On Petition for Rehearing
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
¶ 1 This matter is before us on a petition for rehearing. The original decision in this case was handed down on July 10, 1998, and was published as In re Young, 961 P.2d 918 (Utah 1998) (hereinafter referred to as “original opinion”).1 In that decision, we held that sections 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b) of the Code were violative of article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Those Code subsections provide that two members of the Senate, appointed by the President, and two members of the House, appointed by the Speaker, shall serve on the ten-member Judicial Conduct Commission. As a consequence, we held void proceedings of the commission that led it to recommend that this court enter a public sanction against Judge David S. Young.
¶ 2 The Judicial Conduct Commission moved for permission to file a petition for rehearing. This court granted the motion, as well as the motions of various parties for permission to file briefs as amici curiae in [583]*583support of the petition for rehearing.2 The respondent, Judge Young, filed an opposition to the petition for rehearing. Oral argument was held on December 21, 1998. We now grant the petition and issue this opinion on rehearing.
¶3 The petition for rehearing and the briefs of the various amici have raised several issues of substantial import. First and foremost, the amicus brief of the legislative members of the Judicial Conduct Commission has brought to our attention much new material about the origins of the present judicial article of the Utah Constitution, article VIII, which was rewritten in its entirety and passed by the voters in 1984. Section 13 of that article elevated the Judicial Conduct Commission to constitutional status. The legislator amici contend that this new material demonstrates that the drafters of the amended article, the judges who participated in the hearings preceding its being finalized, the legislators who then passed the proposed amendment and put it on the ballot, and the voters who approved it at a general election all understood that the amended article contemplated legislative participation on the Judicial Conduct Commission. Therefore, they argue, our original decision holding such participation unconstitutional was in error.
¶4 The objective importance of this historical material cannot be overstated. The petition of the Judicial Conduct Commission for rehearing had narrowly asked only that we declare whether the commission can continue to function without the legislative members. But at oral argument, the chair of the commission, who previously had been unaware of the historical materials provided us by the amici, apologized for failing to bring this critical material to our attention in the original proceeding. He also announced in open court that he was now convinced that our original decision was wrong and should be reversed.
¶ 5 The second issue presented by some of the briefs, particularly that of the Governor and the Attorney General, as well as that of the Utah Judicial Council and the Administrative Office of the Courts, is a concern that the original opinion’s language about separation of powers was sufficiently broad to bring into question the constitutionality of many boards, task forces, working groups, advisory committees, and commissions on which members of more than one of the three branches of government sit together. In particular, they urge us to declare that groups with such joint representation that do not exercise “core” or “primary” functions of one branch of government do not fall under the ban of the second clause of article V, section 1. These amici ask that we clarify our original opinion as to the sorts of joint activities that are permissible so that the three branches of government can continue to work together on matters of common concern.
¶ 6 We are persuaded by the briefs and argument that the original opinion should be vacated to the extent that it is inconsistent with this one, and that legislative membership on the Judicial Conduct Commission should be held constitutional. As a preface to a discussion of the merits of the petition for rehearing, we review the analytical approach for determining constitutionality under article V, section 1. We then summarize the core analysis from our original opinion that led us to declare sections 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b) unconstitutional.
f 7 Article V, section 1, the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution, provides:
[584]*584[i] The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and [ii] no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Utah Const, art. V, § 1 (bracketed material added). As indicated by the brackets in the text, this section is divided into two clauses. The first states the general separation of powers principle, and the second very specifi--cally prohibits the exercise of certain functions of one branch by one charged with the exercise of certain powers of another branch. In the present case, the briefing and argument in both the original proceeding and on rehearing have focused exclusively on the second clause of article V, section 1. Our original opinion held that this clause was violated by sections 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b).
■ ¶ 8 The analytical model derived from the second clause of article V, section 1 can be stated as a relatively straightforward three-step inquiry. First, are the legislators in question “charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to” one of the three branches of government? Second, is the function that the statute has given the legislators one “appertaining to” another branch of government? The third and final step in the analysis asks: if the answer to both of the above questions is “yes,” does the constitution “expressly” direct or permit exercise of the otherwise forbidden function? If not, article V, section 1 is transgressed. Utah Const, art. V, § 1. We applied this analytical model in our original opinion, and we do so again today in determining both the permissibility of legislators serving on the Judicial Conduct Commission and the permissibility of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House appointing two members each to the commission.
