THOMAS H. LEE EQUITY FUND v. v. Grant Thornton

586 F. Supp. 2d 119, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59220, 2008 WL 3166536
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 6, 2008
Docket07 Civ. 8663(GEL)
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 586 F. Supp. 2d 119 (THOMAS H. LEE EQUITY FUND v. v. Grant Thornton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
THOMAS H. LEE EQUITY FUND v. v. Grant Thornton, 586 F. Supp. 2d 119, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59220, 2008 WL 3166536 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

GERARD E. LYNCH, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund Y, L.P., Thomas H. Lee Parallel Fund V, L.P., and Thomas H. Lee Equity (Cayman) Fund V, L.P., are investment funds associated with Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P. (“THL”), a private equity firm. Together, plaintiffs invested more than $450 million in Refco and acquired the majority of Refco’s stock through a leveraged buyout (“LBO”) in August 2004. Following *122 Refco’s collapse in the fall of 2005, plaintiffs’ Refco interests became worthless, allegedly causing them losses in excess of $245 million. Plaintiffs bring this action against Refeo’s outside auditor, defendant Grant Thornton LLP, claiming that it made numerous misrepresentations to them in connection with the LBO. The complaint, which was originally filed in the New York State Supreme Court, asserts state law claims for aiding and abetting fraud, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, and professional malpractice. Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1384(b), and now moves to dismiss all claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The motion will be granted in part, and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

I. The Alleged Refco Fraud

This action is another in a series of lawsuits arising out of the implosion of Refco, which prior to its collapse, was among the world’s largest providers of brokerage and clearing services in the international derivatives, currency, and futures markets. See In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11604, 2008 WL 1827644, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 21, 2008). According to the complaint, Refco incurred significant losses in the 1990s as a result of both its own unsuccessful proprietary trading and receivables that became uncollectible when customers could not repay the loans that Refco had extended to them. (ComplJ 20. 1 ) Rather than disclosing these losses and “writing them off as required,” Refco’s CEO, Phillip R. Bennett, allegedly “embarked on a fraudulent scheme to hide them and thereby mask Refco’s true financial condition.” (Id.)

The first step of the purported scheme involved Refco removing the uncollectible receivables from Refco’s books by transferring them to Refco Group Holdings, Inc. (“RGHI”), a company controlled by Bennett that was not consolidated with other Refco entities, thereby creating a large receivable that RGHI owed to Refco that at times totaled more than $1 billion. (Id. ¶ 21.) In order to make the RGHI receivable appear to be a valuable receivable from unaffiliated third-party customers, Bennett allegedly orchestrated a series of sham “round-trip loan” transactions with unrelated entities that temporarily caused all of the RGHI receivable to be replaced by like-sized receivables from the customers. According to the complaint, all the round-trip loans followed the same general pattern:

(i) just before the close of the financial reporting period, a Refco entity ... would make a “loan” to a third-party customer, (ii) simultaneously, the customer would make a “loan,” which was unconditionally and absolutely guaranteed by Refco, in the exact same amount to RGHI; and (iii) RGHI would use these funds to pay down the RGHI Receivable. As a result, at the close of each reporting period, Refco’s books would show a “loan” to the third-party customers, and the RGHI Receivable would be gone. These transactions were then unwound just a few days later, after the close of the financial reporting period, with the RGHI Receivable appearing on Refco’s books.

(P. Mem. 5, citing Compl. ¶¶ 23, 25.) To enable the third-party customers to profit from this arrangement, the interest rate *123 that RGHI paid the customers for their “loans” was between 15 and 100 basis points higher than the interest rate that the customers paid Refco on the Refco “loans.” (ComplA24.) Although characterized as loans, generally no funds were actually transferred other than the customer’s profit from the interest spread. {Id.)

Refco allegedly engaged in seventeen such round-trip loans from February 1998 through August 2005. {Id. ¶¶ 22, 27, 58.) Through these sham transactions, Refco executives were able to disguise Refco’s true financial condition with the aim of “eventually reap[ing] millions of dollars from the sale of all or part of Refco.” {Id. ¶ 27.)

II. Grant Thornton’s Refco Engagement

Beginning in the late 1980s through the audit of Refco’s financial statements for the 2002 fiscal year, Arthur Anderson (“AA”) served as Refco’s independent auditor. {Id. ¶ 29.) Mark Ramler served as the engagement partner on the Refco audit team during the final ten years of AA’s engagement. {Id.) When AA ceased functioning as an audit firm in mid-2002, Ram-ler joined the New York office of defendant Grant Thornton LLP (“GT”). Later that year, Ramler proposed Refco as a prospective client to GT. In March 2003, GT accepted Refco as a client and Ramler continued to serve as the engagement partner on the Refco account. {Id.)

At the outset of the Refco engagement, Ramler put GT on notice of certain concerns he had about Refco’s finances. {Id. ¶ 50.) In particular, Ramler informed GT that Refco had engaged in significant related-party transactions with certain entities that either had not been audited or had been audited by firms other than AA, and that as of February 28, 2002, a rela-tedparty receivable existed between Refco and RGHI in the amount of $170 million. {Id.) Ramler also conveyed to GT his belief that “related-party transactions between [Refco and RGHI] created a high risk of material misstatement.” {Id.) Despite its knowledge of these related-party transactions, however, GT allegedly “failed to implement any procedures to bring about the disclosure of the ... 17 sham round-trip loan transactions.” {Id. ¶ 53 (emphasis omitted).)

III. The LBO Transaction

In June 2004, plaintiffs, which are all investment funds associated with the THL private equity firm, agreed to invest approximately $450 million in Refco through a leveraged buy-out. 2 {Id. ¶ 2.) Over the course of more than ten months leading up to the closing of the LBO in August 2004, plaintiffs engaged in extensive due diligence with the aid of several third-party consultants and advisors, including KPMG LLP (“KPMG”), which plaintiffs hired to perform accounting due diligence. {Id. ¶¶ 2, 36.) KPMG was “specifically tasked by [plaintiffs] to conduct a detailed assessment of [Refco’s] financial reporting for the fiscal years ended February 28, 2002, February 28, 2003 and February 24, 2004, and the risks of the proposed investment.” {Id. 136.)

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586 F. Supp. 2d 119, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59220, 2008 WL 3166536, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-h-lee-equity-fund-v-v-grant-thornton-nysd-2008.