Huntington v. Samaritan Hospital

680 P.2d 58, 101 Wash. 2d 466

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Decided: April 19, 1984
• Docket: 49862-8
• Status: Published

Opinions

Stafford, J.

Petitioner Daniel Huntington, acting as personal representative of the children of Jack Bright, brought this wrongful death action against respondents Samaritan Hospital, Dr. V. W. Klobucher, and Doctors' Clinic, Inc. The trial court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, ruling the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Division Three of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Huntington v. Samaritan Hosp., 35 Wn. App. 357, 666 P.2d 405 (1983). We likewise affirm and hold that in a wrongful death action, the statute of limitations is not tolled during the minority of the statutory beneficiaries.

On September 28, 1976, Jack Bright was taken to Samaritan Hospital by his ex-wife, Janice, and three friends. He had attempted suicide. Mr. Bright was given medication and, approximately IV2 hours later, he was released into the custody of his companions. They took Mr. Bright to his apartment, where they planned to remain with him. Unfortunately, when he was left alone for a brief period of time, Mr. Bright committed suicide. His survivors include four dependent minor children.

On January 7, 1977, Janice Bright was appointed personal representative of Jack Bright's estate. She filed a survival action against a person involved in an automobile accident with Mr. Bright in 1975. The survival action was settled. On January 4, 1979, Janice Bright filed her final report and petition for distribution.

On November 17, 1980, Daniel Huntington filed this wrongful death action, acting as personal representative of Jack Bright's four children. Mr. Huntington alleged respondents were negligent in their treatment of Jack Bright.

The trial court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, holding the statute of limitations is not tolled during the minority of the statutory beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals, Division Three, affirmed. We granted discretionary review and affirm.

As the Court of Appeals correctly found, Mr. Huntington has no authority to bring this. action because he has not been appointed personal representative of Mr. Bright's estate pursuant to RCW 11.28.120. Nevertheless, because proper appointment of a personal representative could be obtained, we address the statute of limitations issue in the interest of judicial economy.

The wrongful death statute, RCW 4.20.010, provides: "When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another his personal representative may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death ..." "Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, child or children of the person whose death shall have been so caused." (Italics ours.) RCW 4.20.020.

In general, a wrongful death action must be commenced within 3 years of the date of death. RCW 4.16.080; Dodson v. Continental Can Co., 159 Wash. 589, 294 P. 265 (1930). Petitioner argues that RCW 4.16.350, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions, should apply to the instant suit. We need not decide which statute is applicable, however, as under either statute the action is barred unless the limitation period is tolled by the minority of the statutory beneficiaries.

The tolling statute, RCW 4.16.190, provides, in relevant part:

If a person entitled to bring an action ... be at the time the cause of action accrued . . . under the age of eighteen . . . the time of such disability shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of action.

(Italics ours.) Petitioner argues that although the personal representative is the only person who statutorily can bring a wrongful death action, the children are the real parties in interest and accordingly, the statute of limitations should be tolled during their minority. We do not agree.

Prior to 1917, a wrongful death action could be brought by the decedent's "heirs or personal representatives." Rem. 1915 Code § 183. In 1917, the Legislature amended the statute to its present form, providing that a wrongful death action may be maintained only by the decedent's personal representative. Laws of 1917, ch. 123, § 1, p. 495. Since the amendment of the wrongful death statute, we have uniformly held only the personal representative may bring a wrongful death action. Wood v. Dunlop, 83 Wn.2d 719, 723-24, 521 P.2d 1177 (1974); Gray v. Goodson, 61 Wn.2d 319, 378 P.2d 413 (1963); Maciejczak v. Bartell, 187 Wash. 113, 60 P.2d 31 (1936). The tolling statute, RCW 4.16.190, thus becomes operative only if the personal representative, the "person entitled to bring an action", is disabled. Consequently, the statute of limitations is not tolled by the minority of the statutory beneficiaries.

Our holding is in accord with the rule in several jurisdictions with wrongful death statutes similar to our own in that only the personal representative can bring the action.¹ E.g., Beverage v. Harvey, 602 F.2d 657 (4th Cir. 1979) (Virginia law); DeLoach v. Emergency Med. Group, 155 Ga. App. 866, 274 S.E.2d 38 (1980); Group Health Ass'n v. Gatlin, 463 A.2d 700 (D.C. 1983); see generally Annot., Minority of Surviving Children as Tolling Limitation Period in State Wrongful Death Action, 85 A.L.R.3d 162 (1978). While a few jurisdictions have reached a contrary result on public policy grounds, e.g., Haakanson v. Wake-field Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1979), such a result can be reached in the instant case only by rewriting a clear statute. Wrongful death actions are strictly statutory. Wood v. Dunlop, supra at 723. The formulation of a new policy with regard to this statutory cause of action is the responsibility of the Legislature, not a task for this court.

The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Dimmick, and Pearson, JJ., concur.

1 Courts in some jurisdictions have held the statute of limitations is tolled by the minority of the statutory beneficiaries. These cases are distinguishable because under the wrongful death statutes of these jurisdictions, the beneficiaries may bring the action. E.g., Cox v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 665 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1982) (Idaho law); Cross v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 690, 388 P.2d , 36 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1964); Hun v. Center Properties, 63 Hawaii 273, 626 P.2d 182 (1981).

Other courts have held that a wrongful death action is a common law cause of action with respect to which the statute of limitations is tolled during the claimant's minority. E.g., Barnette v. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 350, 391 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1977); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972); but see Beninati v. Oldsmobile Div. of Gen. Motors, 94 Misc. 2d 835, 405 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1978). In contrast, we have held wrongful death actions are strictly statutory and were unknown at common law. See Whittlesey v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 645, 163 P. 193 (1917).