[Cite as In re M.D., 2026-Ohio-1394.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF M.D., A.A.D., : K.A.D. : C.A. No. 2025-CA-64 : : Trial Court Case Nos. 20180601, : 20218602, 2018603 : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- : Juvenile Division) : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION ...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on April 17, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
LEWIS, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur. OPINION CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-64
KELLY M. SCHROEDER, Attorney for Appellant JOHN M. LINTZ, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Mother appeals from the judgment of the Clark County Common Pleas Court,
Domestic Relations Division, Juvenile Section, granting permanent custody of her minor
children to the Clark County Department of Job and Family Services (“JFS”), thereby
terminating her parental rights. Mother also appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying
her maternal aunt’s motion for legal custody of the children. For the reasons outlined below,
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} Mother and Father are the biological parents of M.D. (age 12), A.A.D. (age 10),
and K.A.D. (age 8) (collectively, “the children”). JFS initially became involved with Mother
and Father due to M.D. and K.A.D. being born testing positive for drugs in their systems.
Approximately a year after K.A.D. was born, JFS filed complaints on July 10, 2018, alleging
that the children were dependent. Mother and Father stipulated to the dependency
allegation, and on September 24, 2018, the trial court adjudicated the children dependent.
{¶ 3} After adjudicating the children dependent, the trial court granted a protective
order of supervision that was scheduled to expire on July 10, 2019. A month prior to that
expiration date, JFS filed a notice indicating that it was going to let the protective order expire
and then close Mother and Father’s case. As represented, JFS closed Mother and Father’s
case in 2019. Mother and Father were subsequently charged with multiple counts of child
endangerment, so JFS reopened the case on February 15, 2023.
2 {¶ 4} The child endangerment charges arose after employees from Rent-A-Center
delivered a generator to Mother and Father’s home on February 8, 2023, and reported to
the police that the children in the home were residing in deplorable living conditions. Upon
conducting a welfare check, the police discovered that the home had no heat or electricity,
no consumable food, an inoperable refrigerator infested with insects, a large amount of
unclean dishes in the sink, dog feces on the floor, and an abundance of trash inside and
outside the home. After observing these poor conditions, the police removed the children
from Mother and Father’s care.
{¶ 5} Following the children’s removal, JFS placed the children with a kinship
caregiver. The children remained with the kinship caregiver until May 2023. JFS obtained
ex parte custody of the children on May 23, 2023, and then interim temporary custody on
May 24, 2023, due to the kinship caregiver not keeping in contact with JFS and the caregiver
advising JFS that she was no longer able to care for the children. JFS thereafter received
temporary legal custody of the children on September 7, 2023.
{¶ 6} After obtaining custody of the children, JFS placed the children with a licensed
foster family. During that time, JFS worked to assist Mother and Father in resolving the
issues that had led to the children’s removal. JFS developed a case plan with various
objectives to help Mother and Father work toward reunifying with the children. Mother and
Father did not cooperate with JFS and made only minimal progress on their case plans.
Thus on July 15, 2024, JFS filed a motion for permanent custody of the children.
{¶ 7} Approximately one month after JFS filed for permanent custody, Mother’s
maternal aunt M.R. filed a motion to be added as a third-party intervenor and a motion for
legal custody of the children. The trial court granted M.R.’s motion to be added as a third-
party intervenor and scheduled the custody matter for an evidentiary hearing. The
3 evidentiary hearing was broken into eight separate dates between November 18, 2024, and
May 6, 2025. Mother, M.R., the children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”), and the JFS
caseworker assigned to Mother and Father’s case attended all the hearing dates. Father
was incarcerated, and he attended two of the hearing dates via the web conferencing
platform Zoom. All parties, including Father, were represented by counsel during the
hearings.
{¶ 8} The following is a summary of the relevant testimony that was elicited during
the evidentiary hearings.
Mother’s Testimony
{¶ 9} Mother is the biological mother of M.D., A.A.D., and K.A.D. She is also the
biological mother of three older daughters who are half-siblings to the children. At the time
of the evidentiary hearings, the three older daughters were 23, 18, and 17 years old. The
17-year-old daughter was legally emancipated and in the legal custody of her paternal
grandmother. The other two daughters had also been in the legal custody of their paternal
grandmother when they were minors. JFS was not involved in the custody matters pertaining
to Mother’s three older daughters.
{¶ 10} Mother admitted to being a drug addict and to using methamphetamine a few
days before testifying at the custody hearing. Mother agreed that she was not fit and capable
of caring for the children and expressed that it would be in the children’s best interest for the
trial court to grant M.R. legal custody. Mother did not see M.R. often, and she could not
remember the last time the children were at M.R.’s house. Mother, however, claimed that
M.R. had been involved with the children since their birth and that the children were bonded
to M.R. Mother explained that she did not initially suggest M.R. as a placement option to
4 JFS because M.R. had been in Florida taking care of a sick friend. Mother also did not initially
mention M.R. because she was hoping to reunify with the children.
