FILED JANUARY 30, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) No. 39941-9-III ) GLENN WEST, ) ) Deceased. ) ) ) GLENDA SANTOS, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant, ) ) and ) ) MICHAEL AUAYAN, ) ) Respondent. )
MELNICK, J.P.T. 1 — Glenda Santos appeals from an order appointing a neutral
third-party administrator, without nonintervention powers, as the personal representative
(PR) of her father’s estate. We affirm. 2
FACTS
Glenn West died testate in 1984. More than forty years later, his estate assets have
not been administered. West’s will specified an equal distribution of the residue of his
1 Rich Melnick, a retired judge of the Washington State Court of Appeals, is serving as a judge pro tempore of this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.150(1). 2 Santos is the only party who filed a brief in this case. No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
estate to his seven named children, including Glenda Santos, should they survive him.
In 1985, the trial court named one of West’s daughters as the PR. When that PR passed
away, another daughter became the successor PR.
When the successor PR passed away, her son, Michael Auayan, requested that he
or a neutral third party be appointed PR after another daughter petitioned to be the PR.
That daughter later withdrew her petition and then Auayan filed a motion. Auayan,
presenting himself as an heir of West, initially sought the position himself, but later
withdrew his request and instead argued only for a neutral third-party appointment to
administer West’s estate. Auayan had the support of the other heirs of the deceased
beneficiaries under West’s will.
Santos, supported by her two remaining living siblings, opposed Auayan’s motion
and sought to be appointed as PR. Her siblings waived their right to notice on Santos’s
petition. Auayan agreed that only a beneficiary of gift under the will would be entitled to
notice. He argued, however, that as the PR of his mother’s estate, he was entitled both to
notice and to object to Santos’s appointment. He reasoned that because his mother’s gift
under West’s estate passed to her estate, her estate became the beneficiary of gift under
West’s will.
2 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
The trial court denied Santos’s petition to become PR because of negative family
interactions and because the estate has not been settled for over forty years. The trial
court appointed a neutral third-party administrator, without nonintervention powers.
Santos now appeals, claiming first that the trial court was required to appoint her
over the third party because she has priority under RCW 11.28.120 as West’s next-of-kin
and because she is available to serve; and second that Auayan was not entitled to notice
or to object to her appointment because he is not a beneficiary of gift under West’s will.
We affirm.
ANALYSIS
Administration of estate
Santos claims the trial court erred by appointing a third-party administrator
because she was qualified to serve as PR and had first priority under RCW 11.28.120.
She essentially argues this statute requires the trial court to appoint the first person
with the highest priority who is available and willing to serve as PR. We disagree.
This issue requires statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State
v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 576, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). The court’s role in statutory
interpretation is first to discern its plain meaning. In re Marriage of Schneider, 173
Wn.2d 353, 363, 268 P.3d 215 (2011). This analysis involves reviewing both the statute
3 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
at issue, and related statutes and provisions within the same act. Dep’t of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).
Santos argues that RCW 11.28.120 (1), (2), and (7) mandate that the court appoint
her as PR; however, this statute concerns the initial appointment of a PR and not the
appointment of a successor PR.
Importantly, the successor personal representative statute, RCW 11.28.280,
provides that, if a personal representative dies, the position “shall be granted to those
to whom the letters would have been granted if the original letters had not been obtained
. . . and the successor personal representative shall perform like duties and incur like
liabilities as the preceding personal representative, . . . unless the court orders otherwise.”
RCW 11.28.280 (emphasis added). Under RCW 11.68.011(2)(c), the trial court may
refuse to grant nonintervention powers to a personal representative if administration
of the decedent’s estate with nonintervention powers would not be in the best interests
of the beneficiaries of the estate. Thus, if we interpreted RCW 11.28.120 as Santos
argues, it would conflict with and negate the discretion granted to courts under
RCW 11.68.011(2)(c).
Santos relies on one published case and three unpublished cases to support her
position. But the appellate issues addressed in two of the cases involved: (1) the authority
4 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
of a PR to bring a wrongful death claim on behalf of the estate, Huntington v. Samaritan
Hospital, 35 Wn. App. 357, 666 P.2d 405 (1983), aff’d, 101 Wn.2d 466, 680 P.2d 58
(1984); and (2) the correct categorization of a creditor’s claim, Bartlett v. Estate
of Parman, No. 56536-6-II (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2022) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056536-6-II%20Unpublished%20
Opinion.pdf.
