319 Ga. 1 FINAL COPY
S24A0399. PLATT v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
Rodrigues Platt1 appeals his convictions related to the shooting
death of David Jones, Jr.2 On appeal, Platt argues that the trial
court should have granted a mistrial due to the State’s failure to
disclose the inconclusive test results of a hair sample from a critical
1 Platt’s first name is spelled “Rodriguez” in some court filings and in his
brief, but most of the court filings below use “Rodrigues.” 2 The crimes occurred on June 16, 2009. In February 2010, a Liberty
County grand jury indicted Platt, Jedediah Duncan, and Steven Bond for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The court severed the co-defendants’ trials, and the record does not show the status of those cases. A jury found Platt guilty on all counts at an August 2011 trial, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison for malice murder, two concurrent 20-year terms for armed robbery and burglary, and a consecutive five-year term for the firearms offense. The other counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Platt filed a motion for new trial in August 2011 and amended it in 2019. The trial court denied the motion in September 2023. Platt timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. The record does not reveal why it took well over a decade to resolve Platt’s motion for new trial. Platt asserts no claim about the post-conviction delay, but we nevertheless remind trial courts and attorneys of their duty diligently and efficiently to resolve pending motions for new trial. witness against him who was also a possible suspect in the timely
manner required by OCGA § 17-16-4 and Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963). He also argues that the
court should have granted a mistrial based on the State’s belated
disclosure that Platt’s initial custodial interview had been recorded
despite previously representing otherwise. Platt also argues that the
trial court should have taken some curative action when the
prosecutor improperly identified him for testifying witnesses, and
that the cumulative prejudice of these errors warrants a new trial.
We conclude that Platt has failed to establish that a mistrial was
necessary to preserve his right to a fair trial, that any curative
action was necessary based on the prosecutor’s identification of him,
or that any errors cumulatively prejudiced him. Therefore, we
affirm.
The evidence at trial showed the following. Jones lived in the
Tapco Mobile Home Park in Liberty County. He sold drugs and kept
his money in a small, black travel safe. On June 16, 2009, Jones was
shot multiple times in his mobile home, leading to his death. Jarius
2 Wilson lived in a mobile home close to the victim’s and heard a noise
on the day of the shooting that sounded like firecrackers. After he
heard the sound, Wilson looked out his window and saw “some guys”
wearing masks running from the victim’s home and toward a
“grayish-greenish” SUV.
Monique Hendry, Platt’s sister, testified that on the day of
Jones’s death, Platt, Steven Bond, and Jedediah Duncan were at
Hendry’s mother’s house. Bond and Duncan were wearing
camouflage, had gas masks, and were playing with a black gun. The
three men left in a “goldish” SUV driven by Duncan.
Miriam Brown testified that on the day of the shooting, Duncan
picked her up and drove her to Hinesville, driving a tan or gold SUV.
Bond was also in the vehicle, and the two men were wearing army
fatigues, jeans, and black shirts. On the drive to Hinesville, Bond
and Duncan showed her a gas mask and a bulletproof vest, and
Duncan passed a black gun to Bond. Duncan and Bond dropped off
Brown. When they picked her up later that day, she heard one of
them say, “I can’t believe it,” that they had killed someone, and that
3 they had shot “him” three times because “he had seen his face.”
Duncan and Bond said that they had gone to the victim’s house to
“kick in the door” and that they took a safe that was full of “eight
balls,” which Brown said meant crack cocaine.
Bruce Coleman testified that he was at Tapco on the morning
of the shooting and went to the store with Duncan and Bond in
Duncan’s gold SUV. Before dropping Coleman off at the Pineland
Apartment complex where Coleman’s girlfriend lived, Duncan and
Bond talked about “a lick,” which Coleman described as a robbery,
and Coleman declined their invitation to join them. Later that day,
Coleman saw Duncan drop off Platt and Bond at Pineland. Bond
said they had robbed and shot someone, possibly killing the victim.
Coleman did not believe Bond, so he went to ask Platt, who had
walked away. Platt said that “they” probably had killed “him” and
showed Coleman a gun that Platt said was used during the robbery.
Steve Plair, Bond’s older brother who also lived at Tapco at the
time of the shooting, said that on the morning of the shooting,
Duncan and Bond were outside the mobile home discussing robbing
4 someone. Plair said that Platt, Bond, and Duncan were at his mobile
home later that night, and Platt had a revolver. Plair testified that
the three men left, and 35 to 45 minutes later, Plair heard gunshots.
Plair saw Platt a few days later, and Platt admitted to shooting
someone called “Little Dave.” Platt said that when he was in the
victim’s mobile home, Platt’s face covering slipped, so he guessed the
victim saw him. Platt said he shot the victim three times, while
Duncan retrieved the safe. Plair admitted that on the night of the
shooting, he hid from police but later turned himself in. Plair was
arrested because someone identified him as being involved in the
shooting, but he denied being involved and said he knew nothing.