Foster Mother’s Testimony
{¶ 11} Foster Mother was married with five children. Foster Mother had three
vehicles, including a 12-passenger van. Since receiving M.D., A.A.D., and K.A.D., Foster
Mother quit her online teaching job to care for the children while her husband continued to
work full time for the Ohio State Highway Patrol. Foster Mother and her husband refurbished
their basement to create extra space for the children.
{¶ 12} When Foster Mother received the children, they all had behavioral concerns.
M.D. was aggressive and would throw himself on the ground, scream, cry, and flail his hands
when he did not get his way. A.A.D. yelled, lacked communication skills, and was very
scared and anxious, as she was obsessed with small injuries like scuffs on her knee. K.A.D.
cried constantly, was disobedient, and would not listen.
{¶ 13} While M.D. still had aggression issues when he was angry, Foster Mother
reported that M.D.’s behavior had improved and that he geared his aggression towards his
love of baseball. Foster Mother also reported that A.A.D.’s and K.A.D.’s behavior had
improved. According to Foster Mother, A.A.D. was no longer overly preoccupied with her
health and K.A.D. was no longer disobedient.
{¶ 14} Academically, the children were all on individual educational plans in the
Springfield school district. Foster Mother reported that the children’s academics had
improved, but that they were still significantly behind. If adoption was possible, Foster Mother
planned to home school the children as she did with her biological children.
{¶ 15} Foster Mother indicated that the children had multiple health concerns when
she received them. K.A.D. was underweight and had poor vision that required reading
5 glasses. K.A.D. also had an infection in her mouth and had to have 16 decayed teeth pulled.
M.D. was also underweight and had to have 12 teeth pulled and 8 fillings. Similarly, A.A.D.
had to have 8 teeth pulled, 4 fillings, and 2 caps. A.A.D. also suffered from a lazy eye that
required surgery. According to Foster Mother, basic hygiene was a new concept for the
children.
{¶ 16} When initially placed in Foster Mother’s care, none of the children asked
questions about their parents. The children did not start talking about their parents until about
six months after Foster Mother had received them. The children did, however, ask to see
their older half-sisters. Foster Mother arranged visits with the sisters every two weeks, which
had since turned into infrequent phone calls. The children did not talk about any other
relatives with Foster Mother, but they had mentioned a man named Todd with whom they
claimed they felt safe.
{¶ 17} Foster Mother placed all three children in counseling around September or
October 2023. Foster Mother suspended counseling for a period of time because after a few
months without visiting Mother and Father, the children were having no behavioral issues
and were thriving. However, when the visits with Mother and Father resumed, their
behavioral issues began to return. For example, M.D. started to have crying episodes,
nightmares, and tantrums after visits with Mother and Father. As a result, Foster Mother
placed the children back in counseling.
{¶ 18} Foster Mother was first made aware of M.R. in March 2024. Foster Mother
recalled that the children were not familiar with M.R. According to Foster Mother, the children
had their first visit with M.R. at the visitation center in July 2024. Starting November 5, 2024,
the children had visits with M.R. every other week.
6 {¶ 19} Foster Mother had concerns about the children’s visits with M.R. According to
Foster Mother, the children came home from the visits upset because they wanted to visit
their Mother instead. The children, especially K.A.D., often expressed that they did not want
to visit M.R. The children reported to Foster Mother that M.R. had tried to bribe them with
smartphones to live with her.
{¶ 20} Foster Mother did not think that M.R. was a safe placement option for the
children. Foster Mother indicated that the children had also expressed their belief that M.R.
was not a safe placement option. Foster Mother questioned M.R.’s mental health due to
several public posts that M.R. had made on Facebook. For example, Foster Mother read a
post by M.R. in which she referred to JFS as a terrorist group. She also claimed that M.R.
wrote a post asking for advice on whether to use an experimental drug for her anxiety and
depression, as well as a post disclosing that she is disabled and a recovered drug addict
who suffers from executive functioning disorder.
{¶ 21} Foster Mother admitted that she had occasionally made disparaging
comments about Mother and Father out of frustration when the children came home from
visits with them. Foster Mother testified that she had also made the mistake of talking to her
husband about her concerns with M.R.’s mental and physical health within earshot of the
children. Foster Mother expressed remorse about making the disparaging comments and
indicated that she did not want the children to have negative thoughts about their family.
Foster Mother indicated that she had since tried to maintain better control over what she
says when the children are around.
{¶ 22} Foster Mother explained that while the children love Mother and Father, they
did not feel safe with them, and Foster Mother feared the children would be given back to
them. Foster Mother expressed that she would like to adopt the children. She also testified
7 that if she were permitted to adopt the children, she would facilitate a continued relationship
with the children’s biological family as long as it is a healthy and safe option.
JFS Caseworker’s Testimony
{¶ 23} The JFS caseworker testified that she was assigned to Mother and Father in
March 2023. When the caseworker initially asked Mother for the names of anyone who could
be a kinship caregiver for the children, Mother did not provide her with any names. At a
subsequent court hearing, Mother recommended placing the children with two family
friends—T.L. and A.W. The caseworker contacted T.L. and A.W., but T.L. indicated that he
was unavailable and A.W. never followed through with the required background check and
home study.
