HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.
Intermountain Rural Electric Association (employer) appeals from a decision by the National Labor Relations Board (Board) finding that it had committed numerous unfair labor practices. This case was tried before an administrative law judge (AU). The employer was found to have violated § 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). The Board affirmed the AU’s decision, 253 N.L.R.B. 1153, III R. 1290. The employer petitioned for review and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement.
I
The factual setting
A.
Unchallenged unfair labor practices
The Board affirmed the AU’s rulings, findings and conclusions, and adopted his recommended order. Ill R. 1290. The AU discussed the employer’s unfair labor practices, and we only summarily outline those that the employer does not challenge. The so-called outside or production and maintenance employees had a collective bargaining agreement with the employer. A dispute arose concerning the feasibility of the pension plan agreed on in the collective bargaining agreement. The AU found that the employer violated § 8(a)(1) and (5) by unilaterally altering a mandatory bargaining subject during the term of a bargaining agreement, III R. 1263,
and by failing to comply with the request for documents relevant to the duty of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. Ill (Union) to represent its members. Ill R. 1264.
During the imbroglio surrounding the pension plan, a campaign to organize the employer’s so-called inside or clerical employees began. For its actions during this campaign, the employer was found to have violated § 8(a)(1) by unlawfully questioning and intimidating one of its employees, and by permitting memoranda to reach employees which threatened to obstruct the exercise of their rights under the Act. Ill R. 12.
The employer has not petitioned for review of these findings. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 12 n. 2. Accordingly, they are entitled to summary enforcement.
Retail Clerks Union Local 1401 v. NLRB,
463 F.2d 316, 320 (D.C.Cir.1972);
Riverside Press, Inc. v. NLRB,
415 F.2d 281, 284-85 (5th Cir.1969),
cert. denied,
397 U.S. 912, 90 S.Ct. 915, 25 L.Ed.2d 94 (1970).
B.
Challenged, unfair labor practices
The employer has challenged the findings that it violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) when it suspended and subsequently discharged Katherine Tate (Tate), and reprimanded Kathleen Gunton (Gunton). Both Tate and Gunton were active in organizing the inside or office employees. The catalyst for the employer's disciplinary action against Tate and Gunton was an incident on July 5, 1979. The AU found the following facts.
On July 5, irate utility customers, whose power had been cut off, left a bag of spoiled food in the reception area. After the customers departed, there was much merriment surrounding the incident. Mr. Cronk, the employer’s operating manager, had attempted to assuage the irascible customers’ mood. Cronk was “seemingly a willing participant in the fun.” Ill R. 1273. The spoiled groceries were near Tate who was operating the switchboard. When Cronk began to leave, Tate asked that he take the garbage with him; she said that if he did not she would put it on his desk. Cronk refused. When Tate said that she did not sit with trash, Cronk retorted “[g]o ahead and have a wildcat walkout.” Ill R. 1273;
see also
I R. 122 (testimony of Tate). Upon hearing this, Tate picked up her belongings and began to leave the area. Before she had gone far, a call came through the switchboard. She returned to answer it, and finished out her shift. I R. 122 (testimony of Tate); I R. 555 (testimony of Cronk).
Cronk returned to his office and “after a few minutes of contemplation” became upset with Tate. I R. 122 (testimony of Tate); I R. 555 (testimony of Cronk). He reported her action to Mr. Deans — Tate’s immediate supervisor and the Director of Electrical Engineering. Deans told Tate that she might be suspended and to see him after work. Thereupon Tate asked Gunton to be present (which the employer strenuously denies) as a witness when she spoke with Deans.
After work, Gunton went to Tate’s office work area. Two other clerical employees were there at the time. I R. 127, 131-32, 234. When Deans told Tate that she probably would be suspended, Tate looked out the door to Gunton. I R. 234. In response, Gunton entered Deans’ office. Deans told Gunton to “get the hell out,” and when she started to say something, he stood up and told her to get out. Gunton promptly left. For this incident she was given a written reprimand which went into her personnel file.