In the other cases, both appellate courts deferred to the trial court’s broad
discretion to appoint next-of-kin as PR. In re Est. of Peterson, No. 30686-1-III
(Wash. Ct. App. Jun. 6, 2013) (unpublished) (affirming appointment of creditor over
daughters of decedent despite antagonism, noting court’s authority to appoint anyone
not statutorily disqualified), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/306861.pdf;
In re Est. of Cohen, No. 56662-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. May 9, 2023) (unpublished)
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED JANUARY 30, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) No. 39941-9-III ) GLENN WEST, ) ) Deceased. ) ) ) GLENDA SANTOS, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant, ) ) and ) ) MICHAEL AUAYAN, ) ) Respondent. )
MELNICK, J.P.T. 1 — Glenda Santos appeals from an order appointing a neutral
third-party administrator, without nonintervention powers, as the personal representative
(PR) of her father’s estate. We affirm. 2
FACTS
Glenn West died testate in 1984. More than forty years later, his estate assets have
not been administered. West’s will specified an equal distribution of the residue of his
1 Rich Melnick, a retired judge of the Washington State Court of Appeals, is serving as a judge pro tempore of this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.150(1). 2 Santos is the only party who filed a brief in this case. No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
estate to his seven named children, including Glenda Santos, should they survive him.
In 1985, the trial court named one of West’s daughters as the PR. When that PR passed
away, another daughter became the successor PR.
When the successor PR passed away, her son, Michael Auayan, requested that he
or a neutral third party be appointed PR after another daughter petitioned to be the PR.
That daughter later withdrew her petition and then Auayan filed a motion. Auayan,
presenting himself as an heir of West, initially sought the position himself, but later
withdrew his request and instead argued only for a neutral third-party appointment to
administer West’s estate. Auayan had the support of the other heirs of the deceased
beneficiaries under West’s will.
Santos, supported by her two remaining living siblings, opposed Auayan’s motion
and sought to be appointed as PR. Her siblings waived their right to notice on Santos’s
petition. Auayan agreed that only a beneficiary of gift under the will would be entitled to
notice. He argued, however, that as the PR of his mother’s estate, he was entitled both to
notice and to object to Santos’s appointment. He reasoned that because his mother’s gift
under West’s estate passed to her estate, her estate became the beneficiary of gift under
West’s will.
2 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
The trial court denied Santos’s petition to become PR because of negative family
interactions and because the estate has not been settled for over forty years. The trial
court appointed a neutral third-party administrator, without nonintervention powers.
Santos now appeals, claiming first that the trial court was required to appoint her
over the third party because she has priority under RCW 11.28.120 as West’s next-of-kin
and because she is available to serve; and second that Auayan was not entitled to notice
or to object to her appointment because he is not a beneficiary of gift under West’s will.
We affirm.
ANALYSIS
Administration of estate
Santos claims the trial court erred by appointing a third-party administrator
because she was qualified to serve as PR and had first priority under RCW 11.28.120.
She essentially argues this statute requires the trial court to appoint the first person
with the highest priority who is available and willing to serve as PR. We disagree.
This issue requires statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. State
v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 576, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). The court’s role in statutory
interpretation is first to discern its plain meaning. In re Marriage of Schneider, 173
Wn.2d 353, 363, 268 P.3d 215 (2011). This analysis involves reviewing both the statute
3 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
at issue, and related statutes and provisions within the same act. Dep’t of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).
Santos argues that RCW 11.28.120 (1), (2), and (7) mandate that the court appoint
her as PR; however, this statute concerns the initial appointment of a PR and not the
appointment of a successor PR.
Importantly, the successor personal representative statute, RCW 11.28.280,
provides that, if a personal representative dies, the position “shall be granted to those
to whom the letters would have been granted if the original letters had not been obtained
. . . and the successor personal representative shall perform like duties and incur like
liabilities as the preceding personal representative, . . . unless the court orders otherwise.”
RCW 11.28.280 (emphasis added). Under RCW 11.68.011(2)(c), the trial court may
refuse to grant nonintervention powers to a personal representative if administration
of the decedent’s estate with nonintervention powers would not be in the best interests
of the beneficiaries of the estate. Thus, if we interpreted RCW 11.28.120 as Santos
argues, it would conflict with and negate the discretion granted to courts under
RCW 11.68.011(2)(c).