{¶ 24} The caseworker asked the children’s older sisters if they knew of any family
members who would be willing to care for the children, but the sisters could not provide the
caseworker with any names. The caseworker also asked the eldest sister if she would be
willing to be a placement option herself, and the sister indicated that she was unable to
because of personal reasons.
{¶ 25} In spring 2023, Mother suggested that the children’s maternal grandmother be
a potential placement option. The caseworker attempted to contact maternal grandmother
multiple times and went to her house, but the caseworker was unable to reach her. Father
recommended his sister, but when the caseworker contacted the sister, she indicated that
she was unable to care for the children. Having no other names, the caseworker ran an
“AQUIRANT search” to find potential family members. The caseworker wrote 30 letters to
potential family members obtained from the AQUIRANT search but received no positive
responses.
8 {¶ 26} Mother did not mention M.R. as a possible placement option until March 2024.
Mother did not know M.R.’s phone number, so the caseworker contacted M.R. via Facebook
Messenger. The caseworker first reached out to M.R. in mid-March 2024. M.R. called the
caseworker back on April 19, 2024, and confirmed that she was Mother’s maternal aunt.
M.R. told the caseworker that she needed to check with her husband about taking the
children. After doing so, M.R. reached back out to the caseworker and indicated that she
was willing to be a placement option. M.R. then began the background check and home
study process, which was approved in August 2024.
{¶ 27} In July 2024, M.R. had her first visit with the children at the visitation center.
The caseworker recalled that the children were nervous about the visit and that they did not
remember M.R. Following the first visit, the caseworker indicated that the children were
uncomfortable and expressed worries about continuing to visit M.R. The caseworker spoke
with her supervisor, the GAL, and the children’s counselor about the children’s reaction to
the visit. Following that discussion, the consensus was to discontinue the visits until an
upcoming court hearing. At the court hearing, the trial court issued an order for the children
to have visitation with M.R. Following that order, the children visited with M.R. every other
Monday beginning in November 2024.
{¶ 28} According to the caseworker, M.R. canceled two visits with the children due to
her husband having health issues. The caseworker indicated that M.R. has health issues
herself. She testified that M.R. suffers from vertigo and multiple sclerosis (“MS”). The
caseworker said that she had concerns about M.R. and her husband’s health issues
because the children were very active. The caseworker believed that the health issues of
M.R. and her husband would make it difficult for them to meet the children’s needs. The
9 caseworker also expressed concern that the children would regress in their behaviors and
attitudes if they were removed from their foster home.
{¶ 29} The caseworker testified that the children cared deeply for Mother and Father,
but that Mother and Father had continued to abuse drugs and failed to comply with their
case plans. Mother’s case plan objectives were to complete a drug and alcohol assessment,
a mental health assessment, follow through with all recommendations from those
assessments, obtain stable housing and income, and comply with JFS and court orders.
Father’s case plan objectives were the same, with the addition of completing an anger
management course. The caseworker advised that Father had been in prison, but he had
been recently released and had last visited the children in July 2024.
{¶ 30} The caseworker testified that Mother and Father were not capable of caring
for the children. However, the caseworker testified that it would be appropriate for the
children to maintain contact with Mother and Father if Mother and Father were safe and
sober. The caseworker explained that the decision regarding the children’s contact with
Mother and Father would be made by the adoptive parents.
{¶ 31} The caseworker indicated that the children were bonded to their foster family
and were very comfortable with them. The caseworker also indicated that the children were
thriving in their foster family’s care. The caseworker reported that M.D. had told her that if
he could not reunify with Mother and Father, he wanted to stay with his foster family. The
caseworker also reported that A.A.D. and K.A.D. both indicated that they wanted to stay with
their foster family as opposed to reunifying with Mother and Father. The caseworker opined
that it would be in the best interest of the children for JFS to obtain permanent custody.
M.R.’s Testimony
{¶ 32} M.R. was 57 years old and married. At the time of the custody hearings, M.R.’s
10 household included her husband and six grandchildren. The grandchildren were 21, 19, 17,
10, 8, and 5 years old. The 5-year-old grandchild is autistic.
{¶ 33} M.R. had lived on and off with her husband for 35 years. M.R. admitted that
her husband had beaten her on more than one occasion years ago. M.R. indicated that since
November 2024, her husband had experienced serious health issues that caused him to be
bedridden for three months. M.R., however, reported that her husband’s condition had since
improved.
{¶ 34} M.R. raised two biological children and three stepchildren, who are now adults.
In addition, M.R. raised six of her stepdaughter’s children, as her stepdaughter is in prison.
The six step-grandchildren were all adults, except for the 17-year-old who was living with
M.R.
