KASHIWA, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “PTO”) Board of Appeals (the “board”) sustaining the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 8,10-13,18, 23, 25, 26, 28 and 29 in reissue application serial No. 163,300, filed June 27, 1980. Original U.S. Patent No. 4,161,449, entitled “Powdered Carpet Composition” was issued on July 17, 1979, from an application filed September 2,1977. All of the claims at bar stand rejected as unpatentable under, inter alia, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).1 We affirm the rejections under section 102(b).
The Invention
Appellants’ invention relates to a vacuumable, powdered carpet composition which [1129]*1129is used as a carpet and room deodorizer and a method for treating carpets by using the powdered carpet composition. The patented product, CARPET FRESH, after application on the carpet in powdered form and removal by vacuuming, imparts deodorizing, antistatic and antisoil characteristics to the carpet. Appellants’ invention is best described by their broadest independent claim:
1. A powdered carpet-treating composition comprising a blend of from about 40.0-98.99%, by weight, of an inorganic salt carrier selected from the group consisting of sulfates, chlorides, carbonates, bicarbonates, borates, tripolyphosphates, nitrates and blends thereof, substantially all of the particles of said carrier being between 0.06-0.25 millimeters; from about 1.0-25.0%, by weight, of an agglomerating agent selected from the group consisting of starch, silica powders, grain flour, wood flours, talc, pumice, clays and calcium phosphate; from about 0.01-20.0%, by weight, of a volatile odorous agent and an effective amount, up to about 15%, by weight, of an antistatic agent, said composition being adapted for application onto a carpet and for removal by vacuuming to impart a deodorizing effect.
All of the remaining claims at bar recite the ingredients of claim 1. Claim 26 additionally recites a dedusting agent, described as “an alkyl phthalate dedusting agent, the combined concentration of phthalate and said odorous agent ranging up to about 5.0% by weight.” The method claims at bar, claims 8, 10, 18 and 25, recite the application of the claimed composition onto a carpet in powdered form and the removal of the composition, such as by vacuuming, in order to impart deodorizing, antistatic and antisoil characteristics to the carpet.
Procedural Background
Appellants applied for reissue in connection with a patent infringement suit pending in a United States district court.2 That action was between appellants’ assignee, Airwick Industries, Inc. (“Airwick”), and the intervenor of this case, Sterling Drug, Inc., which appeared as a protestor3 before the PTO throughout the reissue prosecution. The district court issued a stay pending the reissue decision.
Background
In August, 1976, more than one year before appellants’ filing date of September 2, 1977, Airwick conducted a consumer test in St. Louis, involving 76 consumers. During the first stage of the St. Louis test carried out on August 9 and 10, 86 consumers viewed a video tape presentation of the product concept. Similar tests, consisting of only video tape presentations, had previously been used in Philadelphia and Houston. After viewing the video presentation, the consumers were questioned about the pricing of the product, the believability of the claims made for the product, and their purchase intent.
[1130]*1130In an internal memorandum dated August 19, 1976, James A. Smith, director of research and development at Airwick and one of the co-inventors, wrote to Wesley M. Buckner, the vice president for marketing at Airwick:
Results [of the first stage test] were good, but not as good as noted in the previous two cities. The respondents [consumers] overall reactions were rather dull and lacked the highly enthusiastic research seen earlier. Outlined below is the purchase intent scores.
Purchase intent # of Respondents %
Definitely would buy 21 24.4
Probably would buy 37 43.0
Might or might not buy 19 22.1
Probably would not buy 8 9.3
Definitely would not buy _1 1.2
86 100.0
Smith further observed in this memorandum:
Again, suggested pricing was reviewed with the respondents and there apparently is no problem with $1.89 for 14 oz. It did not affect the purchase intent trial of the women [consumers] questioned.
Smith concluded this memorandum by stating that “[t]he results will guide our future product development activities especially in fragrance type and level as well as product form.”
