiff who is not in the custody of the District of Columbia. Finally, the court ruled that Doe’s claims under District of Columbia law were barred by D.C.Code § 12-309. The court concluded that the January 1990 letter from Doe’s counsel did not satisfy the statute’s mandatory six-month notice requirement and insufficiently identified the place where Doe was injured. The court further ruled that although the police reports of March 2 and 3, 1989, collectively described the place where the injuries occurred and the mother’s abandonment of her children, two of whom were in foster care, as well as the doctor’s opinion that Doe’s injuries were consistent with intentional burning, the reports did not provide statutory notice because they failed to identify any conduct that suggested the District government was liable. In so ruling, however, the district court acknowledged the “extremely close” nature of the case and the novel issue of District of Columbia law presented under § 12-309 by Doe’s extremely young age and custodial status.
II.
Doe contends that the district court erred in holding that she cannot enforce, under § 1983, a provision of CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) (1994).3 The district court correctly applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Suter, 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1, therefore we affirm the dismissal of the federal statutory claim.
The Supreme Court established in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), that § 1983 may be used to enforce violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. The Court then established two notable exceptions to § 1983’s application to statutory violations. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). First, and most important for the present case, § 1983 may not be used when the statute does not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities. See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540-41, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). Second, a plaintiff may not sue under § 1983 when it is evident that Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement.4 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-15, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2622-23, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981).
Doe’s claim fails because the section of CAPTA upon which she relies, § 5106a(b)(2), does not create an enforceable right. Specifically, § 5106a(b)(2) reads as follows:
(b) Eligibility requirements
In order for a State to qualify for a grant under subsection (a) of this section, such State shall—* * *
(2) provide that upon receipt of a report of known or suspected instances of child abuse or neglect an investigation shall be initiated promptly to substantiate the accuracy of the report, and, upon a finding of abuse or neglect, immediate steps shall be taken to protect the health and welfare of the abused or neglected child and of any other child under the same care who may be in danger of abuse or neglect.
Doe insists that this provision vests in her an enforceable right to “prompt investigation of reports of abuse or neglect.”
However, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Adoption Act in Suter, 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1, forecloses Doe’s argument. The Court held that the Adoption [866]*866Act, which contains language remarkably similar to CAPTA, imposed only generalized duties on the states, and thus it created neither a private right of action nor an enforceable right under § 1983. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 363, 112 S.Ct. at 1370-71. A careful comparison of the two statutes demonstrates that the same conclusion must be reached in this case.
Like CAPTA, the Adoption Act establishes federal funding for states provided that the states comply with the requirements delineated in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 672-74, 675(4)(A) (1988 & Supp. I). In many respects, the Adoption Act provides even greater detail than CAPTA, as it requires states to submit plans to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval and enumerates 16 qualifications that each plan must contain. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 351, 112 S.Ct. at 1363-64 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1988 & Supp. I)). The respondents in Suter based their claim for relief on two key provisions of the Adoption Act. First, they asserted a claim under § 671(a)(15), which requires states to submit a plan that:
provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home....
Second, they based a claim for relief on § 671(a)(9), which closely parallels the CAP-TA provision at issue in this case. Section 671(a)(9) requires a state plan to:
provid[e] that where any agency of the State has reason to believe that the home or institution in which a child resides ... is unsuitable for the child because of the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of such child, it shall bring such condition to the attention of the appropriate court or law enforcement agency....
Moreover, § 671(a)(3) requires the state to “provide that the plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them.”
The Supreme Court in Suter framed the relevant question as whether Congress “unambiguously conferred] upon the child beneficiaries of the Act a right to enforce” these provisions of § 671. 503 U.S. at 357, 112 S.Ct. at 1366-67 (emphasis added). Despite the mandatory language and the detailed nature of the Adoption Act and its corresponding regulations, the Court held that the statute failed to create an enforceable right. In so holding, the Court emphasized the necessity of analyzing “the statutory provisions in detail, in light of the entire legislative enactment, to determine whether the language in question” established an enforceable right. Id.
