In re E.C.

Ohio Court of Appeals

In re E.C.

2025 Ohio 3024

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedAugust 25, 2025

Docket5-24-36

StatusPublished

This text of 2025 Ohio 3024 (In re E.C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re E.C., 2025 Ohio 3024 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025).

Pincite

Opinion

[Cite as In re E.C., 2025-Ohio-3024.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HANCOCK COUNTY

IN RE: CASE NO. 5-24-36

E.C., OPINION AND ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT JUDGMENT ENTRY CHILD.

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court No. 2024 JD 0083

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: August 25, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Howard A. Elliott for Appellant

Justin Kahle for Appellee Case No. 5-24-36

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Adjudicated delinquent child-appellant, E.C., appeals the August 28,

2024 judgment entry of disposition of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas,

Juvenile Division. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} This cases arises from a May 11, 2023 incident in which E.C., then 13-

years-old, was walking near a railroad track in Allen County, Ohio, with a concealed

weapon. E.C. entered into an argument with some other individuals which resulted

in E.C. producing the gun and shooting more than 12 shots toward the other

individuals. One of the shots struck K.P., an uninvolved bystander, in her lower

back, causing her serious injury.

{¶3} On August 21, 2023, a complaint was filed in the Allen County

Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, charging E.C. with four counts: Count

One of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises in violation of R.C.

2923.162(A)(3), (C)(4), a first-degree felony if committed by an adult; Count Two

of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), (D)(1)(a), a second-degree

felony if committed by an adult; Count Three of tampering with evidence in

violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), (B), a third-degree felony if committed by an adult;

and Count Four of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2),

(F)(1), a fourth-degree if committed by an adult. Counts One and Two included

-2- Case No. 5-24-36

firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A). On August 23, 2023, E.C.

entered a denial to the allegations in the complaint.

{¶4} The parties appeared for a change-of-plea hearing on March 13, 2024,

and pursuant to a negotiated-plea agreement, E.C. withdrew his denial of Counts

Two, Four, and the firearm specification associated with Count Two, and entered

an admission to those counts and the specification. The trial court accepted E.C.’s

admission and found him to be a delinquent child. At the motion of the State, the

trial court dismissed Counts One, Three, and the firearm specification associated

with Count One.

{¶5} The matter was transferred to the Hancock County Court of Common

Pleas, Juvenile Division, for disposition. On August 28, 2024, the parties appeared

for disposition. With respect to Count Two, the trial court committed E.C. to the

Ohio Department of Youth Services for institutionalization for a minimum period

of 12 months and a maximum period not to exceed E.C.’s attainment of the age of

21. The trial court also committed E.C. to a mandatory term of 3 years in the Ohio

Department of Youth Services for the firearm specification associated with Count

Two to be served consecutively to the sentence on Count Two. With respect to

Count Four, the trial court committed E.C. to the Ohio Department of Youth Service

for institutionalization for a minimum period of 6 months and a maximum period

not to exceed E.C.’s attainment of the age of 21. The trial court ordered the term of

commitment with respect to Count Four to be served consecutively to that of all

-3- Case No. 5-24-36

other counts for a minimum term of 4 years and 6 months to a maximum term not

to exceed E.C.’s attainment of the age of 21.

{¶6} On August 30, 2024, E.C. filed his notice of appeal. He raises one

assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The trial court erred in accepting the admission of the delinquent child to the sentence herein [sic] when it failed to substantially comply with the dictator [sic] of Juvenile Rule 29(D) requiring the adjudication for the delinquent child to be set aside and remanded to Trial Court for further proceedings.

{¶7} In his assignment of error, E.C. contends that the trial court erred by

accepting his admission to the charges because the trial court did not substantially

comply with Juv.R. 29(D). Specifically, E.C. argues that the trial court failed to

properly advise him of his right to remain silent and the right against self-

incrimination. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

Standard of Review and Relevant Law

{¶8} Juv.R. 29(D) provides, in relevant part:

The court may refuse to accept an admission and shall not accept an admission without addressing the party personally and determining both of the following:

(1) The party is making the admission voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the allegations and the consequences of the admission;

(2) The party understands that by entering an admission the party is waiving the right to challenge the witnesses and evidence against the party, to remain silent, and to introduce evidence at the adjudicatory hearing.

-4- Case No. 5-24-36

“As many Ohio courts of appeals recognize, ‘An admission in a juvenile proceeding,

pursuant to Juv.R. 29, is analogous to a guilty plea made by an adult pursuant to

Crim.R. 11 in that both require that a trial court personally address the defendant on

the record with respect to the issues set forth in the rules.’” In re C.S., 2007-Ohio-

4919, ¶ 112, quoting In re Smith, 2006-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “Both Crim.R.

11 and Juv.R. 29 require the respective courts to make careful inquiries in order to

insure that the admission or guilty plea is entered voluntarily, intelligently, and

knowingly.” In re Smith at ¶ 13, citing In re Flynn, 101 Ohio App.3d 778, 781 (8th

Dist. 1995). “The juvenile court has an affirmative duty under Juv.R. 29(D) to

‘determine that the [juvenile], and not merely the attorney, understands the nature

of the allegations and the consequences of entering the admission.’” In re T.N.,

2013-Ohio-135, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.), quoting In re Beechler, 115 Ohio App.3d 567, 571

(4th Dist. 1996).

{¶9} Although the “preferred practice” in a juvenile delinquency case “is

strict compliance with Juv.R. 29(D),” “if the trial court substantially complies with

Juv.R. 29(D) in accepting an admission by a juvenile, the plea will be deemed

voluntary absent a showing of prejudice by the juvenile or a showing that the totality

of the circumstances does not support a finding of a valid waiver.” In re C.S. at ¶

113. “For purposes of juvenile delinquency proceedings, substantial compliance

means that in the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile subjectively understood

-5- Case No. 5-24-36

the implications of his plea.” Id. “Therefore, the best method for complying with

Juv.R. 29(D) is for a juvenile court to tailor the language of the rule to ‘the child’s

level of understanding, stopping after each right and asking whether the child

understands the right and knows he is waiving it by entering an admission.’” In re

D.P., 2017-Ohio-606, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.), quoting In re Smith at ¶ 14, quoting In re

Miller, 119 Ohio App.3d 52, 58 (2d Dist. 1997). A trial court’s failure to

substantially comply with Juv.R. 29(D) when accepting a juvenile admission “has a

prejudicial effect necessitating a reversal of the adjudication so that the juvenile may

plead anew.” In re T.N.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI