Judge STRAUB files a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner-Appellant ISC Holding AG (“ISC”) appeals from a November 23, 2010 order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Stanton, J.) vacating its voluntary notice of dismissal and from a judgment, entered on January 20, 2011, dismissing with prejudice its petition to compel arbitration. The matter presents two issues. First, ISC contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying its motion for recusal. Second, ISC argues that the court erred in vacating its notice of voluntary dismissal, filed pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)®.
ISC based its recusal motion on the district court’s receipt of supposedly prejudicial information from a putatively “extrajudicial” source. Said source was ISC’s own lawyer, who spoke briefly with the district judge, in camera and ex parte, after moving to withdraw prior to a scheduled evidentiary hearing and after indicating that he believed his withdrawal was mandatory, but that he was not comfortable discussing the details in the presence of counsel for Respondenh-Appellee Nobel Biocare Finance AG (“Nobel”).1 Even assuming that the information conveyed by ISC’s counsel was extrajudicial — at best a dubious proposition — we conclude that the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse was not an abuse of discretion.
The vacatur issue is less straightforward. The district court vacated the notice of voluntary dismissal, filed by new counsel one business day before the evidentiary hearing was to commence, on the authority of Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid, Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.1953). In resolving the issue, we reach the same result as the district court, but by a different route. As previously noted, ISC purported voluntarily to dismiss its petition to compel arbitration (filed pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4) on the authority of Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)®. We conclude, however, based on the interaction of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)® and Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(6) with 9 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 6, that ISC’s purported voluntary dismissal was improper because Rule 41(a)(1)(A)® does not apply in the context of petitions to compel arbitration. We thus agree with the district court that vacatur was appropriate and therefore Affirm its judgment, without reaching the question whether Harvey Aluminum remains good law.
Background
This appeal is the second time that the present matter has come before this Court. We begin with the background to [102]*102the first appeal, relevant here. This case centers on a document, stating itself to be an “Asset Management Facilitation Agreement” (“Agreement”), that was signed, purportedly in January 2008, by a representative of ISC and by one Martin Gerber, the corporate treasurer of what was then Nobel’s parent company. (As noted, the subsidiary and its parent have since merged.) According to the Agreement, ISC was to act as Nobel’s asset and investment manager regarding $200 million of specified assets, with concomitant control over those assets; the Agreement also provided for arbitration of disputes arising thereunder.
On December 19, 2008, ISC, claiming Nobel to be in breach of its obligations under the Agreement and urging that “[t]ime was of the essence,” filed a petition to compel arbitration in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 206. Nobel duly opposed the petition, contending, inter alia, that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Nobel, and that the Agreement itself had been fraudulently entered into by ISC, a three-person Swiss firm with no track record in asset management, and Gerber, who, without actual authority to bind Nobel, had signed the Agreement in exchange for a six-figure kickback from ISC.2 The briefs from both sides, and the numerous and extensive accompanying exhibits, totaled more than 800 pages.
In April 2009, shortly after the conclusion of briefing, the district court denied the petition to compel. Mem. Op., ISC Holding AG v. Nobel Biocare Inv. N.V., No. 08-11051 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2009), EOF No. 29. The district court noted that the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) had refused to arbitrate the dispute, because the International Chamber of Commerce rules specified in the Agreement’s arbitration clause were incompatible with AAA arbitration.3 The court then held that the Agreement’s stated alternative to AAA arbitration, submission of the dispute “to any other U.S. court,” clearly referred to resolution of disputes only in a judicial, rather than arbitral forum. Since an “agreement to submit the disputes to a court is not an agreement to arbitrate them,” id. at *1, the court held that there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and it denied the petition to compel on the merits.4 ISC timely filed a notice of appeal.
The parties thereafter submitted some 850 pages of briefing and appendix material to this Court. In November 2009, following oral argument in the matter, a panel of the Court vacated the district court’s [103]*103judgment by summary order. ISC Holding AG v. Nobel Biocare Inv. N.V., 351 Fed.Appx. 480 (2d Cir.2009). We held that, considering the Agreement as a whole, the arbitration clause’s reference to “any other U.S. court” was ambiguous, and could fairly be read as referring either to a judicial or to an arbitral forum. Id. at 482-483. Since the arbitration clause was, contrary to the view of the district court, potentially an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, we remanded for further proceedings.
