City of San Bernardino, California

499 B.R. 776, 70 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 629, 2013 WL 5645560, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4327, 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 163
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California
DecidedOctober 16, 2013
DocketNo. RS 6:12-bk-28006 MJ
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 499 B.R. 776 (City of San Bernardino, California) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of San Bernardino, California, 499 B.R. 776, 70 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 629, 2013 WL 5645560, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4327, 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 163 (Cal. 2013).

Opinion

OPINION

MERIDETH A. JURY, Bankruptcy Judge.

CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO ELIGIBILITY OPINION

A major creditor of the City of San Bernardino, the California Public Employee Retirement System, objected to the eligibility of the City to file a petition under chapter 91 of the Bankruptcy Code on the grounds that it did not desire to effect a plan of adjustment and did not file the petition in good faith. The Court recognizes that the City was not a poster child in organization and prepetition planning before it entered into the complex world of chapter 9 reorganization. The Court also acknowledges that the City got off to a slow start in getting its financial records in order and adopting an interim balanced budget to bridge the gap from the petition date to eventual plan of adjustment. However, despite the untidy disarray of the City’s finances and the early lack of direction toward long-term resolution of its admitted financial distress, in this summary judgment proceeding, the Court overrules the CalPERS objections on their limited stated grounds and finds the City eligible to remain in its chapter 9 proceeding. The factual and legal basis for the Court’s decision follows.2

Factual Background

The Great Recession and the burst of the housing bubble in 2007 negatively affected the City of San Bernardino like many other cities in California and the entire country. The drop in housing prices and increase in foreclosures of single family residences resulted in significantly lower property tax revenues, a prime source of revenue for California cities. The City was particularly hard hit by these phenomena because, due to the cheaper housing and available financing, an influx of people moved to the Inland Empire during the boom, and the consequent bust led to unprecedented foreclosures, one of the highest rates in the country. Along with the foreclosures came substantial unemployment, as much of the population had been employed in the housing industry, from construction workers to real estate realtors to mortgage brokers, resulting in a significant drop in household income.3 This decline led to less consumer sales and consequently smaller sales tax [779]*779revenues, another major component of the City’s revenues.

The City was impacted not only on the revenue side but also by escalating expenses. The influx of population created a greater demand for public services, from public safety (police and fire) to more mundane matters such as street repair and infrastructure maintenance.4 City employee salaries and benefits, as in most municipalities, make up 75% of the City’s budget and, as the need for services grew in the boom, so did the number of City employees and consequent expenses. Adding to the costs were particularly lucrative retirement benefits which the Common Council had negotiated in the collective bargaining agreements with the City’s seven unions.

The City participates in the California Public Employee Retirement System (Cal-PERS), a state-run retirement system, which is funded by a combination of an employer share and an employee share.5 Until 2011, the City, unlike most California cities, paid not only the employer share but also the employee share to CalPERS, making the City’s contributions to retirement rate as a percentage of payroll 39% for safety and 25% for other employees. Along with the current CalPERS obligations were substantial unfunded liabilities to the pension funds based on actuarial tables, past performance of the funds, retirement age and other contractual factors. Each year the City must also pay a portion of the unfunded liabilities to Cal-PERS.6

Along with the CalPERS obligations, the City has promised its retirees an annual 2% cost of living adjustment regardless of the Consumer Price Index or the state of the retirement funds. In addition, the City’s retirement plans also provide for another post-employment benefit consisting of retiree medical care. Because the City’s employees are eligible to retire at either age 50 (safety) or 55 (other employees), many employees retire before they are eligible for Medicare, creating a significant cost for the City. The cost of this perk has not been funded through the working life of the employees and the City has little money set aside to fund these benefits, resulting in another substantial unfunded liability.

As the economy worsened and revenues decreased, the City took some stop gap measures to try to stop the bleeding. It implemented a hiring freeze and downsized departments, reducing the workforce by 20%. It negotiated and imposed concessions on its unions, saving about $10 million per year.7 It exhausted its general fund reserves and sold excess assets to provide cash to fund ongoing operations. While the financial crisis deepened, the City’s finance department, either because it was understaffed or because it was incompetent (or both), fell behind in providing basic accounting records for the City, including bank reconciliations. The financial picture for the City was blurred at best and the City was sliding toward severe cash flow problems.

A major change in City personnel from late December 2011 through May 2012 awakened the Common Council to the full [780]*780import of the impending financial crisis. The City’s former Director of Finance retired at the end of December 2011 and the City Manager resigned effective May 1, 2012. The new Director of Finance, James P. Simpson, began analyzing the City’s financial condition in May 2012, while attempting to formulate a budget for 2012-13. In doing so, he discovered the bookkeeping woes described above and even worse. He determined that the budget projection for 2012-13 resulted in a $45.9 million cash deficit with no general fund reserves; the cash balances for the prior two fiscal years had been overstated; the beginning cash deficit for the next fiscal year was over $18.2 million; and the City did not have enough unrestricted cash or reserves to pay its current financial obligations due and those obligations to become due beginning in July 2012, and continuing indefinitely.

On July 9, 2012, the City’s Department of Finance issued a report “San Bernardi-no Budgetary Analysis and Recommendations for Budget Stabilization” (the Budget Report) which was presented to the Common Council at a publicly noticed meeting on July 10, 2012. The presentation of the Budget Report on July 10, 2012, was the first comprehensive report to the Common Council regarding the fiscal crisis facing the City.8 The Common Council addressed the Budget Report at three meetings in July 2012. At meetings on July 16 and 18, 2012, the Common Council adopted Resolutions 2012-205 and 2012-206 which (1) declared a fiscal emergency and (2) authorized the City Attorney to file a chapter 9 petition in the bankruptcy court and the City Attorney and other management staff to take all steps necessary to prosecute the chapter 9 proceeding. Compliant with these resolutions, on August 1, 2012, the City filed its petition for chapter 9 in the Central District of California, Riverside Division.9

Procedural Background in Chapter 9

The City filed its Statement of Qualifications on August 13, 2013, and its Amended Statement of Qualifications on August 31, 2013.10

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499 B.R. 776, 70 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 629, 2013 WL 5645560, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4327, 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 163, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-san-bernardino-california-cacb-2013.