PER CURIAM:
T1 On June 13, 2006, we suspended the attorney for two years and one day for his dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, and misleading actions in a real estate transaction resulting in significant economic harm, embarrassment to the legal profession and to this Court, and an undermining of public confidence in the Bar Association and its members. We deemed the extended suspension appropriate based on Pacenza's disciplinary history, discipline administered in similar cases, and the attorney's unwillingness to acknowledge his wrongdoing.
T2 Upon a de novo review,
we determine that the attorney did not present clear and convincing evidence that, if readmitted, his conduct would conform to the high standards required of a member of the Bar Association.
Therefore, we deny reinstatement and impose the costs of the proceeding in the amount of $2,714.63.
Our decision is supported by the attorney's continued lack of understanding of the consequences of his actions leading to suspension and any true remorse for the results of his conduct along with testimony from former colleagues and a judicial officer questioning both his legal abilities and his integrity and by uncertainty concerning his competency to practice law raised by the lack of strict compliance with the rules governing suspension and reinstate ment proceedings.
FACTS RELEVANT TO REINSTATEMENT PROCEEDINGS
1 3 Pacenza was admitted to the practice of law on October 7, 1976. Before the incident resulting in his suspension for two years and a day, he was disciplined on two occasions. The attorney was privately reprimanded by this Court in October of 1987 for engaging in conduct involving misrepresentations and deceit arising from his collusion in removing a client's child from the lawful custody of the minor's father and transporting the mother and child from Texas to Oklahoma. On February 24, 1989, the Professional Responsibility Commission administered a private reprimand for misrepresentations he made to a social worker at the Oklahoma Department of Human Services that he had filed suit on behalf of an individual and expected to settle the suit within six months. No lawsuit had been filed and the attorney was aware that there was no settlement forthcoming.
T4 The transaction leading to his suspension occurred in 1999 when the Richards executed a contract for deed to purchase real
property from the attorney. At that time, Pacenza did not disclose: the existence of $300,00.00 in IRS tax liens against the property; title problems existing as a result of an incomplete foreclosure action; or that the couple could only expect a merchantable title upon the payment of cash in hand to the attorney. For a period of approximately nine months, Pacenza represented to the Richards and to attorneys hired to assist them that he was working on clearing title to the property. During this period, the attorney did nothing to remedy the title problems.
5 Once the Richards sought independent legal advice, Pacenza attempted to force the couple into a settlement of $55,000.00. The attorney advised the couple's lawyer that if they did not take his offer, he would obtain a divorce to protect his assets. The settlement offer was refused; and Pacenza followed through with his threats, divorcing his wife in order to preserve assets of his estate.
The Richards estimated their total out of pocket expenses at $116,265.25. By the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings, the couple received between $39,000.00 and $40,000.00, leaving them with a loss in excess of $75,000.00. Pacenza was able to purchase many of the items sold in the bankruptcy proceedings, including the building where his law office was located; and, he and his wife remarried.
T6 On July 28, 2008, Pacenza filed for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 11, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A. The hearing on reinstatement was held before the trial panel on October 14, 2008. The trial panel issued its report on November 12, 2008 determining that Pacenza had not met the burden of proof for reinstatement and recommending that reinstatement be denied and costs be imposed. On the same day, the Bar Association filed an application for the assessment of costs in the amount of $2,714.63. The order setting a briefing schedule issued on November 13, 2008. On December 9th and 15th, respectively, Pacenza and the Bar Association filed waivers of their rights to file briefs in the cause.
JURISDICTION, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND BURDEN OF PROOF
17 It is this Court's nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate both the practice and the ethics, licensure, and discipline of the practitioners of the law. The duty is vested solely in this department of government.
Our determinations are made de novo.
Although given great weight,
neither the finding of facts of the trial panel nor its view of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses bind this Court. The recommendation is merely advisory.
We are bound neither by its findings nor its assessments as to the weight or credibility of the evidence.
A thorough and complete exploration of all relevant facts is mandatory in consideration of matters to regulate the practice of law and legal practitioners.