Tate was suspended for three days for her actions during the spoiled food incident. Upon her return, she showed Deans a note that she had from her doctor that “strongly” recommended that she be given a week off and that the company should not “underestimate the importance of this.” Deans consulted Mr. Lewandowski, the employer’s chief operating officer about Tate’s requested leave of absence. Lewandowski phoned the clinic and learned that a doctor with the same name that appeared at the end of the letter was employed there. Lewandowski denied the request without any inquiry into the seriousness of Tate’s health problem. I R. 444.
When Tate learned that her request for leave had been denied, she said that she had to follow her doctor’s orders. Deans told Tate that if she were not at work she would probably be fired. Tate said she would return in a week and left. Tate was fired when she failed to appear for work.
As to Gunton the AU concluded, and the Board agreed, that by entering Deans' office on Tate’s behalf and proposing that an attempt be made to reach Cronk for clarification of Tate’s job status, Gunton had joined with Tate “for the purpose of ... mutual aid and protection,” which was protected by § 7 of the Act, so that the ensuing reprimand of Gunton violated § 8(a)(1). Further, it was considered that the reprimand of Gunton, while triggered by Gun-ton’s activities in aid of Tate, in fact was in recrimination for her union sympathies and activities, thereby violating § 8(a)(3) in addition to § 8(a)(1).
As to Tate the AU concluded, and the Board agreed, that the 3-day suspension and subsequent discharge of Tate in July 1979 were prompted by Tate’s union sympathies and activities, in violation of § 8(a)(3) and (1); that these conclusions were drawn because of common knowledge among management that Tate was prominently prounion; that the employer had been intent on building a case against Tate; that the spoiled-food incident was seized on as a convenient pretext for punishing Tate for her union involvement; that the reasons for denying her requested leave were unconvincing; and that the July 5, 1979 suspension and July 13 discharge of Tate were in violation of § 8(a)(3) and (1). Ill R. 1278-79.
In addition the AU noted that despite recurrent determinations to the contrary in the representation case, the employer persisted in contending Tate was a confidential employee and, as such, was outside the protection of the Act. No findings were made on the factual nature of Tate’s status as secretary to Deans, or whether Tate’s position was such that she was a confidential employee assisting and acting in a confidential capacity to those handling management policies in the field of labor relations — thus having a “labor-nexus” under Board decisions.
See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Corp.,
454 U.S. 170, 173, 102 S.Ct. 216, 220, 70 L.Ed.2d 323 (1981). Instead of making such findings, the employer’s confidential employee defense as to Tate’s charges was rejected by the AU and the Board by noting that the claim that confidential employees do not enjoy the protection of the Act is inconsistent with current Board law.
On the basis of the findings and conclusions made the Board ordered remedial relief for Gunton and Tate, as well as on the unchallenged violations. In this review proceeding the employer argues that (1) the Board erred by refusing to allow the employer to relitigate the question of Tate’s status as a confidential employee and, on review of the record, the evidence supports a finding that Tate was such an employee; (2) the Board’s finding that the employer violated the Act by dismissing Tate for taking an unauthorized leave of absence is not supported by the record; (3) the Board applied an incorrect standard in determining that Tate’s discharge violated the Act, not applying the
Wright Line
test; (4) the Board erred in finding that Tate’s suspension for leaving her work station violated the Act; and (5) the Board erred in finding that Gunton’s interruption of a confidential interview was protected concerted activity.
II
Tate’s suspension and discharge
The AU determined that, in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3), the employer suspended and subsequently discharged Tate because of her union sympathies and activities. Ill R. 1278. We must uphold findings of the Board if they are supported by substantial evidence, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes.
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951);
McLane/Western Inc. v. NLRB,
723 F.2d 1454, 1457 (10th Cir.1983);
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. NLRB,
691 F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir.1982). We turn first to the question whether the record as a whole supports the Board’s findings respecting Tate’s suspension and discharge.
Substantiality of the evidence to support the findings
Tate was actively involved in union activities. I R. 102-04. The employer was
aware of this. I R. 105, 107, 117, 150, 378, 409; Deposition of Deans at 47-48. When an employee who is active in union affairs is disciplined or discharged, it can give rise to an inference of violative discrimination.