{¶ 35} M.R. claimed that before JFS became involved with M.D., A.A.D., and K.A.D.,
she visited the children five or six days a week. M.R. did, however, admit that some distance
grew between her and the children when she stopped driving in 2021 or 2022. M.R. stopped
driving due to her MS, as she felt that it was no longer safe for her to drive since she
occasionally experienced “drop foot.” Tr. 668. M.R. admitted that after she stopped driving,
she did not have any face-to-face interaction with the children for two years. Despite this,
M.R. asserted that she had always maintained a close relationship with the children.
{¶ 36} Although M.R. did not drive, she claimed that transporting the children would
not be an issue because her husband and several other people in her household drove.
M.R. explained that the children would get to school via a bus driver she knew. M.R. also
claimed that the children’s adult siblings would be able to drive them around.
{¶ 37} M.R. indicated that her MS caused her to suffer from short-term memory loss,
which required her to use several calendars, journals, and Post-it notes to help her
11 remember things. Her grandchildren’s school was aware of her condition and sent her
multiple notices about school activities. M.R. also suffered from vertigo on a daily basis.
According to M.R., the condition caused her to have constant numbness and tingling and a
lack of coordination. M.R. also occasionally suffered from temporary blindness, blurry vision,
slurred speech, and fatigue. In addition, M.R. reported having problems with her gait, which
affected her mobility. M.R. also reported suffering from seasonal depression and a two-year
opioid addiction, which started when she was diagnosed with MS in 2016. M.R. indicated
that she was no longer addicted to opioids, but she testified to using marijuana to self-
medicate.
{¶ 38} M.R. claimed that her medical issues would not impact her ability to provide
for the children’s daily needs. M.R., however, indicated that in 2017, she relinquished legal
custody of a step-grandchild because her medical issues prevented her from caring for the
child. Specifically, M.R. claimed that the child, who was 15 years old, was violent and that
she was unable to protect herself. M.R. added that the 15-year-old child had a baby and that
M.R. relinquished legal custody of that child as well because she could not keep up with a
toddler.
{¶ 39} In 2018, M.R. was previously involved with JFS when she served as a
chaperone for Mother and Father due to their substance abuse issues. During that time,
M.R. moved in with Mother and Father and helped them with their daily routine. According
to M.R., it did not take long for Mother and Father to close their case with JFS.
{¶ 40} M.R. learned about the children’s removal from Mother and Father’s care in
2023 while she was taking care of her sick friend in Florida. Approximately a year later in
March 2024, M.R. received a Facebook message from the caseworker, who asked M.R.
whether she would be able to take care of the children. This shocked M.R. because Mother
12 had led her to believe that she and Father had been completing their case plans and that
they were on track to get the children back. However, M.R. learned from the caseworker that
Mother had “done nothing on her case plan.” Tr. 677. M.R. claimed that she did not know
the children were living in deplorable conditions and that she did not realize how dire the
situation was until she spoke with the caseworker.
{¶ 41} After discussing the situation with her husband and her adult children, M.R.
contacted the caseworker and told her that she would be able to care for the children and
that she was ready to move forward with the required background check and home study.
M.R. passed both the background check and home study and later had visits with the
children. M.R. described her visits with the children as “awkward” and “unnatural.” Tr. 682.
During one visit, M.R. recalled A.A.D. and K.A.D. walking her around the visitation center
and making her aware of every camera and recording device. According to M.R., the children
spent the entire time telling her that they were being watched. M.R., however, claimed that
the children were more relaxed when they went outside to play. M.R. expressed her opinion
that the children had been coached on how to act around her. M.R. claimed that her visits
with the children were overall “really good” and that the children remembered her. Tr. 683.
{¶ 42} M.R. admitted that in September 2024, she made a Facebook post that vented
her frustrations about JFS and referred to the agency as a “government-sanctioned
trafficking ring.” Tr. 753. M.R. claimed that it was an emotional response and that she
regretted making the post. She also claimed that she would never vent her frustrations
directly in front of the children. She denied bribing the children during her visits with them.
{¶ 43} Financially, M.R. indicated that she would provide for the children “as best as
[she could].” Tr. 700. M.R. acknowledged having financial problems. She indicated that her
husband was in physical therapy and retired but that he planned on returning to work. She
13 indicated that her husband had worked as a self-employed carpenter and that he received
$1,200 per month in social security benefits. M.R. received $1,100 per month in disability
benefits. M.R. said that she was working on opening up a small boutique in downtown
Springfield because her disability benefits would not be enough financial support. M.R. had
four bedrooms in her home plus three more that would have to be refinished before anyone
could move into them.
{¶ 44} M.R. explained that she was asking for legal custody of the children because
she loves them and because their family has a lot of heritage. She feared that if the children
remained with their foster family, their older siblings would not be able to visit them anymore
and that the children would lose their connection to their biological family. M.R. also claimed
that she was bonded to the children, but she did not know if the children were bonded to
her.