In the second stage of the test, 40 of the consumers were then given a granular version of the composition and 36 given a powdered version. The. composition had the following ingredients:
Ingredients Percent
Sodium sulfate 52.2
Sodium bicarbonate 25.0
Aluminum oxide (Dispal)4 10.0
Starch 10.0
Perfume 2.5
This composition is identical to that of formulation 3 of Example III in appellants’ original patent and in the instant reissue application. In an internal memorandum dated August 6, 1976, Smith observed that the powdery product had, inter alia, the following characteristics:
[P]roduct should have better deodorization, anti-static and anti-soil properties. Easier to vacuum up (even on shag carpeting — according to Jim McLaughlin). Would be easier to manufacture, and less costly to manufacture — it’s a complete dry blend. [Emphasis in original.]
Moreover, Smith stated, with regard to the upcoming St. Louis test, that “[h]opefully, we will have some guidance as to product form — large or small particle size.”
These 76 consumers were allowed to use the products in their own homes for about two weeks and were instructed to return any unused portion. They did not enter into any agreement of confidentiality with Airwick and were allowed to use the products in their own homes without legal restriction.
On August 29 and 30, 68 of the consumers (33 of whom received the powdery product) were personally interviewed by the appellants regarding their experience with the product. The record, however, does not indicate Whether the appellants attempted to contact the remaining eight consumers or .to retrieve the product. Smith detailed the results of the St. Louis test in his memorandum dated September 20, 1976. Smith pointed out:
There was a difference in the ease of vacuuming up the two product forms. * * [T]he more powdery one, vacuumed up the best. * * * [T]the granular version, was definitely more difficult to vacuum up. The product bounced under furniture or up against the baseboard resulting in greater effort to vacuum up. Neither of the products got trapped in carpeting at all.
The overwhelming majority of participants stated the product does deodorize. Some commented upon specific applications to rid the carpeting and room of pet [1131]*1131odors especially. In a few instances, the odor was so overpowering that no opinion could be formed. Again, this will be further evaluated in any revised formulas.
******
Although the product usage period was relatively short, no mechanical problems with any of the vacuum cleaners used was evident. There was no mention of any bags breaking or machines clogging due to the product, either.
******
[W]e are pursuing alternate fragrances to remove the sweet note of the current fragrance * * *.
******
[W]e will pursue only the powdery form in our final product development efforts because of favorable product testing results and anticipated lower manufacturing costs.
After the St. Louis consumer test, work continued at Airwick in experimenting with different formulations. For instance, Example 15 of appellants’ original patent and the instant reissue application, which is the CARPET FRESH formulation as first made, was first recorded in an Airwick worker’s notebook on October 5, 1976. Moreover, testing for the antistatic and antisoil properties of the CARPET FRESH product was not planned until early October, 1976.
In his affidavit dated December 22, 1980, James H. McLaughlin, one of the co-inventors, stated:
Airwick * * * was seeking to technically develop the product while testing consumer reaction to the concept and to various prototype forms. In preparation for this Affidavit, I previewed the film of the video presentation given in Philadelphia and Houston in the summer of 1976. The video shows white beads being sprinkled onto a carpet and bouncing about on the carpet surface. This was not a “commercial” nor a test of any “product”, as urged by Sterling. It was clearly a rough mock-up of the concept to test consumer reaction and, in fact, rapidly solidified in the container. * * * The remaining consumer test in the summer of 1976 in St. Louis, is shown in the test report to be a more advanced concept test with the experimental formulations. One was a powder, the other was a granular material. This test was during a period of intensive experimental work in the laboratory to define the metes and bounds of the Carpet Fresh product. I did not consider these tests to be a commercial exploitation but an integral part of our development and experimental work.