See NLRB v. First National Bank of Pueblo,
623 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir.1980) (recognizing that such an inference is permissible but not permitting it in view of employee’s very limited union activity);
Head Division, AMF, Inc. v. NLRB,
593 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir.1979) (inference permitted where employee actively engaged in union activities);
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
554 F.2d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1977) (permitting inference). Such discrimination must generally be proven by circumstantial evidence.
Head Division v. NLRB, supra,
593 F.2d at 975;
see also McLane/Western, supra,
723 F.2d at 1459 (“An employer’s anti-union motive generally may be proven only by circumstantial evidence.”). Buttressing this inference are statements made by Deans indicating his hostility towards Tate’s union involvement. Deans admitted that Tate’s union sentiments were a source of discomfort to him because of what he believed was the confidential nature of her duties. The way Deans “looked at it” either Tate would have to be terminated or she would have to agree not to belong to the union. Deposition of Deans at 73-74.
It is also probative that the employer began keeping a file on Tate’s errors soon after Deans became uncomfortable with Tate’s union sentiments. Deposition of Deans 74, 75-79. This suggests that the employer sought to manufacture a case against Tate. Although the employer argues that the file was kept because of a legitimate concern with the quality of Tate’s work, Opening Brief of Petitioner at 20, the AU found that the weight of the evidence demonstrated that Tate was a more than adequate employee. Ill R. 26. Despite the evidence that the employer has offered to refute this, the inference the Board has drawn has adequate support in the record,
and we will not disturb it.
See Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB,
685 F.2d 362, 364 (10th Cir.1982) (“We are unable to reevaluate the evidence when conflicting views have been presented and the Board has chosen a version which is adequately supported by the evidence.”);
NLRB v. Wilhow Corp.,
666 F.2d 1294, 1299, (10th Cir.1981) (“We are not authorized to make contrary alternative inferences from the record evidence where there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination.”).
In addition, the circumstances surrounding both the suspension and discharge of Tate also support the Board’s findings. As to the suspension, it was found that the atmosphere surrounding the spoiled food incident was jovial and that the incident was used as a pretext to punish Tate for her union sympathies. Ill R. 1273, 1278. There is substantial evidence that this was the case. Cronk admitted that there was kidding surrounding the incident. I R. 569-70. Moreover, Tate’s discharge followed what the Board found to be an unlawfully motivated suspension of Tate.
Cf. McLane/Western v. NLRB, supra,
723 F.2d at 1460 n. 5 (timing of discharge supports unfair labor practice charge). Furthermore the events surrounding the denial of Tate’s request for leave suggest that the employer was searching for a reason to discipline her. After Tate gave Deans the letter from her physician recommending that she be given a one week leave of absence, Deans took the letter to Lewandowski because Deans
was unsure how to handle the matter. Although Tate’s appearance suggested that she might have a health problem,
Lewandowski denied the request without making an inquiry into the seriousness of her health problem. I R. 443-44. For these reasons we hold that there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings that Tate was unlawfully suspended and discharged.
The employer argues that even if the General Counsel made a prima facie case of unlawful discharge, the employer demonstrated that its action would have been taken regardless of illegal motivation; that Tate was absent without leave; that the General Counsel offered no evidence concerning Tate’s physical or emotional condition; and thus under the
Wright Line
analysis which should have been followed, the finding of violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3) by Tate’s discharge must be vacated. Opening Brief of Petitioner 31-35.
We find no fatal defect in the record on this point. The AU’s conclusions, adopted by the Board and supported by the record, included the conclusion that the spoiled food incident was “seized upon as a convenient pretext to punish [Tate] for her union involvement;” that the employer “was intent upon building a case against Tate” which was inferrable from instructions given to Deans, within about one month before Tate’s July 5,1979, suspension and her July 13, 1979 discharge, to keep track of examples of error in Tate’s work; that the weight of the evidence, including Deans’ previous letter of recommendation of Tate, undercuts the bona fides of the documentation procedure; and that Lewandowski’s professed reservations over the form of the doctor’s note could only be described as the quibbling of one with an ulterior motive. II R. 1278-79. Thus the findings can fairly be read, with record support, to rule out the possibility of the employer’s prevailing on the theory of a
Wright Line
defense and no remand is necessary to restate the findings in terms of
Wright Line
analysis.