Following the Supreme Court’s analysis in Suter, we reject Doe’s claim to enforce CAP-TA under § 1983. Doe exposes no appreciable difference between the Adoption Act and CAPTA to permit us to hold otherwise. Like the Adoption Act provisions analyzed in Su-ter, the CAPTA provision at issue speaks in mandatory language. But it mandates merely that the state5 “provide that” investigations will occur when reports for abuse are received. One difference, of course, is the Adoption Act specifically requires states to submit a plan, whereas CAPTA grants states flexibility in how they choose to “provide that” investigations shall be initiated.6 The District has fulfilled this condition for funding in enacting the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C.Code ANN. §§ 6-2102(b) & 6-2103(c), which provides, inter alia, that the Child Family Services Division (CFSD) “shall commence an investigation of all reports alleging neglect other than abuse within 24 hours of the receipt of the report” and that the police department shall “immediately” investigate reports of abused children. [867]*867Even if Doe can demonstrate that the District of Columbia law was violated in this particular case, she does not have a cause of action under § 1983. Doe may not enforce the laws of the District of Columbia in federal court under § 1983, just as the respondents in Suter were not permitted to enforce the provisions contained in Illinois’ plan under the Adoption Act. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 358-59, 112 S.Ct. at 1367-68 (noting that Illinois complied with the funding mandates in the Adoption Act by submitting a plan with appropriate provisions, but refusing to allow private individuals to enforce those provisions under § 1983).
Doe asserts that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990), merits a contrary conclusion. Admittedly, Suter and Wilder both involved statutory schemes and language of similar character. Yet the Court in Wilder found an enforceable right whereas the Court in Su-ter did not. See, e.g., Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605, 607 (D.C.Cir.) (recognizing the implicit tension between Suter and Wilder in determining that there is an enforceable right under the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11489 (1994)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 578, 130 L.Ed.2d 493 (1994). The two cases are reconciled, albeit tenuously, by carefully interpreting the statutes “on [their] own terms.” Id. We follow Suter’s lead in distinguishing the language at issue in Suter from the language at issue in Wilder and, in turn, categorizing the language in the present case. In Suter, the Supreme Court was careful to point out that the Medicaid legislation at issue in Wilder “set forth in some detail the factors to be considered” in setting rates. The Court distinguished the Adoption Act, noting that it provided no guidance in how to measure reasonable efforts. The Court in Suter made this determination despite regulations promulgated under the Adoption Act which provide a laundry list of services that may be included in a state’s proposal. CAPTA analogously fails to offer a definition of what constitutes a “prompt investigation.” The CAPTA regulations, like those promulgated under the Adoption Act, merely offer myriad suggestions of what an investigation may include. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(d), (f) (1995). Unlike the regulations in Wilder, the CAPTA regulations do not mandate factors that must be part of an “investigation.” See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519, 110 S.Ct. at 2522-23 (noting that “the statute and regulation set out factors which a State must consider in adopting its rates”) (emphasis added). The striking parallels to the Adoption Act and its related regulations place this case squarely under the rationale of Suter and therefore Wilder is distinguishable.7 Our holding today comports with our decision in Lampkin, 27 F.3d at 607-12, because unlike the McKinney Act, § 5016a(b)(2) of CAPTA does not provide sufficiently specific, mandatory terms requiring states to investigate in a particular manner or time frame. Lamp-kin thus more closely resembles Wilder, whereas Suter dictates the result in this case. Like the Adoption Act, CAPTA “is at least as plausibly read to impose only a rather generalized duty on the State.... ” Suter, 503 U.S. at 363, 112 S.Ct. at 1370. Section 5106a(b)(2) of CAPTA fails to unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon its beneficiaries, therefore Doe’s claim under § 1983 was appropriately rejected by the district court.