Following remand, the parties met with the district court in December 2009 and concurred that an evidentiary hearing would be required to resolve facts concerning the meaning of the purported arbitration clause, Gerber’s authority to sign the Agreement, and personal jurisdiction over Nobel. The parties agreed on a provisional discovery schedule and thereafter commenced discovery here. Document discovery was begun and completed by February 2010; by March 2010 the parties had agreed that depositions of all party witnesses who might testify at the evidentiary hearing (essentially a bench trial) on arbitrability would occur in London, England in the space of a week in mid-May 2010.
Testimonial discovery, however, did not run entirely to schedule. On May 4, 2010, only shortly before the scheduled depositions, ISC notified Nobel that a sudden and unavoidable obligation had arisen that would prevent ISC’s principal, Asher Tchividjian, from being deposed in May.5 ISC requested that all depositions be postponed until some time in June. Following an exchange of letters from the parties to the district court, the court directed that Tchividjian’s deposition alone be postponed, with the other depositions to go forward as scheduled; the parties eventually agreed that Tchividjian’s deposition would occur in New York on June 23.
On June 21, ISC e-mailed Nobel to notify it that Tchividjian would not be appearing for his scheduled deposition for a second time because his passport had allegedly been torn coming through customs in Dubai, thus preventing him from traveling to the United States until a replacement passport could be obtained. This email provoked an exchange of heated letters to the court, in which Nobel cast doubt on the veracity of Tchividjian’s statements and argued that ISC should be sanctioned.
The district court ordered the Tchividjian deposition rescheduled for mid-July 2010; the court simultaneously directed ISC to produce all documents related to the passport incident, including proof that Tchividjian had made plans to travel to New York for his deposition prior to the alleged tearing of his passport. On July 7, counsel for ISC provided Nobel with documents that purported to be from the travel service Expedia, namely: (1) a purported e-mail from Expedia confirming that Tchividjian had booked a flight to New York; and (2) a purported acknowledgement by Expedia of Tchividjian’s request for a refund of his airfare in light of the supposed passport mishap. At Tchividjian’s deposition, which finally occurred on July 13 and 14, Nobel questioned Tchividjian regarding his explanations for both postponements of his deposition and sought details regarding the alleged passport incident.
Nobel, unsatisfied with Tchividjian’s account, wrote the district court on July 30, describing inconsistencies in Tchividjian’s statements and implying that Tchividjian [104]*104had simply fabricated his need to be in Madrid for a week and the later damage to his passport.6 The letter made clear that Nobel planned to file a motion for discovery sanctions to recover the additional costs incurred as a result of the deposition postponements. Nobel further requested that the district court set a date for the evidentiary hearing in October 2010.
By early August, Nobel had also come to the conclusion that the purported Expedia documents were probable forgeries, and it wrote to ISC on August 9 to demand electronic copies of those documents in native format. The parties conferred with the district court on this issue on August 10. Following the August 10 conference, in response to Nobel’s allegations that Tchividjian and ISC had made false statements to the court and had fabricated the Expedia documents, the district court ordered Tchividjian to submit a declaration regarding his travel arrangements in response to questions to be provided by Nobel, to be submitted within two weeks of receipt of Nobel’s questions. The court also ordered that ISC submit a draft pretrial order, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, to Nobel by September 30, and that the parties submit a joint pretrial order to the court by October 20, preparatory to the evidentiary hearing, which was to begin on October 25.
