Indiana Petroleum Marketers & Convenience Store Ass'n v. Cook

808 F.3d 318, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21572, 2015 WL 8606449
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedDecember 14, 2015
Docket14-2559
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 808 F.3d 318 (Indiana Petroleum Marketers & Convenience Store Ass'n v. Cook) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Indiana Petroleum Marketers & Convenience Store Ass'n v. Cook, 808 F.3d 318, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21572, 2015 WL 8606449 (7th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

SYKES, Circuit Judge.

An association of Indiana convenience stores filed this lawsuit seeking to invali *320 date a state law that restricts the sale of cold packaged beer. The suit claims the law violates the Equal Protection Clause because some kinds of stores may sell cold beer but grocery and convenience stores may not. The district court upheld the law and entered judgment for Indiana.

We affirm. A threshold question is the extent to which the Twenty-first Amendment affects this case. Indiana argues it has “nearly absolute” authority to regulate alcohol sales under the Twenty-first Amendment and no further analysis is necessary. That’s not correct. But the district court was right to uphold the law. Indiana’s cold-beer statute is subject to rational-basis review and survives that lenient standard.

I. Background

The Indiana Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store Association is a trade association that serves the interests of gas stations and convenience stores located in the state. The Association, together with three of its members and an individual consumer, filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of section 7.1-5-10-11 of the Indiana Code, which prohibits holders of a beer dealer’s permit from selling cooled packaged beer. The suit contends that the statute substantially reduces the beer sales of the Association’s members and diverts those sales elsewhere.

The defendants named in the complaint are the chairman of the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission, sued in his official capacity; the Commission itself; and the State of Indiana. The Commission and Indiana were dropped from the suit by stipulation, so the Commission chairman is the sole remaining defendant. 1 Because he is sued in his official capacity, we’ll refer to the defendant as “Indiana.” We’ll refer to the plaintiffs collectively as “the Association.”

The complaint alleges that the cold-beer statute violates the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and parallel provisions in the Indiana Constitution. The equal-protection claim rests on two separate theories. First, the Association contends that the Indiana statutory scheme permits cold-beer sales by grocery and convenience stores located in unincorporated towns but prohibits the sale of cold beer at like stores in incorporated municipalities. Second, the Association contends that the statutory scheme imper-missibly discriminates between package liquor stores, which are permitted to sell cold beer, and grocery and convenience stores, which are not.

The district judge resolved the case on cross-motions for summary judgment. He rejected the first equal-protection theory because the statutory scheme does not actually allow grocery and convenience stores in unincorporated towns to sell cold beer, as the Association contended. On the second equal-protection theory, the judge held that Indiana has a rational-basis for prohibiting grocery and convenience stores from selling cold beer. The judge also considered and rejected the other constitutional challenges and granted Indiana’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. By separate order the judge denied the Association’s motion and entered final judgment for Indiana.

The Association appealed, focusing solely on the equal-protection claim.

*321 II. Discussion

A. Twenty-first Amendment

Indiana argues that the plaintiffs’ equal-protection challenge is “doomed” because state authority to regulate how alcoholic beverages are sold is “nearly absolute” under the Twenty-first Amendment. That’s a considerable overstatement.

The Twenty-first Amendment ended Prohibition and restored the regulatory authority of the States over the transportation and importation of alcoholic beverages within their borders. More specifically, § 2 of the Amendment provides: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. Const, amend. XXI § 2 (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has explained, § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment restored state regulatory authority as it existed prior to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, but it did not immunize state alcohol laws from challenge under other parts of the Constitution. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484-88, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005).

Granholm was a Commerce Clause challenge to laws in Michigan and New York prohibiting out-of-state wineries from selling directly to consumers in those states. Id. at 465-66, 125 S.Ct. 1885. The Court invalidated the two laws, holding that the dormant Commerce Clause “does not allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers.” Id. at 493, 125 S.Ct. 1885.

Along the way to this holding, the Court explained that “state laws that violate other provisions of the Constitution are not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.” Id. at 486, 125 S.Ct. 1885. To illustrate the point, the Court cited several of its cases applying other constitutional provisions to state alcohol regulation, including challenges under the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Import-Export Clause, Congress’s Commerce Power, and the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 486-87, 125 S.Ct. 1885.

Indiana points to other language in Granholm that in its view supports expansive state power to regulate alcohol without the usual constitutional limits. The Court said that “[t]he Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.” Id. at 488, 125 S.Ct. 1885 (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110, 100 S.Ct. 937, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980)). This passage cannot be read in isolation. What comes next in the opinion clarifies the Court’s point: “A State which chooses to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol altogether could bar its importation; and, as our history shows, it would have to do so to make its laws effective.” Id. at 488-89, 125 S.Ct. 1885. In other words, the States have the power under the Twenty-first Amendment to ban the importation of alcohol, but to avoid transgressing the limits of the dormant Commerce Clause, they may do so only if they also ban the intrastate sale and consumption of alcohol.

The Court also said that the three-tier distribution alcohol system in use in many states — a system that requires the separation of producers, distributors/wholesalers, and retailers — is “unquestionably legitimate” as state policy. Id.

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808 F.3d 318, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21572, 2015 WL 8606449, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/indiana-petroleum-marketers-convenience-store-assn-v-cook-ca7-2015.