Justice HOBBS
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This case arises out of an eminent domain proceeding brought by the respondent, E-470 Public Highway Authority ("E-470"), to acquire a portion of the Hellerstein property ("property") from the petitioners, Jeanne Y. Jagow, Trustee; Stephen A. Hellerstein, Trustee; Stephen A. Hellerstein, Successor Trustee to LA. Hellerstein, Trustee; and Howard L. Farkas (collectively "Heller-stein"). E-470 condemned a portion of the Hellerstein property for construction of the E-470 Highway. The valuation commission entered a condemnation award of $1,828,691.15 for the value of the property taken, $2,888,272.80 for alleged damages to the remainder property, and $297,000.00 for special benefits. The court of appeals overturned the remainder property damages award as unsupported by the evidence and excessive as a matter of law. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798, 804 (Colo.App.2001). We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' judgment.1
We hold that the $2.88, million award for damages to the remainder property had no support in the evidence and was excessive as a matter of law. At the valuation hearing, Hellerstein had the burden of proof to establish: (1) the existence of damages to the remainder property; (2) the E-470 Highway project caused these damages; and (8) the amount of compensation owed. La Plata Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cummins, 728 P.2d 696, 696-97 (Colo.1986); Troiano v. Colo. Dep't of Highways, 170 Colo. 484, 491, 463 P.2d 448, 451 (1969).
We conclude that the evidence does not support the remainder property damages award. Other than the $100,000 cost to redo the development plan, Hellerstein identified no compensable, quantifiable damages to the remainder property unrelated to loss of access, a damage factor that was held inadmissible by the trial court. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' judgment.
I.
E-470 filed a Petition in Condemnation to acquire a portion of the Hellerstein property for construction of the highway. The entire Hellerstein property comprised approximately 351 acres of undeveloped land. The City of Aurora had annexed and designated the property as commercial, office, and industrial use areas under its Master Plan. The property is located near the northwest corner of the interchange of Gun Club Road and Interstate 70. In the eminent domain proceeding, E-470 acquired approximately 60.9 acres claimed in fee, 11.3 acres in permanent easements, and 1.3 acres in temporary construction easements.
Prior to the valuation trial, the trial court held an in limine evidentiary hearing regarding alleged damages to the remainder property. Hellerstein's experts were pre-
[1155]*1155pared to testify at the valuation trial that the value of the remainder property would be significantly diminished by the loss of access that would result from the construction of the E-470 Highway. Hellerstein's first expert, Mr. Peterson, would have assigned the remainder property a pre-taking value of $8,230,000.00 and a post-taking value of $4,330,000.00, resulting in damages of $3,900,000.00. Hellerstein's second expert, Mr. Van Court, would have assigned the remainder property a pre-taking value of $6,981,450.00 and a post-taking value of $2,948,400.00, resulting in damages of $4,033,050.00. E-470's expert, Mr. Hegarty, would have determined that the remainder property had not been damaged by the E-470 Highway project, but rather had benefited from it. Thus, he valued the remainder property at $2,517,000.00 before the taking, and $2,798,000.00 after the taking, resulting in a special benefit of $281,000.00.
However, the trial court ruled that the E-470 project did not substantially impair access to the remainder of the property. See State Dep't of Highways v. Davis, 626 P.2d 661, 665-66 (Colo.1981); Trotano, 170 Colo. at 495, 468 P.2d at 453 ("Colorado cases have held that mere inconvenience and mere circuity of route necessary for access or egress occasioned by a public improvement are not compensable items of damage."). The trial court therefore ordered Hellerstein not to present evidence concerning impairment of access to the remainder property, and held that any evidence concerning that factor of damage would be inadmissible at the valuation trial before the commissioners.2
Following the trial court's ruling, E-470's counsel argued that Hellerstein's experts should not be allowed to testify before the commission at all, because they could not segregate out damages due to lack of access from their appraisals. The trial court denied E-470's request, stating that the experts would be allowed to testify, but that any testimony given by them "should not reflect any compensation as they have found it to be related to access." The court then asked Hellerstein's attorney to describe the testimony that the experts would give in light of this pre-trial ruling:
THE COURT:
When and what are they going to testify?
