Intel Corporation v. Ulsi System Technology, Inc.

995 F.2d 1566, 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1136, 93 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4419, 93 Daily Journal DAR 7845, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21733, 1993 WL 196286

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
• Decided: August 26, 1993
• Docket: 92-1116
• Status: Published

Opinions

LOURIE, Circuit Judge.

ULSI System Technology, Inc. appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon granting Intel Corporation’s motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining ULSI from infringing U.S. Patent Re. 33,629. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., 782 F.Supp. 1467, 21 USPQ2d 1922 (D.Or.1991). Because the district court clearly erred in concluding that Intel had established a reasonable likelihood of success on the issue of infringement, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

Intel is the assignee of U.S. Patent Re. 33,629 to John F. Palmer, et al., entitled “Numerical Data Processor.”¹ The claims of the ’629 patent are directed to the design and operation of a floating-point arithmetic processor capable of mixed precision calculations, mixed mode arithmetic calculations, and rounding operations. Intel has developed a line of math coprocessors² covered by the patent, including the Intel 8087, 80287, and 80387 coprocessors.

On January 10, 1983, Intel and the Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) entered into a cross-licensing agreement to “increase their freedom of design by obtaining a license under present and future patents and patent applications owned or controlled by the other.” Under that agreement, Intel and HP each granted to the other an “irrevocable, retroactive, nonexclusive, world-wide, royalty-free license” under all patents and patent applications “having an effective filing date prior to January 1, 2000, said license to be effective until the expiration of said patents.”

ULSI sells a math coprocessor known as the US83C87 (’C87 coprocessor) which is compatible with the Intel 80386 microprocessor and competes commercially with the Intel 80387 coprocessor. Since September 22, 1989, ULSI has purchased the ’C87 coprocessors from HP under an agreement entered into on August 2, 1988, in which HP agreed to manufacture the coprocessors for ULSI. As is apparently common in such “foundry” arrangements in the semiconductor industry, ULSI supplied HP with proprietary design specifications and HP then manufactured and shipped completed coprocessor chips to ULSI, which resold them as ULSI products.³

Intel first became aware of ULSI’s ’C87 coprocessor sales on February 4, 1991. On July 29, 1991, Intel brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon alleging infringement of the ’629 patent by ULSI’s “making and selling, and inducing others to make, sell and use, the ‘US83C87’ [coprocessor].”⁴ Intel filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. In considering Intel’s motion, the district court weighed several factors relating to injunctive relief, including the likelihood of Intel’s success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of hardships, and the public interest.

The district court determined that the public interest favored neither party because the public’s interest in the protection of patents was balanced by its interest in allowing an accused company to continue to operate until the issue of liability was fully adjudicated. Additionally, the court determined that the balance of hardships tipped in favor of ULSI because the ’C87 coprocessor was ULSI’s only product and ULSI “would in all likelihood be forced out of business” if it were enjoined. However, the district court concluded that Intel had established a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the issues of infringement, validity, and enforceability of the ’629 patent. Furthermore, it determined that ULSI failed to rebut the presumption of irreparable harm that arose from Intel’s “clear showing” of validity and infringement. Because the “likelihood of success on the merits and the irreparable harm (both of which favor Intel)” outweighed “the balance of ■ hardships (which favors ULSI),” the district court granted Intel’s motion.⁵

DISCUSSION

The issuance of a preliminary injunction under 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988) is a matter of discretion for a district court. That discretion, however, is not absolute and must be reviewed in light of the equitable standards governing the issuance of injunctions. Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1579, 219 USPQ 686, 691 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996, 104 S.Ct. 493, 78 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983). In determining whether a movant has established a right to preliminary injunctive relief, the district court must consider a number of factors, viz., (1) whether the movant has sufficiently established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted; (3) whether the balance of hardships tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) the impact, if any, of the injunction on the public interest. Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451, 7 USPQ2d 1191, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1988). Each factor must be weighed and assessed against the others and against the form and magnitude of the relief requested. Id. We have cautioned, however, that a preliminary injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely granted. Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869, 18 USPQ2d 1347, 1349 (Fed.Cir.1991); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 683, 15 USPQ2d 1307, 1310 (Fed.Cir.1990).