III.
In her initial brief to this Court, Doe claims that she suffered a deprivation of procedural due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The D.C. Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977,8 she [868]*868claims, vested in her an entitlement to “protective services” triggered by the procedures laid out in the Act and by the DHS’ alleged determination that she was in need of such services. When the DHS failed to follow up on that determination, the argument goes, it deprived her of her entitlement to protective services, without due process of law. This argument is severely flawed.
It is clear that state law which generates a legitimate claim of entitlement can create an interest the deprivation of which triggers application of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi 443 U.S. 55, 64 & n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649 & n. 11, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979); Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 904 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083, 111 S.Ct. 955, 112 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1991). It is equally clear, however, that state-created procedures do not create such an entitlement where none would otherwise exist. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1748, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (“Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.”); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471, 103 S.Ct. 864, 871, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (noting that the existence of “a careful procedural structure” does not give rise to a protected liberty interest); Griffith v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 842 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C.Cir.1988). Doe’s procedural due process claim will fail, then, unless she can show that the procedures that the DHS allegedly failed to follow were enacted pursuant to a substantive constitutional obligation to protect Doe from abuse or neglect. As the Supreme Court made clear in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), Doe cannot make such a showing.
Indeed, Doe’s “procedural” due process claim appears to be little more than a recasting of the substantive due process claim rejected by the Supreme Court in DeShaney. In DeShaney, a child and his mother sued a county department of social services and several of its workers for failing to take action to prevent the abuse of the child by his father. The Supreme Court held that the defendants’ failure to act did not make out a claim, since “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” 489 U.S. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004. In an effort to avoid DeShaney, Doe disclaims reliance on “substantive due process” as such. Rather, she contends that her claim is based on a statutory entitlement to protective services and is thus not governed by DeShaney, which explicitly declined to consider whether the relevant child protection statutes gave the plaintiff there an “ ‘entitlement’ which ... enjoy[ed] due process protection.” 489 U.S. at 195 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 1003 n. 2. As noted, however, process alone does not give rise to a protected substantive interest: by codifying procedures for investigating child abuse and neglect reports, D.C. has not assumed a constitutional obligation to protect children from such abuse and neglect. The fact that Doe can point to a D.C. statute mandating investigation does not, therefore, convert a meritless substantive due process claim into a fruitful procedural one.
Even if Doe were able to allege an interest the deprivation of which requires due process, she could not prevail. By framing her claim as one of procedural due process, Doe necessarily presents the question of what, if any, additional process is due. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Beo v. District of Columbia, 44 F.3d 1026, 1028 (D.C.Cir.1995). And in a ease such as this, where the alleged deprivation of liberty or property is not pursuant to an established state procedure, the existence of an adequate [869]*869post-deprivation remedy under state tort law is all the process that is due. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 118, 129-30, 110 S.Ct. 975, 985-86, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-34, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3203-04, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913-14, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Doe does not call into question the adequacy of her tort remedy under D.C. law,9 and so she fails to identify a remedy for the alleged violation of her procedural rights. That is, for purposes of due process, she has failed “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
To support her “procedural” due process claim, Doe relies on Taylor by and Through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1337, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989). In Taylor, a foster child sued Georgia state and county officials, alleging violations of both substantive and procedural due process for their failure to prevent the abuse the child suffered at the hands of her foster mother. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the en banc Eleventh Circuit reversed. With respect to substantive due process, the court in Taylor found a liberty interest in “the right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary pain ... and the fundamental right to physical safety.” Id. at 794. By “assuming the responsibility of finding and keeping the child in a safe environment,” the state undertook an obligation to ensure “the continuing safety of that environment,” and failure to meet that obligation violated the child’s substantive due process rights. Id. at 795. We need not consider here whether the substantive due process holding of Taylor was overruled by DeSha-ney, or, instead, whether it can be distinguished on the basis of the state’s role in placing the child in a foster home, cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2460, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (holding that a child confined to a state mental health hospital has a substantive due process interest in reasonably safe living conditions). For, as noted above, DeShaney squarely bars a due process claim, whether phrased as “substantive” or “procedural,” based solely on the theory that the state knew or should have known that a child was going to be abused or neglected, and that it failed to prevent that abuse or neglect.
In Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit also determined that the “comprehensive” Georgia child care scheme created in the plaintiff child “a legitimate and sufficiently vested claim of entitlement such that deprivation of that entitlement without due process of law impose[d] on her a grievous loss.” 818 F.2d at 798 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). Emphasizing that the child was “entitled to be protected in the manner provided by statute,” the court held that the Georgia child care scheme gave rise “to a Roth-type claim.” Id. at 800. In so holding, however, the court did not suggest what, if any, additional process the state should provide prior to depriving the child of her entitlement to services. See id. at 822 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the procedural due process holding of the case is fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that it is not the deprivation of the protected interest itself that violates procedural due process; rather, it is the deprivation without due process of law. See, e.g., Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 871-72; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537, 101 S.Ct. at 1913-14; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349, 96 S.Ct. at 909-10. To the extent Taylor held that one can allege a procedural due process violation without even suggesting what sort of process is due, we disagree.
The Seventh Circuit has rejected a due process claim remarkably similar to Doe’s. See Doe by Nelson v. Milwaukee, 903 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir.1990).10 Doe by Nel[870]*870son involved the alleged failure of social services workers to investigate and protect against abuse, as mandated by statute, after learning of the possibility of abuse. After noting that DeShaney barred the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, see 903 F.2d at 502, the court found their procedural due process claim based on the procedures mandated by state law “untenable.” Id. at 504. The plaintiffs could not assert an entitlement to the procedures required by state law because “ ‘[plrocess is not an end in itself,’ ” but is rather a means to the end of protecting substantive rights. 903 F.2d at 503 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1748-49, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983)). Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs’ in Doe by Nelson could assert the existence of an entitlement to protective services, the court there could not fathom what process, beyond the available state remedy, “could possibly suffice to prevent the wrongful ‘deprivation.’ ” 903 F.2d at 504. Pointing out that “not every violation of state law infringes upon constitutional rights,” the court rightly emphasized that a contrary rule would circumvent the Supreme Court’s holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from ordering state officials to comply with state law. Id. at 504-05 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984)). The Doe by Nelson court concluded, as we conclude here, that the proper means by which a plaintiff may seek redress for an alleged failure to comply with state and local child protection statutes is an action for damages under state and local law. See 903 F.2d at 505.
Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of asserting a procedural due process claim based on the DHS’ failure to follow up on Doe’s need for protective services, Doe switches gears in her reply brief to this court. Disclaiming interest in any “procedural safeguard ... other than a state tort remedy,” Doe now seeks to base her due process claim on the application — or, to be precise, the threatened application — of D.C.’s notice-of-claim provision, see D.C.Code Ann. § 12-309. That is, Doe claims that § 12-309 as applied by the District Court “arbitrarily denied [Doe] an opportunity to remedy the defendants’ failure to provide her entitled services.” Although we need not reach this claim in light of our certification to the D.C. Court of Appeals of the question whether § .12-309 bars Doe’s tort claim, we do note that such a claim faces an uphill battle. Even if the D.C. Court of Appeals finds Doe’s tort claim barred by § 12-309, Doe may not be able to establish that she has been deprived of a legal claim to redress under D.C. law. Although the Supreme Court has held that a legal claim is a type of “property” that the state cannot deprive one of without due process of law, see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1153-54, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that a failure to satisfy § 12-309 means that no right of action accrues, see Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C.1981). Moreover, as emphasized above, a procedural due process claim requires the plaintiff to identify the process that is due. Even assuming that barring Doe under § 12-309 deprives her of a property right under Logan, it is difficult to discern any additional process that could inure to Doe’s benefit. She will have had the opportunity to argue, first in District Court, then in this court, and, finally, in the D.C. Court of Appeals, that § 12-309 does not and should not bar her claim. And if Doe is ultimately forced to contend that § 12-309 cannot as a constitutional matter bar her claim regardless of the amount of process she receives, she must contend with the presumptive constitutional validity of the principled application of state procedural and jurisdictional bars. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 342, 106 S.Ct. 677, 680, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (Stevens, J., concurring); Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314-16, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142-43, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945). As the Supreme Court stated in Logan, “the State certainly accords due pro[871]*871cess when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural or evi-dentiary rule.” 455 U.S. at 437, 102 S.Ct. at 1158.
