Botsford, J.
This bar discipline matter comes before the court on a reservation and report by a single justice, without decision. The respondent, Thomas M. Finneran, a former Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, pleaded guilty on [723]*723January 5, 2007, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to a charge of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000).1 The specific charge was that the respondent wilfully had made misleading and false statements under oath while testifying in his capacity as Speaker in a Federal voting rights lawsuit. A hearing panel of the Board of Bar Overseers (board) recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years and undergo a reinstatement hearing prior to reinstatement to the bar. Both the respondent and bar counsel appealed to the board from the hearing panel’s report; a majority of the board recommended that the respondent be disbarred, with one member dissenting. We accept the recommendation of the board’s majority and remand the case to the county court where a judgment of disbarment shall enter.
1. Background. The following is drawn from the findings of the hearing panel and the exhibits that were before it,2 as well as the report of the board. The respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth on December 18, 1978. That same year he was first elected to serve in the Massachusetts House of Representatives (House), representing the Mattapan section of Boston. The respondent served as the elected representative of that district — the Twelfth Suffolk District — for over twenty-six years. During his tenure, he served as chairman of the House committee on banking, chairman of the House committee on ways and means, and, beginning in 1996, he was elected five times by his fellow representatives to the position of Speaker of the House. He served in that capacity until his resignation from the House in 2005.
In 2001, the Massachusetts Legislature undertook a process [724]*724to redraw the boundaries of the electoral districts for the House and the Massachusetts Senate; these efforts culminated in the passage of St. 2001, c. 125 (2001 Redistricting Act).3 In June of 2002, an organization named the Black Political Task Force and other organizations and individuals representing or comprising African-American and Latino voters in Boston filed a civil action in the Federal District Court (voting rights lawsuit). The voting rights lawsuit named the respondent as a defendant in his official capacity as Speaker, and alleged that the 2001 Redistricting Act, as it related to House seats in Suffolk County, contravened the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and § 2 of the Federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that although in 2000 Boston’s minority population constituted over fifty per cent of the city’s total population, the 2001 Redistricting Act “eliminated two majority-minority districts, reduced the minority population in one district, and ‘super-packed’ another district so that it contains a voting age population that is [ninety-eight per cent] minority.” It was further alleged that the 2001 Redistricting Act gerrymandered and diluted minority voting strength and created a number of majority-white districts greater than justified by the percentage of white voters in the city’s voting age population.
Although the respondent was subsequently dismissed as a defendant,4 the plaintiffs sought to establish that he played a key role in developing the 2001 Redistricting Act and contributed to the redrawing of the boundaries of his own district. The respondent was deposed in the voting rights lawsuit on March 28, 2003, and voluntarily testified at trial on November 14, 2003, before a three-judge panel assigned to hear the case. See [725]*72528 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2000). In his trial testimony,5 the respondent diminished or denied the extent of his involvement in the redistricting process by claiming he had no substantive knowledge of the development of the redistricting plan. He also asserted that he had not seen a redistricting plan before the final plan was filed with the clerk of the House of Representatives (House clerk) on October 18,2001. More specifically, the respondent provided the following answers during his testimony:
Q.: “And did you review a number of the redistricting plans as the process proceeded?”
A.: “No, I did not.”
Q.: “Did you review any of the redistricting plans as the process proceeded?”
A.: “Not as the process proceeded. No, sir.”
Q.: “Okay. When was the first time you saw a redistricting plan?”
A.: “It would have been after the committee on redistricting filed its plan with the House Clerk as a member who has an interest. I would have availed myself of it and made a review of it.”
Q.: “So the first time you saw a redistricting plan was when the redistricting committee disseminated its plan to the full House; is that your testimony?”
A.: “That is my testimony. Yes, sir.”6
[726]*726The plaintiff's in the voting rights lawsuit ultimately prevailed: the three-judge panel concluded that the 2001 Redistricting Act violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting the voting power of African-American voters. See Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 316 (D. Mass. 2004). Of relevance here is a footnote in the panel’s decision that stated: “Although Speaker Finneran denied any involvement in the redistricting process, the circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the opposite conclusion.” Id. at 295 n.3.
