315 Ga. 558 FINAL COPY
S22A1266. HUFF v. THE STATE.
COLVIN, Justice.
Appellant Jazzy Huff was convicted of felony murder and
related offenses in connection with the August 2019 shooting death
of Zenas Lee Davis.1 On appeal, Appellant contends that (1)
insufficient evidence supported his convictions; (2) the trial court
erred in admitting irrelevant, improper, and prejudicial character
evidence that Appellant held a firearm “gangster style” prior to
1 Davis died on August 21, 2019. On September 4, 2019, a Dougherty County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). A jury trial was held from March 9 to 12, 2020. Appellant was acquitted of malice murder (Count 1) but was found guilty of the remaining counts. On August 19, 2020, the trial court imposed a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder (Count 2) and a consecutive sentence of five years’ probation for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). The aggravated assault count (Count 3) merged into the felony murder count (Count 2) for sentencing purposes. On September 15, 2020, Appellant’s trial counsel timely filed a motion for new trial, which was amended through new counsel on October 1, 2021. The trial court denied the amended motion on June 13, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed to our August 2022 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. firing the gun; (3) the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant,
improper, and prejudicial character evidence that Appellant held
the firearm the way an armed robber might hold a firearm; (4) he
was deprived of an impartial jury because jurors had improper,
unsupervised contact with the victim’s family during deliberations;
(5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to irrelevant,
improper, and prejudicial character evidence; and (6) the cumulative
effect of the trial court’s evidentiary errors and trial counsel’s
ineffective assistance unfairly prejudiced Appellant and deprived
him of his right to due process and a fair trial. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm.
1. Appellant first asserts that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to sustain
his convictions because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant was not justified in using self-defense. We
disagree.
The evidence presented at trial showed the following. On the
morning of August 21, 2019, Appellant, who owned Jazzy Movers,
2 met to discuss an upcoming job opportunity with a group of
independent contractors, including Davis, outside Jazzy Movers’
headquarters in Albany, Georgia. During this meeting, Appellant
informed the contractors that the job entailed packing and moving
furniture at a location in Moultrie, Georgia. Appellant further
informed the contractors that they would be paid for their services
on Friday, August 23. The contractors were then transported to the
job site, which was approximately 30 minutes away.
Two hours after the contractors began packing furniture,
Appellant observed Davis sitting on the back of the moving truck.
When Appellant asked Davis why he was not working, Davis told
Appellant that “he was tired” because he had been “working all day.”
Davis then requested that Appellant pay him $20 for the two hours
he had worked. Appellant reiterated that Davis would be paid on
Friday, at which point a disagreement ensued. Davis demanded
that Appellant drive him back to Albany so that he could discuss
receiving his payment with Appellant’s business partners.
Appellant then drove Davis and one other contractor, Jay Barron,
3 back to Jazzy Movers’ headquarters. Barron testified that, during
the car ride, Davis was angry and cursing but did not threaten
Appellant.
When Appellant parked the car in front of Jazzy Movers’
headquarters, Davis refused to get out before Appellant because “he
didn’t want [Appellant] to drive off.” Appellant and Barron then got
out of the car, walked into the building, and proceeded onto the
elevator toward the second floor. Davis entered the building behind
them but took the stairs. While on the elevator, Appellant told
Barron to “pull out [his] phone and [start] record[ing], just in case
something happened.” Appellant testified that he had asked Barron
to begin recording because he was concerned that Davis might file a
workers’ compensation claim. Although Appellant believed at the
time that Barron was recording only audio, Barron in fact recorded
a video, which was later played for the jury at trial.
The video showed the following. Appellant walked across a
large room into an adjoining smaller room with Davis following him.
After Davis entered the smaller room, Appellant turned around to
4 face him and said, “You will get your check on Friday, man.” For the
next minute, Appellant and Davis argued back and forth, with Davis
cursing and Appellant threatening to call security. Appellant then
walked out into the larger adjoining room with his back facing
Davis.