In opposition to the motion, ULSI maintained that HP was permitted under the licensing agreement to act as a foundry for ULSI and that the sale of the coprocessors by HP to ULSI was a “first sale” that extinguished Intel’s patent rights with respect to those products. The district court, however, rejected ULSI’s argument because it determined that the licensing agreement did not grant HP the “power to sublicense” the ’629 patent. On appeal, ULSI claims that the district court erred in concluding that the “patent exhaustion” or “first sale” doctrine did not shield ULSI from Intel’s claim of infringement.⁶

The law is well settled that an authorized sale of a patented product places that product beyond the reach of the patent. See Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350-51, 17 L.Ed. 581 (1864). The patent owner’s rights with respect to the product end with its sale, United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252, 62 S.Ct. 1088, 1094, 86 L.Ed. 1408, 53 USPQ 404, 408 (1942), and a purchaser of such a product may use or resell the product free of the patent, id. at 250, 62 S.Ct. at 1093, 53 USPQ at 408. This longstanding principle applies similarly to a sale of a patented product manufactured by a licensee acting within the scope of its license. See Unidisco, Inc. v. Schattner, 824 F.2d 965, 968, 3 USPQ2d 1439, 1441 (Fed.Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 774, 98 L.Ed.2d 860 (1988).

In the instant case, the issue as to whether ULSI is free from infringement liability turns on whether there was a sale of 'C87 coprocessors by HP to ULSI. Intel argues that the “patent exhaustion” doctrine does not apply because HP never sold a product to ULSI. Although Intel claims, as it must, that the ’C87 coprocessor infringes the ’629 patent, it maintains that what was actually sold by HP under the foundry agreement was its fabrication services with an ancillary sale of wafers and chemicals. Intel asserts that HP could not have sold a product covered by the ’629 patent because HP never had or retained any ownership rights in the ’C87 coprocessors. Thus, according to Intel, no sale ever took place that could support ULSI’s “first sale” defense. That argument is incorrect.

Interpretation of a contract is a question of law which we review de novo. See Interstate Gen. Gov’t Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433, 1434 (Fed.Cir.1992). After reviewing the HP-ULSI contract, we cannot accept Intel’s characterization of that agreement as one in which HP merely provided fabrication services to ULSI. That agreement, entitled “Terms and Conditions of Sale,” is replete with references to the sale of semiconductor wafers (i.e., chips) that incorporate the ’C87 coprocessor design. For example, the section of the agreement headed “Section 2: Production Fabrication” provided that HP “will sell CMOS34 wafers to” ULSI. That section recites prices for the chips and includes a delivery. schedule for shipments of the chips to ULSI. Although the agreement also includes a section delineating the “engineering services” to be provided by HP, the agreement clearly involved the sale of chips, not merely the sale of fabrication services.

Nor, as Intel contends, must the licensed seller of a patented product own intellectual property rights to the product in order for there to be a sale. Intel makes much of the fact that the ’C87 chip was based on a design provided by ULSI. Intel confuses the issue of design origin with the issue of sale. Who designed the chip and whether it embodies inventions other than Intel’s have no bearing on the controlling issue whether the ’C87 coprocessors were sold by HP to ULSI and thus extinguished Intel’s patent rights relating to those products.