Santos relies on one published case and three unpublished cases to support her
position. But the appellate issues addressed in two of the cases involved: (1) the authority
4 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
of a PR to bring a wrongful death claim on behalf of the estate, Huntington v. Samaritan
Hospital, 35 Wn. App. 357, 666 P.2d 405 (1983), aff’d, 101 Wn.2d 466, 680 P.2d 58
(1984); and (2) the correct categorization of a creditor’s claim, Bartlett v. Estate
of Parman, No. 56536-6-II (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2022) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056536-6-II%20Unpublished%20
Opinion.pdf.
In the other cases, both appellate courts deferred to the trial court’s broad
discretion to appoint next-of-kin as PR. In re Est. of Peterson, No. 30686-1-III
(Wash. Ct. App. Jun. 6, 2013) (unpublished) (affirming appointment of creditor over
daughters of decedent despite antagonism, noting court’s authority to appoint anyone
not statutorily disqualified), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/306861.pdf;
In re Est. of Cohen, No. 56662-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. May 9, 2023) (unpublished)
(upholding order appointing third party over heir of decedent based on finding heir
conflicted out of role), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056662-1-
II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. Thus, the mere fact that Santos was available to
serve as PR did not automatically qualify her for appointment, nor did it mean that the
court did not have discretion to appoint others. The plain meaning of the above-cited
statutes provides the trial court with discretion to appoint a PR.
5 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
In this case, the declarations filed in support of Auayan’s motion provide
evidence of disagreement within the family as to the administration of the estate. See
RCW 11.68.011(3) (Courts may base a grant of nonintervention powers on affidavits filed
with the court or “other proof submitted to the court.”). Because the trial court followed
the law and based its decision on the facts before it, the record as a whole demonstrates
that the court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a neutral third-party administrator,
without nonintervention powers.
Notice of hearing on petition for nonintervention powers
Santos contends Auayan, and any other heir of West not specifically named in
his will as a beneficiary, was not entitled to notice of the hearing to appoint a personal
representative. Santos argues that because her two sisters, as the only people she claims
were entitled to notice under RCW 11.68.041(1), consented to her appointment at PR,
she should have been unopposed and the trial court should have ordered her appointment.
We disagree.
Auayan’s mother was a named beneficiary in West’s will. Auayan is the PR of his
mother’s estate which is entitled to her portion of West’s estate under the will. Therefore,
Auayan was entitled to notice. Santos’s limited interpretation of who is required to notice
6 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
is unsupported. As conceded by Santos, if Auayan was entitled to notice, the trial court
did not err.
We also note that RCW 11.28.020 provides, “Any person interested in a will may
file objections in writing to the granting of letters testamentary to the persons named as
executors, or any of them, and the objection shall be heard and determined by the court.”
As the PR of his mother’s estate, and as one of his mother’s heirs, Auayan had an
interest in the distribution of assets in West’s estate. As a result, he could file objections
in writing, and the court had an obligation to hear them.
Santos passingly claims the court erred by appointing a third party for whom
Auayan advocated. Santos seems to argue that Auayan allegedly misrepresented his
identity as PR of his mother’s estate, acted so he could control both his mother’s and
West’s estates, coordinated the declarations submitted by other beneficiaries, and claimed
Santos was the source of the dissention within the family. She provides no further
argument or citation to authority. “Passing treatment of an issue, lack of reasoned
argument, or conclusory arguments without citation to authority are not sufficient to merit
judicial consideration.” In re Vulnerable Adult Pet. for Winter, 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 835,
460 P.3d 667 (2020). But even upon consideration, we find nothing in the record to
support these assertions.
7 No. 39941-9-III In re Est. of West
ATTORNEY FEES
Santos requests this court grant her attorney fees pursuant to RAP 18.1 and
RCW 11.96A.150(1) and (2). RCW 11.96A.150 provides that a reviewing court may
award costs and fees in such amount it determines to be equitable to any party, from
any party or estate assets that are the subject of these proceedings.
Because Santos is not a prevailing party on appeal, we decline to award costs
and fees.
CONCLUSION
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________ Melnick, J.P.T.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ Fearing, J.
______________________________ Staab, A.C.J.