Prosecution
The examiner rejected all the claims at bar under, inter alia, section 102(b) on the ground that the December, 1975 composition6 and the RD-144 compositions7 were in public use or on sale more than one year [1132]*1132prior to appellants’ filing date. In addition, the examiner stated that the evidence
establishes that McLaughlin considered the December 1975 composition to have been sold to Airwick in accordance with their August 18, 1976 agreement!8] * * It appears to the examiner that the inescapable conclusion is that the “product” sold to Airwick on August 18, 1976 was RD-144 and/or the December 1975 composition. The experimental use exception argument is not persuasive. In order for this situation to be within the experimental use exception the amount of money-involved would have had to have been incidental to the experimental use. However, the August 18, 1976 letter shows that a considerable amount of money was involved and that the primary objective of CNPD was profit, not experimental evaluation of RD-144 or the December 1975 composition. [Emphasis supplied.]
The board, however, reversed the examiner’s section 102(b) rejection because (1) the December, 1975 and RD-144 compositions were not sold to anyone more than one year prior to the filing date and (2) the August 18, 1976 contract between CNPD and Air-wick did not constitute commercial exploitation per se.
Following protestor’s request and proceeding under 37 C.F.R. § 1.196(b),9 the board, however, rejected all the claims at bar under section 102(b) on the ground that compositions within the scope of the claims were in public use in this country more than one year prior to the filing date of the original application. The board stated:
We believe that the factual situation in the appeal before us is well nigh on all fours with the factual situation before the courts in Omark Industries, Inc. v. Carlton Co. et aL, 652 F.2d 783, 212 USPQ 413 (9th Cir.1980). * * * The product furnished the public in St. Louis was formulation 3 of Example III of Appellants’ patent * * *. This product meets in haec verba each of Appellants’ claims 1 through 5, 11 through 15, 23 and 28 through 30. The public thereupon employed it in the precise method of Appellants’ claims 8 through 10, 18, 19 and 25. Bearing in mind the Durrant et al!10l and Moncrieff [11] prior art the remaining claims in the application, requiring the presence of an alkyl phthalate dedusting [1133]*1133agent, are also rendered unpatentable under 35 USC 102(b) coupled with 103. Applying the tests of the leading case of In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 498 F.2d 271, 183 USPQ 65 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1057 [95 S.Ct. 640, 42 L.Ed.2d 654], 184 USPQ 65 (1974), we conclude that Appellants’ St. Louis market testing was motivated primarily by the desire for competitive exploitation, not for experimentation. See also * * * Drackett Co. v. Davis, 176 USPQ 344 (E.D.Mich., S.Div.1972). [Emphasis in original.]
In addition, the board rejected all the claims at bar under (1) 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) on the ground that compositions within the scope of the claims were not the invention of Smith and McLaughlin, and (2) 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) on the ground that compositions within the scope of the claims were the invention of McLaughlin alone who did not abandon, suppress, or conceal the invention.
Further, the board rejected claims 1, 11-13, 23 and 26 as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of prior art references. Last, the board rejected claims 11-13, 18, 23 and 25 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 251 on the ground appellants are claiming subject matter which had been cancelled in prosecuting the application for the original patent in order to obtain allowance of the claims in that patent.
Appellants’ Arguments
Appellants argue that their consumer test in St. Louis was not a public use. Rather, that test comes under the experimental use exception as enunciated by the Supreme Court in City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 24 L.Ed. 1000 (1878). To illustrate this proposition, appellants cite Johnson & Johnson v. Kendall Co., 215 F.Supp. 124, 137 USPQ 505 (N.D.Ill.1963), rev’d on other grounds, 327 F.2d 391, 140 USPQ 289 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934, 84 S.Ct. 1337, 12 L.Ed.2d 297 (1964). In that case the patentee’s advertising agency conducted a survey in which 100 housewives were asked to determine the efficacy of bandages. The court stated:
The Court is not impressed, irrespective of defendant’s failure to give notice thereof, with the contention that the 1949 consumer test was a public use. As plaintiff [patentee] states, it was a test by its advertising agency on 100 housewives, to determine the efficacy of the crinoline and paper-faced bandages. The test was done in the presence of interviewers and all bandages were used up in the course of the test, and so was a permissible test and not an invalidating public use within the meaning of the patent statute.
