Kirschner v. Bennett

648 F. Supp. 2d 525, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75570, 2009 WL 2601375
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 25, 2009
Docket07 Civ. 8165 (GEL)
StatusPublished
Cited by54 cases

This text of 648 F. Supp. 2d 525 (Kirschner v. Bennett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kirschner v. Bennett, 648 F. Supp. 2d 525, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75570, 2009 WL 2601375 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

GERARD E. LYNCH, District Judge:

Plaintiff Marc S. Kirschner, in his capacity as Trustee of the Refco Private Actions Trust (“Trustee” or “Private Actions Trustee”), originally filed this action in New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Refco’s foreign-exchange customers (the “FX customers”), asserting claims under New York state law against certain Refco insiders, professionals, and advisors for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion. (Compl. ¶¶ 210-38.) Certain defendants subsequently removed the action to this Court on the ground that the case is “related to” Refco’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). See Kirschner v. Bennett, No. 07 Civ. 8165, 2008 WL 1990669 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2008) (denying the Trustee’s motion to remand or abstain). The Trustee alleges that the FX customers collectively suffered losses totaling more than half a billion dollars when insiders at Refco diverted assets from their accounts at Refco Capital Markets (“RCM”) in order to bankroll the Refco fraud. This opinion addresses four motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by Grant Thornton LLP, Ernst & Young LLP (“EY”), Mayer Brown LLP, and Mayer Brown International LLP (collectively, the “Professional Defendants”). 1 The motions will be granted.

BACKGROUND 2

I. The Refco Fraud

Prior to its collapse in the fall of 2005, Refco 3 presented itself to the public as a leading independent provider of execution and clearing services for exchange-traded derivatives and a major provider of brokerage services in the fixed income and foreign exchange (“FX”) markets. (Compl. ¶ 4. 4 ) Beginning in the late 1990s, *529 Refco’s controlling officer-shareholders— Phillip R. Bennett, Robert C. Trosten, and Santo C. Maggio (collectively, the “insiders”) 5 — with the aid of certain professionals and financial advisors, orchestrated a complex fraudulent scheme to artificially enhance Refco’s performance and conceal Refco’s true financial condition, so that these insiders, through the company’s August 2004 leveraged buy-out (“LBO”) and August 2005 initial public offering (“IPO”), could cash out their interests in Refco on lucrative terms. (Compl. ¶¶2-3, 10-12, 26.) That scheme, which has been thoroughly discussed in this Court’s prior opinions, 6 involved both concealment of Refco’s uncollectible debt and the misappropriation of customer assets.

The concealment of Refco’s uncollectible debt involved a two-part process. First, hundreds of millions of dollars in uncollectible trading losses and other operating expenses were converted into apparently legitimate receivables owed to Refco by RGHI, a related-party holding company, or “alter-ego” owned by Bennett and another Refco principal, Tone Grant. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-41, 47-48.) Although RGHI would never be in a position to repay this debt because RGHI’s primary asset was its ownership of Refco stock — the value of which hinged on the insiders’ ability to conceal the very losses they were shifting off of Refco’s books to RGHI — the transfers had the intended effect of fraudulently increasing Refco’s reported profits and concealing Refco’s outstanding debt, the revelation of which would have devastated customer confidence and severely damaged Refco’s business. (Compl. ¶¶ 45-47.) This facade was further improved by various fictitious transfers between Refco and RGHI, including those in which Refco charged RGHI as much as 35 percent interest on the sham receivables — interest that Refco never, in fact, collected. (Compl. ¶¶ 57-59.)

Next, the insiders disappeared the receivables parked at RGHI through a series of so-called round-trip loans. This additional maneuver was necessary because the disclosure of large “related-party” receivables would have raised red flags among investors and regulators. (Compl. ¶ 50.) These “loans,” which straddled the end of each fiscal year starting in 1998 *530 and, after the LBO, at the end of several fiscal quarters as well, all worked in essentially the same way. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-55.) Several days before Refco closed its books for each financial period, a Refco entity— usually RCM — would lend hundreds of millions of dollars to a third-party customer who then, through the customer’s account at Refco, simultaneously lent the same amount to RGHI. (Compl. ¶ 52.) The loan agreements between the third party and the “lending” entity — which were done on a book basis (the principal never changed hands) — were meticulously structured so that they were essentially risk-free to the third-party customers: the customers’ loans to RGHI were guaranteed by Refco and the customers profited for their participation in the “loans” through interest earned on their loans to RGHI, which by design exceeded the interest they were charged by RCM. 7 (Compl. ¶ 53.) RGHI, in turn, used the loans from the customers to pay down the money it owed to Refco for its uncollectible receivables. (Compl. ¶ 49.)

The net effect of these transactions was that at the close of each reporting period, Refco’s books would show apparently legitimate loans to third-party customers, and the RGHI receivables would be gone. (Id.) Then, just days after the financial period closed, the transactions were unwound — the “loans” were repaid, and the uncollectible receivables from RGHI were returned to Refco’s books. (Compl. ¶ 53.) Through these transactions, Refco lent money to itself, through third parties, to conceal its trading losses, its true operating expenses, and the fictitious nature of hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. (Compl. ¶ 55.)

In addition to concealing Refeo’s debt, the insiders routinely misappropriated customer assets held at RCM in order to prop up other Refco entities with cash infusions. (Compl. ¶¶ 30-35, 61-62.) Some of these assets belonged to the FX customers, who maintained accounts at RCM for the sole purpose of engaging in FX trading pursuant to their instructions. 8 (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 20-25, 28.) The insiders, however, directed that all but a de minimis portion of the assets held in the FX customers’ accounts be diverted from RCM to Refco Capital LLC (“RCC”), another Refco subsidiary, under the guise of “loans” to “customers.” (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 68.) RCC, in turn, functioned as a disbursing agent and distributed the looted assets wherever they were needed in the Refco organization, without compensation, security, collateral, or appropriate documentation. (Compl. ¶¶ 19, 34, 66, 69-70.) These receiving Refco entities were not, of course, “customers” in any traditional sense — they were intercompany, related parties — nor could they repay these “loans.” (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 61, 67-70.) Nevertheless, Refco’s overall financial health depended on the steady influx of illicit RCM assets (Compl.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
648 F. Supp. 2d 525, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75570, 2009 WL 2601375, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kirschner-v-bennett-nysd-2009.