On June 6, 2005, the respondent was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in a four-count indictment that alleged he committed three counts of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000), and one count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503; the indictment based these charges on the respondent’s responses to discovery, deposition testimony, and trial testimony in the voting rights lawsuit. On January 5, 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, the respondent pleaded guilty to the obstruction of justice charge contained in count four of the indictment.* *****7 During the plea colloquy, as the hearing panel of the board specifically noted in its report, the assistant United States attorney stated that this charge was unlike other obstruction of justice charges: the false testimony did not occur in the context of a criminal investigation or trial, it was not designed to conceal a crime committed by another individual or to conceal [727]*727the whereabouts of a fugitive, and it did not result in financial gain to the respondent.8 Following the assistant United States attorney’s remarks, the judge before whom the plea was offered noted the seriousness of the offense, particularly given the fact that the respondent was an active member of the Massachusetts bar, but he also pointed to the lack of evil motive, the absence of racial animus, the aberrant nature of the offense, the respondent’s career in public service, contributions to the community at large, and exemplary private life. Based on these considerations, the judge adopted the recommended sentence contained in the plea agreement. The respondent was placed on unsupervised probation for eighteen months, fined $25,000, and agreed not to run for local, State, or Federal office for five years.9 The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed.
Following the respondent’s conviction, on January 23, 2007, by agreement a single justice ordered the temporary suspension [728]*728of the respondent’s license to practice law. On March 13, 2007, bar counsel filed a petition for discipline against the respondent. The hearing panel of three board members conducted a hearing on the petition on December 17 and 18, 2007, and issued its report on October 21, 2008. In addition to the facts previously recited, the hearing panel found that the respondent accepted personal responsibility for the actions that led to his indictment and guilty plea, expressed genuine remorse and regret, and admitted that his failure to be forthcoming in his testimony was affected by his resentment, agitation, and anger at the accusation that he would be a party to a racially motivated redistricting scheme. The panel also recognized the respondent’s service of over twenty-six years in the Massachusetts House as well as his many charitable and community-oriented activities.10
The hearing panel concluded that the respondent’s conduct and plea of guilty to the charge of obstruction of justice violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1), 426 Mass. 1383 (1998) (lawyer shall not knowingly make false statement of material fact or law to tribunal); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (b), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (lawyer shall not engage in criminal act that reflects adversely on lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as lawyer); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentations); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (d), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to administration of justice). The panel found no aggravating factors, but found in mitigation that on the day of the respondent’s testimony in the voting rights lawsuit, his severe physical pain related to his hip, coupled with his concern for his wife’s health, diminished his ability to focus, contributed to the misleading character of the testimony, and led to his aberrant conduct.
The panel recognized that the respondent’s plea of guilty to the felony charge of obstruction of justice constituted a “conviction” of a “serious crime” within the meaning of SJ.C. Rule [729]*7294:01, § 12 (1) and (3), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1313 (1997),11 for which the presumptive sanction was disbarment or indefinite suspension. Nonetheless, the panel found that the respondent’s misconduct occurred while acting as a private citizen and not while he was engaged in the practice of law, and further that, because of the mitigating circumstances of the case and the private citizen exception, a substantial deviation from the presumptive sanction was appropriate. The panel recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years and undergo a reinstatement proceeding prior to his reinstatement to the bar.