See McLane/Western, supra,
723 F.2d at 1461;
The Artra Group, Inc., v. NLRB,
730 F.2d 586, 591, 592 (10th Cir.1984).
In sum, the record as a whole supports the Board’s findings as to the unfair labor practice charges concerning Tate’s suspension and discharge.
The employer’s confidential employee defense
The employer strenuously contends that Tate was a confidential secretary and thus not entitled to the protection of the Act; that the employer was entitled to re-litigate this issue in this unfair labor practice proceeding; and that it was denied this right.
We must agree that the employer was entitled to relitigate its assertions that Tate was a confidential employee. In an unfair labor practice proceeding under § 8(a)(1) and (3), the Board’s regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(f) (1983),
do not prevent relitigation of common issues that were decided in an earlier representation hearing. This proceeding is not a subsequent “related”
proceeding so that § 102.67(f) would bar relitigation of the confidential employee issue.
See NLRB v. Dillon Stores,
643 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.1981).
We must carefully delineate the Board’s handling of this confidential employee defense asserted in the instant case in light of the similar problems and the holding of the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp.,
454 U.S. 170, 102 S.Ct. 216, 70 L.Ed.2d 323 (1981). In
Hendricks,
the Court reviewed Board decisions before 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act, and its legislative history. It concluded that it had been the Board’s practice before Taft-Hartley to apply a labor-nexus test to identify confidential employees excluded from bargaining units and that there was nothing in the Taft-Hartley legislative history providing support for the argument that Congress disapproved of that Board practice; that to the contrary the history indicated that Congress intended to leave that historic practice undisturbed.
Id.
at 185, 102 S.Ct. at 226. Because there was no attack on the Board’s finding that the confidential secretary there did not have a labor-nexus, the Court remanded with directions to enforce the Board’s remedial order on the § 8(a)(1) charge.
Id.
at 191, 102 S.Ct. at 229.
The Court did not decide the broad question which Board counsel argues in the instant case, namely that all confidential employees are properly entitled to the protection of the Act. The Court was not called on to decide the propriety of the Board’s practice of affording even “labor-nexus” employees some protections of the Act, and the question was not addressed.
Id.
at 185-86, n. 19, 102 S.Ct. at 226 n. 19.
As the employer points out in the instant case, evidence was presented here concerning confidential information to which Tate was privy. The employer says Tate, who was secretary to Deans, the Director of Electrical Engineering, acted in a confidential capacity as to Deans, that her work placed her in a position of confidence where she had access to confidential information, that the evidence showed Tate was privy to important information other than labor relations matters not available to the public, that Deans fulfilled an important role in formulating and implementing labor relations policy of the employer, and also that as Deans’ confidential secretary Tate typed memoranda on the employer’s position on issues being negotiated with the union. Opening Brief of Petitioner 14-16. The employer argues that under either the broad definition that all confidential secretaries are excluded from coverage of the Act (as the Seventh Circuit held in
Hendricks),
or the Board’s definition limiting such confidential employees to those with a “labor-nexus,” Tate was a confidential employee and accordingly she did not enjoy the protection of the Act.
Opening Brief of Petitioner 16-17.
We noted earlier that the AU’s findings, adopted by the Board, did not determine the status or type of relationship Tate had under the
Hendricks
classifications. Instead the ALJ and the Board acknowledged the assertions of the employer, referred to the earlier determinations by the Regional Director against the employer’s assertions that Tate was a confidential employee, and then dismissed the employer’s assertions that Tate did not enjoy the protection of the Act as contrary to current Board law. Ill R. 1278 n. 20.
Since the employer’s arguments were advanced the Supreme Court has decided
Hendricks.
