In Re Refco, Inc. Securities Litigation

609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21505, 2009 WL 724378
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 17, 2009
Docket05 Civ. 8626(GEL)
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 609 F. Supp. 2d 304 (In Re Refco, Inc. Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Refco, Inc. Securities Litigation, 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21505, 2009 WL 724378 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

GERARD E. LYNCH, District Judge.

In yet another chapter of this putative class action for securities fraud arising from the collapse of Refco Inc. and its affiliated companies (“Refco”), Joseph P. Collins (“Collins”) and Mayer Brown LLP (“Mayer Brown”) (the “Mayer Brown Defendants”) — move for dismissal of the Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“the Complaint”) as to them. 1 The core issue before the Court is whether *306 the plaintiff-investors 2 can hold Refco’s outside counsel liable for their injury pursuant to §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a). Although the Complaint alleges facts that, if true, would make the Mayer Brown Defendants guilty of aiding and abetting the securities fraud that harmed the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court and Congress have declined to provide a private right of action for victims of securities fraud against those who merely — if otherwise substantially and culpably — aid a fraud that is executed by others. Accordingly, the motions to dismiss must be granted.

BACKGROUND

The factual background of the fraudulent scheme to deceive investors and others about the true financial circumstances of the international brokerage firm Refco Inc. and its affiliated companies is set forth in detail in the Court’s prior opinion in In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F.Supp.2d 611, 618-20 (S.D.N.Y.2007), and in any number of additional opinions, 3 but the details will be repeated here to the extent that they are relevant. In reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), plaintiffs’ allegations are assumed to be true for purposes of deciding the motion. Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir.2007).

1. The Alleged Fraudulent Scheme

Prior to Refco’s spectacular collapse, it was among the world’s largest providers of brokerage and clearing services in the international derivatives, currency, and futures markets. Refco’s business model involved extending credit to its customers so that they could trade on margin and leverage their capital into larger trades, for which Refco could again extend credit. (ComplJ 2.) These trades generated substantial commissions, revenues, and profits for Refco, but over time Refco began making loans without adequately assessing customers’ credit-worthiness or the risks associated with their trading activities. (Comphlffl 428-30.) These lapses began to have consequences in the late nineties, when several global financial crises caused a number of customers to suffer massive trading losses. (Compl.lffl 3, 431-35.) The loans now became “uncollectible receivables” that Refco’s customers were unwilling or unable to repay.

Rather than write off or disclose these uncollectible receivables — the revelation of which would have had dire financial consequences for the company (CompLIffl 426, 579-80) — Refco’s management allegedly devised a scheme to conceal them from the public and Refco’s investors. (Comply 3.) First, they transferred the loans onto the books of Refco Group Holdings, Inc. (“RGHI”), an entity owned and controlled by Phillip R. Bennett (“Bennett”), Refco’s President, CEO, and Chairman. (Complin 3, 33.) As a result of these transfers, RGHI owed hundreds of millions of dollars to Refco, but RGHI had no liquid assets and no operational functions (Comphlffl 31, 638), and thus it had no eon *307 ceivable means of repaying the “loans.” (Comply 3.)

Next, to avoid the disclosure of large “related-party” receivables — the sum of which dwarfed Refco’s net income — a series of fraudulent transactions were arranged by which the RGHI receivables were periodically made to disappear from Refco’s books through so-called “round-trip loans” in which the receivables owed to Refco from RGHI were replaced with receivables purportedly owed by a third-party customer. (Compl.lffl 3, 450-51, 627.)

These loans, which straddled the end of each fiscal year from 2000 through 2005 and at the end of several fiscal quarters as well, all worked in essentially the same way. (Comply 451.) First, several days before Refco closed its books for each financial period, Refco Capital Markets Ltd. (“RCM”), a Refco subsidiary, would loan hundreds of millions of dollars to a third-party customer who then, through its account at Refco, simultaneously loaned the same amount to RGHI. (Id.) The loan agreements between the third party and RCM — which were done on a book basis (the principal never changed hands) — were meticulously structured so that they were essentially risk-free to the third-party customers; the customers’ loans to RGHI were guaranteed by Refco and the customers profited for their participation in the “loans” through interest earned on their loans to RGHI, which by design exceeded the interest they were charged by RCM. 4 (Compl.lffl 451, 633.) RGHI, in turn, used the loans from the customers to pay down the money it owed to Refco for its uncollectible receivables. (Id.) The net effect of these transactions was that at the close of each reporting period, Refco’s books would show “loans” to third-party customers and the RGHI receivables would be gone. Then, just days after the financial period closed, the transactions were unwound— the “loans” repaid, and the uncollectible receivables from RGHI'were returned to Refco’s books. Thus, these transactions enabled Refco to lend money to itself, through third parties, to conceal its grim, multi-hundred Million dollar losses from the public and from its investors. (Compilé 579-80.)

II. The Mayer Brown Defendants’ Participation in the Alleged Scheme

From 1994 until Refco’s collapse, Mayer Brown was Refco’s outside counsel and was Collins’s largest client. 5 (Compl. ¶¶ 76-78.) Mayer Brown and Collins — the partner-in-charge of the Refco account— had a close working relationship with Ref-co, in which the firm provided the company with a broad range of legal services and through which Mayer Brown collected approximately $5 million per annum in legal fees. (Id.) Accordingly, Mayer Brown was familiar with Refco’s operations and finances and participated in seventeen rounds of the round-trip loan transactions between 2000 and 2005 by which Refco’s uncollectible receivable were concealed. (CompLIffl 79, 451-52.) Specifically, the role of the Mayer Brown Defendants was to explain the structure and terms of the transactions to potential third-party participants, negotiate the loans, draft and re *308

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Bluebook (online)
609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21505, 2009 WL 724378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-refco-inc-securities-litigation-nysd-2009.