Id., 215 F.Supp. at 139, 137 USPQ at 516. The appellants also cite International Silver Co. v. Pomerantz, 271 F.2d 69, 123 USPQ 108 (2d Cir.1959) to buttress the Johnson & Johnson proposition. In International Silver, the patentee permitted the claimed invention of a design patent to be viewed by 100 customers during a survey. The invention remained in the possession of the inventor’s agents throughout the survey.
Appellants argue that they intended the testing activities to be an integral part of their research and development program. Their intent was not to exploit the invention and gain competitive advantage over others. They contend that the test was to obtain a fair and unbiased opinion of the product’s operation and usefulness, especially in light of the fact that two versions of the product were presented to consumers which indicated that appellants’ product was still in the experimental stage. Appellants contend that the fact that (1) the St. Louis test included only an evaluation of the fragrance level and the vacuumability of the product and (2) further formulation work continued after the test indicates that their product was still in the experimental stage. In support of their arguments, the appellants cite Poole v. Mossinghoff, 214 USPQ 506 (D.D.C.1982) for the proposition that their product was not commercially practical and therefore falls within the experimental use exception. In Poole, the inventor demonstrated a breadboard prototype to potential consumers. The demon-[1134]*1134station was conducted under confidentiality and restriction, and the prototype was set up behind partitions. That court (Mar-key, C.J., sitting by designation) stated:
There is a difference between the requirements of a reduction to practice and industry requirements for a commercially practical device. There may be an experimental use following reduction to practice as long as the experiments are, as they were here, part of an attempt to further refine the device.
Id., 214 USPQ at 510.
Moreover, appellants argue that the board’s reliance on Omark Industries, Inc. v. Carlton Co., 652 F.2d 783, 212 USPQ 413 (9th Cir.1980) was misplaced and clearly in error. In Omark, the patentee conducted two different tests regarding a brush cutting chain, one test by the engineering department and a second test by the sales department. As to the former, the chains were provided to workers at a dam site with Omark’s engineers visiting the site to determine performance characteristics. The performance of the chains was recorded and the worn-out chains were taken back to the laboratory for analysis. This activity, which took place in 1957, was not considered by the court to be a public use. The second test, which took place in 1958, was conducted by the sales department to obtain customer reaction to the chains. Sample chains were given to distributors who in turn gave them to customers. The followup was informal — generally third-hand reports from customers to the distributors who relayed the information back to the sales department. This activity was held to be a public use. The appellants in the instant case argue that their St. Louis activities differ from the activities in Omark because their test was supervised, the information derived therefrom was reported to the Airwick scientists, and the test was conducted by the market research group.
Last, appellants argue that the board’s reliance on Drackett Co. v. Davis, 176 USPQ 344 (E.D.Mich.1972) was similarly misplaced. In Drackett, an earlier inventor (i.e., not the patentee) permitted unrestricted, unmonitored use of his sponge mops by 24 consumers in a “market survey.” The inventor subsequently interviewed some of the consumers, approximately two weeks and then six months after the survey began.
We, however, disagree with appellants’ arguments.
OPINION
Since we find the section 102(b) issue to be dispositive in this case, we therefore focus our analysis on this issue and do not reach the other issues.
I
“Public use” of a claimed invention under section 102(b) has been defined as any use of that invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336, 26 L.Ed. 755 (1881). See also In re Blaisdell, 44 C.C.P.A. 846, 242 F.2d 779, 113 USPQ 289 (1957).12 Such use, however, has been held not to be a statutory bar to patentability if the use was primarily for bona fide experimental purposes. The Supreme Court stated in City of Elizabeth, supra, 97 U.S. at 134:
The use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any other person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as such a [public] use.