The employer’s contention based on the Seventh Circuit’s view in
Hendricks
— that all confidential secretaries are excluded from the Act, without regard to labor relations information — -is now untenable. However the additional contention of the employer that Tate was a confidential secretary with a labor-nexus must be considered. We feel that there was sufficient evidence presented on this theory that it might be found that Tate was within that category, being a confidential secretary having a labor-nexus. This was not determined by the Board’s findings. Without such a factual determination by the Board, which has that fact-finding function, we should not dispose of the alternate contention of the employer that Tate did not enjoy the protection of the Act because she was a confidential secretary with a “labor-nexus.”
We conclude that we should not rule on the part of the case relating to Tate on what would be essentially a hypothetical question,
i.e.,
was she entitled to the protection of the Act assuming that she was a confidential employee. Fact-finding on that question and the degree of sensitivity of information to which Tate was privy could be of critical importance. In the posture in which the instant case comes to us, we do not know if we have a “labor-nexus” confidential employee issue. The Board avoided the question and made no findings on the status or relationship of Tate. If it were determined that Tate was not a confidential secretary, assisting and acting in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations, then she would be in a position like the secretary in
Hendricks
and the Board should afford remedial relief on the unfair labor practice charges.
Accordingly, while we uphold the Board’s findings against the challenge that the record does not support the findings of unlawful suspension and discharge, we must remand the portion of the case relating to Tate. The confidential employee defense cannot be properly decided until the Board makes proper findings as to whether Tate was a confidential secretary with a labor-nexus, or whether she was outside that classification. We remand this part of the case for further proceedings the Board deems necessary, for findings and conclusions on the confidential employee defense in light of the classifications identified in
Hendricks,
and for an order thereon. We have not, and do not intend by this opinion, to rule on the question of law whether confidential employees having a labor-nexus are entitled to the protection of the Act against unfair labor practices of the type involved here. That issue remains for the Board to rule on in the first instance if required by the findings it makes on the confidential employee defense.
Ill
Gun ton’s reprimand
The AU found that reprimanding Gunton for her actions in trying to come to
the aid of Tate in Deans’ office violated § 8(a)(1) because Gunton had joined with Tate for mutual aid and protection. The reprimand therefore interfered with the exercise of § 7 rights. 29 U.S.C. § 157. In addition, the AU found that the reprimand was in recrimination for Gunton’s union activities and thereby constituted independent § 8(a)(1) and (3) violations, which include discouragement of union membership. Ill R. 1272. The employer argues that Gunton’s action was neither concerted nor protected. Opening Brief of Petitioner 9-12, 38-42. We are convinced, however, that the record supports the finding of concerted and protected activity. We also conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the finding of unlawful discrimination in reprimanding Gunton because of her union activities.
The Board concluded that Gunton, by entering Deans’ office on Tate’s behalf and proposing that an attempt be made to reach Cronk for clarification of Tate’s job status, joined with Tate for the purpose of mutual aid and protection. Ill R. 1272. This mutually protective action was undertaken by two employees who had been active in the effort to organize the office employees. The Board’s holding is a permissible construction of “concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection” by the agency charged by Congress with enforcement of the Act, and should be sustained.
NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251, 260, 95 S.Ct. 959, 965, 43 L.Ed.2d 171 (1975);
see NLRB v. Modern Carpet Industries, Inc.,
611 F.2d 811, 813-14 (10th Cir.1979);
NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc.,
566 F.2d 681, 686 (10th Cir.1977) (question whether activities are protected by the Act is one on which courts defer to Board expertise);
NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co.,
130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir.1942) (opinion of L. Hand, J., quoted by the Supreme Court in
Weingarten,
420 U.S. at 261, 95 S.Ct. at 965).
We thus conclude that the Board’s finding of the separate § 8(a)(1) and (3) violations by the written reprimand of Gunton is supported by the record.
It was also concluded by the Board that the reprimand of Gunton, while triggered by her activities in behalf of Tate, was in recrimination for her union sympathies and activities. Ill R. 1272. This conclusion is also supported by the record. It was widely known that Gunton was a prime mover in the union organizing effort, I R. 228, 409, 571-72, and the employer admits that she was. Opening Brief of Petitioner 10. As noted, when an employee who is active in union affairs is discharged, it can give rise to an inference of violative discrimination.
