In re M.F.
Opinion
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
IN RE: M.F., H.F., and S.F. C.A. No. 15CA010823
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,
JUVENILE DIVISION
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
CASE Nos. 14JC42524, 14JC42525, and 14JC42526
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: April 25, 2016
CANNON, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Tracey Flowers (“Mother”), appeals the decision of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting legal custody to Paul Fairchild (“Father”) of their three minor children: M.F. (dob 05/18/2003); H.F. (dob 03/14/2004); and S.F. (dob 01/02/2006). For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
I.
{¶2} The minor children were previously adjudicated Neglected and Dependent on August 21, 2014, and protective supervision was granted to appellee, Lorain County Children Services (“LCCS”). Father filed a motion for legal custody of the three children. A hearing was held on October 29, 2014. Emergency temporary custody was granted to LCCS on November 11, 2014, and temporary custody was granted to Father the next day. On January 13, 2015, the hearing resumed on Father’s motion and on LCCS’ motion for further dispositional orders. A magistrate’s decision was issued on January 22, 2015, finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that the best interest of the children warranted the grant of legal custody to Father with protective supervision granted to LCCS. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision on the same day and granted legal custody to Father. Mother filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, which were overruled by the trial court on July 6, 2015. It is from this entry that Mother now appeals.
{¶3} Mother asserts one (amended) assignment of error for our review.
II.
Assignment of Error
The trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence when applying O.R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and 2151.415.
{¶4} Mother argues the decision to grant legal custody of the three minor children to Father was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶5} Granting legal custody to a relative does not terminate parental rights;
rather, “‘residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities’” remain intact. In re N.P., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21707, 2004-Ohio-110, ¶23, quoting R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) and citing In re Shepherd, 4th Dist. Highland No. 00CA12, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3151, *20 (Mar. 26, 2001). “Although there is no specific test or set of criteria set forth in the statutory scheme, courts agree that the trial court must base its decision on the best interest of the child.” Id., citing In re Fulton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-09-236, 2003-Ohio-5984, ¶11. “‘[T]he factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 provide guidance in determining whether a grant of legal custody is in the best interest of the child.’” In re B.C., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 26976 & 26977, 2014-Ohio-2748, ¶16, quoting In re T.A., 9th Dist. Summit No. 22954, 2006-Ohio-4468, ¶17.
{¶6} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides, “[i]n determining the best interest of a
child * * * the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state;
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of [legal custody to the relative];
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
The factors listed in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section refer to the parent pleading guilty to certain enumerated offenses; withholding medical treatment or food; placing the child at substantial risk of harm due to alcohol or drug abuse; abandoning the child; and having his or her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child. See R.C. 2151.414(E).
{¶7} On appeal, an award of legal custody will not be reversed if the judgment is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455 (7th Dist.2001); In re S.A., 11th Dist. Trumbull Nos. 2011-T-0098, etc., 2012-Ohio-2006, ¶25; In re S.D., 5th Dist. Stark Nos. 2013CA0081 & 2013CA0082, 2013-Ohio-5752, ¶32; In re A.C., 12th
Dist. Clermont No. CA2006-12-105, 2007-Ohio-3350, ¶14. “Preponderance of the evidence entails the ‘greater weight of the evidence,’ evidence that is more probable, persuasive, and possesses greater probative value.” Davis v. KB Compost Servs., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21186, 2002-Ohio-7000, ¶10, quoting State v. Williams, 5th Dist. Knox No. 01 CA 24, 2002-Ohio-4267, ¶13. In other words, when the best interest of a child is established by the greater weight of the evidence, the trial court does not have discretion to enter a judgment that is adverse to that interest. Thus, our standard of review is whether a legal custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Ohio Supreme Court has clarified that this standard of review is the same in all cases—criminal, civil, or juvenile—alike. See Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶17-23.
{¶8} “[E]vidential weight concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. * * * If, on weighing the evidence, the trier of fact finds the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue that a party seeks to establish, that party will be entitled to its verdict.” In re G.J.D., 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2009-G-2913, 2010-Ohio-2677, ¶71, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997); see also In re J.C., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 26229 & 26233, 2012-Ohio-3144, ¶19. “Accordingly, before an appellate court will reverse a judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence in this context, the court must determine whether the trier of fact, in resolving evidentiary conflicts and making credibility determinations, clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.” In re I.K., 9th Dist. Summit No. 22424, 2005- Ohio-1634, ¶16, citing Thompkins, supra, at 387.
{¶9} Appellant initially framed her assignment of error under R.C.
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