Application of Sharpe

1972 OK 92, 499 P.2d 406, 1972 Okla. LEXIS 383
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedJune 7, 1972
DocketS.C.B.D. 2239, 2275
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 1972 OK 92 (Application of Sharpe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Application of Sharpe, 1972 OK 92, 499 P.2d 406, 1972 Okla. LEXIS 383 (Okla. 1972).

Opinion

IRWIN, Justice:

Glenn J. Sharpe, Petitioner, filed his Application for Reinstatement to the practice of law in Oklahoma pursuant to Article X, Sec. 18, of the Rules Creating and Controlling the Oklahoma Bar Association. 5 O. S.1971, Chapter 1, Appendix 1. Pursuant to Sec. 18(g) of the Rules, the application was referred to the General Counsel for the Oklahoma Bar Association for complete investigation. The General Counsel made an investigation, conducted a hearing and recommended in his Report to the Board of Governors of the Oklahoma Bar Association that Petitioner be reinstated.

The Board of Governors, after due consideration and deliberation, voted to deny Petitioner’s Application for Reinstatement. Seven members of the Board voted against reinstatement and three members voted for reinstatement. The Report and Recommendations of the Board of Governors and a transcript of the proceedings have been filed in this Court. In its Findings and Recommendations, the Board of Governors stated:

“ * * * the Board of Governors of the Oklahoma Bar Association finds that the applicant, Glenn J. Sharpe, (1) has not undergone rehabilitation during the period of his suspension, and that (2) he has not engaged in any unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension, and that (3) he does possess the competency and learning in the law required for admission to practice law in the State of Oklahoma, and (4) he does not possess good moral character which would entitle him to be admitted to the Oklahoma Bar Association; and the Board respectfully recommends that the Court enter its order denying the application of Glenn J. Sharpe for reinstatement to the practice of law in Oklahoma.”

The background forming the grounds for Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law will be summarized briefly. Petitioner was elected to the office of county judge and assumed that office in January, 1965; and was elected for a second term beginning in January, 1967. In May, 1968, a petition was filed in the Court on the Judiciary, Trial Division, by the Oklahoma Bar Association, seeking the removal of Petitioner from office on the grounds that Petitioner had improperly received fees for the issuance of waiver orders which authorized the issuance of marriage licenses. A trial was conducted and the Trial Division of the Court oh the Judiciary removed Petitioner from office and further ordered that he be “disqualified to hold any public office of honor, trust or profit in the State of Oklahoma for a period of three years”.

On appeal to the Appellate Division of the Court on the Judiciary, that Court modified the judgment of the Trial Division and ordered that Petitioner “shall be disqualified to hold any judicial office within this State for a period of three years”. See Sharpe v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association (1968), 448 P.2d 301.

In June, 1970, this Court suspended Petitioner from the practice of law in Oklahoma for a period of one year. This suspension, in part, was predicated on Petitioner’s activities as a judge and for which he was removed from office and disquali *408 fied to hold a judicial office in this State for three years. Also, in June, 1971, Petitioner was suspended for a period of ninety days for activities unrelated to the.case in which he was suspended for one year.

The record discloses that in July, 1970, Petitioner was employed in a trust department of a National Bank in Dallas, Texas, as an administrative assistant. A vice-president and trust officer of that bank testified that he had become well acquainted with Petitioner; that he has the highest type of character and a great deal of ambition and enthusiasm; that he knew of his past difficulties; and that he would highly recommend his reinstatement.

One of Petitioner’s co-workers at the bank testified that he had been a house guest of Petitioner; that he had a high degree of moral character and that he would vouch for him in any way; that he had unquestionable integrity; and that he saw no reason why he should not be reinstated to the practice of law and that he would recommend his reinstatement without reservation. This witness was familiar with Petitioner’s past difficulties and stated that he took this into consideration in forming his opinion.

Another co-worker of Petitioner at the National Bank testified that Petitioner’s character and reputation were excellent; that he knew of his past difficulties in Oklahoma and that he took this into account in making his evaluation; and that his judgment was not affected by any sympathy or compassion that he might feel towards Petitioner. This witness testified that he had discussed Petitioner’s difficulties in Oklahoma with him several times; that he had overcome any trouble that he might have had; and that he had no bitterness whatsoever towards the Courts in Oklahoma.

A Doctor of Divinity, who was the pastor and senior minister of the Church in Texas in which Petitioner was a member, testified that he was personally acquainted with Petitioner and his family; that Petitioner served as director of the eleventh grade Sunday School; that Petitioner had told him of his difficulties in Oklahoma; that to his knowledge, Petitioner’s moral character and reputation were excellent and that he would recommend his reinstatement.

The above testimony was submitted by depositions in which the General Counsel for the Oklahoma Bar Association participated.

At the hearing, Petitioner testified that he was born in 1936; that he was married in 1959 and had two children and his wife teaches school; that he served as Assistant County Attorney in Bryan County until he became county judge; that after he was removed as county judge, he was an Assistant District Attorney in Bryan County until his suspension from the practice of law in June 1970; that he became employed in the National Bank at Dallas, Texas in July, 1970; and became involved in his church activities and was superintendent of the eleventh grade Sunday School.

Petitioner was asked “what is your present attitude' toward your suspension and the Oklahoma Bar Association and the Court on the Judiciary” and Petitioner responded: “My honest feeling about this is that I’m so remorseful that this ever happened because of the suffering that I’ve put my family through and suffering that I caused many people and I’m just so sorry that it ever happened and I hold no bitterness or belligerence toward anybody or any court or toward the Bar Association and this was my own fault and I realize it and my attitude now is that I have a lot of making up to do and a lot of proving to do and that’s what my life really is dedicated to now; to be an asset to the Bar Association, if I’m re-admitted, and I’m just so sorry it ever happened.”

On further inquiry concerning whether he had any bitterness toward any person or any judge or any court, the Petitioner responded : “I’m the type of individual that I cannot tolerate in myself any type of belligerence toward anybody because of any *409 action that was caused by me. It was my fault and there’s no one to blame but myself and I just don’t have any bitterness or anything like that toward anybody or the courts or the Bar Association; just none whatsoever.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1972 OK 92, 499 P.2d 406, 1972 Okla. LEXIS 383, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/application-of-sharpe-okla-1972.