IV.
Turning to Doe’s claims under District of Columbia law, we first address a procedural objection raised by appellees. For the first time on appeal, appellees contend that the district court lacked jurisdiction over these claims because, having dismissed Doe’s federal and constitutional claims, the district court lacked pendent jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Because appel-lees’ objection goes only to the prudential factors underlying supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1994), this objection has been waived.
A claim that the court lacks jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution may not be waived, since the jurisdiction at issue goes to the foundation of the court’s power to resolve a case, and the court is obliged to address it sua sponte. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). By contrast, in the context of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), Article III is satisfied once it is clear that the complaint raises a substantial federal question and that the federal and state claims arise from a “common nucleus of operative facts.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Appellees do not contest the court’s Article III power; rather, they object to the district court’s discretionary exercise of its jurisdiction over the District of Columbia law claims in Doe’s complaint in view of the difficult questions of District of Columbia law that she presents. The discretionary aspect to supplemental jurisdiction is waivable. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 627, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 1336-37, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974). Appel-lees failed to make this objection in the district court, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances, which appellees do not claim, the objection comes too late. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 419 & n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1992).11 Because appellees have waived their objection to pendent jurisdiction, we turn to the merits of Doe’s claims under District of Columbia law.
Doe brings an action for negligence, in which appellees’ duty of care is based on the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act. In Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662, 675 (D.C.1987), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held under similar circumstances that the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act could create a “special duty”:
With respect to the District of Columbia ... we hold that when [Child Protective Services] received a report that the two Roddy children, who were specifically and individually identified, were being abused by their father, the Child Abuse Prevention Act created a special relationship between the District and the two children. From that moment on, the District had a duty to take certain steps prescribed by the Act for the protection of those children. The District’s breach of that duty is actionable under the special duty exception to the general rule [that general duties owed to the public at large are not enforceable by particular individuals].
A threshold requirement to filing suit, however, is presented by D.C.Code Ann. § 12-309, which provides that:
An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the Metropolitan Po[872]*872lice Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section.
The district court concluded that the letter sent to the Mayor by Doe’s counsel was untimely and that the police reports failed to provide sufficient notice of the “cause” of Doe’s injury.
Doe concedes that the January 9, 1990, letter to the Mayor from her counsel did not conform to the literal terms of § 12-309’s six-month time limit. Doe makes two arguments for why she satisfies the condition precedent for suit. First, she maintains that § 12-309 was equitably tolled by her status as a minor who was in the custody of the District government for a substantial part of the six-month period immediately following her injury and who had no natural or legal guardian to act on her behalf. In addition, Doe claims that the District government, through the DHS, had actual notice of her claim, which should be deemed sufficient. In the alternative, she maintains that the police reports satisfied the second sentence in § 12-309. Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has often had the occasion to construe the notice requirement of § 12-309, we are unaware of any case in which the court has confronted the precise issues that Doe presents, and Doe has moved to certify questions of law to that court.12
A.