Davis immediately followed him out while stating, “What if I
f***ing swing on you?” As Davis continued walking in a straight
line toward the exit, Appellant took two small steps to the right
while quickly turning to face Davis, pulling out a .40-caliber pistol,
and racking the slide. Appellant then pointed the pistol at Davis’s
chest, holding the pistol with the handgrip horizontal to the ground
and said, “Let’s go then, man.” In response, Davis turned and
started walking toward Appellant while repeatedly saying, “F***ing
shoot me, bro.” Meanwhile, Appellant lowered the firearm to his
side and held out his other hand toward Davis while telling him
several times to “back up.”
Davis stopped walking toward Appellant but continued
arguing. As Davis briefly turned to look at Barron, he asked
5 Appellant, “Did you just pull your f***ing gun on me?” Appellant
then said Davis’s name, at which point Davis turned back toward
Appellant, took a half step in Appellant’s direction with his arms
lowered and his chest puffed up, and asked again, “Did you just pull
your f***ing . . . ?” Before Davis could finish his question, Appellant
opened fire on Davis, shooting multiple rounds in quick succession
as Davis grabbed his chest, turned away, and fell to the floor.
After falling to the ground, Davis dropped from his hand a
small, yellow object, which was later identified as a lighter.
Stepping out of view of the camera, Appellant can be heard on the
recording calling 9-1-1 and telling the operator, “Sir, I just shot
somebody.” Following the operator’s directions, Appellant
performed chest compressions on Davis for several minutes, but
Davis was unresponsive. When officers arrived on the scene and
asked who shot Davis, Appellant responded, “I did.” Appellant then
complied with officers’ instructions to turn around and be
handcuffed. Appellant was taken into custody and interviewed by
Sergeant Chris Hutcherson.
6 Sergeant Hutcherson testified that during the interview
Appellant stated that Davis “had some authority problems” because
Appellant was younger than Davis and that Appellant “felt
threatened” by Davis because “he knew [Davis] had a record.”
Sergeant Hutcherson further testified that at no point during the
interview did Appellant indicate that he believed Davis had some
sort of weapon in his hand.
Taking the stand in his own defense, Appellant testified that
he had shot Davis in self-defense. Appellant explained that he felt
threatened when Davis said, “What if I f***ing swing on you,” since
Appellant’s back was turned when Davis made the comment and
Appellant knew Davis had a criminal record. Appellant explained
that, in response to the threat, he pulled out his firearm, “racked a
round,” and turned toward Davis. But Appellant testified that he
“never had any intent to use [the firearm].” Appellant further
testified that, because Davis was “confidently pursuing” him despite
seeing the firearm, Appellant believed Davis had some sort of
weapon. Appellant explained that he then saw a “flicker of yellow
7 and black” in Davis’s hand and assumed it was a box cutter that the
workers sometimes used to unpack furniture, although the evidence
later showed that the item in Davis’s hand was actually a lighter.
Appellant testified that he shot Davis because he was “terrified” that
Davis would use the box cutter as a weapon against him. However,
on cross-examination, Appellant stated that, prior to pulling out the
firearm, he “was not looking at [Davis’s] hands.”
When the prosecutor asked Appellant why he did not mention
to Sergeant Hutcherson at any point during his post-arrest
interview that he believed Davis had a box cutter, Appellant
responded, “I don’t believe I was in the right state of mind.” The
prosecutor also questioned Barron about whether Jazzy Movers had
supplied box cutters for the moving job that morning. Barron
testified that the company did not provide box cutters and that he
did not observe Davis or “anybody using box cutters that morning.”
The medical examiner who performed Davis’s autopsy testified
that Davis’s “cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds” and that
a “total of eight gunshot wounds” were found in Davis’s body, the
8 majority of which struck Davis from behind. The medical examiner
further testified that Davis’s wounds indicated that he had likely
“turn[ed] to the right to get out of the way of being shot” and that
five of the gunshots “could have been lethal” on their own.
On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial evidence
established that he acted in self-defense under OCGA § 16-3-21 (a),
which provides in relevant part that a person is justified in using
deadly force “if he or she reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself . . . or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” According to Appellant,
the trial evidence showed that he reasonably employed “non-lethal”
force by drawing his firearm in response to Davis’s threat to “swing”
on him and then reasonably employed deadly force when Davis
continued to pursue him. Therefore, Appellant argues, the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not
justified in defending himself. We disagree.
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, the proper
standard of review is whether a rational trier of fact could have
9 found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979). This Court will uphold the jury’s verdict “[a]s long as there
is some competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support each
fact necessary to make out the State’s case.” Scott v. State, 309 Ga.