¶ 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is “yes.” Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch — the power to vote on proposed laws. See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939))). This is true of both the legislators appointed to the commission and the legislators appointing them. With similar certainty, we found in the original opinion and we find today that the answer to the third question is “no.” The Utah Constitution contains no express provision directing or permitting service by legislators on the commission, nor is there any provision directing or permitting the President and the Speaker to appoint members of the Judicial Conduct Commission. Therefore, the resolution of this case depends entirely upon the answer to the second question: (i) As it applies to those serving on the commission, are the functions the legislators are called upon to perform as members of the Judicial Conduct Commission functions “appertaining to” the judicial branch? (ii) As it applies to the President and the Speaker, is the function they perform when appointing members of the commission “appertaining to” the executive branch? In the original opinion, we answered these questions in the affirmative. Based on historical and contextual information recently brought to our attention, we reach a different result today.
¶ 10 In our original opinion, we concluded with relatively little analysis that the function performed by the Judicial Conduct Commission was one “appertaining to” the judicial branch of government. Original op. ¶ 84. Therefore, we found that it was a violation of article V, section 1 for legislators to sit on a commission exercising an exclusive judicial branch function. Id. ¶ 89. We also found that because the members of the commission performed a function “appertaining to” the judicial branch, the power to appoint those members constitutionally belonged to the [585]*585Governor3 unless the constitution “expressly directed or permitted” someone else to make the appointments. Because the constitution did not, we held that the statute giving that power to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House violated article V, section 1. Although it was central to our decision, we did not explain at any length why the function performed by the Judicial Conduct Commission was exclusively judicial in nature. We merely made the observation that the commission exercises a “type of judicial authority” and was established by the judicial article, article VIII. Id. f 85. Yet the analytical soundness of our original opinion hangs entirely upon the correctness of this fundamental premise.4
¶ 11 Before we revisit this issue, we briefly address the language of the second clause of article V, section 1. As noted, the critical constitutional language is “powers properly belonging to” one branch and “functions appertaining to” either of the other two. Neither phrase is plain in its meaning, particularly when considered in the context of the real world of government. Taken together, these phrases could be read broadly to encompass all powers and functions given to a branch or its officers by the literal language of the constitution, by statute, and by tradition. On the other hand, they could be read narrowly and reach only certain powers that are essential to the very existence of a branch’s minimally fulfilling its conceptual role as part of a three-department system of government.
¶ 12 Perhaps because of the ambiguity of the language, which becomes acute in the context of the real world, our case law stretching back over the past century seldom, if ever, has attempted to decide cases based on a literalistic approach to the language of the second clause. Indeed, few of our cases ever discuss the language “properly belonging to” and “appertaining to” in any detail. See, e.g., Thatcher v. Industrial Comm’n, 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 178, 181 (1944) (finding that it would be “fruitless and unwise” to delineate which powers properly belong to or appertain to the different branches); Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 312, 226 P.2d 531, 536 (1951) (finding that many powers do not properly belong to a single branch); see also Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848-49 (Utah 1994) (not discussing whether the legislature performed a function “properly belonging to” or “appertaining to” another branch when deciding a separation of powers issue); Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 678-79 (Utah 1982) (discussing violations of separation of powers based on the exercise of effective control over another department rather than on whether one department exercised a power “properly belonging to” or “appertaining to” another department) (hereinafter Matheson I); Mutart v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 250-51, 170 P. 67, 68-69 (1917) (deciding that legislature does not impinge upon judiciary by giving no discretion in sentencing without deciding whether this is a power “properly belonging to” or “appertaining to” the judiciary); In re Handley’s Estate, 15 Utah 212, 221, 49 P. 829, 831 (1897) (not relying on whether legislature performed a function “properly belonging to” or “appertaining to” judiciary in finding that legislature impinged on judiciary by passing a law changing result of a judicial decision). Rather, we have, sub silentio, treated the two phrases as equivalent and have sought to articulate the concepts they embrace by considering the basic notions underlying the separation of powers doctrine as it has grown up over the centuries and by an examination of the practical operation of government.