The leading decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals most closely on point do not indicate whether that court would hold that Doe’s incapacity excused her non-compliance with § 12-309. In Hill v. District of Columbia, 345 A.2d 867 (D.C. 1975), the court rejected an adult’s claim that incapacity excused the tardiness of his § 12-309 letter. Hill was a patient at D.C. General Hospital, whose condition required that he be sedated and strapped to his bed. As a result of a fire in the bed on June 8,1973, he sustained injuries that required that he be hospitalized for another five months, during which time he received a large quantity of sedatives and had five skin graft operations. After his discharge on November 6, 1973, Hill returned to the hospital as an out-patient for physical therapy for some time thereafter. He obtained counsel in January 1974, and his counsel sent a § 12-309 letter 46 days after the six-month deadline expired. Assuming that Hill was incapacitated and unable to give the requisite notice due to the fault of the District of Columbia during his five months’ hospitalization, the court nonetheless rejected his argument that he should be given a reasonable period of time to file notice once he regained his ability to do so. Id. at 868. In granting summary judgment to the District government, the court concluded that Hill’s allegations were insufficient to raise a genuine issue as to whether a wrongful act by the hospital made him incapable of providing notice during the month after he was discharged, in which time the six-month period had not yet expired. Id. at 869.
In Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376 (D.C.1981), the court held that § 12-309 was not tolled for infancy. The court noted generally that “[s]ection 12-309 was purely a notice provision specifically designed to avoid, as applied to the District [government], the pitfalls of the statute of limitations.” Id. at 1378. The court reaffirmed both that § 12-309 is to be strictly construed because it is a departure from the common law concept of sovereign immunity, id. (citing Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362, 1365 (D.C.1981) (en banc)), and that “notice under § 12-309 is a ‘condition precedent’ to filing a suit against the District,” such that “unless timely notice is given, no ‘right of action’ or ‘entitlement to maintain an action’ accrues,” id. (distinguishing tolling of statutes for limitations due to infancy, under D.C.Code Ann. § 12-302). At age 11, Gwinn was injured in a playground accident at a local school, eventually losing all sight in his left eye as a result. He filed suit nine years later, never having provided [873]*873written notice to the Mayor. The court rejected Gwinn’s argument that § 12-309 should be tolled during his minority. Id. at 1377. Adverting to Congress’ decision to give District government officials “prompt notice of claims for potentially large sums of money so that they could: quickly investigate before evidence became lost or witnesses unavailable; correct hazardous or potentially hazardous conditions; and settle meritorious claims,” the court acknowledged that the statute gives the District government a “ ‘liti-gative advantage over an ordinary civil defendant who may learn of claims against him for unliquidated damages at any time within the long statute of limitations period.’ ” Id. at 1378 (quoting Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C.1978)).
Of course, neither Hill nor Gwinn is directly analogous to Doe’s case. She does not claim merely that she was incapacitated during her hospitalization for her injuries nor simply that she was a minor, but rather that she was in the physical and legal custody of the District government for most of the six-month period until she was conditionally released in the care of her grandmother. The district court ruled that it “c[ould] not excuse her grandmother’s neglect in failing to file a timely § 12-309 notice letter.” Both the statute and the case law are silent on the proper course to be followed when a child’s legal guardian has abandoned her, as Doe’s mother did. Furthermore, the grandmother’s obligation to send a § 12-309 letter is unclear inasmuch as the conditional release order of August 11, 1989, placed Doe in her grandmother’s care only after the grandmother received training at a rehabilitation center in Charlottesville, Virginia. As Doe points out, the Superior Court did not appoint the grandmother as legal guardian. Further, as the district court noted, it is unclear whether, under District of Columbia law, Doe’s attorney in the neglect proceeding had an ethical obligation also to protect her tort claims under District of Columbia law. Cf. S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d 870, 875-78 (D.C.1991).