That ULSI, rather than HP, might have owned any existing intellectual property rights to the chips was a matter between ULSI and HP, and did not concern Intel. Intel does not dispute that HP was authorized under the broad terms of the licensing agreement to sell the chips at issue. To the extent that Intel had a patent covering the chips, HP’s conceded right to sell the chips deprives Intel of any claim of infringement, as long as HP sold the chips. If it had not granted that license or if the license had been limited in some relevant way, that would be a different case from the one before us. Intel might thereby have retained its right to proceed against those who entered into foundry agreements such as the present one. While Intel may not in retrospect be pleased with the deal that it made permitting HP to make unrestricted sales, it nevertheless granted HP that right in 1983, presumably for consideration it believed to be of value at that time. It cannot now renege on that grant to avoid its. consequences.

We also reject Intel’s contention that the sale of chips by HP to ULSI constituted a “de facto sublicense” prohibited by the licensing agreement. We found a similar argument to be “without merit and specious” in Lisle Corp. v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 693, 227 USPQ 894 (Fed.Cir.1986). In Liste, a licensed manufacturer sold products covered by the licensor’s patent to a third party which resold them under its trademark. The licensor brought an infringement action against both the licensee and the third party on the basis that the manufacture of the patented product for the third party constituted a sublicense. Because such sublicensing was prohibited under the licensing agreement, the patent owner claimed that the products were infringing. The court in Lisle, however, concluded that the licensee’s sales were authorized and that the resale by the third party did not create a sublicense. Id. at 695, 227 USPQ at 895. Similarly, the sale by HP to ULSI here did not create a sublicense. HP did not empower ULSI to make Intel-patented chips or to use or sell any such chips except those lawfully sold to it by HP; these would have been the incidents of a sublicense.

Relatedly, we do not agree with the district court’s conclusion that the sale of chips by HP to ULSI was not a “first sale” because HP was not authorized to sublicense ULSI to design products covered by the ’629 patent. That HP did not have the authority to sublicense the ’629 patent to ULSI is irrelevant. The agreement between HP and ULSI was not a sublicense, but a contract for the manufacture and sale of chips. Thus, HP did not grant a sublicense; it sold a product, albeit one designed by its purchaser. ULSI is immune from infringement, not because it was a sublicensee, which it was not, but because HP was a licensed and therefore legitimate source of the chips. Moreover, ULSI was not required to be sublicensed in order to provide its chip design to HP.

Both parties cite our earlier decision in Intel Corp. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed.Cir.1991) (“Atmel”), as supporting authority. Atmel is similar to, but distinguishable from, the instant case. Under the agreement in Atmel, Intel granted Sanyo a “non-exclusive, world-wide royalty-free license without the right to sublicense except to Subsidiaries, under Intel Patents which read on any Sanyo [devices] for the lives of such patents, to make, use and sell such products.” (Emphases added). Intel alleged that Atmel, among others, violated 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988) by importing EPROMs (Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories) that infringed a number of Intel patents. Atmel claimed that its imported EPROMs were not infringing because they were manufactured and sold by Sanyo under its agreement with Intel. Intel, on the other hand, argued that Sanyo was not permitted to sell EPROMs to Atmel for resale as Atmel products because the licensing agreement only authorized Sanyo to sell Sanyo products.

As an initial matter, the court in Atmel expressly recognized the freedom from patent infringement of one purchasing products from a licensed party under a foundry agreement. The court stated that

[i]f the Intel/Sanyo agreement permits Sanyo to act as a foundry for another company for products covered by the Intel patents, the purchaser of those licensed products from Sanyo would be free to use and/or resell the products. Such further use and sale is beyond the reach of the patent statutes. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-52, 62 S.Ct. 1088, 1093-94, 86 L.Ed. 1408, [53 USPQ 404, 408] (1942) (the first vending of any article manufactured under a patent puts the article beyond the reach of the patent).

Id., 946 F.2d at 826, 20 USPQ2d at 1166. Thus, the court agreed that Atmel would be shielded from Intel’s claims of infringement if Atmel could establish that Sanyo was authorized to sell the EPROMs to Atmel.