GAL’s Recommendation
{¶ 45} The GAL recommended that the children be placed in the permanent custody
of JFS due to Mother and Father not progressing on their case plans. The GAL expressed
concerns that Mother and Father would never be able to provide a safe and stable home for
the children. The GAL did not recommend the court grant legal custody to M.R. The GAL
had several concerns with M.R.’s ability to care for the children. Specifically, he was
concerned about M.R.’s health condition, Facebook posts, failure to intervene while knowing
the children were not living in a safe environment, history of drug use, and current caregiving
responsibilities to other children. The GAL also testified that he believed M.R. would allow
Mother to see the children in violation of court orders. The GAL further noted that if legal
custody were granted to M.R., the children would have to change school districts, which the
GAL did not think was in the best interest of the children. However, the GAL did recommend
14 that the children continue to have visitation with their biological family, particularly their older
half-siblings.
{¶ 46} Father did not provide any testimony during the evidentiary hearings he
attended. Father’s counsel advised the trial court that he wanted M.R. to have legal custody
if he could not have custody of the children.
Custody Decision
{¶ 47} After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearings, on August 6, 2025, the trial court issued a decision finding that it was in the
children’s best interest to grant JFS permanent custody. The trial court granted JFS’s motion
for permanent custody, thereby terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights. The trial
court further denied M.R.’s motion for legal custody. Mother now appeals from that judgment
and raises two assignments of error for review.
First Assignment of Error
{¶ 48} Under her first assignment of error, Mother claims that the trial court’s
judgment granting JFS permanent custody should be reversed because Father was not
properly served with notice of the evidentiary hearings. For the reasons outlined below,
Mother’s argument is not well taken.
{¶ 49} As a preliminary matter, we note that “[i]n permanent custody proceedings,
when service of process upon a parent is defective, the juvenile court fails to acquire
jurisdiction over that parent as required to terminate the parent’s parental rights with respect
to his or her children.” In re Holloway, 1996 WL 227481, *2 (12th Dist. May 6, 1996); State
ex rel. Ballard v. O’Donnell, 50 Ohio St.3d 182, 183 (1990) (“‘It is axiomatic that . . . a
judgment rendered without proper service or entry of appearance is a nullity and void.’”),
quoting Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader, 165 Ohio St. 61, 64 (1956).
15 {¶ 50} “R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) provides, in relevant part, that when a motion for
permanent custody is filed, ‘the court shall schedule a hearing and give notice of the filing of
the motion and of the hearing, in accordance with section 2151.29 of the Revised Code, to
all parties to the action and to the child’s guardian ad litem.’” In re J.C.S., 2023-Ohio-1511,
¶ 53 (2d Dist.), quoting R.C. 2151.414(A)(1). “‘For proper service [under R.C. 2151.29], the
parents must be notified of the permanent custody motion and the initial permanent custody
hearing by one of three methods: personal service, service by certified or registered mail
. . . , or—if both those methods fail—by publication.’” (Bracketed text in original.) Id. at ¶ 54,
quoting In re Keith Lee P., 2004-Ohio-1976, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.29 and
Juv.R. 16.
{¶ 51} “Service by publication ‘“is reserved for those cases in which the residence of
the parent is unknown and is not ascertainable with reasonable diligence.”’” Id., quoting In re
J.T., 2019-Ohio-465, ¶ 38 (4th Dist.), quoting In re R.P., 2012-Ohio-4799, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.).
“It has been described as ‘“a method of last resort.”’” Id., quoting J.T. at ¶ 38, quoting In re
Miller, 33 Ohio App.3d 224, 226, (8th Dist. 1986). With regard to service by publication,
Juv.R. 16(A) provides, in relevant part, that “[b]efore service by publication can be made, an
affidavit of a party or party’s counsel shall be filed with the court. The affidavit shall aver that
service of summons cannot be made because the residence of the person is unknown to
the affiant and cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence and shall set forth the last
known address of the party to be served.”
{¶ 52} In this case, the record indicates that personal service was attempted at
Father’s residence on July 17, 2024, and that service could not be perfected due to Father’s
residence being boarded up and empty. On July 30, 2024, JFS filed a motion to serve Father
by publication. The motion included an affidavit averring that Father’s whereabouts were
16 unknown. Service by publication was thereafter effectuated between August 1, 2024, and
August 8, 2024. Service on Father was never challenged or objected to during the court
proceedings. Mother, however, is now challenging it for the first time in this appeal.
{¶ 53} Initially, we note that Mother complains of an alleged service error against
Father, not herself. We recently addressed the same scenario in In re A.W., 2025-Ohio-5657
(2d Dist.). The father in A.W. argued that the mother had not been properly served, and we
stated the following in response:
“‘Generally, an appellant does not have standing to argue issues affecting
another person.’” Dayton Lodge, L.L.C. v. Hoffman, 2013-Ohio-5755, ¶ 35
(2d Dist.), quoting Benjamin v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 2006-Ohio-2739, ¶ 4
(10th Dist.). “‘However, an appellant may “complain of an error committed
against a nonappealing party when the error is prejudicial to the rights of the
appellant.”’” Id., quoting Benjamin at ¶ 4, quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d
1, 13 (6th Dist. 1991).