Nobel e-mailed its questions to Tchividjian on August 13, but ISC failed to submit a responsive declaration from Tchividjian prior to the two-week deadline set by the court. On September 14, no declaration having yet been submitted, Ira Matetsky, counsel for ISC, wrote the court to request a pre-motion conference regarding a planned motion by his law firm seeking withdrawal from representation of ISC. Both parties appeared at that conference, held on September 21, 2010.7
Counsel for Nobel averred below — and ISC has not disputed the accuracy of this account — that at this conference, Matetsky, with counsel for Nobel present, told Judge Stanton that, during his preparation of the Tchividjian declaration, an event had occurred, related to the August 10 conference and one of the issues that Nobel had raised with the court there, that Matetsky saw as obligating him to withdraw from the case.8 Judge Stanton then spoke briefly with Matetsky, out of the presence of counsel for Nobel, regarding the request to withdraw.9
Following this conversation, with counsel for Nobel present, Judge Stanton indi[105]*105cated that he had decided to grant the motion to withdraw, assuming certain conditions could be met. On September 23, Judge Stanton issued an order that granted the motion to withdraw upon ISC’s submission of a draft pretrial order by September 30; the order required that successor counsel for ISC enter a notice of appearance by October 15, with trial still scheduled to begin on October 25. On September 24, Nobel issued a subpoena to Expedia for documents and deposition testimony, with the documents to be produced by October 18, and the deposition scheduled to occur on October 20.10
On October 14, new counsel for ISC entered an appearance, and requested a pretrial conference to discuss trial preparation and scheduling. Successor counsel stated that at said conference, counsel would request that the scheduling order be modified and the trial postponed, so that ISC could request documents and take the deposition of Gerber (which ISC had never previously sought) in Switzerland.
Pursuant to ISC’s request, the district court conferred with the parties on October 20. At that conference, in the course of discussing the need to subpoena Expedia, counsel for Nobel reminded Judge Stanton that he had spoken privately with Matetsky regarding the latter’s reasons for seeking to withdraw, and Nobel’s counsel briefly discussed that prior conversation with the judge.11 The court and counsel for both parties then discussed arrangements for the Expedia subpoena and deposition, and agreed that the deposition would go forward on October 22. Counsel for ISC then raised again the issue of pushing back the October 25 trial date to allow time to obtain documents and deposition testimony from Gerber; the court, without ruling out the possibility of a later adjournment for that purpose, concluded that it would not be fair to postpone the beginning of the bench proceeding. Both sets of lawyers then conferred regarding logistics outside the presence of the court, and told the court that they had agreed that the hearing should begin as scheduled, subject to any last-minute client scheduling conflicts.
At the close of the pretrial conference, counsel for ISC stated that they had been unaware that Matetsky had spoken to Judge Stanton regarding his reasons for withdrawal, and requested that the portion of the record dealing with that conversation be unsealed and provided to them; on hearing that the conversation had occurred without a court reporter present, counsel said that they would confer with Matetsky regarding the conversation directly.12
Thus, as of this conference on Wednesday, October 20, Nobel was to depose Ex-pedía on Friday, October 22, and hearing was scheduled for Monday, October 25, 2010, over 22 months after ISC first filed the petition to compel arbitration. On October 22, however, one business day before the scheduled hearing, ISC filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). ISC also wrote a letter to Judge Stanton, stating that it believed that the judge needed to recuse himself from any further pro[106]*106ceedings regarding the case because of his conversation with Matetsky.
Notwithstanding this notice of dismissal, Nobel went forward that day with the scheduled Expedia deposition. The Expedia employee whom Nobel deposed testified that, based on the documents provided to her (and provided by ISC to the court) she had found no records within Expedia’s system that would support or corroborate Tchividjian’s account of his travel arrangements; that she had been unable to locate the e-mails (purportedly from Expedia to ISC) provided by ISC to the district court; and that her search was sufficiently thorough that she would have been able to locate said e-mails had they in fact been sent by Expedia.
At the request of Nobel, the parties met with the district judge that same afternoon to discuss the notice of dismissal and the suggestion of recusal. At the conference, Judge Stanton, discussing the issue of recusal, stated first that the
reason I had forgotten [the information conveyed by Matetsky] ... [is] because so much of what was told me during that conference was simply a rehash of what I had already heard in conferences between the two sides. And I wasn’t interested in that. What I was interested in was is there enough here to justify withdrawal. So I was only listening really for that....
After further discussion of the notice of dismissal and the issue of recusal, the parties set a schedule for further motions on those issues, and the conference ended there. Considerable procedural ructions then ensued.
