WARREN, J.
Plaintiffs filed this class action in circuit court on behalf of residential consumers of electricity provided by Portland General Electric (PGE), who have had their electrical service terminated or threatened to be terminated under circumstances where lack of electricity would significantly endanger their physical health. They appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing their complaint seeking to enforce their rights under the PUC statutes and regulations and the Oregon Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act. PGE
filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint as to PGE, because there was no allegation of an illegal termination of electricity in the wintertime, which it held is required under the PUC statutes, ORS 757.750
et seq,
to state a cause of action. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court found
that the Public Utility Commissioner does not have authority to make a rule prohibiting the termination of residential electrical and natural gas service year around. ORS 757.750
et seq.
Plaintiffs refused to plead further and brought this appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint, because PGE’s statutory obligation under ORS 757.760 to notify consumers of their right to enter into time payment plans is not expressly limited to the wintertime. They also contend that their complaint should not have been dismissed, because it did state a claim under a PUC rule
prohibiting termination of electrical service
throughout the year when it would significantly endanger the physical health of the customer.
These two contentions will be discussed together. The contention that their claim under the Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act, ORS 646.639
et seq,
should not have been dismissed will be discussed separately.
The general grant of authority to the Public Utilities Commissioner under ORS 756.040(1) and (2)
is broad.
See First Nat. Bank v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
81 Or 307, 159 P 561 (1916). The statute states that the Commissioner is vested with power to regulate every public utility and “to do all things necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.” Although the rule goes further than ORS 757.760
et seq,
it does not conflict with the statute.
See City of Portland v. Sunseri,
66 Or App 261, 673 P2d 1369 (1983). ORS 757.750 and 757.755 impose on the Commissioner a duty to establish rules governing termination of service in the winter. They do not limit the Commissioner’s broad authority under ORS 756.040(1) and (2), except that he may not refuse to follow the legislative mandate. In other words, we conclude that the Commissioner had authority under ORS 756.040(1) and (2) to make the rule under consideration. The legislative directive merely imposed an obligation to make a rule governing termination of service, applicable at least in winter. The Commissioner’s rule covers winter
and
the rest of the year. It does not contravene the statute merely because it is broader than the statute.
See Nichols v. Board of Pharmacy,
61 Or App
274, 657 P2d 216,
rev den
294 Or 749 (1983) (Oregon statute restricting dispensing controlled substances, although more restrictive than federal law, upheld as consistent with purposes of federal law). The rule is not invalid. The trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs did not state a claim for that reason.
Because the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, it did not reach the issue of exhaustion of remedies. We turn to that issue next.
Plaintiffs argue that they have no adequate administrative remedy, because the Commissioner has adopted internal procedures effectively denying the right to a formal hearing and has refused to issue an order after a public hearing and because additional attempts at solving their problems administratively would be futile.
Ordinarily, those who seek judicial relief must show that they have exhausted administrative remedies.
Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co.,
282 Or 591, 581 P2d 50 (1978);
Oregon City v. Hartke,
240 Or 35, 400 P2d 255 (1965);
Bay River v. Envir. Quality Comm.,
26 Or App 717, 554 P2d 620,
rev den
(1976). In determining whether there are, in fact, administrative remedies at all, three tests have been used by this court. (1) Were the nonjudicial remedies to be pursued by plaintiffs truly “administrative” or were they legislative in nature? (2) If “administrative,” were these potential remedies truly available to plaintiffs at the time they filed suit? (3) If available, were they adequate to address plaintiffs’ problems?
See Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., supra,
282 Or at 615;
Albright v. Employment Appeals Board,
32 Or App 379, 574 P2d 344 (1978).
Although plaintiffs argue otherwise, it is apparent that the answers to all three questions above are “yes.” Plaintiffs concede that the remedies were “administrative in nature” but contend that they were not truly available to them when they filed suit. A close examination of what was pleaded concerning exhaustion of remedies shows that plaintiffs are divided into three groups of persons claiming to be aggrieved: (1) Austin and the Nicols, who appealed to the Commissioner by telephone hearing and got relief; (2) the Bethunes, who appealed to the Commissioner but got no relief; however, they
concede that they failed to use ORS 183.490
to force action by the Commissioner after he had failed to act; and (3) the Isoms, Burkhardt, the Brewers and the Fergusons, who made no attempt to seek their administative remedies.