The experiment to improve and perfect the invention must be the real purpose in such public use and not merely incidental and subsidiary. Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 266, 8 S.Ct. 122, 130, 31 L.Ed. 141 (1887). See also Ushakoff v. United States, 164 Ct.Cl. 455, 327 F.2d 669, 140 USPQ 341 (1964).
[1135]*1135The experimental use exception, however, does not include market testing where the inventor is attempting to gauge consumer demand for his claimed invention. The purpose of such activities is commercial exploitation and not experimentation. See Smith & Davis Manufacturing Co. v. Mellon, 58 F. 705, 707 (8th Cir.1893). See also Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chemical Coatings, Inc., 235 F.Supp. 936, 143 USPQ 229 (N.D.Cal.1964), 356 F.2d 24, 148 USPQ 527, modified on other grounds, 358 F.2d 732, 149 USPQ 158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832, 87 S.Ct. 71, 17 L.Ed.2d 67 (1966).
Where, as here, the inventor made the allegedly public use, he has the burden of going forward with convincing evidence that the public use activities fall within the experimental use exception. . Smith & Griggs, supra, 123 U.S. at 264, 8 S.Ct. at 129. See also Blaisdell, supra, 242 F.2d at 784, 113 USPQ at 292-93. Cf. Strong v. General Electric Co., 434 F.2d 1042, 1043-44, 168 USPQ 8, 9 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 2207, 29 L.Ed.2d 681 (1971).
II
Although the appellants argue that their St. Louis activities were used to obtain technical data for further technical development of the claimed invention, the evidence indicates that the activities did not fall within the experimental use exception. In determining the purpose of the alleged experimental use, objective evidence indicating a purpose for such testing and experiment is generally preferred. An inventor’s subjective intent is generally of minimal value. See Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Manufacturing Co., 482 F.2d 426, 431, 178 USPQ 577, 581 (9th Cir.1973). Cf. In re Theis, 610 F.2d 786, 792, 204 USPQ 188, 193 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Objective evidence may include, inter alia, whether the inventor inspected the invention regularly, see Cataphote, supra; whether the inventor retained control over the invention, see Magnetics, Inc. v. Arnold Engineering Co., 438 F.2d 72, 168 USPQ 392 (7th Cir.1971); and whether the commercial exploitation was merely incidental to the primary purpose of experimentation, see Theis, supra.
Contrary to appellants’ contention that the St. Louis test was needed to obtain scientific data on their invention’s operation and usefulness, such data could have been easily obtained in their own facilities. The operability and other properties of the claimed invention could have been verified without the assistance of “typical housewives” (consumers). Instead, there was a more dominant purpose behind the St. Louis test, viz. to determine whether potential consumers would buy the product and how much they would pay for it — commercial exploitation. What the appellants wanted was information in order to gear their product to maximize potential sales before they would place their commercial product on the market. Appellants wished to obtain marketing data such as the purchase intent of the consumers. The St. Louis test was an experiment geared toward marketing and only incidentally toward technological improvement. See Theis, supra.
Contrary to appellants’ contention, the use of two versions of the product does not in itself indicate experimentation. It was only a test to determine which version the typical consumer would prefer. Once that determination had been made, the appellants intended to gear the product to the form most acceptable to consumers. For example, Smith commented in his August 6, 1976 memorandum that the appellants hoped the test would provide some guidance as to the product form — large or small particle size. This evidence suggests that the test was a determination as to which particle size was more marketable and not a determination as to which particle size was technically superior.
Appellants’ contention that the St. Louis test was an experiment because only the fragrance and vacuumability aspects of their invention were evaluated is inapposite. Since fragrance strength is an unclaimed element of the invention, it is [1136]*1136therefore not a part of the invention. It is settled law that the experimental use exception is not applicable to experiments performed with respect to unclaimed features of an invention. In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Kent Industries, Inc., 409 F.2d 99, 101, 161 USPQ 321, 322-23 (6th Cir.1969), the court stated:
The claims of the patent and not the specifications measure the invention * *, and here the Cumar ingredient, although beneficial, was not included in the patent claims. The further experiments after May 5,1942, were necessary to attain the added shelf-life, but the tests were for a non-patented ingredient or feature and therefore it did not prevent the statute from operating to invalidate the patent. * * * In Atlas v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 311 F.2d [156] at 160, [136 USPQ at 7,] supra, the Court stated: “[T]he rule is that an invention is deemed functional for public use purposes when it can perform the general function for which it has been developed, even though the device might later be refined.” [Citations omitted.]