764, 766 (1) (848 SE2d 448) (2020) (citation and punctuation
omitted). “When a defendant presents evidence that he was justified
in using deadly force, the State bears the burden of disproving the
defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Birdow v. State, 305 Ga. 48, 50
(1) (823 SE2d 736) (2019). However, it is the role of the jury to
evaluate the evidence and decide whether the defendant was
justified in using deadly force in self-defense. See Howard v. State,
298 Ga. 396, 398 (1) (782 SE2d 255) (2016). In evaluating the
evidence, “[the] jury is free to reject a defendant’s claim that he acted
in self-defense.” Id.
Here, the trial evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to
conclude that Appellant did not reasonably believe that deadly force
was necessary to defend himself during the encounter with Davis
10 and thus to reject Appellant’s self-defense claim. Specifically, the
video recording of the incident authorized a jury to find that
Appellant did not reasonably fear that Davis posed a threat of death
or great bodily injury either when Davis commented about
“swinging” at Appellant or when Davis approached him. Instead,
the jury could have reasonably concluded from the video recording
that Appellant did not shoot Davis in self-defense because Appellant
invited a physical encounter with Davis by pulling a gun, pointing it
at him, and saying, “Let’s go then, man,” and Davis’s conduct in
approaching Appellant with his arms down and asking if Appellant
had really pulled a gun on him did not give rise to a reasonable belief
that Davis was threatening to physically harm Appellant.
Moreover, a rational jury could have disbelieved Appellant’s
claim of self-defense based on his own trial testimony. See Walker
v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 235 (1) (862 SE2d 285) (2021) (noting that “the
jury was entitled to disbelieve [the defendant’s] testimony” in which
he claimed that he fired in self-defense). See also Mims v. State, 310
Ga. 853, 855 (854 SE2d 742) (2021) (“[T]he defendant’s testimony,
11 in which he claimed he was justified or provoked into acting, may
itself be considered substantive evidence of guilt when disbelieved
by the jury, as long as some corroborative evidence exists for the
charged offense.”). This is particularly true here, where Appellant’s
testimony at trial and his statements during his interview
immediately after the shooting were inconsistent. Appellant
testified at trial that he shot Davis because he believed Davis had a
box cutter in his hand that he intended to use as a weapon against
Appellant. However, in his post-arrest statement to police he never
mentioned the box cutter. Thus, the jury was authorized to reject
Appellant’s claim that he shot Davis in self-defense and to find him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and the other
crimes for which he was convicted. See State v. Newman, 305 Ga.
792, 795 (1) (827 SE2d 678) (2019) (“[T]he evidence presented at trial
was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject [the defendant’s]
claim[ ] of . . . self-defense and to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.”).
2. Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in
12 permitting the prosecutor to refer to Appellant’s manner of holding
the firearm as “gangster style.” The prosecutor first used the phrase
“gangster style” during his opening statement, when he told the jury
that it would see a video in which Davis “turns around and sees a
gun in his chest, gangster style. Gangster style, turned to the side.
And then [Appellant] says let’s go then.” Then, during its direct
examination of Barron, the prosecutor used the phrase “gangster
style” again. Specifically, after playing Barron’s video for the jury,
the prosecutor asked Barron, “And you saw a gun pointed gangster-
style in [Davis’s] chest, just like we saw in this video, didn’t you?”
Barron replied, “Correct.” Defense counsel did not timely object
during either the State’s opening statement or Barron’s testimony.2
2 The day after Barron testified, defense counsel moved “for the Court to
direct the District Attorney’s Office to stop using any word affiliated with the word gang,” arguing that the phrase “gangster style” erroneously implied that Appellant was “somehow gang-related.” Although the court noted that, when it heard the prosecutor use the phrase “gangster style,” it initially understood the phrase as “a descriptor” of how Appellant was holding the gun, the court ultimately sustained Appellant’s motion in part. Specifically, the court ruled that the State could no longer use the phrase while examining witnesses but could use it as a descriptor during closing arguments. However, following the court’s ruling, the prosecutor did not use the phrase again either with witnesses or in closing arguments.
