Jackie L. HAYS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee

907 F.2d 1453, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11726, 1990 WL 94687
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJuly 11, 1990
Docket89-1593
StatusPublished
Cited by1,855 cases

This text of 907 F.2d 1453 (Jackie L. HAYS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackie L. HAYS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, 907 F.2d 1453, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11726, 1990 WL 94687 (4th Cir. 1990).

Opinion

ERVIN, Chief Judge:

Jackie L. Hays, Jr. (“Hays”) appeals from the decision of the district court affirming the determination of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the-“Secretary”) that Hays was not eligible for disability insurance benefits because he had the residual functional capacity for a full range of “light work.” Because the denial of benefits in this case is supported by substantial evidence, the judgment below is hereby affirmed.

I.

Hays was 33 years old at the time of his administrative hearing, has a general equivalency diploma, and had been employed for approximately three years as an electronic assembly technician, which involved skilled labor and “heavy” to “very heavy” work. 1

Hays applied for disability insurance benefits on November 21, 1986, alleging that he has been disabled since January 11, 1986, due to a back injury sustained at work. 2 The Department of Health and Human Services, denied Hays’ application for benefits originally and upon reconsideration. Thereafter, an administrative law judge (“AU”) conducted a formal hearing and determined that Hays was not disabled because he had a residual functional capacir ty for a full range of “light work.” The Appeals Council subsequently denied Hays’ request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which then became the final decision of the Secretary. Reviewing the ALJ’s decision upon referral by the district court, a federal magistrate concluded that the denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence, and recommended that the Secretary’s determination be affirmed. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the lower court adopted the magistrate’s proposed findings of fact and recommendation, and entered final judgment in favor of the Secretary.

On appeal, Hays argues that the Secretary’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ improperly evaluated Hays’ physical impairment and accompanying pain under the regulations. More specifically, Hays contends that his back injury constitutes a musculoskeletal' *1456 impairment as that medical condition is defined in 20 C.F.R. Chapter III, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 1.05(C) (1989). In addition, Hays insists that his disability claim was improperly evaluated under the medical-vocational guidelines contained in 20 C.F.R. Chapter III, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (1989), that the ALJ erred in failing to use vocational expert testimony, and that the Secretary's conclusion that he could perform “light work” is not supported by substantial evidence.

II.

Judicial review of a final decision regarding disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (the “Act”), is limited to determining whether the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclu-sive_”); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1422, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.1987). The phrase “supported by substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. at 1427 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). Elaborating on the foregoing definition, this court has defined “supported by substantial evidence” as:

evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is “substantial evidence.”

Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.1966), quoted in Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir.1984), and Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir.1972). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court’s function to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary if his decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff 307 F.2d 518, 529 (4th Cir.1962). Ultimately, it is the duty of the administrative law judge reviewing a case, and not the responsibility of the courts, to make findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir.1979) (“This Court does not find facts or try the case de novo when reviewing disability determinations.”); Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (4th Cir.1976) (“We note that it is the responsibility of the Secretary and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies in the medical evidence, and that it is the claimant who bears the risk of nonpersuasion.”); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d at 775 (“[T]he language of § 205(g) precludes a de novo judicial proceeding and requires that the court uphold the Secretary’s decision even should the court disagree with such decision as long as it is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’ ”).

III.

The principal question on appeal is whether Hays’ back injury satisfies the definition of a musculoskeletal impairment contained in 20 C.F.R. Chapter III, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (1989) (the “Listings”). If a claimant’s physical impairment satisfies any of the medical conditions set forth in the Listings, the individual is considered to be disabled under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Section 1.05(C) of the Listings provides as follows: 1.05 Disorders of the spine:

******
C.

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907 F.2d 1453, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11726, 1990 WL 94687, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackie-l-hays-jr-plaintiff-appellant-v-louis-w-sullivan-secretary-ca4-1990.