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WARREN, J.
Plaintiffs filed this class action in circuit court on behalf of residential consumers of electricity provided by Portland General Electric (PGE), who have had their electrical service terminated or threatened to be terminated under circumstances where lack of electricity would significantly endanger their physical health. They appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing their complaint seeking to enforce their rights under the PUC statutes and regulations and the Oregon Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act. PGE
filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint as to PGE, because there was no allegation of an illegal termination of electricity in the wintertime, which it held is required under the PUC statutes, ORS 757.750
et seq,
to state a cause of action. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court found
that the Public Utility Commissioner does not have authority to make a rule prohibiting the termination of residential electrical and natural gas service year around. ORS 757.750
et seq.
Plaintiffs refused to plead further and brought this appeal.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint, because PGE’s statutory obligation under ORS 757.760 to notify consumers of their right to enter into time payment plans is not expressly limited to the wintertime. They also contend that their complaint should not have been dismissed, because it did state a claim under a PUC rule
prohibiting termination of electrical service
throughout the year when it would significantly endanger the physical health of the customer.
These two contentions will be discussed together. The contention that their claim under the Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act, ORS 646.639
et seq,
should not have been dismissed will be discussed separately.
The general grant of authority to the Public Utilities Commissioner under ORS 756.040(1) and (2)
is broad.
See First Nat. Bank v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
81 Or 307, 159 P 561 (1916). The statute states that the Commissioner is vested with power to regulate every public utility and “to do all things necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.” Although the rule goes further than ORS 757.760
et seq,
it does not conflict with the statute.
See City of Portland v. Sunseri,
66 Or App 261, 673 P2d 1369 (1983). ORS 757.750 and 757.755 impose on the Commissioner a duty to establish rules governing termination of service in the winter. They do not limit the Commissioner’s broad authority under ORS 756.040(1) and (2), except that he may not refuse to follow the legislative mandate. In other words, we conclude that the Commissioner had authority under ORS 756.040(1) and (2) to make the rule under consideration. The legislative directive merely imposed an obligation to make a rule governing termination of service, applicable at least in winter. The Commissioner’s rule covers winter
and
the rest of the year. It does not contravene the statute merely because it is broader than the statute.
See Nichols v. Board of Pharmacy,
61 Or App
274, 657 P2d 216,
rev den
294 Or 749 (1983) (Oregon statute restricting dispensing controlled substances, although more restrictive than federal law, upheld as consistent with purposes of federal law). The rule is not invalid. The trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs did not state a claim for that reason.
Because the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, it did not reach the issue of exhaustion of remedies. We turn to that issue next.
Plaintiffs argue that they have no adequate administrative remedy, because the Commissioner has adopted internal procedures effectively denying the right to a formal hearing and has refused to issue an order after a public hearing and because additional attempts at solving their problems administratively would be futile.
Ordinarily, those who seek judicial relief must show that they have exhausted administrative remedies.
Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co.,
282 Or 591, 581 P2d 50 (1978);
Oregon City v. Hartke,
240 Or 35, 400 P2d 255 (1965);
Bay River v. Envir. Quality Comm.,
26 Or App 717, 554 P2d 620,
rev den
(1976). In determining whether there are, in fact, administrative remedies at all, three tests have been used by this court. (1) Were the nonjudicial remedies to be pursued by plaintiffs truly “administrative” or were they legislative in nature? (2) If “administrative,” were these potential remedies truly available to plaintiffs at the time they filed suit? (3) If available, were they adequate to address plaintiffs’ problems?
See Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., supra,
282 Or at 615;
Albright v. Employment Appeals Board,
32 Or App 379, 574 P2d 344 (1978).
Although plaintiffs argue otherwise, it is apparent that the answers to all three questions above are “yes.” Plaintiffs concede that the remedies were “administrative in nature” but contend that they were not truly available to them when they filed suit. A close examination of what was pleaded concerning exhaustion of remedies shows that plaintiffs are divided into three groups of persons claiming to be aggrieved: (1) Austin and the Nicols, who appealed to the Commissioner by telephone hearing and got relief; (2) the Bethunes, who appealed to the Commissioner but got no relief; however, they
concede that they failed to use ORS 183.490
to force action by the Commissioner after he had failed to act; and (3) the Isoms, Burkhardt, the Brewers and the Fergusons, who made no attempt to seek their administative remedies.
Under former OAR 860-21-090,
any customer may appeal a utility’s decision to terminate service or its refusal to restore service by notifying the Commissioner by telephone, in writing or in person. The Commissioner then resolves the problem informally, if possible. Otherwise, it will be set for hearing at the request of the customer or the Commissioner. If the Commissioner fails or refuses to act, the customer may petition the court to compel him to act pursuant to ORS 183.490; or, if the Commissioner acts and the customer disagrees with the action or results, the customer may file suit against the Commissioner pursuant to ORS 756.580 or 183.484.
Those plaintiffs who sought and obtained administrative relief by calling the Commissioner in an informal hearing cannot now argue that there are no administrative remedies or that they are futile. Those plaintiffs who did not seek administrative remedies have joined in the proceeding with those who did and who received relief; they cannot now complain of lack of administrative remedies. If the administrative remedies provided relief for some plaintiffs, it is difficult to argue seriously that the others did not need to exhaust the remedies that were available and adequate for others in the same class. The Bethunes, who appealed to the Commissioner through the informal process and got no relief, because the Commissioner failed to act and did not hold a formal hearing, did not follow through under former OAR 860-21-090 or ORS 183.490. They cannot use only part of the administrative remedies and then argue that they are inadequate or futile; they must use
all
the administrative remedies available to them. Not having done so, they may not complain that the remedies were inadequate.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that their causes of action under the Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act, ORS 646.639
et seq,
should not have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, because the Commissioner has no power to enforce the act. We agree. The legislature, through the Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act, has provided a private right of action for certain debt collection practices not subject to the commissioner’s authority. Plaintiffs are entitled to pursue this cause of action.
See
ORS 756.200(1).
Plaintiffs claim that PGE violated ORS 646.639(2) (k)
by terminating or threatening to terminate their service when they had reason to believe that that right did not exist. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that PGE insisted on full payment instead of explaining the option of partial payment, ignored the existence of the medical certification procedure, despite being informed of facts which indicate that plaintiffs would qualify, terminated or threatened to terminate service after a valid medical certification has been provided, asserted a right to plaintiffs’ full cash payment which, under the Low Income Energy Assistance Act, they knew did not exist and terminated service despite full payment.
The facts of the Isoms’ claim are characteristic. Their pleadings assert:
“XIV.
“The facts in the cases of plaintiffs are typical of those of the class. Plaintiffs Robert and Marjorie Isom were unable to pay their electric bill. Plaintiffs Robert and Marjorie Isom were in personal contact with PGE agents on several occasions during February, March, and April, 1980. At no time did any PGE agents advise plaintiffs orally about the availability of the 10% plan as an alternative to termination of service.
“XV.
“During conversations with PGE agents, the Isoms advised defendant that one of their children had been badly burned in a house fire, receiving second and third degreeburns over 45% of her body and requiring substantial facial reconstruction surgery. Despite this knowledge, defendant PGE never advised plaintiffs of their right to obtain a medical certification.
“XVI.
“On or about April 2,1980, the Isoms’ electric service was terminated. Despite payment of $318.00 (out of $497.87 owing) on April 9, 1980, defendant PGE refused to restore service until the full amount was paid, despite defendant PGE’s knowledge that it had not complied with the applicable statute and rule prior to termination. Electrical service was restored to plaintiffs on April 16, 1980, only after the intervention of a social service agency.”
We conclude that, if evidence is presented supporting these allegations in the complaint, a jury could find PGE attempted to or threatened to enforce the right to terminate service when it had reason to believe that the right to terminate was not available because plaintiffs qualified for legislatively mandated relief.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded for further proceedings on plaintiffs’ claim under the Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act.