¶ 13 The textual justification for this approach was alluded to in Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 312, 226 P.2d 531, 536 (1951):
We call attention to the use of the phrase “exercise of powers 'properly belonging to one of these departments” (emphasis added), ... The qualified expression indicates the members of the Constitutional Convention must have considered that there were powers which were not so inherently a part [586]*586of one department that other departments would be forever precluded from exercising those which were necessary to a proper functioning of that particular department.
Id. (emphasis in original). It is just this sort of judgment about what is so inherent in a branch that it cannot be exercised by another and what is not so inherent to one that it can be exercised by several that our cases have striven to determine over the years. An excellent example of this mode of analysis is presented in Tite v. State Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404, 67 P.2d 734 (1936). And the spirit of this approach was well expressed when the Tite court quoted the following:
“The absolute independence of the three branches of government which was advocated by Montesquieu has not been found entirely practicable, and, although the threefold division of powers is the basis of the American Constitution, there are many cases in which the duties of one department are to a certain extent devolved upon and shared by the other.”
Id. at 737 (quoting Bouvier’s Dictionary (Rawles 3d Rev.), at 1114). The Tite court also observed that although
“the executive, legislative and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be forever separate and distinct, it is also true that the science of government is a practical one; therefore, while each should firmly maintain the essential powers belonging to it, it cannot be forgotten that the three co-ordinate parts constitute one brotherhood, whose common trust requires a mutual toleration of the occupancy of what seems to be a ‘common cause of vicinage’ bordering the domains of each.”
Id. (quoting Brown v. Turner, 70 N.C. 93 (1874)).
¶ 14 From a survey of our cases the most that can be said categorically is that for powers or functions to fall within the reach of the second clause of article V, section 1, they must be “so inherently legislative, executive or judicial in character that they must be exercised exclusively by their respective departments.” Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 315, 226 P.2d 631, 537 (1951). In defining the functions or powers which are exclusive to one department, we have also used the terms “primary,” “core,” or “essential.” See Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1994); Timpanogos Planning & Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 567 (Utah 1984); State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 688 (Utah 1977). But we have never been willing to be more precise than this. See Thatcher v. Industrial Comm’n, 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 178 (1944). A necessary corollary to the doctrine that some powers or functions belong exclusively to the members of one branch is that there must be powers and functions which may, in appearance, have characteristics of an inherent function of one branch but which may be permissibly exercised by another branch. See Matheson I, 641 P.2d 674, 676 (Utah 1982) (holding that narrowing of field of potential judicial appointees before governor appoints partakes of elements of the appointment power, but is not so inherently an executive function as to preclude participation by the legislative branch in that narrowing); see also Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 226 P.2d 531 (1951); Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734 (1936). We conclude that when the power exercised or the function performed is one that we determine is not exclusive to a branch, it is not “appertaining to” that branch and does not fall within the reach of the second clause of article V, section 1.
¶ 15 With this background in mind, we address the historical and textual materials that have now been brought to our attention to determine what light they shed on the question of whether the function performed by legislators on the commission is one “appertaining to” the judicial branch. It is argued on rehearing by- counsel for Judge Young that we should limit ourselves to the plain language of the constitution and that we should therefore not consider the history of article VIII, section 13. But the plain language is of marginal help on this question. And in such circumstances, we have rejected any such rigid rule of constitutional interpretation. In Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993), we made it plain that in interpreting the constitution, we consider all relevant factors, including the language, other provisions in the constitution that may bear on the matter, [587]*587historical materials, and policy. See id. at 920-21, 921 n. 6. Our primary search is for intent and purpose. Consistent with this view, this court has a very long history of interpreting constitutional provisions in light of their historical background and the then-contemporary understanding of what they were to accomplish.5 This case, like many others, proves the wisdom of the axiom that “[a] page of history is worth a volume of logic.” Society of Sepamtionists, 870 P.2d at 921.