On October 28, ISC formally noticed its motion for Judge Stanton to recuse himself. Nobel in turn, that same day, filed a motion requesting that the district court deem the notice of dismissal to be of no effect and that the court set a new trial date on the petition to compel arbitration.
Following briefing on both motions, the court denied ISC’s motion for recusal on November 22, ISC Holding AG v. Nobel Biocare Inv., N.V., 759 F.Supp.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y.2010);13 the court granted Nobel’s motion and vacated ISC’s notice of dismissal on November 23, ISC Holding AG v. Nobel Biocare Inv. N.V., 759 F.Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.2010).14 On November 30, ISC filed a notice of appeal of the vacatur.15 Following a status conference on December 16, the district court rescheduled the trial to begin on January 18, 2011, over ISC’s objections. ISC then mounted a series of unsuccessful attempts, both in the district court and this Court, to have the trial stayed. On January 18, when the trial began as scheduled, ISC declined to put on any witnesses or otherwise introduce evidence; the district court therefore dismissed the petition to compel arbitration with prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).16 Following the entry [107]*107of judgment, ISC timely appealed the dismissal with prejudice; that appeal, consolidated with ISC’s appeal of the vacatur, is before us now.
Discussion
I. Recusal
We begin with Judge Stanton’s denial of ISC’s motion for his recusal, which we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carlton, 534 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir.2008). Recusal here is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which states that “[a]ny ... judge ... of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”17 This provision is to “be evaluated on an objective basis, so that what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). The question, as we have put it, is whether “an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts, [would] entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal.” Carlton, 534 F.3d at 100 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). “[I]t is a rare case,” as this Court has said, “when a district judge’s denial of a motion to recuse is disturbed by an appellate court....” In re IBM, 45 F.3d 641, 642 (2d Cir.1995).
In applying § 455(a)’s standard, the Supreme Court has noted that “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. However, where these opinions are not “properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings,” id. at 551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, but rather “derive[ ] from a source outside judicial proceedings,” id. at 554, 114 S.Ct. 1147, this requirement of deep-seated antagonism does not apply.
Here, ISC does not contend that Judge Stanton has shown a deep-seated favoritism toward Nobel or antagonism toward ISC. Rather, ISC argues that in his 10-minute conversation with Matetsky, Judge Stanton became privy to prejudicial information that would substantially bias him against ISC; this information, ISC says, was privileged and conveyed without ISC’s consent in an unrecorded ex parte conversation to the trier of fact, and therefore constituted an “extrajudicial source of bias” in the Liteky framework.
We are doubtful. Any information the district court acquired was obtained in the normal course of adjudicating a withdrawal motion by counsel of record and, it seems to us, could not qualify as “extrajudicial.” But even assuming arguendo that Matetsky could count as an extrajudicial source, Liteky teaches that the fact that a judge’s opinion derives from a source outside judicial proceedings is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for a bias or prejudice recusal: “The fact that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside judicial proceedings ... is [not] a sufficient condition for ‘bias or prejudice’ recusal, since some opinions acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the [108]*108judge’s view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice.” Id. at 554, 114 S.Ct. 1147. In the circumstances here, we easily conclude that ISC has failed to show that the extrajudicial acquisition of information in this case requires recusal.
First, the knowledge at issue, as Judge Stanton recognized, went not to the heart of whether the Agreement’s arbitration clause should be enforced, but only “to a question of credibility about a collateral scheduling dispute.” ISC Holding, 759 F.Supp.2d at 291. The in camera conversation principally addressed Matetsky’s conjectures and concerns regarding ISC’s account of Tchividjian’s travel arrangements.
Next, this subject was hardly new to the district judge. Indeed, Nobel had been hotly questioning Tchividjian’s credibility regarding his travel plans and the delays in scheduling his deposition for months prior to Matetsky’s conversation with Judge Stanton. The district judge had taken Nobel’s allegations sufficiently seriously to require Tchividjian to turn over documentary evidence supporting his explanation of the need to delay his deposition, and later to require Tchividjian to submit a sworn declaration on the same topic.