This court has addressed a situation where a mother claimed that a
children services agency did not complete a diligent search before serving
notice of the permanent custody hearing on the father by publication. In re
Shackelford, 1990 WL 68954, *5 (2d Dist. May 22, 1990). The mother argued
that had the father received proper notice of the permanent custody hearing
and attended the hearing, there may have been a chance that the father or
one of his relatives would have received custody of the child, which would have
allowed her to see the child more often. Id.
The record in Shackelford indicated that the father had seen the child
only three or four times before the child was removed from the mother’s care,
17 had no contact with the children services agency, and had never made an
effort to legally establish his paternity. Id. at *2-4. Under these circumstances,
this court found that the possibility of the child being placed with the father or
one of the father’s relatives “was remote in the extreme.” Id. at *6. The court
also found that even if it were to assume that the children services agency
could have made a greater effort to locate the father, the mother had failed to
establish that she was prejudiced by the father being served by publication. Id.
As a result, the court concluded that the mother lacked standing to argue that
the father was improperly served with notice of the permanent custody hearing.
Id.
Other appellate courts of this state have reached the same conclusion
as Shackelford regarding standing. See, e.g., In re Sours, 1988 WL 81057, *2
(3d Dist. Sept. 27, 1988) (appellant mother lacked standing to object to a
purported defect in service upon father where mother failed to point to any
realistic possibility of prejudice to herself from the procedure followed by the
juvenile court); In re Jordan, 2002 WL 121211, *7 (9th Dist. Jan. 30, 2002)
(appellant mother lacked standing to raise alleged failure of service on father
where mother failed to demonstrate that she was actually prejudiced by the
alleged error); In re Kincaid, 2000 WL 1683456, *4 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2000);
(appellant mother had no standing to raise the issue of the trial court’s personal
jurisdiction over the father when there is no evidence that her defense was
prejudiced by the absence of the father from the proceedings).
A.W., 2025-Ohio-5657, at ¶ 74-77 (2d Dist.).
18 {¶ 54} Based on the foregoing case law, this court found in A.W. that the father lacked
standing to challenge the service on mother because he had failed to argue how he was
prejudiced by the alleged service error and because the record did not otherwise establish
any resulting prejudice. Id. at ¶ 78. Significantly, the record in A.W. indicated that the mother
was aware of the hearing date and simply chose not to attend. Id.
{¶ 55} The present case is similar to A.W. Here, Mother does not argue how she was
prejudiced by the alleged service error on Father. The record indicates that Father was
aware of the custody matter, was represented by counsel at all of the hearing dates, and
remotely attended two of the hearing dates himself. Father chose not to testify, and his
counsel expressed Father’s wishes to have the children placed in the legal custody of M.R.
Under these circumstances, we fail to see how the alleged service error on Father could
have prejudiced Mother or even Father for that matter. Because Mother has failed to make
any argument regarding how she was prejudiced by the alleged service error and because
the record does not otherwise establish any prejudice, Mother lacks standing to raise the
alleged service error in this appeal.
{¶ 56} Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 57} Under her second assignment of error, Mother claims that the trial court’s
judgment granting permanent custody to JFS should be reversed because M.R. was a
suitable relative who was ready, willing, and able to take legal custody of the children.
According to Mother, the children’s best interest would have been served by granting M.R.
legal custody. Mother, therefore, is essentially challenging the trial court’s denial of M.R.’s
motion for legal custody. Alternatively, Mother argues that the trial court should have granted
19 an extension of temporary custody as opposed to awarding JFS permanent custody. For the
reasons outlined below, Mother’s arguments are not well taken.
Legal Custody
{¶ 58} “If a child is adjudicated a ‘dependent child,’ the court may grant legal custody
of the child ‘to either parent or to any other person who, prior to the dispositional hearing,
files a motion requesting legal custody of the child.’” In re D.P., 2024-Ohio-480, ¶ 11
(2d Dist.), quoting R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). “An award of legal custody gives the custodian the
right to have physical care and control of the child, to determine where the child lives, ‘and
the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food,
shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges,
and responsibilities.’” Id., quoting R.C. 2151.011(B)(21). “A juvenile court may award legal
custody of a child to an individual if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
legal custody is in the best interest of the child.” In re C.B., 2019-Ohio-890, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.),
citing In re M.O., 2015-Ohio-2430, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 59} “The custody determination under R.C. 2151.353 must be made in accordance
with the ‘best interest of the child’ standard described in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).” D.P. at ¶ 12.
“The factors which must be considered include things like the ‘parents’ wishes; the child’s
wishes, if the court has interviewed the child; the child’s interaction with parents, siblings,
and other who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; adjustment of the child to
home, school, and community; and the mental and physical health of all involved persons.’”
Id., quoting R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). (Other citation omitted.).
{¶ 60} This court applies an abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s
judgment on a motion for legal custody and will not reverse it absent an abuse of that
discretion. In re G.D., 2023-Ohio-1913, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). “‘Abuse of discretion’ has been
20 defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” AAAA Ents., Inc.
v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990).
“[M]ost instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable.”