Attorneys suspended for disciplinary reasons
will not automatically be reinstated on a pri-ma facie showing that the attorney has not engaged in improper conduct during the suspension period.
T8 A suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years and one day is tantamount to disbarment in that the suspended lawyer must follow the same procedures for readmittance as would a disbarred counterpart.
Before an attorney who has been disciplined for more than two years may be readmitted to the practice of law, it must be established that the lawyer's conduct will conform to the high standards required of a member of the Oklahoma Bar. The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the prerequisites for reinstatement are satisfied.
The applicant must present stronger proof of qualifications than one seeking first time admission.
T9 Rule 11.5, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.98.2001, Ch. 1, App.
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PER CURIAM:
T1 On June 13, 2006, we suspended the attorney for two years and one day for his dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, and misleading actions in a real estate transaction resulting in significant economic harm, embarrassment to the legal profession and to this Court, and an undermining of public confidence in the Bar Association and its members. We deemed the extended suspension appropriate based on Pacenza's disciplinary history, discipline administered in similar cases, and the attorney's unwillingness to acknowledge his wrongdoing.
T2 Upon a de novo review,
we determine that the attorney did not present clear and convincing evidence that, if readmitted, his conduct would conform to the high standards required of a member of the Bar Association.
Therefore, we deny reinstatement and impose the costs of the proceeding in the amount of $2,714.63.
Our decision is supported by the attorney's continued lack of understanding of the consequences of his actions leading to suspension and any true remorse for the results of his conduct along with testimony from former colleagues and a judicial officer questioning both his legal abilities and his integrity and by uncertainty concerning his competency to practice law raised by the lack of strict compliance with the rules governing suspension and reinstate ment proceedings.
FACTS RELEVANT TO REINSTATEMENT PROCEEDINGS
1 3 Pacenza was admitted to the practice of law on October 7, 1976. Before the incident resulting in his suspension for two years and a day, he was disciplined on two occasions. The attorney was privately reprimanded by this Court in October of 1987 for engaging in conduct involving misrepresentations and deceit arising from his collusion in removing a client's child from the lawful custody of the minor's father and transporting the mother and child from Texas to Oklahoma. On February 24, 1989, the Professional Responsibility Commission administered a private reprimand for misrepresentations he made to a social worker at the Oklahoma Department of Human Services that he had filed suit on behalf of an individual and expected to settle the suit within six months. No lawsuit had been filed and the attorney was aware that there was no settlement forthcoming.
T4 The transaction leading to his suspension occurred in 1999 when the Richards executed a contract for deed to purchase real
property from the attorney. At that time, Pacenza did not disclose: the existence of $300,00.00 in IRS tax liens against the property; title problems existing as a result of an incomplete foreclosure action; or that the couple could only expect a merchantable title upon the payment of cash in hand to the attorney. For a period of approximately nine months, Pacenza represented to the Richards and to attorneys hired to assist them that he was working on clearing title to the property. During this period, the attorney did nothing to remedy the title problems.
5 Once the Richards sought independent legal advice, Pacenza attempted to force the couple into a settlement of $55,000.00. The attorney advised the couple's lawyer that if they did not take his offer, he would obtain a divorce to protect his assets. The settlement offer was refused; and Pacenza followed through with his threats, divorcing his wife in order to preserve assets of his estate.
The Richards estimated their total out of pocket expenses at $116,265.25. By the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings, the couple received between $39,000.00 and $40,000.00, leaving them with a loss in excess of $75,000.00. Pacenza was able to purchase many of the items sold in the bankruptcy proceedings, including the building where his law office was located; and, he and his wife remarried.
T6 On July 28, 2008, Pacenza filed for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 11, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A. The hearing on reinstatement was held before the trial panel on October 14, 2008. The trial panel issued its report on November 12, 2008 determining that Pacenza had not met the burden of proof for reinstatement and recommending that reinstatement be denied and costs be imposed. On the same day, the Bar Association filed an application for the assessment of costs in the amount of $2,714.63. The order setting a briefing schedule issued on November 13, 2008. On December 9th and 15th, respectively, Pacenza and the Bar Association filed waivers of their rights to file briefs in the cause.
JURISDICTION, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND BURDEN OF PROOF
17 It is this Court's nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate both the practice and the ethics, licensure, and discipline of the practitioners of the law. The duty is vested solely in this department of government.
Our determinations are made de novo.
Although given great weight,
neither the finding of facts of the trial panel nor its view of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses bind this Court. The recommendation is merely advisory.
We are bound neither by its findings nor its assessments as to the weight or credibility of the evidence.
A thorough and complete exploration of all relevant facts is mandatory in consideration of matters to regulate the practice of law and legal practitioners.
Attorneys suspended for disciplinary reasons
will not automatically be reinstated on a pri-ma facie showing that the attorney has not engaged in improper conduct during the suspension period.
T8 A suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years and one day is tantamount to disbarment in that the suspended lawyer must follow the same procedures for readmittance as would a disbarred counterpart.
Before an attorney who has been disciplined for more than two years may be readmitted to the practice of law, it must be established that the lawyer's conduct will conform to the high standards required of a member of the Oklahoma Bar. The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the prerequisites for reinstatement are satisfied.
The applicant must present stronger proof of qualifications than one seeking first time admission.
T9 Rule 11.5, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.98.2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A requires the trial panel to make specific findings regarding whether: 1) the petitioner possesses the good moral character which would entitle him to be admitted to the Bar Association; 2) the petitioner has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension; and 8) the petitioner possesses the competency and learning in the law required for admission to the practice of law in the State of Oklahoma. In addition, this Court considers the following eight factors in making a reinstatement decision: 1) the applicant's present moral fitness; 2) demonstrated consciousness of the conduct's wrongfulness and the disrepute it has brought upon the legal profession; 8) the extent of rehabilitation; 4) the original misconduct's seriousness; 5) conduct after resignation; 6) time elapsed sinee the resignation; 7) the applicant's character, maturity, and experience when suspended; and 8) present legal competence.
Each reinstatement decision is determined on a case-by-case basis, carefully weighing all factors.
11 10 a. The attorney has not demonstrated the clear and convincing evidence necessary for his readmittance to the practice of law in Oklahoma.
[ 11 Pacenza did not submit a brief arguing his position, but we assume that the attorney would assert that he has met all requirements for reinstatement; or, he would not have sought such by the filing of a
petition and participation in reinstatement proceedings. The trial panel found that Pa-cenza had not submitted credible evidence of his good moral character or that, if readmitted, he would conform his conduct to the high standards expected of members of the legal profession in Oklahoma. Specifically, it determined that the attorney was not truly remorseful for his actions and did not understand their gravity nor did he acknowledge the effect of his actions on the public and his clients. Nevertheless, the trial panel did believe that Pacenza had met the burden of proof on the issue of his learning and competence in the law. Both the trial panel and the Bar Association recommend that we deny reinstatement and impose costs of the proceeding. We agree with these recommendations. However, unlike the trial panel, we are not persuaded that Pacenza met the burden of proof as it relates to his competency to practice law. Our lack of confidence in the attorney's legal abilities arises from his failure to strictly comply with the rules governing suspension and reinstatement proceedings.
1 12 1) Pacenza failed to demonstrate true remorse for the damage he caused his clients and to recognize that they have not been fully reimbursed economically.
118 Both the Richards appeared to testify against readmitting the attorney to the practice of law. Their general purpose in doing so was an attempt to keep the same harm Pacenza inflicted upon them from happening to anyone else.
The first time that the attorney contacted the Richards to express his regrets for the treatment they suffered at his hands was the day of the reinstatement hearing. Although those apologies appear on the record, the candor of the attorney's statements do not comport with the tone of questioning he utilized with the couple. In cross examination, Pacenza was far more interested in attempting to show that the couple had not been injured to the extent - they - claimed, _ approximately $75,000.00,
than he was to demonstrate that he had done anything to ease their losses.
Although the attorney testified that not a day
had gone by since his suspension that he did not feel remorse for the pain he had caused the Richards and the disrepute he brought on the profession, when asked how he would characterize his punishment, Pacenza testified that the discipline imposed for his involvement with the Richards was "excessive" and "harsh."