¶ 16 The history of article VIII as a whole is a fascinating study of the conflict between the executive and legislative branches. The struggle began when the legislative branch insisted on input in the selection and confirmation process for judges and the executive resisted. The judicial branch was left to settle several confrontations in this struggle. See Matheson I, 641 P.2d 674, 676-77 (Utah 1982) (finding that the presence of “two legislative appointees on a seven-member judicial nominating commission is constitutionally accommodated and does not necessarily violate Article V, § 1,” but that adding Senate confirmation of gubernatorial appointees to legislative participation on the nominating commission “tips the scale” and violates first clause of article Y, section 1); Matheson v. Ferry, 657 P.2d 240 (Utah 1982) (finding Senate confirmation of judges impermissible in all cases except for juvenile court appointments) (hereinafter Matheson II). Those cases did not end the matter. Rather, they precipitated a complete rewrite of the judicial article of the Utah Constitution that finally settled this dispute and several other long-standing issues with a set of wide-ranging compromises that brought all interested parties to the table. See Utah Const. Revision Comm’n Rep., 15-16 (Jan.1984) (delineating goals of Constitutional Revision Commission to improve functioning of judicial branch and noting that all interested groups were consulted in the processes leading to the drafting of the article). The rewritten judicial article of the Utah Constitution, inter alia, restructured the selection and discipline provisions of the constitution and for the first time constitutionalized both the preexisting judicial nominating commission process and the Judicial Conduct Commission. For today’s purposes, we limit our discussion to the background of section 13 of the new article VIII, the section concerning the Judicial Conduct Commission.
¶ 17 The Judicial Conduct Commission did not spring into life with the drafting of section 13. It preexisted the 1984 constitutional provision. The entity that is the Judicial Conduct Commission had its origins in [588]*5881971. Section 38, 1971 Utah Laws 113, established a commission concerning judicial qualifications. It is worth describing at length because of the near identity, in concept and language, of the original 1971 statute and section 13 of article VIII.6 The commission established in 1971 was composed of five members, three from the board of commissioners of the Utah State Bar and two legislators, one each appointed by the President and the Speaker. The commission was empowered to investigate complaints against judges, hold hearings, take evidence, and make recommendations to the Supreme Court for “removal, suspension, censure, reprimand or retirement.” The grounds listed in the statute for removal, suspension, censure, or reprimand were as follows:
(a) Willful misconduct in office ...; or
(b) Final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law; or
(c) Persistent failure to perform his duties; or
(d) Habitual use of alcohol or drugs which interferes with the performance of his judicial duties.
1971 Utah Laws 113, § 38(2). A separate subsection provided for the involuntary retirement of a judge for “disability seriously interfering with the performance of his duties.” 1971 Utah Laws 113, § 38(4). The statute further provided that upon receipt of such a recommendation from the commission, the Supreme Court was to review the record of the proceedings on the law and facts. The Supreme Court was free to permit the introduction of additional evidence. After review, the court was required to “enter its order implementing the commission recommendation, or modifying or wholly rejecting the recommendation, as it finds just and proper.” 1971 Utah Laws 113, § 38(5).
¶ 18 Between 1971 and 1983, the statute creating the commission was amended several times. There was, however, no significant change in language or concept. Most of these amendments related to a realignment of membership. In 1975, for example, the number of legislators on the commission was increased to three and the total membership to six. In 1977, the membership was increased to seven, and four of them were to be legislators. In 1983, the membership was increased to nine with the two new members being appointees of the Governor. Also in 1983, the name of the commission was changed to the Judicial Conduct Commission. Thus, by the time the new judicial article was drafted, there was a thirteen-year history of a judicial conduct commission that was not the province of any one branch of government. Rather, it started out as a joint exercise of the judicial and legislative branches (in the form of the state bar commissioners) and, by the end, had evolved into an exercise in shared power by all three branches of government. Throughout, the commission remained a group making nonbinding recommendations to the Supreme Court.
¶ 19 A comparison of the constitutional Judicial Conduct Commission in section 13 of article VIII and the statutory Judicial Conduct Commission shows that the former is a virtual copy of the latter, down to the phrasing of the grounds for discipline [589]*589and the rather unique structural relationship between the commission and the Supreme Court. The constitutional provision is briefer; it left the details of procedure and commission composition to be fixed by the statute, as is appropriate in good constitution drafting. Instead, section 13 simply stated, “The Legislature by statute shall provide for the composition and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission.” • Utah Const, art. VIII, § 13. But despite the minor differences, it seems plain that the Constitutional Revision Commission intended the commission to remain an entity exercising powers available to be shared by other branches of government.