MR. OPPERMAN [Hellerstein's Counsell: I believe at this point, Your Honor, as it's related to damages, Mr. Bagley would testify to his cost to redo the Century 21 subdivision in the $80,000 or $80,000 plus, and that was disclosed in his deposition and his report. Mr. Peterson will testify to $100,000 as his opinion of the value to redo the subdivision plat. Mr. Van Court will testify that if there are any damages to the remainder, they would be what Mr. Bag-ley has stated to be for the redrawing or reprocessing the subdivision plat pursuant to the Court's order limiting damages in this case. So we would expect to put on our testimony with respect to the value of the whole in the before condition or value of the taking in the before condition and our limited damages based upon the Court's ruling allowing us to put in damages other than anything related to access. Now, with that statement, the one concern is obviously redoing the plat. Also redoing the access points.
THE COURT:
So far as it relates to redoing the plat, that doesn't relate to the ruling I just made.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the offer of proof did not include the access issue.
At the valuation hearing before the commissioners, Hellerstein put its three identified experts on the stand in their case-in-chief. None of these experts testified to an after-taking value of the remainder property. Mr. Peterson and Mr. Van Court testified to their before-taking valuation of the property and certain factors that would affect the property's value after the taking. However, they did not identify any damages to the [1156]*1156remainder property unrelated to loss of access, nor did they assign a monetary value to any alleged damages caused by the E-470 project. Mr. Bagley testified that it would cost $100,000 to redo the planning and zoning of the remainder property.
E-470's expert, Mr. Hegarty, testified that the remainder property had not been damaged by the E-470 Highway project, but rather had benefited from it.
At the conclusion of the valuation trial, the commission rendered a Certificate of Ascertainment and Assessment which assessed the following: $1,8323,691.15 for the value of the property taken; $2,888,272.80 for damages to the remainder property; and $297,000.00 for specific benefits accruing to the remainder property. The trial court denied E-470's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It found that, based upon its review of the evidence and the available trial tran-seripts, there was a factual basis presented to the commission to support its damage assessment. Therefore, the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the com-rnission's assessment.
On appeal, the court of appeals overturned the award of $2.88 million for damages to the remainder property as unsupported by the evidence and excessive as a matter of law. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798, 804 (Colo.App.2001)("Even considering the testimony of [Hellerstein's] witnesses, there is no basis in the record for a damages award in this amount. Accordingly, the trial court should have granted [E-470's] motion for post-trial relief as to this issue."). It found that no evidence was presented to the commission to support a damages award in excess of $100,000. It then directed the trial court to offer Hellerstein the option of a remittitur, or, if Hellerstein did not accept the remittitur, to order a new trial on the amount of compensation due for damages to the remainder property3 Id. at 805.
IL
We hold that the $2.88 million award for damages to the remainder property had no support in the evidence and was excessive as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' judgment.
A.
Eminent Domain Proceedings
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation. Colo. Const. art. II, § 15. Damages to the remainder property are cognizable under Colorado law. "When a portion of a landowner's property is taken, just compensation includes compensation for injury to the remainder of the property as well as payment for the portion actually taken." La Plata Elec. Ass'n, 728 P.2d at 698.
In an eminent domain proceeding, the court determines all questions and issues except the amount of compensation. § 38-1-101, 10 C.R.S. (2001). A board of commissioners of not less than three disinterested and impartial freeholders ascertains the amount of compensation. Id.4 The trial judge's function is to convene the commission, make evidentiary rulings, and instruct the commission regarding the applicable and proper law to be followed in arriving at their assessment:
Specifically, the duties of the court, in the absence of a jury, are initially to appoint the commissioners, administer the oath of office to them, fix the time and place of their first meeting, instruct them in writing as to their duties and, at the conclusion of the testimony, instruct them in writing as to the applicable and proper law to be [1157]*1157followed by them in arriving at their ascer- - tainment. The court shall upon request make rulings upon the propriety of the proofs and objections of the parties.
Bd. of County Commr's v. Vail Assocs., 171 Colo. 381, 391-92, 468 P.2d 842, 847-48 (1970).
The role of the commission is to ascertain the present, reasonable market value of the property. Goldstein v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 192 Colo. 422, 424, 560 P.2d 80, 82 (1977); Stark v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 192 Colo. 396, 398, 560 P.2d 77, 79 (1977)("The role of the commission is simply to determine the true market value."). The commission must consider any competent evidence that a prospective seller or buyer would consider as tending to affect the present market value of the land, apart from those factors precluded by the trial court. Goldstein, 192 Colo. at 425, 560 P.2d at 83. The commission determines what weight to give the evidence. Id. at 427, 560 P.2d at 84. Nevertheless, the commissioners must confine their evaluation of the market value of the property to the evidence before them. Stark, 192 Colo. at 399, 560 P.2d at 80.