See First National Bank of Pueblo, supra,
623 F.2d at 692;
Head Division AMF, Inc. v. NLRB, supra,
593 F.2d at 975;
Montgomery Ward, supra,
554 F.2d at 1002. Gunton testified that her involvement with the union organizing campaign was very strong. I R. 228. The testimony of Stanley Lewandowski, the employer’s chief operating officer, and of Spencer Cronk, the employer’s director of operations, make clear that the employer was aware of Gunton’s active support for the union. I R. 409, 571-73.
Further, the employer committed other unfair labor practices.
This fact suggests that the employer was hostile to the union, and the presence of anti-union ani
mus lends support to the inference that Gunton was unlawfully reprimanded.
See NLRB v. Automotive Controls Corp.,
406 F.2d 221, 226 (10th Cir.1969) (upholding Board finding of unlawful discharge and permitting Board to rely in part on evidence of company’s anti-union animus as demonstrated by § 8(a)(1) violations);
NLRB v. Georgia Rug Mill,
308 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir.1962) (anti-union bias is significant factor in determining motive);
see also NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc.,
558 F.2d 160, 166 (3d Cir.1977) (“prior unfair labor practices demonstrate the company’s propensity for [violating the Act] and suggest that its post-election grant of benefits was likewise improperly motivated.”).
We are also convinced that the record supports an inference that Gunton was discriminatorily disciplined. The written reprimand of Gunton said that she entered Deans’ office without authorization and with no official duties to perform, and that employees were not authorized to visit other areas of the building after working hours unless they had authorization or official business to conduct. Though the evidence indicates that other employees stayed in the building after hours,
Lewandowski’s testimony establishes that only Gunton received a written reprimand for such conduct between January 1978 and November 1979 when the AU heard the case. I R. 15. That only Gunton was disciplined for activity in which other employees engaged further supports the conclusion that her reprimand was in recrimination for her union activities.
Cf. Head Division, AMF, Inc. v. NLRB,
593 F.2d 972, 975-76 (10th Cir.1979) (“NLRB was not unreasonable in concluding that [employee]” was unlawfully discharged when he was only employee ever discharged for committing act — “without prior warning or attention to less extreme disciplinary sanctions”);
NLRB v. Big Three Industrial Gas & Equipment Co.,
579 F.2d 304, 312 (5th Cir.1978) (“otherwise valid rule may be discriminatorily applied to penalize those who assert rights protected under the Labor Act.”),
cert. denied,
440 U.S. 960, 99 S.Ct. 1501, 59 L.Ed.2d 773 (1979);
NLRB v. Heck’s Inc.,
386 F.2d 317, 320 (4th Cir.1967) (“well settled that enforcement of otherwise valid rule only against those engaging in union activities is discriminatory”).
We conclude that the record as a whole supports the Board’s finding that Gunton’s reprimand was a violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3). Moreover, while the Board’s findings do not go through the step-by-step
Wright Line
analysis,
see NLRB v. Transportation Management,
— U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983), we are convinced that consideration was given to the theory of defense the employer asserts and that the rejection of it is supported by the record.
We conclude that the findings can fairly be read, with record support, to rule out the possibility of the employer’s prevailing on a defense under the
Wright Line
theory; therefore a remand to restate the findings in terms of the
Wright Line
analysis is unnecessary.
See McLane/Western, supra,
723 F.2d at 1461;
The Artra Group, Inc. v. NLRB,
730 F.2d 586, 591, 592 (10th Cir.1984).
In sum, we uphold the Board’s findings and conclusions concerning Gunton’s writ
ten reprimand and will enforce the order thereon.
IV
For the reasons stated, the Board’s order will be enforced in all respects except as to the suspension and discharge of employee Tate. With respect to the suspension and discharge of Tate, the case is partially remanded to the Board for further proceedings on the employer’s confidential employee defense as provided herein, this court retaining jurisdiction following such proceedings to review determinations of the Board which are challenged and to consider any further application made for enforcement.