In Hill, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals expressly left open the question “whether we would construe our statute as providing an additional period for compliance where the fault of the government makes timely compliance unreasonable or impossible.” 345 A.2d at 869 & n. 3; see also Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 1379 n. 4 (noting that this question has been “left unanswered”). This court recognized that the effect of a plaintiffs incapacity under § 12-309 was an open question in Hunter v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 74 (D.C.Cir.1991). Furthermore, in Hill the District of Columbia Court of Appeals declared that it did not need to “reach the constitutional due process question which would be presented if [Hill’s] acknowledged incapacity ... had more nearly approached or exceeded the.six-month statutory notice period.” Id. at 870 n. 4.
The court notes also that when Congress enacted § 12-309, it purported to provide for the District of Columbia the same type of notice statute that existed in most states. In Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1502 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073, 105 S.Ct. 2153, 85 L.Ed.2d 509 (1985), this court observed that in the legislative history to § 12-309, Congress “explicitly analogized to similar legislation passed in the states to govern other municipalities.” Congress “equated the provision with laws commonly passed by state governments. The report accompanying the bill pointed out that ‘[sjimilar statutes are in effect in 32 States’ and sought to justify the length of time allowed for giving notice by comparing it to the provisions in effect in 'other jurisdictions.’” Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 2010, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1933)). Consequently, the fact that the highest courts in a number of states with notice statutes have construed their statutes in a divergent manner raises the question of how the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would apply § 12-309 to Doe’s case.13 [874]*874We express no view as to how the D.C. Court of Appeals will construe § 12-309 in the context of the facts before us.
B.
Two other related areas of uncertainty exist under § 12-309. Appellees contend that the January 1990 letter sent to the Mayor by Doe’s attorney failed to satisfy the “place” requirement of § 12-309. As we understand their position, the letter was deficient because it did not state that Doe was injured in her mother’s friend’s home or provide that address. A recent decision by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that notice was adequate where the date and time of the injury were slightly inaccurate, reaffirming the court’s position that although the time provisions of the statute must be strictly construed, “greater liberality is appropriate with respect to the content of the notice.” Wharton v. District of Columbia, 666 A.2d 1227, 1230 (D.C.1995) (citing Washington, 429 A.2d at 1365 n. 9). In that case, the date stated in the notice was off by one day and the time was off by 12 hours, which, the court concluded, amounted to a “minor discrepancy.” Id. at 1231. The court noted that the “statutory purposes focus on fairness to the District, and not on technical perfection.” Id.
Still, the situation presented by Doe’s letter is different, and the omissions, particularly the lack of an address, may not be “minor” when the letter is viewed in isolation. And that is the question. For it can be argued that the letter contained references to records by which the District could have learned the place and address where Doe’s injuries occurred. Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has declined to go beyond the four corners of the § 12-309 letter or police report in determining whether statutory notice has been given, see Washington, 429 A.2d at 1367; Braxton v. National Capital Hous. Auth., 396 A.2d 215, 217 (per cu-riam), it has not addressed a situation where a minor was in the District government’s care for all except possibly the last 10 days of the six-month notice period, when the court authorized her release to her grandmother. In addition, the police reports independently provided the address of Doe’s mother’s friend’s apartment, where Doe was scalded. See Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 476 (D.C.Cir.), vacated, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C.Cir.1977), reinstated in relevant part, 580 F.2d 647 (D.C.Cir.1978) (en banc). But the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has approved the view that this court took in Rieser only to the point of holding that “precedents considering whether a particular police report has satisfied the notice requirement of Section 309 ... follow a case-by-case approach in an area where no ‘bright line’ tests are applicable.” Pitts, 391 A.2d at 808. Thus, it is unclear whether the specification of the “place” of injury in the police reports can supplement the notice-of-claim letter.