In determining whether the licensing agreement provided for foundry rights, the court focused on what was meant by the “Sanyo limitation” in the agreement. The court concluded that the limitation precluded Sanyo from serving as a foundry for non-Sanyo EPROMs because Sanyo was only permitted to sell Sanyo products. Sanyo was prohibited from producing and selling EP-ROMs to Atmel for resale as Atmel products, and the court thus held that Atmel could not rely on the license defense. Id. at 828, 20 USPQ2d at 1167-68. In contrast, the licensing agreement between Intel and HP here contains no restriction on HP’s right to sell or serve as a foundry.

In light of our discussion above, we hold that the ’C87 coprocessors were insulated from Intel’s claim of infringement because they were sold to ULSI by HP, which was authorized to do so under its licensing agreement with Intel. Accordingly, we conclude that Intel cannot establish a likelihood of success on the issue of infringement.

To obtain reversal of a grant of a preliminary injunction, an alleged infringer must establish that a determination regarding one or more of the factors relied on by the district court was clearly erroneous. New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882, 23 USPQ2d 1622, 1625 (Fed.Cir.1992). Although none of the factors alone is dispositive, the absence of a sufficient showing with regard to any one factor may, in light of the weight assigned to the other factors, preclude preliminary injunctive relief. See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, 908 F.2d 951, 953, 15 USPQ2d 1469, 1471 (Fed. Cir.1990).

The district court’s finding on the likelihood of success is clearly erroneous because it was based on a legal error concerning the application of the first sale doctrine. As to the other preliminary injunction factors, the district court presumed irreparable harm because it found that Intel had made a clear showing that the ’629 patent was valid and infringed. Because that presumption was based on a clearly erroneous finding on the likelihood of success, it too was clearly erroneous. We discern no clear error in the district court’s determination that the balance of hardships tipped in ULSI’s favor and that the public interest favored neither party. In view of the totality of these factors, as weighed by the district court, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting Intel’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

CONCLUSION

The district court erred in determining that the Intel-HP licensing agreement did not provide ULSI with a defense against Intel’s claim of infringement, a predicate to its finding a likelihood of success in proving infringement, and derivatively, irreparable harm. The district court’s grant of Intel’s motion for a preliminary injunction is therefore reversed.

REVERSED.

1 . The '629 patent is a reissue of U.S. Patent 4,338,675.

2 . A math coprocessor is a device which is designed to operate in conjunction with a microprocessor and is capable of performing mathematical computations at speeds up to 100 times faster than the microprocessor alone.

3 . Specifically, ULSI supplied HP with the physical layout and design specifications for the 'C87 coprocessor, encoded on a magnetic design tape. The design data were used by HP to imprint a design pattern onto a quartz glass plate. The imprinted plate known as a "reticle” or a lithographic mask was used in the chip fabrication process to etch the circuit layout of the coprocessor into blank silicon wafers. After the wafers were fabricated, HP conducted a visual inspection and a parametric test to detect any imperfections and errors that may have occurred during the fabrication process.

4 .Intel also brought an action against ULSI for alleged violations of section 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a) (1988). The district court issued a stipulated order permanently enjoining ULSI from misleading consumers as to the origin of the ’C87 coprocessor. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., Civil No. 9-742-JO (D.Or. August 12, 1991).

5 . ULSI filed a motion in this court for a stay pending appeal. Because we concluded that ULSI had shown that a substantial legal question existed on the issue of infringement, we granted the motion for a stay pending appeal. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Technology, Inc., No. 92-1116 (Fed. Cir. January 14, 1992).

6 . ULSI alternatively argues, as it did below, that the 'C87 coprocessor does not literally infringe the '629 patent. Because ULSI's defense based on the Intel-HP license is dispositive, we do not decide whether the district court erred in concluding that the claims of the '629 patent read on the 'C87 coprocessor. Additionally, ULSI does not contest the district court's conclusions regarding Intel's likelihood of success on the issues of invalidity and unenforceability, and we do not consider them.