T14 In his opening statement, Pacenza expressed that he had done everything in his power to make the injured parties whole.
This statement, in itself, is misleading. The record is devoid of any indication that the Richards ever received anything from the attorney other than the original settlement monies disbursed in the bankruptcy proceedings. It appears that the attorney believes that the settlement reached in bankruptcy constituted full restitution for his wrongs.
$15 Making full restitution to a lawyer's victims will neither preclude discipline nor insure reinstatement.
- Nevertheless, the lack of any attempt at restitution is germane to a reinstatement proceeding.
This Court's concern is heightened when an attorney takes the position that no further restitution is necessary where it is obvious that the monetary position of a client has not been fully restored.
Undoubtedly, the Richards entered a settlement agreement whereby they accepted substantially less than they lost in the real estate transaction with Pacen-za, releasing any legal right to pursue full restitution from the attorney. However, a settlement netting approximately $40,000.00 does not constitute full restitution for a loss in excess of $116,000.00. The Richards have not been "made whole" and any contention to the contrary is unconvincing to this Court and demonstrative of the attorney's continued lack of understanding of the harm his actions caused.
1 16 2) Evidence of Pacenza's good work in his church and in his community is insufficient to overcome testimony from former colleagues and a judicial officer questioning both his legal abilities and his integrity.
117 During the reinstatement hearing, the attorney called four individuals.
Two of these individuals were not listed as witnesses but were allowed to make narrative statements. Only one of the four witnesses was a lawyer familiar with Pacenza's legal practice. He testified that the attorney had given him excellent assistance in research of a complicated medical malpractice case during his suspension. He also stated that Pacenza was considered a very ethical and decent person in the community. The two individuals allowed to make narrative statements were adamant that Pacenza is a good man who does extensive work in his church, ministers to shut-ins in the local rest homes, and is a solid contributor to the well being of the community as a whole. Also included in the record are eight letters from members of the legal and church community which strongly urge reinstatement.
1118 The President of the Pawnee County Bar Association, Patrick Pickerill (PickerilD), testified that he began receiving telephone calls and letters from other attorneys in his community opposing Pacenza's reinstatement even before he read the notice of the filing of the petition in the Bar Journal. Recognizing that he has had personal differences with Pacenza in the past,
Pickerill testified that the attorney 'did not possess the character and knowledge necessary to practice law
and that he lacked candor with his clients.
Pickerill also stated that he believed it would be a detriment to the law and to the legal profession if Pacenza was allowed to practice law again.
119 Another lawyer testified that he became involved in a cause in which Pacenza had been the attorney of record in a guardianship and adoption case in which the father's parental rights had been terminated and an adoption had been allowed, all without notice to the father.
The lawyer was sue-
cessful in having the father's parental rights reinstated. When asked if he would support Pacenza's readmission to the practice of law, he responded that he could not make such a recommendation.
120 Pacenza listed several judges as potential witnesses. Most of those listed were ambivalent about the. reinstatement either stating that they did not have a lot of contact with the attorney when practicing or that they simply had no knowledge of his having engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. Nevertheless, the Bar Association's investigator spoke to one judge who stated that he did not support reinstatement because he did not believe the attorney to be trustworthy.
121 The District Attorney of Pawhuska County stated that he did not believe Pacen-za could be trusted and that he hoped he would not be reinstated.
In contrast, the District Attorney of Creek County said he thought the attorney was aggressive and conscientious in the representation of his clients but expressed no opinion on reinstatement.
"... Q. (By Mr. Davidson) based upon your representation to the Sissoms in this fraudulent guardianship and adoption of their child, do you have an opinion as to whether or not Mr. Pacenza possesses good moral character that would entitle him to reinstatement? A. The only thing that I have to base that on is this case and what I saw in the file and based on what I saw, I would certainly not recommend that...."
122 The statements from the attorney's witnesses are insufficient to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence
of either Pa-cenza's good moral character or his competency in the law when compared with the strength of contrary evidence elicited by the Bar Association. They do not produce in this Court's collective mind a firm belief or conviction
that: the attorney understands the extent of his wrongdoing; he is truly
remorseful for his actions; or he possesses the good moral character necessary in one licensed by this body to practice law.