Admittedly, as ISC contends, concerns about Tchividjian’s credibility prior to Judge Stanton’s meeting with Matetsky had emanated from ISC’s adversary, rather than its own counsel. But the fact remains that any information that Matetsky conveyed was largely cumulative of information brought forward by Nobel in much more emphatic terms. As the district court observed, “[Mjuch of what was told me during that conference was simply a rehash of what I had already heard in conferences between the two sides. And I wasn’t interested in that. What I was interested in was is there enough here to justify withdrawal.”
Finally, there is no indication here that the district judge came to have an opinion — favorable or unfavorable — regarding ISC or the merits of its petition as a result of the Matetsky conference. Nor has ISC demonstrated that the conference was of a sort to make this likely. As the district court noted in denying the motion to recuse, no “ ‘opinion’ could be formed on the basis of the in camera communication.” 759 F.Supp.2d at 291. Matetsky’s concern about his position, according to the district court, was itself “speculative, recognizing that the problem [he was experiencing with his client] might reflect only a lack of needed cooperation.” Id. Indeed, the information disclosed was sufficiently unmemorable that the judge had completely forgotten it within a month.
This is not the rare case in which an appellate court revisits the denial of a motion to recuse. ISC cannot credibly argue that an objective and informed observer considering the circumstances here would entertain significant doubt as to whether justice would be done in this case based on its own lawyer’s in camera conference with the district court. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying ISC’s recusal motion.
II. Vacatur
ISC next contends that the district court erred in vacating its Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(a)(l)(A)(i) notice of dismissal.18 [109]*109The district court vacated the notice of dismissal pursuant to Nobel’s motion to set a new trial date, which it construed as in substance making out a request for relief from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). We review district court rulings on Rule 60(b) motions for abuse of discretion. Encoder Commc’ns, Inc. v. Telegen, Inc., 654 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir.1981). Whether voluntary dismissal was available to ISC pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(1)(A)(i) is a legal question which we review de novo. See Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.2008).
Here, if on de novo review we are satisfied that the district court acted correctly in vacating the notice of dismissal, the court’s Rule 60(b)(6) ruling would not be an abuse of discretion. Granted, Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only available if Rules 60(b)(1) through (5) do not apply, and if extraordinary circumstances are present or the failure to grant relief would work an extreme hardship on the movant. In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d 754, 758-59 (2d Cir.1981).19 ISC does not seriously contend, however, either that any of Rules 60(b)(1) — (5) applies here or that circumstances justifying vacatur of a notice of dismissal on the ground of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)’s inapplicability would not qualify as “extraordinary” for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6). We turn, then, to the applicability and interpretation of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)®.
Nobel contends that the district court acted properly because Rule 41(a)(1), it says, does not apply to petitions to compel arbitration, and ISC’s Rule 41(a)(1) notice was therefore of no legal effect. ISC argues, to the contrary, that its notice of voluntary dismissal was properly filed, and that the district court therefore erred in vacating it. Suffice it to say that the question is not without difficulty.
As relevant here, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)® states that “the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” In arbitration proceedings under the Federal Arbitration [110]*110Act (“FAA”), including petitions to compel arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(6) states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern, “except as [9 U.S.C.] providefs] other procedures.” 20 Title 9 does not “provide other procedures” expressly to govern the voluntary dismissal of petitions to compel arbitration in particular. But 9 U.S.C. § 6 does instruct more generally that “[a]ny application to the court hereunder [including petitions to compel under § 4] shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions.”
1. “Actions” vs. “Motions”
Nobel contends, at the start, that since ISC’s petition to compel arbitration is to be treated as a motion, and Rule 41(a)(1) provides a procedure only for the dismissal of “an action,” a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal was not available to ISC. This argument is unpersuasive.