Id. “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support
that decision.” Id.
Standing to Challenge Denial of Motion for Legal Custody
{¶ 61} “‘A parent has no standing to assert that the court abused its discretion by
failing to give the [third-party relative] legal custody; rather, the challenge is limited to
whether the court’s decision to terminate parental rights was proper.’” In re L.W., 2017-Ohio-
657, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting In re S.G., 2016-Ohio-8403, ¶ 52 (3d Dist.), citing In re Pittman,
2002-Ohio-2208, ¶ 70 (9th Dist.). Therefore, “a parent who does not challenge the
termination of her or his own parental rights may not instead assert the rights of a relative
who has not appealed the denial of her or his petition for legal custody.” In re K.C., 2017-
Ohio-8383, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.); see In re S.F., 2020-Ohio-693, ¶ 51 (2d Dist.) (contrasting a
scenario where a parent appeals from the parent’s own motion asking for a relative to be
granted legal custody). In other words, a parent may appeal the termination of only his or
her own parental rights, not the denial of a motion by a third party.
{¶ 62} In this case, M.R. is not a party to this appeal, yet Mother is challenging the
trial court’s denial of M.R.’s motion for legal custody. Without M.R. appealing from the trial
court’s denial of her motion for legal custody, there is no remedy we can provide, as we
cannot assume that M.R. still desires to be awarded legal custody of the children. Stated
simply, Mother does not have standing to argue for legal custody in favor of M.R. Her
challenge on appeal is limited to whether the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental
rights was proper.
21 {¶ 63} Even if Mother had standing to challenge the denial of M.R.’s legal custody
motion, we would not find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying it. Indeed, it
was reasonable for the trial court to deny the motion given M.R.’s serious health concerns,
her responsibilities to several other children in her household, her negative social media
posts about JFS, her finances, her past history with drug addiction and domestic violence,
and her lack of any bond with the children.
Permanent Custody
{¶ 64} Because Mother alternatively argued that the trial court should have extended
JFS’s temporary custody, as opposed to awarding it permanent custody, we also review the
trial court’s permanent custody decision.
{¶ 65} Initially, we note that “[i]t is well recognized that the right to raise one’s own
child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997), quoting
In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972). That right, however, is “‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is
the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100,
106 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla.App. 1974). “Severing the parent-
child relationship in a permanent custody case ‘has been described as “the family law
equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.”’” In re N.R., 2025-Ohio-2896, ¶ 56
(2d Dist.), quoting Hayes at 48, quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist. 1991).
“The termination of parental rights should be an alternative of ‘last resort.’” In re D.A., 2007-
Ohio-1105, ¶ 11, quoting Cunningham at 105. “Though an award of legal custody is intended
to be permanent, an award of legal custody is not equivalent to, or as drastic as, a permanent
custody award, because legal custody ‘does not divest a parent of residual parental rights,
privileges, and responsibilities.’” N.R. at ¶ 56, quoting In re C.R., 2006-Ohio-1191, ¶ 17; see
22 R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) (defining “legal custody”). “Accordingly, termination of parental rights
requires a higher burden of proof than a grant of legal custody.” Id.
{¶ 66} Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent custody of
a child to the agency that moved for permanent custody if the court finds “by clear and
convincing evidence (1) that one or more of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through
(e) applies and (2) that a grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.” In re
A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 18, citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
{¶ 67} With regard to the factors under (a) through (d) of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), “the
court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the child either (a) cannot or should
not be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time; (b) is abandoned; (c) is
orphaned and no relatives are able to take permanent custody of the child; or (d) has been
in the temporary custody of one or more public or private children services agencies for 12
or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.” (Citations omitted.) In re J.N., 2020-
Ohio-4157, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.). Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e), the court must find that “[t]he child
or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has
been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three
separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e). “If
any of the aforementioned factors are satisfied, then the court must determine whether
granting permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.” In re A.W., 2025-Ohio-5657,
¶ 51 (2d Dist.), citing J.N. at ¶ 26 and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
{¶ 68} When making the best-interest determination, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides
the following non-exhaustive list of factors for the trial court to consider:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
23 providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
(c) The custodial history of the child;
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of R.C. 2151.414
apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶ 69} “[A] court must consider ‘all relevant factors,’ including five enumerated
statutory factors . . . . No one element is given greater weight or heightened significance.” In
re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 57, quoting In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56. “Juvenile
courts need not ‘expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors,’ and ‘[c]onsideration is
all the statute requires.’” (Bracketed text in original.) In re H.V.F., 2024-Ohio-5838, ¶ 41
(2d Dist.), quoting A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, at ¶ 31.
{¶ 70} The standards that apply in reviewing decisions on the permanent custody of
children and the termination of parental rights are sufficiency of the evidence and manifest
weight of the evidence. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 1. “When reviewing for manifest
weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v.
24 Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must
always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Eastley at ¶ 21.