¶ 20 It is also clear that the legislature assumed the commission would exercise a function that was permissible to members of branches other than the judicial. The sponsor of the resolution placing the amended article VIII on the ballot was Representative James Moss, who was a member of the statutory Judicial Conduct Commission. He addressed section 13 on the floor of the House during debates and spoke to the question of membership on the commission.
Section 13 deals with the establishment and constitutional foundation of a judicial conduct commission. Representative Ted Lewis and myself serve as your representatives on the state judicial conduct commission by appointment from the Legislature. Senator Cornaby and Senator Black serve from the Senate on that commission and we have been meeting on a regular basis. I will tell you that it is an active group that considers, in private and strict confidentiality, a number of matters that come before us to consider the quality and the potential for problems that judges may have. It is a very important tool that the Supreme Court can use in dealing with reprimanding, the discipline, and possible removal of judges within the system entirely apart from the unopposed retention election. It has the power of reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, and voluntary and involuntary retirement of judges.
Floor Debate, Statement of Rep. James Moss, 45th Utah Leg, 2d Spec. Sess. (March 27,1984) (House recording no. 9).
¶ 21 Finally, the voters to whom the amendment was presented were told othat this was to be a commission upon which legislators and others would sit. The impartial analysis in the 1984 voter information pamphlet stated in part as follows:
The proposal also provides for the constitutional establishment of a judicial conduct commission to review complaints and order disciplinary action against judges. The judicial conduct commission is composed of lawyers, legislators and lay citizens.
David S. Monson, Utah Voter Information Pamphlet 15 (1984) (emphasis added). This language is of course inconsistent with the assumption in our original opinion in this case that the Judicial Conduct Commission established by section 13 of article VIII was intended to perform an exclusively judicial function. The voters, however, informed by this language, approved the amendment.
¶ 22 In Society of Separationists, we said that historical and textual evidence, policy, as well as plain language are the tools that we use in determining the purpose of constitutional provisions. The historical materials discussed above and the textual comparison of section 13 with the preexisting-statutory provisions dealing with the Judicial Conduct Commission convince us that the function to be performed by the commission is not and has never been one that is exclusively within the province of the judicial branch. Rather, that function was intended by the Constitutional Revision Commission which drafted the article, the legislature which placed it before the people, and the voters who adopted it to be performed collaboratively by the several branches. Because the function performed by the commission is not the exclusive province of the judiciary, we answer the second question in our article V, section 1 analysis in the negative — the function exercised by the legislators sitting on the commission is not “appertaining to” the judicial branch.7 Therefore, the prohibi[590]*590tion contained in the second clause of article V, section 1 has no application to sections 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b). That has two consequences. First, because there is no requirement that the constitution expressly direct or permit service by legislators on the commission, there is nothing to prevent the legislature, in the exercise of the authority given it by article VIII, section 13, from passing a statute placing legislators on the commission. Second, because the members of the commission do not perform exclusively judicial functions, the power to appoint them does not belong solely to the Governor and there need not be any constitutional provision expressly directing or permitting their appointment by someone other than the Governor.8
¶23 The only remaining ground for challenging legislative service on and appointment to the commission is the first clause of article V, section 1. That clause has not been specifically addressed by the parties in this case, but it is reasonably implicated in the issues briefed. The first clause of article V, section 1 does not contain the specific ban of the second clause. It simply states that the government is to be divided into three branches. Our cases have indicated that the first clause is only offended when there is an attempt by one branch to dominate another in that other’s proper sphere of action. See, e.g., Matheson I, 641 P.2d at 678. The first clause disallows one branch from effectively controlling another even when the power in question is shared. See id.