At minimum, it is inconsistent with Nobel’s own conduct in this litigation. Nobel obtained the dismissal with prejudice of ISC’s petition pursuant to Rule 41(b). The text of Rule 41(b), however, also refers only to the dismissal of an “action,” rather than a motion.21 Similarly, to demonstrate ISC’s putative discovery misconduct, Nobel obtained third-party deposition testimony via a subpoena pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45; Nobel has also intimated that it intends to move for discovery sanctions, presumably under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37. Both these rules presume that subpoenas and sanctions are being sought in a pending “action,” rather than in another type of proceeding.22
Nobel’s proffered approach is also inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court. In Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental De Navegacion De Cuba, S.A., 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir.1957), considering a petition to compel arbitration, we declined to read a state-law distinction between “actions” and “special proceedings” (such as petitions to compel arbitration) into the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d) for effecting service. Id. at 347 (citing Stathatos v. Arnold Bernstein S.S. Corp., 202 F.2d 525, 527 n. 1 (2d Cir.1953)).23 In so declining, we observed [111]*111that recognizing such a distinction “would unreasonably limit the definition of ‘action’ in Rule 2, Fed.R.Civ.P., which is broad enough to include an arbitration proceeding.” Id.24
Similarly, in Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir.1993), overruled on other grounds by Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S.Ct. 2402, 156 L.Ed.2d 414 (2003), this Court stated that “a district judge considering related petitions to compel arbitration can have all of the petitions heard at once pursuant to Rule 42(a).... ” But Rule 42(a), which deals with consolidating proceedings, expressly concerns “actions ... involving] a common question of law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a) (emphasis added). Granted, in the circumstances of Boeing, this Court’s statement was dicta.25 But it is relevant and informative here nonetheless. See also Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgrnt, LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 102-103 (2d Cir.2006) (describing a petition to vacate an arbitration award, brought under 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 and 203, as an “action”).26
In sum, we are unpersuaded by Nobel’s argument that Rule 41(a)(1) is inapplicable to petitions to compel arbitration for the reason that Rule 41(a)(1) deals with actions, and not motions. Indeed, even brief consideration of the implications of any holding to such effect for other contexts in which the civil rules are commonly employed in the adjudication of petitions to compel counsels strongly against Nobel’s position. At the same time, however, we conclude that there are compelling other reasons, grounded in the text and operation of subparagraph 41(a)(1)(A)(i), for holding that this subsection is inapplicable in the context of petitions to compel. We turn now to consideration of those reasons.
2. The Inapplicability of Rule 41 (a) (1) (A) (i)
Rule 41(a)(1)(A) is the only form of dismissal requiring no court action to be effective. See Thorp, 599 F.2d at 1175 n. 8. Plaintiffs invoking Rule 41(a)(1)(A)®, specifically, have an “unfettered right voluntarily and unilaterally to dismiss an action,” but the rule itself, by requiring them to do so before the opposing party has served an answer or a motion for summary judgment, confines this right to “an early stage of the proceedings” and thus ensures against the sharp practice that could otherwise ensue. Id. at 1175. Thus the rule, by its terms, presupposes that a given [112]*112litigation proceeds in two stages — one before the service of an answer or motion for summary judgment, one after — and thus also presupposes that the opposing party can file both such papers in the first place.
Here, Nobel served neither an answer nor a motion for summary judgment before ISC filed its notice of voluntary dismissal almost two years into hotly contested proceedings. But, importantly, Nobel unquestionably could not have filed an answer in this case consistent with both 9 U.S.C. § 6 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and perhaps could not have filed a motion for summary judgment either.
Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 6, petitions to compel are “made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions.” And while an expansive interpretation is given to “action” in the civil rules — an interpretation that is broad enough to encompass arbitration proceedings' — those rules draw a clear and consistent distinction between pleadings and motions. Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a), with Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1)—(2); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a)-(b), 12(b). This distinction simply precludes treating the one as the other.
It was for this reason that this Court held in Productos Mercantiles E Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA Inc., 23 F.3d 41 (2d Cir.1994), that Rule 12(b)’s pleading requirements did not apply to a petition to modify and then confirm an arbitration award. Rule 7(a) exhaustively enumerates the different “pleadings” available under the civil rules; motions, not appearing in that enumeration, are discussed in Rule 7(b).27 Because the petition at issue could only be “made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions,” 9 U.S.C. § 6, Rule 12(b)’s pleading requirements were deemed inapplicable. Productos Mercantiles, 23 F.3d at 46; see also O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof'l Planning Assocs. Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 745-746, 748 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that Rule 8’s notice pleading requirements do not apply in a proceeding to vacate an arbitration award because relief must be sought in the form of a motion).