Both parties appealed to the board. On March 9, 2009, the board issued its memorandum of decision, adopting the hearing panel’s subsidiary findings of fact and conclusions of law but modifying the hearing panel’s proposed disposition. The board recommended that the respondent be disbarred, retroactive to the effective date of his temporary suspension. It concluded: the respondent’s conviction related to a serious crime; his distinguished career was not enough to deviate from what the board described as the presumptive sanction of disbarment; the respondent’s own testimony dispelled any conclusion that he could not focus due to his hip pain or concern for his wife12; the private citizen exception did not apply; the trial in which the respondent endeavored to obstruct related to fundamental voting rights of citizens of color; and the effect on and perception of the bar and of the public required disbarment. One member of the board dis[730]*730sented, finding that the hearing panel’s recommendation of a two-year suspension with the requirement of a reinstatement hearing was more consistent with this court’s precedent and the public interest.
The board caused an information to be filed in the county court on March 20, 2009, in accordance with S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (4), as appearing in 425 Mass. 1309 (1997). The single justice thereafter reserved and reported the case to the full court.
2. Discussion. In bar disciplinary cases where a single justice has reserved and reported the case to the full court, we review the matter and “reach our own conclusion.” Matter of Wainwright, 448 Mass. 378, 384 (2007), quoting Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. 481, 487 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997). We recognize that the hearing panel is the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony presented at the hearing. S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (4). See Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 328 (1989). Regarding the board, although its findings and recommendations are not binding on the court, they are “entitled to great weight.” Matter of Fordham, supra, citing Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 461 (1975).
In the present case, there is no dispute between the parties that the respondent has been convicted of a felony and therefore a “serious crime,” and there is no dispute that his conduct violated the rules of professional conduct cited by the hearing panel and the board: Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1), 8.4 (b), (c), and (d). Their dispute concerns the appropriate sanction. The respondent argues that a term suspension constitutes appropriate discipline and is consistent with our precedent when the special mitigating circumstances present are taken into account. Bar counsel argues that disbarment is the only appropriate sanction.
We turn immediately, therefore, to the issue of sanction. Because the sanction imposed in comparable cases is a critical consideration, see, e.g., Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 85 (2009), we consider first the disposition of cases where an attorney has been convicted of a felony. We have repeatedly confirmed that “disbarment or indefinite suspension is the usual sanction imposed for a felony conviction.” Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 329 (1996), citing Matter of Knox, 412 Mass. 569 (1992). [731]*731See Matter of Driscoll, 447 Mass. 678, 688 (2006); Matter of Otis, 438 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2003); Matter of Grella, 438 Mass. 47, 52-53 (2002); Matter of Goldberg, 434 Mass. 1022, 1023 (2001); Matter of Kennedy, 428 Mass. 156, 158 (1998); Matter of Labovitz, 425 Mass. 1008, 1009 (1997); Matter of Nickerson, 422 Mass. 333, 337 (1996).
Even more specific than felony convictions, we must consider prior bar disciplinary matters where an attorney was convicted of obstruction of justice or a similar felony related to providing false testimony to the tribunal.13 In most instances, disbarment has resulted. See Matter of Labovitz, 425 Mass. at 1008-1009 (attorney disbarred after pleading guilty to thirteen felony charges involving bankruptcy fraud, diversion and concealment of as[732]*732sets, intentional fraud, and perjury); Matter of McCarthy, 18 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 380 (2002) (attorney disbarred after conviction of obstructing Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding by instructing employees in law firm to delete information from computer files and lying under oath); Matter of Cintolo, 6 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 54 (1990) (attorney disbarred after conviction of conspiracy to obstruct justice); Matter of Norton, 5 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 272 (1987) (attorney disbarred after convictions of conspiracy to defraud United States, falsely testifying before grand jury, and obstruction of justice). In only one instance has this court imposed an indefinite suspension rather than disbarment as the appropriate disciplinary sanction for an attorney convicted of obstruction of justice or a similar felony. See Matter of Colson, 1 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 64, 64, 67-69, 73 (1975) (attorney, who was special counsel to President of United States, indefinitely suspended after pleading guilty to one count of obstruction of justice; single justice recognized attorney’s unusual relationship with President and sincere belief that actions were in interests of national security). Imposing disbarment on an attorney convicted of obstructing justice or providing false testimony is in accordance with the American Bar Association’s standards for imposing lawyer sanctions. See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 5.11(a) (1992) (disbarment appropriate sanction for lawyer who engages in criminal conduct involving intentional interference with administration of justice). See also id. at § 6.11 (disbarment is generally appropriate where lawyer, with intent to deceive court, makes false statement, submits false document, or improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to party or has adverse effect on legal proceeding).14
These precedents point to disbarment or, to a lesser degree, [733]*733indefinite suspension as the appropriate level of discipline in this case. However, we have recognized the importance of the “factual nuances” in each case, Matter of Shaw, 427 Mass. 764, 768 (1998), and we do not impose a particular level of discipline without considering each bar disciplinary matter on its own merits. Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. at 85-86, quoting Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 837 (1984).
