In Re Arnold

162 B.R. 775, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 2130, 1993 WL 535711
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedDecember 21, 1993
Docket19-40186
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 162 B.R. 775 (In Re Arnold) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Arnold, 162 B.R. 775, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 2130, 1993 WL 535711 (Mich. 1993).

Opinion

OPINION RE: APPLICATION OP SHERMETA, CHIMKO & KILPA-TRICK FOR COMPENSATION FOR LEGAL SERVICES RENDERED TO CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE

ARTHUR J. SPECTOR, Bankruptcy Judge.

Shermeta, Chimko & Kilpatrick filed an application requesting allowance of $13,-105.50 for compensation for legal services rendered to the chapter 7 trustee between August 31, 1989 and October 31, 1992. In considering the appropriate level of compensation for the applicant’s services, I must utilize the “lodestar method” endorsed by the Sixth Circuit in In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir.1991). This method entails “multiplying the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.” Id. (quoting Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co., 908 F.2d 874, 879 (11th Cir.1990)). Before launching this inquiry, however, a few preliminary observations are in order.

Determination of the “reasonable” hourly rate for an applicant’s legal services is essentially an evidentiary matter, wherein the court attempts to approximate the market rate for an attorney with the applicant’s skills, training and experience. In re The Vogue, 92 B.R. 717, 720-21 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1988). Reference to these factors is appropriate because the market generally assigns a greater value to services rendered by “proven” lawyers than to lawyers with less impressive credentials. At least one reason why the market behaves in this fashion is that the public perceives a positive correlation between a lawyer’s qualifications and the quality of services that will be provided. In essence, an attorney’s background serves as a means by which the client can predict the degree of competency that he or she is purchasing.

But like most prognostic methods, reference to an attorney’s qualifications and experience is an imperfect tool. A prestigious law firm, such as this one, may thoroughly botch a law suit, while a fledgling may prove to be highly creative and resourceful in the way that she handles her first-ever trial. Thus the determination of the market rate for a particular applicant’s services should not necessarily end a court’s analysis. If the applicant’s performance is substantially better or worse than predicted by the market based on the applicant’s track record, then an upward or downward adjustment in the hourly rate may be appropriate. See Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 920 (1st Cir.1980) (The lodestar fee may be “adjusted upward or downward to reflect ... quality of representation (i.e., an unusually good or poor performance above or below the skill already reflected in the hourly rate).”); Cf. Boddy, 950 F.2d at 338 (“[T]he lodestar presumably subsumes all of these factors[ 1 ] in its analysis *778 of the reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable hours worked.”).

The other variable to be determined under the lodestar method is the number of hours reasonably expended by the applicant. The number of factors potentially relevant to this determination probably borders on the infinite. See Faison v. City of New York, No. 79 Civ. 3175, 1994 WL 28625 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1983) (available on LEXIS) (“The fair assessment of attorney’s fees requires freedom to make adjustment for an infinite variety of factors which cannot be definitively listed in advance.”).

Stated simply, however, the court must determine whether the hours invested by the applicant in a particular task are justifiable given the probable benefit to the applicant’s client. In re MCorp. Financial, Inc., 160 B.R. 941, 951 (S.D.Tex.1993) (the value of litigation “is the expected outcome[ ] ... multiplied by the likelihood of [that] outcome [ ] less time-adjusted expenses and less the opportunity costs in the meantime.”), see also id. at 958. “If it appears that litigation would cost more than the expected return, there is a duty not to commence the litigation.” In re Great Sweats, Inc., 113 B.R. 240, 242 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1990); Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 924 F.2d 955, 958-59 (5th Cir.1991) (among other things an attorney is “obligated to consider” before litigating is: “Is the burden of the probable cost of legal services disproportionately large in relation to the size of the estate and maximum probable recovery?”). See, e.g., Great Sweats, supra (poor judgment to incur $2,218.75 in fees on a $2,000 preference); In re Mayes, 101 B.R. 494, 498 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1988) (poor judgment to spend 10.4 hours deciding whether to seek to recover a $1,924.38 preference); In re WHET, Inc., 62 B.R. 770, 777-78 (Bankr.D.Mass.1986) (poor judgment to spend $9,568 in fees to collect $3,413.75 in accounts receivable). In weighing these considerations, the court should resist the temptation to engage in “20/20 hindsight,” and focus instead on facts known (or which should have been known) to the applicant at critical points during the pendency of the case. See Wool-ridge v. Marlene Industries, 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir.1990) (“[T]he standard is whether a reasonable attorney would have believed the work to be reasonably expended in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was performed.”).

Utilizing these guidelines, I will now determine the appropriate compensation for the applicant. In compliance with L.B.R. 3.03 (E.D.M.), governing the content of fee applications, the applicant described in general terms five different adversary proceedings it instigated on behalf of the trustee. Contrary to subsection (a)(5)(E) of that rule, however, the application does not “describe the results obtained” by the applicant in these lawsuits. A review of these five adversary proceedings gives some insight into why this information was not freely offered by the applicant.

A.P. No. 89-1166

Bleau v. Gerald Arnold

By my estimate, 2 the applicant claims to have expended 39.6 hours pursuing the trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s discharge. The trustee has the duty to object to a debtor’s discharge “if advisable.” 11 U.S.C. § 704(6). Because denial of a discharge is so serious a matter, a trustee ought not lightly bring an action under § 727(a). Cf. In re Weber, 99 B.R. 1001, 1017 (Bankr.D.Utah 1989) (describing denial of discharge as a “drastic remedy”); In re Johnson, 98 B.R. 359, 366 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1988) (calling denial of discharge a “drastic ... punishment”). Therefore, counsel for a trustee is justified in devoting substantial effort in investigating the facts and researching the law before and after filing a suit to deny discharge. Especially since the action here was tried to conclusion, I find that all of the time expended was reasonably necessary for the adversary proceeding.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
162 B.R. 775, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 2130, 1993 WL 535711, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-arnold-mieb-1993.