See also Theis, supra, 610 F.2d at 793, 204 USPQ at 193-94; Gould Inc. v. United States, 217 Ct.Cl. 167, 579 F.2d 571, 198 USPQ 156 (1978). There is no evidence that the test was related to the claimed aspects of the invention such as the particular carrier or its particle size, the particular agglomerating agent, the volatile odorous agent broadly, the antistatic agent broadly, or the proportions of the ingredients. Appellants’ determination of consumer-acceptable fragrance strengths was a marketability experiment and not a technical experiment.
In addition, the result of the St. Louis test, as evidenced by Smith’s September 20, 1976 memorandum, indicated that there was no problem in vacuuming with either form and that the powder version was more favorably received by the consumer. Such data could have been obtained by testing in appellants’ facilities.
As to appellants’ contention that further formulation work after the St. Louis test indicates that their product was still in the experimental stage, we again disagree. Although the appellants stated that antistatic and antisoil tests were not planned until October, 1976, the record indicates that these tests were not planned with technological reasons in mind. For example, Smith had already stated in his August 6, 1976 memorandum that the powdery product should have better antistatic and antisoil properties than the granular type. Since the appellants already knew the technical efficacy of these properties, tests directed toward these properties were unnecessary. These tests were planned primarily for marketing purposes, similar to the purposes of the St. Louis tests for fragrance level and vacuumability.
Moreover, the procedures used by the appellants suggest that the test was designed primarily to determine how well the product would sell, not to isolate systematically technical problems which remained in the product. Omark, supra, 652 F.2d at 787. Appellants did not control the actual testing of the composition. For example, the testing of the composition in the instant case was not conducted in the presence of appellants. Nor were restrictions placed on the consumers as to the use of the product. See Egbert, supra. Contrary to appellants’ contention, this lack of restriction is similar to the situation in Omark where the cutting chains were used by consumers without restriction and in Drackett where the sponge mops were used without restriction. The instant case differs from the situation in Johnson & Johnson where the bandages were tested in front of patentee’s interviewers and from International Silver where inventor’s interviewers retained control over the invention at all times. Moreover, three of the 36 consumers who received the powder version were not interviewed and the product was not retrieved.
Appellants also contend that Omark is distinguishable because appellants’ testing was conducted by the market research group and not a sales department. We disagree. In either instance, the investigating entity was testing the marketability of [1137]*1137a product and not the operability or technical aspects of the product. In addition, as contrasted to the confidential evaluation of the prototype by consumers in Poole, the consumers in the instant case were not bound by any confidentiality agreement. See Egbert, supra. Moreover, the consumer interview and the subsequent evaluation in the instant case dealt with marketing aspects such as which version the consumers would purchase, the price range, etc. It was not an evaluation of the technological aspects of the product. See Omark, supra.
The totality of the evidence indicates that the St. Louis test was an experiment to determine whether consumers would buy a product.13 Such market testing does not fall within the experimental use exception. As stated in Cataphote, supra, 356 F.2d at 27, 148 USPQ at 529, citing Smith & Davis, supra:
[T]he entire course of appellant’s conduct * * * was to promote product sales, and any testing that occurred had as its primary objective an ascertainment of the product’s marketability. This activity * * * is typical of “a trader’s, and not an inventor’s, experiment,” and “such a use does not carve an exception out of the statute.” [Emphasis in original.]
Since the appellants have failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the St. Louis test falls within the experimental use exception, we hold the claims at bar are unpatentable and the decision of the board is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.