{¶ 71} In contrast, a review for the sufficiency of the evidence involves testing the
adequacy of the evidence and determining, as a matter of law, whether the evidence is
legally sufficient to sustain a judgment. Z.C. at ¶ 13, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
380, 386 (1997). “When applying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a court of appeals
should affirm a trial court when ‘“the evidence is legally sufficient to support the [judgment]
as a matter of law.”’” Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 3, quoting Thompkins
at 386, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990).
{¶ 72} As to the first finding required for JFS to receive permanent custody, the trial
court found under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that the children could not be safely placed with
Mother or Father within a reasonable period of time. This finding is supported by sufficient
evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record indicates that
at the time of the hearing, Mother and Father had a longstanding history of substance abuse
and that they had failed to make any progress on their case plan objectives for over a year,
despite receiving assistance from JFS. The record also includes the GAL’s reported concern
that Mother and Father would never be able to provide a safe and stable home for the
children. Additionally, Mother testified that she was a drug addict and not capable of caring
for the children.
{¶ 73} The trial court also found under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) that Father had
abandoned the children. That finding is also supported by sufficient evidence and is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. A child is presumed abandoned when a parent
has failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than 90 days. R.C. 2151.011(C).
Here, the record indicates that Father had not contacted the children since July 2024, which
25 was well over 90 days prior to the commencement of the permanent custody hearing in
November 2024.
{¶ 74} As for the best-interest finding, the trial court considered the relevant factors
under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and determined that permanent custody in favor of JFS was in
the children’s best interest. In reviewing that decision, we consider each of the applicable
factors.
a. Children’s Interactions and Interrelationships with Others
{¶ 75} The record establishes that the children were very bonded to their foster family
and to each other. While the children were also very bonded to their adult half-siblings and
Mother, those parties expressed that they were unable to care for the children. The foster
family provided a safe, stable, and loving home for the children and wished to adopt the
children. Foster Mother permitted the children’s half-siblings to visit the children, and she
indicated that if she were to adopt the children, she would continue to allow the children to
visit their half-siblings. While some of the half-siblings expressed that they were
uncomfortable around Foster Mother due to her religious beliefs, nothing in the record
indicates that Foster Mother ever prohibited the half-siblings from having contact with the
children. The record indicates that it was the half-siblings’ choice to stop communicating
regularly with Foster Mother and the children. Foster Mother also indicated that she would
allow Mother and Father to have contact with the children as long as it was a safe and
healthy option.
b. Children’s Wishes
{¶ 76} The record establishes that the children were interviewed in camera
individually and that they each expressed a desire to be safe and to remain with their foster
family.
26 c. Custodial History
{¶ 77} The record establishes that the children have had a longstanding history with
JFS. In 2018, the children were adjudicated dependent and placed under an order of
supervision due to Mother’s and Father’s drug abuse issues. Thereafter, in February 2023,
the children were removed from Mother and Father’s care due to deplorable living
conditions, and the children were once again adjudicated dependent. The children were
initially placed with a kinship caregiver, but JFS eventually received temporary custody of
the children in May 2023 and placed them with their foster family. The children have lived
with their foster family ever since.
d. Children’s Need for Legally Secure Placement
{¶ 78} “While the Ohio Revised Code does not define a ‘legally secure permanent
placement,’ Ohio courts have held that the phrase means ‘a safe, stable, consistent
environment where a child’s needs will be met.’” In re Z.A., 2025-Ohio-5247, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.),
quoting In re K.M., 2023-Ohio-3203, ¶ 35 (4th Dist.).
{¶ 79} The record indicates that Mother and Father failed to rectify the issues that
caused the children to be removed from their care despite JFS’s reasonable efforts to assist
them. Specifically, Mother and Father continued to use drugs, did not gain meaningful
employment, and did not obtain appropriate housing. It was not viable to return the children
to Mother or Father. Mother herself admitted that she was not capable of caring for the
children. Also, the GAL expressed doubts as to whether Mother and Father would ever be
able to provide a safe and stable home for the children.
{¶ 80} The record indicates that the children’s eldest half-sibling told JFS that she
was unable to care for the children, as she was young with personal issues of her own. The
record also indicates that M.R. was not a viable placement option because she had severe
27 health concerns, was responsible for several other children, posted negative comments
about JFS on social media, had financial issues, had a past history of addiction and domestic
violence, and acknowledged that the children were not bonded to her.
{¶ 81} Despite much effort, JFS could not find an appropriate relative who was willing
and capable of caring for the children. Accordingly, the record supports finding that the
children were in need of a legally secure placement that could not have been achieved
without granting permanent custody to JFS.
{¶ 82} When considering all the aforementioned factors, we find that sufficient
evidence supports the trial court’s determination that it was in the children’s best interest to
grant JFS permanent custody. We also find that the trial court’s best-interest determination
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial
court erred by granting JFS’s motion for permanent custody and terminating the parental
rights of Mother and Father. Accordingly, Mother’s alternative argument that the trial court
should have instead extended temporary custody to JFS is not well taken.
{¶ 83} Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 84} Having overruled both assignments of error raised by Mother, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
.............
LEWIS, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.