A similar analysis holds here. An answer is a responsive pleading, not a motion, Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a), 12(a), that may in turn only be filed in response to certain enumerated pleadings, and not to motions, Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a). Since filings in the present proceeding can only be “made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions,” 9 U.S.C. § 6 (emphasis added), Nobel could not have filed an answer here, any more than ISC could have filed a complaint.
[113]*113Although we do not find it necessary to resolve the question, there is also a plausible argument that Nobel could not have filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Rule 81(a)(6) says that the civil rules apply, “except as [the Federal Arbitration Act] provide[s] other procedures.” Section 4 of the Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4, in turn, sets out a simple, flexible framework for deciding whether a petition to compel arbitration must proceed to trial,28 consistent with “the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration,” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), but in contrast to the intricate requirements of Rule 56. And for decades this Court’s § 4 jurisprudence has stood as a self-contained body of precedents that do not draw on our case law construing Rule 56, see, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 129-130 (2d Cir.1997) (collecting cases), even though to be sure the substantive standards of § 4 and Rule 56 are in the end quite similar, see Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir.2003); Distajo, 107 F.3d at 129-130.29 Regardless, though, even if summary judgment motions are available in this context, that answers are not available convinces us that Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) does not apply to § 4 petitions to compel.
As a textual matter, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) cannot and does not apply to such petitions. Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), drafted to preserve only a “narrow slice” of the expansive power that plaintiffs had at common law to dismiss unilaterally, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), allows such dismissals only “before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41 (a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).30 This rule, by its terms, thus gives an opposing party not simply the ability to preclude unilateral dismissals, but the flexibility to choose between two means of doing so depending on the circumstances.31 If [114]*114Rule 41(a)(1)(A)® applies to petitions to compel, however, that flexibility vanishes because — at best — only one of the means given under the rule is available.
ISC argues that this anomalous and undesirable result is required by the literal terms of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)®. But this literal interpretation, as put forward by ISC, itself presupposes that Rule 41(a)(1)(A)© applies to petitions to compel arbitration. Absent this presupposition, it is at least equally plausible that, given the relevant subparagraph’s either/or language, the terms of the Rule literally cover only proceedings that could have both answers and motions for summary judgment. In any event, ISC’s proposed “literal” interpretation of the rule is simply not a reasonable interpretation in the context of petitions to compel arbitration. Rule 41(a)(1)(A)®, the Supreme Court has instructed, “was designed to limit a plaintiffs ability to dismiss an action,” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 397, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (emphasis added), and the rule is drafted accordingly. ISC’s interpretation, however, would expand, the availability of unilateral dismissals in the context of petitions to compel arbitration beyond what would otherwise be permissible. This interpretation would permit a vexatious petitioner in arbitration proceedings greater compass than the civil rules generally for “the annoying of a [respondent] by being summoned into court in successive actions,” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 397, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (quoting 2 American Bar Association, Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules 350 (1938) (remarks of Judge George Donworth, member of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure)), in situations not contemplated by Rule 41’s text.32 Such an interpretation thus would disrupt the balance struck by the rule’s terms — a particularly ironic result in the context of petitions to compel arbitration, which the Supreme Court has admonished should receive a “summary and speedy disposition,” Moses H. Cone Mem’l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 29, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983).
The terms of Rule 81(a)(6) also support our conclusion that Rule 41(a)(1)(A)© is inapplicable in § 4 proceedings. To repeat, Rule 81(a)(6) states in relevant part that the civil rules apply except insofar as the Federal Arbitration Act provides other procedures. Thus, at minimum, where the FAA’s procedures are in conflict with those of the civil rules, the former controls.