¶ 24 On the facts of this case, there is no reason to conclude that the first clause is violated. First, in Matheson I, the legislature had no specific constitutional authorization for what it was attempting. See id. Therefore, we had to analyze its actions under the general rubric of separation of powers. Here, however, the legislators are performing functions that section 13 of article VIII intended them to perform, functions that are definitionally not within the exclusive sphere of the judiciary. Therefore, there is nothing in those functions standing alone that could give rise to a complaint that legislators are using these functions to dominate another branch, here the judicial. Second, even assuming for the purposes of argument only that in performing the functions given it by section 13, the Supreme Court is performing a judicial function, or even an exclusively judicial function, the legislators on the commission are not in a position to interfere with or dominate the exercise of that function. The Judicial Conduct Commission’s relationship to the Supreme Court in matters of judicial discipline is preliminary and advisory, as it was under the preceding statutory regime. The constitution gives this court the power to review matters of law and fact, to take additional evidence if it desires to do so, and to reject in whole or part, or modify as it sees fit, the recommendations of the commission. As we said in In re Worth-en, “this court, not the [Judicial Conduct] Commission, has ultimate responsibility for determining both whether conduct that warrants sanctions has been proven and what those sanctions should be.” In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 862 (Utah 1996); see also Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 (Utah 1994) (delineating power of Judicial Conduct Commission as “power to investigate corn-[591]*591plaints and recommend sanctions”). In the present case, then, there is no basis for finding that the presence of legislators on the Judicial Conduct Commission could violate the first clause of article V, section 1.
¶ 25 The final issue is a request that we clarify the scope of our holding so that it does not inadvertently imperil the functioning of various boards and commissions within state government upon which members of two or more of the three branches may sit together. The anxieties expressed by the amici seem to stem from the fact that the original opinion spoke of the conduct commission as exercising judicial functions that could not be participated in by members of other branches, based on the mere fact that the commission was provided for in the judicial article of the constitution. This was found to be the ease even though the Judicial Conduct Commission does not have more than a preliminary function when it comes to judicial discipline. The apparent conclusion of the amici was that this meant no matter how purely advisory its function, any board or commission that could be seen as an adjunct of any one branch of government could not have members from another branch.
¶ 26 The original opinion held that the Judicial Conduct Commission performed an inherently judicial function, one therefore exclusive to the judiciary. As we have noted above, this conclusion is incorrect for two reasons. First, the 1984 amendment made the commission the exerciser of a function which is not exclusively judicial. Second, and more important from the standpoint of the concerns of the amici, the commission does not in any event purport to perform a function that is inherently and exclusively judicial, such as entering judgment. The commission makes only nonbinding recommendations to this court. Analogously, we have indicated that there is no usurpation of an exclusive judicial function for a domestic relations commissioner, who lacks any constitutional status, to handle a proceeding right up to sending a proposed order to a judge. See Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 851 n. 17. Therefore, even if article VIII, section 13 did not exempt the Judicial Conduct Commission from the reach of the second clause of article V, section 1, and even if this court were exercising an exclusively judicial function in entering orders of discipline against judges — a question not before us and which we do not decide — legislative participation on the commission would not impinge upon the Supreme Court’s exclusively judicial function. See id. at 851. For this reason, a proper understanding of the analytical model used in our separation of powers cases indicates that unless a board, commission, or other body upon which a member of one branch sits purports to exercise a function “appertaining to” another branch, there need be no concern about that service running afoul of the second clause of article V, section 1. As discussed above, the term “appertaining to” has historically been interpreted as meaning more than just a power or function that is exercised by one branch. Rather, it must be one that is essential, core, or inherent in the very concept of one of the three branches of a constitutional government. Unless that standard is met, the function is not one barred to other branches, or to members of those branches.
¶ 27 Obviously, whether the separation of powers principle is violated in any particular situation beyond the one before us is not a question we address today. But this clarification should be enough to allay fears expressed by the amici, without our venturing unnecessarily into the realm of an advisory opinion.
¶28 In conclusion, we reject Judge Young’s contentions that sections 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b) are unconstitutional and that the Judicial Conduct Commission is unlawfully composed. We recognize that as a result of our earlier decision in this matter, the Judicial Conduct Commission operated for a short period without its four legislator members. Its actions during that period are lawful and valid insofar as the Commission nevertheless acted with a quorum present.
¶29 Regarding the matter that brought this case before us, the recommendation of public discipline for Judge Young, we request the parties to reargue the question of the appropriateness of the recommended sanctions. We will set the matter for argument at the earliest convenience.
[592]*592¶ 30 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM and Justice RUSSON concur in Justice ZIMMERMAN’S opinion.