In Re Arthur Carol Sanford, Debtor. United States of America v. Arthur Carol Sanford

979 F.2d 1511, 28 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 360, 71 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 405, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33706, 1992 WL 361473
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedDecember 29, 1992
Docket91-5870
StatusPublished
Cited by52 cases

This text of 979 F.2d 1511 (In Re Arthur Carol Sanford, Debtor. United States of America v. Arthur Carol Sanford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Arthur Carol Sanford, Debtor. United States of America v. Arthur Carol Sanford, 979 F.2d 1511, 28 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 360, 71 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 405, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33706, 1992 WL 361473 (11th Cir. 1992).

Opinions

FAY, Circuit Judge:

The government appeals the United States District Court’s order affirming the judgment of the bankruptcy court, which reduced Debtor’s tax. penalty liabilities by two-thirds without publishing relevant factual findings. These tax penalties were imposed pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1), 6651(a)(2), and 6654(a). We hold that the penalties imposed under these sections must be waived or imposed in their entire- ■ ties, according to whether Debtor makes the factual showing statutorily required for waiver of the penalties. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand this ease to the district court with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for findings regarding whether the debtor, Arthur Carol Sanford, has proven facts which entitle him to a waiver of the penalties imposed pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1), 6651(a)(2), and 6654(a).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Debtor is an eighty-six year old man who retired from his business in 1980. After retirement, he relied upon his then-wife and her accountant to handle his personal busi[1512]*1512ness affairs, including the preparation and filing of federal income tax returns. Debt- or developed serious health problems during 1983, and his wife, thirty-nine years his junior, filed for divorce in May, 1984. After the divorce, Debtor’s problems worsened. A receiver took control of his assets, and in 1989 his creditors filed an involuntary petition against him under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Shortly thereafter, the case was converted to Chapter 11.

When the bankruptcy petition was filed, Debtor had not filed federal income tax returns for the 1983 through 1988 tax years. During the bankruptcy proceedings, however, Debtor filed returns for the years 1986 through 1988. In the bankruptcy proceedings, the Internal Revenue Service asserted an unsecured priority claim under Bankruptcy Code § 507(a)(7) for taxes, interest and penalties for Debtor's tax years 1983 through 1988. Following the statutory formulas set forth in I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1) 1, 6651(a)(2)2, and 6654(a)3, the IRS calculated the amount of tax penalty attributable to each of the tax years 1983 through 1988. The specific penalties asserted in the IRS’s amended proof of claim are set forth in the margin.4

Debtor did not dispute the amount of tax liability or the computational accuracy of the penalties asserted in the amended proof of claim. However, Debtor urged the bankruptcy court to “reduce or eliminate” the penalties because Debtor had shown “good cause” for failing to file returns or pay tax for the years 1983 through 1988. The bankruptcy court’s order allowed the IRS’s claim for tax liabilities of $417,853.26 for the years 1983 through 1988. However, the bankruptcy judge reduced the claim for tax penalties by approximately two-thirds, to $36,796.18. Further, the bankruptcy judge ordered the reduction “to be prorated among the penalties asserted under Sections 6654, 6651(a)(1), and 6651(a)(2).”

On appeal to the United States District Court, the government argued that the [1513]*1513bankruptcy court must either allow or disallow the entire statutory penalty amount, not merely reduce the amount of penalty imposed by statute. However, the district judge affirmed the bankruptcy court's order, holding that the bankruptcy court’s equitable powers enable it to partially disallow the IRS’s claim for tax penalties. Further, the district judge opined that, if the penalties must be imposed or excused, in their entirety, the facts of this case justified excusing the entire amount of tax penalty. The government now appeals this order of the district court.

DISCUSSION

Bankruptcy Code § 502 governs the allowance of claims in bankruptcy. Section 502(b)(1) provides that a claim shall not be allowed in bankruptcy if it “is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor under any agreement or applicable law....” 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1988). In other words, a claim against the bankruptcy estate will not be allowed in a bankruptcy proceeding if the same claim would not be enforceable against the debtor outside of bankruptcy. Outside bankruptcy, the enforceability of the tax penalties in this case is governed by I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1), 6651(a)(2), and 6654. In determining whether to allow the IRS’s claim for tax penalties against the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy judge therefore was obliged to determine whether those penalties would be enforceable against Debtor outside of bankruptcy, according to §§ 6651(a)(1), 6651(a)(2), and 6654.

Sections 6651(a)(1) and 6651(a)(2)

Section 6651(a)(1) imposes a penalty, or “addition to tax,” for failure to file a required tax return on the required date. The amount of this penalty is determined by a' formula set forth in § 6651(a)(1).5 This penalty “shall be added” to the tax owed for the year, (‘unless it is shown that [the failure to file] is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect.” I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (1988). Similarly, § 6651(a)(2) imposes a, penalty for failure to pay, by the required date, the tax liability shown on the taxpayer’s return.- The amount of this penalty also is determined by a statutory formula.6 Further, this penalty also “shall be added” to the tax owed for the year, “unless it is shown that [the failure to pay] is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect.” I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) (1988). In the bankruptcy proceedings, the IRS asserted penalties under both of these provisions for each of the tax years 1983 through 1988.

Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury Regulations allow the partial waiver of a § 6651(a)(1) or § 6651(a)(2) penalty for a single tax year. Rather, each penalty for each tax year is fully enforceable against the taxpayer “unless” the taxpayer had reasonable cause not to comply with the Code’s requirements that year. Depending on the factual determination of reasonable cause, the penalty for each year will be either fully enforceable or fully unenforceable. The statutory term “unless” does not authorize the partial waiver-of a § 6651(a)(1) or § 6651(a)(2) penalty. On the contrary, both statutes command that the penalties for each year be imposed in full, “unless” the taxpayer shows reasonable cause, in which case the penalties for that year will be excused in full.

Because the clear language of §§ 6651(a)(1) and 6651(a)(2) forbids the partial waiver of these penalties, the bankruptcy court may not use its equitable powers7 to reduce the amount of the penalties by partially disallowing them. , Reducing the amount of these penalties would supplant Congress’ determination of the proper amount of penalty, as set forth in the statutory formulas of §§ 6651(a)(1) and 6651(a)(2). Moreover, reducing, or partially disallowing, the penalties would undermine [1514]*1514§ 502(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for allowance of claims according to the applicable substantive legal standards. The bankruptcy court may not use its equitable power against the dictate of § 502, or any other section of the Bankruptcy Code. On the contrary, this equitable power “must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." In re Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v.

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979 F.2d 1511, 28 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 360, 71 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 405, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33706, 1992 WL 361473, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-arthur-carol-sanford-debtor-united-states-of-america-v-arthur-ca11-1992.