Here, given the interaction of 9 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 6, if a party initiates a Title 9 [115]*115proceeding via petition to compel arbitration, an opposing party may respond — and thereby potentially put “the making of the agreement for arbitration ... in issue,” 9 U.S.C. § 4 — only by motion, and is precluded from filing an answer. But, as just discussed, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)® presumes that an opposing party may cut off the right of unilateral dismissal by filing and serving an answer. Cf. Thorp, 599 F.2d at 1176 (noting that in the ordinary case Rule 41 does not leave a defendant “defenseless against the whim and caprice of the plaintiff,” because “plaintiffs ability to harass defendant by the filing and dismissing of successive actions ... can be cut off completely by the ... filing and service of an answer or motion for summary judgment”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation and alteration omitted). Rule 81(a)(6) is thus implicated here because §§ 4 and 6 of the FAA, providing for the filing and adjudication of petitions to compel, constitute “other procedures” that prevent Rule 41(a)(1)(A)® from operating according to its terms.33
Nor is this conflict merely an abstract point — on the theory that even if a respondent cannot file an answer as contemplated by Rule 41(a)(1)(A)®, a motion for summary judgment may be available. Consider cases in which the “making of the agreement for arbitration” is “in issue” such that it is clear at the outset that summary judgment will not (and should not) be granted, because an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve disputed facts. If Rule 41(a)(1)(A)® is applicable to 9 U.S.C. § 4, an opposing party in such a case must either allow the petitioner the right of unilateral dismissal at any time, or such a party must file and serve a motion for summary judgment that the party knows to be likely futile, or even frivolous.34 Imposing such an unpalatable choice on those opposing petitions to compel arbitration would disregard Rule 41(a)(l)(A)(i)’s careful balance between the interests of the parties, and would create opportunities for sharp practice that are inconsistent with the notion that petitions to compel are to be decided with dispatch. Cf. D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 107-109 (2d Cir.2006) (holding Fed.R.Civ.P. 55, related to default judgments, inapplicable to a proceeding under Title 9 to confirm an arbitration award, noting that Rule 55 “does not operate well in the context of a motion to confirm or vacate an arbitration award,” such that granting a default judgment in a “confirmation/vacatur proceeding! ]” would be “generally inappropriate”).35
[116]*116In light of this conflict between the FAA’s requirement that petitions to compel be made and heard “in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions” and Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)’s text, which contemplates that a defending party may cut off the complaining party’s right of voluntary dismissal by filing an answer, it is irrelevant whether ISC filed its notice of voluntary dismissal in scrupulous compliance with the literal terms of the latter rule. In this particular, and unusual, procedural circumstance, such compliance availed it nothing. We conclude that ISC could not dismiss its petition to compel arbitration pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), because that provision does not apply to petitions to compel under 9 U.S.C. § 4 in the circumstances here.36
The district court vacated ISC’s notice of dismissal on the authority of Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.1953). Though we do not reach the issue given our resolution of the case, we note our skepticism that Harvey Aluminum is still good law, even confined to the exceedingly narrow compass allowed by our precedent. Cf. Johnson Chem. Co. v. Home Care Prods., Inc., 823 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir.1987), abrogated on other grounds by Cooler & Gell, 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (“Harvey has received a ‘cool reception.’ ... [and] stands as the only decision in which we have rejected a strict construction of Rule 41(a)(1)[ (A) ](i).... We repeat our admonition, foreshadowed twenty-nine years ago in Littman v. Bache & Co., 252 F.2d 479, 481 (2d Cir.1958), that Harvey must be limited to its ‘extreme’ facts.”) (quoting Thorp v. Scame, 599 F.2d at 1176).
Our analysis differs from that of the district court. We nonetheless agree with that court’s conclusion that ISC’s notice of dismissal was properly vacated and therefore with its determination that the petition to compel arbitration should be dismissed with prejudice. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s Rule 60(b)(6) ruling.
ISC filed its voluntary dismissal here almost two years into litigation, literally on the eve of trial. In the normal course, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)® would operate to bar a unilateral dismissal at such an advanced stage of the proceedings. Here, however, because of the anomalous procedural posture of this case, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)® did not operate at all, and ISC lacked the right to unilaterally dismiss its petition to compel arbitration. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it [117]*117denied ISC’s recusal motion and therefore reached Nobel’s motion for relief from the notice of dismissal. Nor, given the unusual circumstances here, did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted Nobel’s motion and vacated ISC’s notice of voluntary dismissal.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court are Affirmed.