13 On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
permitting the prosecutor to use the phrase “gangster style” because
the phrase was improper character evidence in violation of OCGA §
24-4-404 (a),3 not relevant and therefore inadmissible under OCGA
§ 24-4-402,4 and should have been excluded pursuant to OCGA § 24-
4-4035 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. This enumeration of error fails.
As an initial matter, opening statements are not considered
evidence, and failure to timely object to a remark in opening
statements waives the issue on appeal. See Phillips v. State, 285
Ga. 213, 217 (3) (675 SE2d 1) (2009) (“The failure to object to the
remark [made during the opening statement] . . . constitutes a
3 OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) provides, in pertinent part, “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character shall not be admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”
4 OCGA § 24-4-402 provides, in pertinent part, “[e]vidence which is not
relevant shall not be admissible.”
5 OCGA § 24-4-403 provides, in pertinent part, “[r]elevant evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” 14 waiver of the issue on appeal.”). Here, because defense counsel
failed to timely object to the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “gangster
style” during opening statements, Appellant’s challenge to the
State’s opening statement was not preserved for review, and plain
error review does not apply to comments made by lawyers during
opening statements. See Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. 370, 372-373 (2)
(788 SE2d 494) (2016).
Although Appellant did not timely object when the prosecutor
elicited witness testimony that Appellant held the firearm “gangster
style,” we may review his claim that the trial court erred in
admitting such testimony for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (d).
See also Adams v. State, 306 Ga. 1, 3 (1) (829 SE2d 126) (2019)
(noting that plain error review is available under OCGA § 24-1-103
(d) for unpreserved challenges to evidentiary rulings). To establish
plain error, Appellant
must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
15 proceedings.
Kemp v. State, 303 Ga. 385, 397-398 (3) (810 SE2d 515) (2018)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, assuming without deciding that the trial court clearly
erred in admitting into evidence Barron’s testimony that Appellant
held the gun “gangster style,” Appellant cannot satisfy the third
prong of plain error review, which requires him to demonstrate that
“the outcome of the trial court proceedings likely was affected.”
Hightower v. State, 304 Ga. 755, 759 (2) (b) (822 SE2d 273) (2018)
(citation and punctuation omitted). To the extent that the phrase
caused any prejudice, it was unlikely to affect the outcome of the
trial. The prosecutor only briefly used the phrase “gangster style”
while examining Barron, and nothing introduced into evidence or
presented in the record suggests that the phrase was used to suggest
that Appellant was a gang member, that the shooting was gang
related, or that Appellant had a propensity to commit violence.
Additionally, the jury viewed for itself the video recording of the
entire incident and heard testimony that Appellant had changed his
16 story about why he believed deadly force was necessary. In light of
the evidence presented, we cannot say that any error in admitting
into evidence the “gangster style” reference likely affected the
verdict. See Harris v. State, 302 Ga. 832, 835 (2) (809 SE2d 723)
(2018) (“[The defendant] has failed to establish that the error
affected his substantial rights, given the strong evidence of guilt
against him.”). Accordingly, Appellant has not shown plain error.
3. Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred in permitting
a witness to testify that the manner in which Appellant held the
firearm was akin to the manner in which armed robbers hold a
firearm. This claim fails.
During his direct examination, Sergeant Hutcherson testified
that he had “several years of experience in firearms,” was “on SWAT
Team,” and was currently “in a firearms instructor course.” The
prosecutor then asked him why a person may “cant” (that is, tilt) a
firearm sideways, as Appellant had done. Sergeant Hutcherson
responded, “[M]ost people who pull out a firearm in that manner are
either pulling it out to intimidate the other person[ or] punk the
17 other person.” Sergeant Hutcherson further explained, “You may
see people pull that firearm in that manner in an armed robbery,
when they’re trying to rob someone, they’ll cant the firearm in that
manner.”
Neither the State nor any witnesses referenced armed robbery
again, and defense counsel objected to Sergeant Hutcherson’s
testimony only on the ground that the State was improperly
bolstering the testimony of a previous witness. Because defense
counsel did not object on any other ground, Appellant did not
preserve for ordinary appellate review the contentions raised here,
namely, that the testimony was improper character evidence,
irrelevant, and inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403. See Payne v.