The respondent urges the court to weigh several mitigating factors that he believes are present in his case and together require a significant downward departure from the usual and presumptive sanction to a term suspension. In this regard, he argues that his conviction of obstruction of justice did not occur in the practice of law, and this fact alone distinguishes his case from most all of the cases in which this court has ordered a sanction of disbarment or indefinite suspension for obstruction of justice or providing false testimony.15 He points out that the court has expressly stated that misconduct “directly related to the practice of law” is generally treated more harshly than misconduct taking place in another setting, see Matter of Barrett, 447 Mass. 453, 465 (2006); Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. at 331, and that “disbarment — or in some instances, indefinite suspension — is the usual and presumptive sanction for a lawyer who has committed a felony while in the course of practicing law” (emphasis added). Matter of Driscoll, 447 Mass. 678, 688 (2006). The respondent claims that because he was not represent[734]*734ing a client at the time he provided the false or misleading testimony and, further, because his testimony was unrelated to his practice of law, he should not be sanctioned as severely as a respondent who acted as a lawyer.
We disagree. We have generally concluded that crimes (and sometimes unprosecuted acts of misconduct) involving interference with the administration of justice generally do not qualify for a lesser sanction on the ground that the lawyer was not representing a client or directly engaged in the practice of law at the relevant time. Thus, in Matter of Labovitz, 425 Mass. at 1008, the respondent urged that his ethical violations — felony convictions of bankruptcy fraud, intentional fraud, and perjury — occurred while conducting personal business and not in the practice of law. The court found that the exception could not apply to a situation where “an attorney has knowingly and repeatedly, with the intent to deceive, misrepresented facts to a tribunal.” Id. at 1008 n.1. In Matter of Otis, 438 Mass. 1016 (2003), where the respondent had been convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, we refused to impose a lesser sanction than disbarment even though her misconduct did not involve clients or the practice of law. Id. at 1017 n.3. The fact that the respondent’s conviction involved “fraud in connection with judicial proceedings” was enough to bar application of the exception. Id. See Matter of Hyatt, 23 Mass. Att’y Discipline Rep. 309, 311 (2007) (private citizen exception not applicable to respondent convicted of multiple crimes because his misconduct affected due “administration of justice”).16 [735]*735Because the respondent was testifying under oath in a judicial proceeding in his official capacity as a member of the House, his conviction of obstruction of justice places his case squarely within this group of cases. No exception from the presumptive sanction applies to him based on the fact that the crime did not involve the practice of law.17
The respondent further points to the unique aspects of his obstruction of justice charge and mitigating factors highlighted by the assistant United States attorney and the judge during the respondent’s plea hearing as reasons that compel a term suspension rather than disbarment or indefinite suspension.18 The hearing panel emphasized these factors in determining that a substantial downward departure from the presumptive sanction was appropriate in this case. We accept and recognize the respondent’s long and distinguished career of public service and his many pro bona services that have focused on the community he represented in the House, and we further accept that the respondent’s conduct was not animated by evil motive or racial animus. But these considerations, while clearly relevant to the question of criminal sentencing, do not generally qualify as the types of special mitigating circumstances, Matter of Driscoll, 447 Mass. at 688, that we have pointed to as reasons for not applying a presumptive level of disciplinary sanction. Rather, our bar discipline cases have recognized most of these considerations as “ ‘typical’ mitigating circumstances,” Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 157 (1983), that, while relevant, do not affect the presumptive sanction. See generally Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 327 (1989) (typical mitigating evidence generally not given substantial weight).19 The considerations involved [736]*736in this case that our prior cases have not directly addressed — mainly, the absence of an evil motive or racial animus and evidence of an exemplary private life — do not, in our view, rise to the level of special mitigating factors.20 The respondent’s absence of evil motive or racial animus is not dissimilar to the lack of dishonesty listed in Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 157 (1983), as a typical mitigating factor. While we acknowledge that if the circumstances were reversed and the respondent had acted on the basis of an evil or racist motive, it would constitute a matter in aggravation, we cannot say that their absence represents a special factor in the respondent’s favor. And the respondent’s exemplary private life is comparable to his distinguished career or devotion to his constituents: each is highly admirable, but not so extraordinary that it should mitigate the presumptive sanction for a lawyer who is convicted of obstruction of justice.
