In Re County of Orange

183 B.R. 594, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 721, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 321, 1995 WL 319205
United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California·Decided May 22, 1995·No. Bankruptcy SA 94-22272 JR, SA 94-22273 JR·Published·Cited by 16 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN E. RYAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Under California state law, certain government entities may choose to deposit, or are required to deposit, their excess funds into the county treasury. The county treasurer may then invest these funds in a variety of securities. Acting pursuant to these statutes, the Orange County Treasurer, Robert L. Citron (the “Treasurer”), combined the funds he received from various participating entities into a commingled investment pool, a commingled bond investment pool, and a specific investment account (collectively, the “OCIP”). By December 1994, 190 municipal entities had invested approximately $7.6 billion in the OCIP.

The Treasurer’s investment strategy for the OCIP was risky, volatile and lacked liquidity. It revolved around the Treasurer’s bet that interest rates would not rise in 1994. This proved incorrect and on December 6, 1994, Orange County (the “County”) and the OCIP filed separate chapter 9 petitions in bankruptcy.

Later, three OCIP participants, Yorba Linda Water District (“Yorba Linda”), Special District Risk Management Authority (“SDRMA”), and Huntington Beach (“Huntington Beach”) and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (“Merrill Lynch”) (collectively, the “Mov-ants”) filed motions to dismiss the OCIP case (the “Motions”). Movants contend that the *597 OCIP ease should be dismissed because the OCIP has not satisfied the jurisdictional requirements for a chapter 9 debtor.

After a hearing on March 28, 1995, I took the dismissal question under submission.

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over this bankruptcy case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1995) (the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all eases under Title 11), 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1995) (authorizing the district courts to refer all Title 11 cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy judges for the district) and General Order No. 266, dated October 9, 1984 (referring all Title 11 cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy judges for the Central District of California). This matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (0) (1995).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Treasurer is a separately elected officer of the County. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 24000(f) and 24009. He is responsible for receiving and safekeeping all monies belonging to the County and all other funds directed by law to be paid to the Treasurer. Cal. Gov’t Code § 27000.

California state law requires that all excess funds of certain governmental entities be held by the Treasurer. E.g., Cal.Educ.Code § 41001 (all monies received by school districts); Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 6320 (all monies received by law libraries). Other public entities, such as cities and special districts, may also deposit their excess funds into the County treasury if authorized by their governing boards. E.g., Cal.Gov’t Code § 6505.5 (funds of entities created by joint powers authorities); Cal.Pub.Util.Code § 40096 (funds of the Orange County Transit District). These deposits may then be accepted by the Treasurer for investment. 1 Once these funds are deposited into the County treasury, the Treasurer may invest 2 in a variety of securities, including U.S. Treasury Notes, bonds and reverse repurchase agreements (“reverse repos”). Cal.Gov’t Code §§ 53601 and 53635. On February 2, 1988, the County Board of Supervisors (the “Board”) adopted Resolution No. 88-134 which authorized local agencies to deposit their excess funds in the County treasury (the “Resolution”). By December 1994, 190 municipal entities had invested approximately $7.6 billion in the OCIP. California Bureau of State Audits, Report on Orange County Treasurer’s Investment Strategy, at 3 (March 1995).

The Treasurer combined the funds he received from these entities into the OCIP. 3 Id. at 2. This pooling arrangement allowed for the purchase of large denominations of securities that provided higher yields than those available to smaller investors. Id.

The Treasurer’s investment strategy for the OCIP “was risky, volatile and lacked liquidity.” Id. at 9. This strategy involved leveraging or borrowing billions of dollars against the OCIP to obtain cash for invest *598 ments, 4 thereby dramatically increasing the OCIP’s risk to interest rate changes. Id. at 13. For example, as of November 30, 1994, the County’s leveraging strategy magnified the impact of an interest rate change on the base portfolio 2.7 times. Id.

Using the funds obtained through leveraging, the Treasurer often purchased derivatives known as inverse floaters. 5 Id. at 19. Inverse floaters are highly sensitive to changes in interest rates. The OCIP held at least $6.6 billion of these derivatives (32% of the total portfolio). Id. By investing heavily in inverse floaters, the Treasurer bet that interest rates would remain low or fall. Id.

The Treasurer’s strategy was also risky because he purchased long-term securities with short-term borrowings. Id. at 20. This strategy forced the OCIP to continually borrow at current short-term rates until the long-term security matured. 6 Id. at 21. Thus, as short-term rates rose, the spread decreased and eventually disappeared. Id. at 22.

The practice of borrowing short and buying long further exposed the OCIP to an increased risk of collateral calls. Id. at 22. “When a broker lends money under a reverse repo, the broker requires collateral in excess of the amount lent to protect its interest.” Id. If the market value of the collateral declines, the broker can send a collateral call to the borrower requiring additional assets to secure the borrower’s interest. Id. Collateral calls adversely affect a securities portfolio by draining cash, requiring the deposit of additional collateral or forcing the premature liquidation of the collateral. Id.

As stated, the Treasurer’s investment strategy revolved around his prediction that interest rates would not rise. Id. at 3. By early 1994, however, interest rates began rising sharply. As interest rates rose, the value of the collateral pledged to secure the OCIP’s reverse repos dropped. Id. This created two problems.

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In Re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 721, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 321, 1995 WL 319205 (Cal. 1995).

183 B.R. 594 (In Re County of Orange) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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