State, 313 Ga. 218, 221 (1) (869 SE2d 395) (2022) (noting that a
defendant’s evidentiary objection at trial failed to preserve for
ordinary appellate review a different evidentiary challenge to the
same testimony). See also Harris v. State, 307 Ga. 657, 663-664 (2)
(a) (837 SE2d 777) (2020) (“[B]ecause [the defendant] did not make
a specific objection at trial to the admission of his statements on the
18 grounds now asserted in his appeal, we review these claims only for
plain error.”). Accordingly, we review Appellant’s contentions only
for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (d). Even assuming that the
armed-robbery reference was improper, Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that any error in admitting the evidence likely affected
the outcome of his trial. As explained in Division 2, the evidence
against Appellant was strong, and the reference to armed robbery
was brief. Because Appellant has not shown that the armed-robbery
reference affected his substantial rights by likely affecting the
outcome of the trial court proceedings, Appellant has not
demonstrated plain error. See Watson v. State, 303 Ga. 758, 761 (2)
(c) (814 SE2d 396) (2018) (no plain error where it was “not probable
that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it not heard
[the challenged evidence]”).
4. Appellant also asserts that he was deprived of his right to an
impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution because the jury had improper, unsupervised contact
with the victim’s family during deliberations. The record shows
19 that, during jury deliberations, defense counsel reported to the trial
court that a group of jurors had been standing “very close” to some
of Davis’s family members during a break and that deputies, who
also observed the parties in close proximity, reported that “there was
no communication” between the parties and that “it appeared to be
purely innocent.” The court indicated that it would take measures
to prevent the possibility of future interactions between the jury and
family members, and defense counsel did not request any further
relief. Because defense counsel did not assert a Sixth Amendment
claim or seek any relief from the trial court when he discovered the
allegedly improper jury contact, this Sixth Amendment claim is not
preserved for appellate review. See Moore v. State, 294 Ga. 450, 451
(2) (754 SE2d 333) (2014) (concluding that the defendant’s failure to
“make a contemporaneous motion for a mistrial when it was
discovered that” three jurors had seen an unredacted reference to
the defendant’s prior guilty plea “waived review of th[e] issue on
appeal”).
5. Appellant next asserts that he received constitutionally
20 ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to
object to evidence that Appellant held the firearm “gangster style”
and that canting the firearm sideways was an intimidation tactic
commonly used by armed robbers. We disagree.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show both “that his counsel’s performance was
professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.”
Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80
LE2d 674) (1984)). To prevail on the deficiency prong, the appellant
“must demonstrate that the lawyer performed his duties in an
objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances in
light of the prevailing professional norms.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga.
180, 182-183 (2) (787 SE2d 221) (2016). “To prove prejudice,
Appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have
been different.” Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3). A defendant’s
failure “to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to
21 defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon
this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731,
733 (2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, Appellant has failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test. As explained in Divisions 2 and 3, because of the
strong evidence against him, Appellant is unable to demonstrate a
reasonable probability of a different result if trial counsel had
objected to the “gangster style” and “armed robbery” references. See
Stepp-McCommons v. State, 309 Ga. 400, 407 (4) (a) (845 SE2d 643)
(2020) (“[T]his Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain
error standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Accordingly,
Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
6. Finally, Appellant claims that the cumulative effect of the
asserted trial court errors and ineffective assistance of counsel
violated his right to due process and a fair trial. We disagree.
To establish cumulative error a defendant must demonstrate
that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial”
22 and “considered together along with the entire record, the multiple
errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the
petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.” State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21
(4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). When
considering the “cumulative effect of presumed errors by trial
counsel and the trial court,” this Court “consider[s] collectively the
prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the
prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel.” Patterson
v. State, 314 Ga. 167, 181 (5) (875 SE2d 771) (2022) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Here, Appellant’s claim fails because
Appellant has not demonstrated that the prejudicial effect of the
assumed trial court errors and ineffective assistance denied him a
fundamentally fair trial, given the strong evidence against him,
including the recorded video of the incident and Appellant’s
inconsistent explanations of the shooting.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
23 Decided February 7, 2023.
Murder. Dougherty Superior Court. Before Judge Marshall.
Sharp Georgia Law Firm, Randall P. Sharp, for appellant.
Gregory W. Edwards, District Attorney, M. April Wynne,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.