We also recognize that the obstruction of justice at issue here was one that arose in connection with a civil rather than a criminal case, that the respondent was not seeking to cover up a crime that he or another person had committed, and that there was no financial gain or motive underlying his criminal conduct. Admittedly, these circumstances distinguish the respondent’s conviction from other, more typical convictions under the same Federal statute. On the other hand, even the respondent does not challenge that his conduct constituted a “serious crime” as [737]*737defined by this court’s rules. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12 (3). More to the point, as this court recently emphasized, “we cannot condone the actions of an attorney in giving false testimony under oath, irrespective of the circumstances” (emphasis added). Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. at 89. The crime of which the respondent stands convicted required proof that he had the specific intent to mislead the court and thereby interfere with the administration of justice. That the circumstances of the respondent’s crime suggest it was not as egregious as in other cases does not diminish the significance of the felony the respondent did commit.
Thus, we find no persuasive reason not to impose the presumptive sanction of disbarment or indefinite suspension.21 The final task, therefore, is to decide which of these two alternatives provides the most appropriate disposition.22 To make this determination, we turn to the primary factor for consideration in all bar discipline cases, “the effect upon, and perception of, the public and the bar.”23 Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 829 (1994), quoting Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. at 156. See Matter [738]*738of Barrett, 447 Mass. at 463; Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. 359, 367 (1999); Matter of Doyle, 429 Mass. 1013, 1014 (1999); Matter of Nickerson, 422 Mass. 333, 337 (1996). The hearing panel credited the testimony of the respondent’s several character witnesses, who stated in effect that the respondent’s criminal conduct was aberrant and out of character, the respondent was remorseful, he had been sanctioned or punished enough by virtue of his conviction and his suspension from the practice of law, and a relatively short-term suspension would not have an adverse impact on public perception of the bar. The dissenting member of the board agreed with this analysis of impact on public perception.24 The board did not. In the board’s view, a departure from what it saw as the “usual sanction of disbarment” in a case where the respondent had “lied about his own actions as a public official in federal court[] and which endeavored to obstruct a meritorious action to vindicate the voting rights of people of color” would likely be outrage.
The respondent’s misconduct implicates both the integrity of the judicial system and the honesty of a member of the bar.25 We have no reason to disagree with the finding that the respondent’s [739]*739conduct during the voting rights lawsuit represented an aberrant event in his long career of serving his constituency and the public with loyalty and distinction. But the respondent was convicted of a serious crime involving false testimony to a court under oath in a significant case about fundamental rights. We share the board’s view, which is “entitled to substantial deference,” Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 81, 88 (1994), that the public perception of the bar would be gravely damaged if this court were to impose a sanction less than the generally applicable one of disbarment.
3. Conclusion. This case is remanded to the single justice for entry of an order disbarring the respondent from the practice of law. The disbarment shall be effective retroactive to January 23, 2007, the date of the respondent’s temporary suspension.
So ordered.