At the valuation trial, the property owner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the basis and amount of any damages to its remaining property caused by the taking. Trotano, 170 Colo. at 491, 463 P.2d at 451 ("The property owner had the burden of proof with regard to establishing the existence of damages and the amount of compensation therefor."). Mere depreciation in value alone does not amount to grounds for awarding compensation. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 179 (Colo.1998)("In no case has mere depreciation in value been grounds to award just compensation for a damaging of property."); La Plata Elec. Ass'n, 728 P.2d at 698 (holding that the proper measure of compensation for damages to the remainder property is "the reduction in the market value of the remaining property that is caused by the taking ")(emphasis added).
There must be competent evidence in the record to show that the taking caused the depreciation in value. Loa Plate Elec. Ass'n, 728 P.2d at 698; City & County of Denver v. Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 181-82, 493 P.2d 348, 350-51 (1972)(reversing damages awarded in condemnation proceedings where, even though jury was properly instructed, there was no admissible evidence supporting the damages award). Once the property owner has met its burden of showing that the condemnation project caused the depreciation in value to the remainder property, then the compensation owed for damages to the remainder property is measured by the reduction in the remainder's market value resulting from the taking, offset by the amount of any special benefits La Plate Elec. Ass'n, 728 P .2d at 698.
The commission's certificate of ascertainment and assessment is accorded the same degree of deference as a jury verdict. Aldrich v. Dist. Court, 714 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Colo.1986). We do not set aside the commission's valuation determination unless the amount of the award is clearly inadequate or excessive as a matter of law.
Where an award of damages is manifestly excessive in light of the evidence presented, a court has the power under C.R.C.P. 59 to grant a new trial or, in the alternative, to deny a new trial on the condition that the plaintiff agree to a remittitur of the amount of damages found to be excessive. CRCP. 59; Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broad. Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Colo.1988); Mortensen v. Mortensen, 135 Colo. 167, 168, 309 P.2d 197, 198 (1957)(holding that a commissioners' report in an eminent domain proceeding, unsupported by any findings and based on undisputed evidence, does not bind the court). A remittitur is permissible where excessive damages are not the result of passion or prejudice. Burns, 659 P.2d at 1356.
We review the case before us to determine whether the commission's award for damages to the remainder property was supported by the evidence. A commission's award of damages will be set aside only where no credible evidence supports it:
In the face of conflicting evidence, the appellate court will generally refuse to modify the decision, as long as there is some credible evidence in the record to [1158]*1158support it. The court will not, so long as the award is within the range of eredible testimony, reweigh the evidence or retry the facts. Where, however, the amount of the award is not supported by any evidence and is, in fact, contrary to the evidence adduced at the trial, the appellate court may set aside the award even though it is based in part upon a view of the premises by the trier of the facts. ~
5 Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 17.1[4], 17-14 to -21 (8d ed.2000). In examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we must also consider whether the con-demnee met its burden of proof to demonstrate the existence, cause, and amount of damages to the remainder property. Troiamo, 170 Colo. at 491, 463 P.2d at 451.
"We defer to the trial court's findings of fact and conduct de novo review of its legal conclusions." Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1998-1 v. City of Boulder, 17 P.3d 797, 802 (Colo.2001).
Whether sufficient evidence supports the damage award, and whether the condemnee has met its burden of proof with regard to establishing such damages, are matters of law we review de novo.
B.
Damages to the Remainder Property Award
We therefore review the valuation hearing record to determine whether credible evidence supported the commission's assessment. We conclude that the evidence did not support the commission's award for damages to the remainder property, and was excessive as a matter of law.
At the valuation hearing, Hellerstein had the burden of proof to establish: (1) the existence of damages to the remainder property; (2) the E-470 Highway project caused these damages; and (8) the amount of compensation owed. La Plata Elec. Ass'n, 728 P.2d at 696-97; Troigno, 170 Colo. at 491, 463 P.2d at 451, We conclude that Heller-stein did. not meet its burden of proof in regards to the $2.88 million awarded for damages to the remainder property. Other than the $100,000 cost to redo the development plan, Hellerstein identified no compen-sable, quantifiable damages to the remainder property unrelated to loss of access, a damage factor that was held inadmissible by the trial court.
1. Existence of Damages
Hellerstein asserts that the damage award could be attributed to loss of visibility. We disagree. We find nothing in the record to support an assessment of $2.88 million in damages based upon lack of visibility. Although one of Hellerstein's experts, Mr. Peterson, mentioned loss of visibility as a factor that could diminish the remainder property's value, he did not assign a dollar figure to this factor. Furthermore, when first asked what factors were important in analyzing the after-taking value of the remaining property, Mr. Peterson did not even mention loss of visibility.