{23 3) The attorney's failure to strictly comply with the rules governing suspension and reinstatement proceedings militates against a finding of knowledge of the law and competency in its practice.
$24 Pacenza filed for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 11, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S.2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A. However, his petition did not conform strictly to the requirements of the rule. Rule 11.1, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. Supp.2002, Ch. 1, App. 1-A requires that affidavits be attached to the petition showing all the applicant's activities and places of residence since suspension along with an affidavit of the applicant and of all court clerks in counties in which the applicant resided establishing that there has been no unauthorized practice of law during the suspension.
1 25 The three documents attached to the application did not conform with the statutory requirements for affidavits. In one instance, the document denominated as an affidavit was not signed. None of the three supposed affidavits indicated they were signed before an individual authorized to administer oaths nor did they contain a statement indicating they were being signed under penalty of perjury.
126 A witness list was attached to the application denominating twenty-seven individuals. When the investigator for the Bar Association made inquiries of these individuals, only nine responded. In addition, it became clear that Pacenza had not contacted all the individuals nor advised them that he would be calling them as witnesses.
T27 Rule 9.1, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.98.2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A
provides that when a lawyer is suspended there is an affirmative duty within twenty days, to notify all clients via certified mail with pending business of the inability to represent them. There is also a requirement to formally withdraw from all pending cases. Finally, during the same twenty day period, the lawyer must file an affidavit with the Commission and with the Clerk of the Supreme Court affirming his compliance with the rule and providing a list of the clients notified along with a summary of all other state and federal courts and administrative agencies before which the lawyer is admitted to the practice of law.
128 Because he had no pending causes in any court, Pacenza did not file any formal withdrawals after he was notified of his suspension. When asked for evidence that he had contacted all his clients as required upon suspension, the attorney was able to present only twenty-five return receipts although he had a client list of thirty-five individuals.
129 Every lawyer is charged with the observance of the rules of professional conduct.
The lack of knowledge of the rules of professional conduct and disciplinary proceedings raises concerns.
While there is no evidence that Pacenza's failure to strictly comply with the rules governing suspension and reinstatement arose from a deceitful motive, it is additional evidence of his lack of knowledge of the rules which govern the practice of law in Oklahoma.
CONCLUSION
''When the action of the Supreme Court becomes final, a lawyer who is disbarred or suspended, or who has resigned membership pending disciplinary proceedings, must notify all of the lawyer's clients having legal business then pending within twenty (20) days, by certified mail, of the lawyer's inability to represent them and the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel.... The lawyer shall also file a formal withdrawal of counsel in all cases pending in any tribunal.... Proof of substantial compliance by the lawyer with this Rule 9.1 shall be a condition precedent to any petition for reinstatement."
T30 We agree with the trial panel that there is no evidence to indicate that the attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. However, although there is testimony in support of Pacenza, the transcript of proceedings before the trial panel makes it clear that the attorney has not demonstrated true remorse for the damage he caused and that he continues to fail to recognize that his clients have not been made whole financially. In addition, we are presented with testimony from the clients harmed by the attorney's actions leading to discipline, by the practicing bar, and by one judicial officer questioning his legal abilities and his integrity. Finally, we are
faced with evidence that Pacenza did not strictly comply with the rules governing either his suspension or his reinstatement.
131 In making a reinstatement decision, this Court must disregard feelings of sympathy,
recognizing that the petitioner's burden of proof is a heavy one.
While we are concerned with any adverse effect reinstatement might have on the practicing bar, our foremost consideration is always to protect the public welfare.
After having given due consideration to the evidence contained in this record and the appropriate factors examined in reinstatement proceedings, we determine that the petitioner has failed to carry his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence
that he is entitled to reinstatement. Therefore, reinstatement is denied and costs of $2,714.63
are imposed.
PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IS DENIED; PETITIONER IS ORDERED TO PAY COSTS.
EDMONDSON, C.J., TAYLOR, V.C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, WINCHESTER, COLBERT, JJ., concur.
REIF, J., recused.