Plair later told police about Platt’s statements, admitting that he
did so only after being charged with murder in this case — charges
that were ultimately dismissed.
During the investigation, Duncan led police to a field where
they found, among other things, a stocking cap that had hairs inside,
a camouflage shirt and pants, a gas mask, and a safe that had “3A2”
written on it. The same inscription — “3A2” — was also written on
5 a key found in the victim’s pocket. Police also found one 9mm shell
casing at the bottom of the steps to the victim’s mobile home and
another in Duncan’s vehicle, and a firearms expert testified that
they were fired from the same weapon.
Platt was interviewed by police on two different days. During
the second interview, which was recorded and played for the jury at
trial, Platt admitted participating in the armed robbery and that
Jones was shot during the crime. He denied shooting Jones. Platt,
Duncan, and Bond were charged with several crimes, and following
a jury trial, Platt was convicted of malice murder, armed robbery,
burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
crime.
1. Platt argues that the trial court should have granted a
mistrial based on the State’s untimely disclosure that it had
compared the hairs found in the recovered stocking cap against
Plair’s hair and found the results inconclusive. We disagree.
Platt filed a pretrial discovery motion, requesting, among other
things, the results of all scientific tests and all Brady material. Two
6 weeks before trial, defense counsel met with the prosecutor, the lead
investigator Detective Snider, and other police officers, to review
every exhibit the State intended to introduce at trial. The State did
not at that time disclose to Platt that it had tested Plair’s hair with
inconclusive results.
During opening statements, Platt’s counsel told the jury that,
although the State had compared the hair recovered from the
stocking cap to the defendants in the case and did not find a match,
the State never compared those hairs to hair samples from Plair. In
fact, that was not true: unbeknownst to trial counsel, the State had
made that comparison, although the results were inconclusive. After
opening statements and during a recess, the State disclosed to Platt
for the first time that it had tested Plair’s hair with inconclusive
results. Platt moved for a mistrial and called Detective Snider in
support of that motion. Detective Snider testified that a few weeks
before trial, he talked to the GBI agent who conducted the test on
Plair’s hair, and was told that the initial comparison was
“tentatively” inconclusive, the agent would prepare a final report
7 after peer review, and the agent would submit samples for DNA
testing, which Detective Snider understood to mean that the agent
had only looked at the hair samples under a microscope. Detective
Snider confirmed that, although testing results for Platt and other
defendants were provided to Platt as part of discovery, no
information about the testing of Plair’s hair was provided. Detective
Snider said he had not talked to the GBI agent since being informed
of the inconclusive results.
The court denied the mistrial motion, concluding that the
results did not “help or hurt either side.” The court allowed Platt’s
counsel to reopen opening statements. Counsel told the jury that he
made a misstatement about Plair’s hair never having been tested
and this was caused by the State’s failure to disclose this
information. Counsel insisted that the State was “hiding evidence,”
that he had been subjected to “trial by ambush,” that he had been
unable to prepare the defense adequately or conduct independent
testing of the hair given the last-minute disclosure, and that this
was “all the reasonable doubt” the jury needed.
8 On appeal, Platt argues that the untimely disclosure impaired
his defense and that a mistrial was therefore warranted. A trial
court is vested with broad discretion as to whether to grant a
mistrial, and a court’s decision not to grant one will not be disturbed
on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial was essential to
preserve a party’s right to a fair trial. See Jordan v. State, 305 Ga.
12, 15 (2) (823 SE2d 336) (2019); Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 833-
834 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016).
Platt argues primarily that a mistrial was necessary to remedy
the State’s violation of Brady. Under Brady,
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. This includes the suppression of impeachment evidence that may be used to challenge the credibility of a witness.
Hood v. State, 311 Ga. 855, 863 (1) (860 SE2d 432) (2021) (citations
and punctuation omitted); see also Chavez v. State, 307 Ga. 804, 813
(3) (837 SE2d 766) (2020) (to be entitled to a new trial, a defendant
must show that the evidence is “material to his guilt or punishment”
9 (citation and punctuation omitted)). Evidence is “material” in this
context when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is one
in which the suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.” Chavez, 307 Ga. at 813 (3) (citations and
punctuation omitted). “In the case of an untimely disclosure, a
defendant must show that an earlier disclosure would have
benefited the defense and that the delayed disclosure deprived him
of a fair trial.” Anglin v. State, 312 Ga. 503, 510 (2) (b) (863 SE2d
148) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). Platt has failed to
make this showing.
Platt first argues that the untimely disclosure affected his
opening statement, and that the entire defense, as reflected by the
opening statement, became “unsupported” by the late disclosure.