The two E-470 witnesses who addressed the property's visibility both concluded that visibility was either unchanged or improved by the construction of the E-470 Highway. Mr. Ross, the design engineer, testified that the visibility of the property from E-470 would constitute an improvement to the before-taking visibility from Gun Club Road.5 Mr. Hegarty, E 470's expert witness, concluded that visibility of the property was improved by the construction of the E-470 Highway, and included increased visibility as one of the specific benefits bestowed on the remainder property by the E-470 project.6
Hellerstein argues that because E-470's expert downgraded a completely different property by $9,168 per acre due to loss of visibility, the commission could have used this as evidence to support the $2.88 million [1159]*1159in damages awarded to the Hellerstein property.7 This argument is unpersuasive. E-470's expert, Mr. Hegarty, testified that loss of visibility was not the primary factor in making the downward adjustment in value to the other property, rather it was due to several factors, including zoning, readiness for development, platting, interchange, and visibility:
MR. OPPERMAN (Hellerstein's Attorney): So you were trying to make a comparison between L-1, which is Gateway III, and your sale number 1, correct?
MR. HEGARTY: Yes.
MR. OPPERMAN: You first adjusted the 22,000-or the 9,000 discount for the location of L-1 next to the interchange, correct?
MR. HEGARTY: No. And that's your mis-characterization. There were other factors that caused me to adjust that a little bit. I was trying to narrow in, if I could, given the sales data, on the increase in value as you move east towards the developed areas of town. Sale-the Gateway III that you refer to, there were portions of it that were zoned for immediate development, had infrastructure and those type of things. I was trying to eliminate that. It's not just an interchange that I tried to reduce that for. I was just trying to back out a little bit, if I could, of the fact that additional infrastructure and the fact that it was ready for development. And that's what's classified as my visibility at I-70 interchange at that point.
Moreover, the entire discussion involving the downgrading of the other property was in relation to sale number 1, a sale that was not significantly related to the valuation of the Hellerstein property. E-470's expert testified that sale number 1 was only included for instructional purposes to demonstrate that the more developed property areas around 225 and the Stapleton/DIA industrial base are significantly more valuable than the less developed areas on the eastern side of the Denver metro area:
MR. DUNCAN (E-470S Attorney): All right, sir. And do you rely upon sale number 17
MR. HEGARTY: Sale number 1 was included for instructional purposes. That's a parcel of land that's located directly south of Front Range Airport along I-70 at Quail Run Road that is designated as a future interchange along I-70, but at the present time there's no interchange there. It was used to demonstrate that there's a significant increase in the value as you move from the less developed areas on the eastern side of the metro area to the more developed areas around 225 and the Stapleton/DIA type industrial base.
MR. DUNCAN: Mr. Hegarty, what Td like you to do now is go through each of your sales now, 2, 3, 4, and 6 on the chart, and on the analysis of comparable land sales, if you'd tell me the buyer and the seller and the date of sale.
The testimony of E-470's expert does not support the $2.88 million award for damages to the remainder property.
Despite the trial court's contrary in limine ruling, Hellerstein's attorney elicited testimony from one of its expert witnesses, Mr. Peterson, regarding the fact that lack of access affected the after-taking value of the remainder property. Mr. Peterson testified that the remainder property was damaged in potential loss of highest and best commercial use and development potential. However, this testimony was directly related to loss of access. Mr. Peterson testified that the higher density of development contained in the 1987 Annexation Agreement was approved because of the "excellent access onto I-70 at Gun Club Road." 8 Furthermore, Mr. Peterson's testimony regarding potential loss of highest and best commercial use was immediately interrupted by an objection made by [1160]*1160E-470's attorney based upon the inadmissibility of loss of access evidence. The commission then requested a ruling by the trial judge. The trial judge reiterated his in i-maine ruling barring all lack of access evidence, and the testimony was stricken from the record. When the valuation hearing resumed, Hellerstein's attorney asked Mr. Peterson to state what factors he considered in determining the after-taking value of the property, excluding those factors related to loss of access. In response, Mr. Peterson did not mention potential loss of highest and best commercial use, nor did he mention loss of development potential. The only factors Mr. Peterson identified which were unrelated to loss of access were loss of visibility and the cost to replan the remainder property:
MR. OPPERMAN (Hellerstein's attorney): Can we have just a moment? Mr. Peterson, in considering the value of the residue in the after condition were there factors that you took into consideration which do not include any of the prohibited factor as ruled on by the Court?
MR. PETERSON: Yes, there were.
MR. OPPERMAN: Where were those?