Appellees also contend that the police reports did not suffice to meet the notice [875]*875requirement of § 12-309 because they omit the critical element of “cause.” In order to satisfy § 12-309, “a police report ‘must contain information as to time, place, cause and circumstances of injury or damage with at least the same degree of specificity required of a written notice.’ ” Campbell v. District of Columbia, 568 A.2d 1076, 1078 (D.C.1990) (quoting Miller v. Spencer, 330 A.2d 250, 252 (D.C.1974)). The police reports in Doe’s case revealed the location, approximate time of the accident, and the person who was responsible for placing Doe in the scalding water, and were prepared in the regular course of duty. However, a police report only sets forth “cause” within the meaning of § 12-309 “if it recites facts from which it could be reasonably anticipated that a claim against the District might arise.” Pitts, 391 A.2d at 809; see also Washington, 429 A.2d at 1366 (stating that notice is sufficient if it “described the injuring event with sufficient detail to reveal, in itself, a basis for the District’s potential liability”).
The closest cases in Doe’s favor are Rieser and Pitts. In Rieser the plaintiff sued on behalf of a woman who was raped and murdered by a parolee under the supervision of the District government. The police reports indicated the identity of the victim and the parolee, and the fact that the parolee was working at the site where the crimes occurred. 563 F.2d at 476-77. In Pitts, the police report stated that a child had fallen through a guard rail at a public housing project; the report did not indicate that the railing was damaged or defective. 391 A.2d at 809-10. In both cases, the courts found § 12-309 was satisfied. Appellees, like the district court, rely on Braxton v. District of Columbia, 396 A.2d at 217-18, where the police reports simply stated that unidentified burglars had broken into an apartment in a public housing complex. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the police reports did not satisfy § 12-309 because they stated that the door had been pried open while the plaintiff later sued the District government for negligence in keeping track of the master key; nothing indicated that the mode of entry had been by a skeleton key possessed by a housing authority official. Hence, the reports did “not state such cause and circumstances as would give the District of Columbia notice of a forthcoming claim that careless handling of a master key on the part of [the housing authority] enabled the burglary to take place.” Id.
The district court read Braxton as holding that a police report that suggests the responsibility of an intervening actor will not sufficiently put the District government on notice under § 12-309 of its potential liability. Although that view is inconsistent with Rieser, Doe’s interpretation of the police reports requires an expansive reading of § 12-309’s “cause” requirement. While the reports do state that Doe’s mother had abandoned her and that two of Doe’s siblings were in foster care, from which one might infer that the District owed a duty of care toward Doe, the reports omit the critical fact that Doe’s grandmother repeatedly attempted to contact DHS workers about Doe’s circumstances. The district court nonetheless viewed the sufficiency of the notice in the police reports as a very close call. Uncertain of how the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would decide this question, we include it in our certified question.
Therefore, because the court concludes that “there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,” D.C.Code Ann. § 11-723, the court certifies the question whether § 12-309 bars Doe from proceeding with her claims under District of Columbia law against the District government and two of its employees for negligence, based on the District of Columbia Child Abuse and Prevention Act.14
Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of the federal cause of action, concludes there is no merit to Doe’s procedural due process contention, and certifies the D.C.Code Ann. § 12-309 issues to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
[876]*876
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION OF LAW
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals pursuant to D.C.Code Ann. § 11-723
On May 6, 1996, a panel of the United States Court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard oral argument in Doe v. District of Columbia, et al., 93 F.3d 861 (D.C.Cir.1996). It appears from the briefs and oral arguments that a question of statutory interpretation under D.C.Code Ann. § 12-309 will determine the outcome of the appeal with respect to Doe’s claims under District of Columbia law. It further appears that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has issued no controlling precedent addressing the determinative questions. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is not now positioned to render a secure disposition of the entire cause and, therefore, on its own motion, consistent with Doe’s motion, certifies the determinative question of law to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
The question of law to be answered is this: Are Jane Doe’s claims for negligence, based on the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C.Code ANN. §§ 2-1351 to -1357, 6-2101 to -2127, against the District of Columbia and two of its employees barred under D.C.Code ANN. § 12-309? In addressing this question, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals should consider the issues addressed in Part IV of the opinion issued in this case on the date of the certification.