MR. PETERSON: Well, one was there will be some costs to replan for this property, considering that there will be a portion of it lost. Another one is that moving this property or moving the residue back from I-70 makes it a little less visible. That visibility is also affected by the fact that E-470 has been raised considerably higher and buildings that would have been here (indicating) in this accommodation, this commercial part of the property in particular, maybe in this part, are not going to be as visible from vehicles westbound on I-70. So there's a loss of visibility. That's from two points of view and there is a planning aspect that has to be met, costs that have to be met.
Thus, although Hellerstein's expert, Mr. Peterson, mentioned a loss of visibility, neither he nor any other witness offered any opinion or evidence regarding whether this loss caused damage to the remainder property and, if so, the amount of damages.
Hellerstein's attorney also introduced a significant amount of evidence regarding the inadequacy of access provided by Smith Road.9 In addition, even though the trial court instructed the commission that any damages arising from loss of access were not compensable, one of the commissioners questioned Hellerstein's expert regarding the lack of access to the remainder property.10 Any evidence regarding lack of access cannot support the commission's damage assessment because the trial court ruled as a matter of law that this damage factor was not compen-sable, and that ruling was not appealed. The only evidence presented at the hearing to support a finding that the remainder property was damaged was the expert testimony that it would cost $100,000 to redo the planning and zoning of the remainder property.
2. Causation
In valuation proceedings, compensation is due if the evidence supports a finding that a diminution in market value caused by the taking has occurred. La Plata Elec. Ass'n, 728 P.2d at 703. It is not enough to show that the remainder property was damaged; the property owner must show that the condemnation caused this damage.
In his closing argument, Hellerstein's counsel advised the commission to ascertain [1161]*1161damages by mechanically subtracting the E-470 expert's after-taking valuation of the property from the Hellerstein experts' before-taking valuation. He sought to discredit the E-470 expert's before-taking valuation, yet he urged the commission to accept this same expert's after-taking valuation. Heller-stein argues that this method of damage computation is legally correct and supported by the evidence in this case. We disagree.
The proper measure of compensation for damages to the remainder property is "the reduction in the market value of the remaining property that is caused by the taking," offset by the amount of any special benefits accrued due to the condemnation project. La Plata Elec. Ass'n, 728 P.2d at 698 (emphasis added). There must be some evidence linking the before-taking and after-taking property valuations to the condemnation project; here, other than the $100,000 replanning cost, there was none. Of itself, valuation evidence does not prove the condemnation project in particular caused the depreciation in property value. Id. Causation of damages is a determination that cannot be made solely on the basis of valuation evidence; the property owner must present evidence demonstrating that the condemnation caused the depreciation in property value. Id.
Here, the award is not accompanied by sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the difference between the before-taking valuation of the remainder property, provided by Hellerstein's experts, and the after-taking valuation, provided by E-470's expert, was caused by the E-470 Highway project. The only evidence linking damages to the remainder property to the E-470 Highway project was in regard to the $100,000 cost to replan the remainder property.
3. Amount of Compensation Due
In making its assessment, the commission could not have determined whether E-470's condemnation caused compensable damages in any amount greater than $100,000, because there was no evidence presented to them to support such a finding. Although Hellerstein's experts testified to a before-taking value, they did not identify any quantifiable damages caused by the E-470 Highway project, nor did they assign a depreciated after-taking value to the remainder property. E-470's expert testified to a before-taking and after-taking value, but these valuations were based upon his conclusion that the remainder property had not been damaged at.all, and had in fact increased in value due to the E-470 Highway project. _
From the record, it appears that the commission incorrectly combined incompatible valuation testimony (Hellerstein's before-taking value and E-470's after-taking value) to produce a damages amount. The only after-taking value presented to the commission came from E-470's expert, who found that no damages occurred to the property in question. Thus, the valuation evidence before the commission clearly did not show that the remainder property suffered a depreciation in value due to the E-470 Highway project. The commission's assessment yielded a "damages" figure of millions of dollars where no expert testified to damages of more than $100,000.
IIL
We hold that the $2.88 million award for damages to the remainder property had no support in the evidence and was excessive as a matter of law. Other than the $100,000 cost to redo the development plan, Heller-stein failed to identify any compensable, quantifiable damages to the remainder property caused by E-470.
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment directing the trial court to offer Hellerstein the option of a remittitur, or, if Hellerstein does not accept the remitti-tur, to order a new trial on the amount of compensation due for damages to the remainder property. We return this case to the court of appeals for remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice KOURLIS dissents, and Justice BENDER joins in the dissent.