Although the untimely disclosure undermined his statement about
a lack of testing, Platt was able to argue to the jury that the State
was “hiding evidence,” creating doubt as to the thoroughness of the
10 State’s investigation.
Platt also argues that the untimely disclosure hampered his
defense, but he does not show how he would have altered his defense
if given the information sooner. Platt claims that he could have
procured independent DNA testing of the hair had he been made
aware of the inconclusive results sooner, and that he could have used
this information to impeach Plair and establish his motive for saying
that Platt confessed to him that Platt shot Jones. Platt’s arguments
are meritless. Platt knew about the hair recovered from the stocking
cap. Although he thought the hair had not been compared to Plair’s
hair, as reflected by his initial opening statement, there is no
evidence in the record that he ever sought to secure independent
DNA testing of the recovered hair prior to trial. And Platt’s claim
about what the DNA testing would reveal is purely speculative, as
there is no evidence of such testing. Platt argues in his appellate
brief that “[i]t could have been [Plair’s] hair in the stocking cap[,]”
but further testing could have alternatively revealed that the hair
belonged to Platt. In any case, whatever the results of DNA testing
11 would have revealed, Platt has not shown that any further
impeachment of Plair would have made a meaningful difference.
Moreover, Platt was able to impeach Plair about his motive for
saying that Platt confessed to the crime, suggesting that Plair
named Platt only after Plair himself was charged in the case. See
Hood, 311 Ga. at 864-865 (1) (although full scope of witness’s
“possible incentives to cooperate with the State was not made known
to the jury, the jury was nonetheless aware there was reason to
regard his testimony with skepticism[,]” and witness’s testimony
was largely cumulative of other evidence, so defendant was unable
to establish materiality). Because Platt has shown only a mere
possibility that additional testing would have been favorable to his
defense, he has failed to show a Brady violation. See Mitchell v.
State, 307 Ga. 855, 862 (2) (b) (838 SE2d 847) (2020) (rejecting Brady
claim as not establishing materiality because defendant offered no
evidence in support of his speculation that had he been provided
with information about fingerprints lifted from a taxi where the
victim was found dead, he could have procured independent testing
12 that would have helped his defense).
Platt also argues that the State’s failure to disclose the
inconclusive results violated statutory disclosure rules. Specifically,
Platt argues that the State violated OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4) by failing
to reduce to writing the GBI agent’s oral report and failing to provide
him with a copy of the same. By its terms, however, the statute
imposes a duty on the State to provide the results of scientific
testing, including if a report is “oral or partially oral,” only “if the
state intends to introduce [the results of the testing] in evidence in
its case-in-chief or in rebuttal[.]” See OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4).3 There
3 The paragraph provides:
The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the defendant at a time agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court to inspect and copy or photograph a report of any physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments, including a summary of the basis for the expert opinion rendered in the report, or copies thereof, if the state intends to introduce in evidence in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal the results of the physical or mental examination or scientific test or experiment. If the report is oral or partially oral, the prosecuting attorney shall reduce all relevant and material oral portions of such report to writing and shall serve opposing counsel with such portions no later than ten days prior to trial. Nothing in this Code section shall require the disclosure of any other material, note, or memorandum relating to the psychiatric or psychological treatment or therapy of any victim or
13 was no indication that the State intended to introduce into evidence
the “inconclusive results” of the testing of Plair’s hair, so Platt has
failed to demonstrate a violation of OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4). Because
the untimely disclosure did not violate Brady or OCGA § 17-16-4 (a)
(4), Platt’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to remedy such
violations necessarily fails.
2. Platt argues that the trial court should have also granted a
mistrial, or at least a continuance, due to the State’s untimely
disclosure that Platt’s first custodial interview had been recorded
when it had previously represented otherwise. We disagree.
At a Jackson-Denno4 hearing before trial, the investigator who
had interviewed Platt, Detective Howard, testified that he
interviewed Platt on two different days, the second interview a full
day after the first. Detective Howard testified that although he
proposed recording the first interview, he did not actually do so. He
testified that the second interview was recorded and that Platt’s
witness. OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4) (emphasis added). 4 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
14 statements during the first interview were consistent with those
given at the second interview.
Apparently based on this testimony, Platt argued during
opening statements that the jury was not going to hear what
happened during the first interview because it was not recorded; the
jury would hear only what a police officer says happened; and the
jury would hear only Platt’s statements that were recorded after he
had spent a night in a jail where the victim’s father worked, which
would have instilled fear into Platt.
During the lunch break on the second day of the trial, the State
informed defense counsel that Platt’s first interview had, in fact,
been recorded. Defense counsel listened to the recording once over
the lunch break and asked for a mistrial because the “new evidence
. . . contradicts a good bit of what I’ve been saying and the way I’ve
tailored the defense in this — you know, during this trial for the past
day and a half.” Defense counsel alternatively asked for a
continuance “at least for the rest of the day” to allow counsel to
review the recording more thoroughly and incorporate the evidence
15 into Platt’s defense.
The prosecutor stated that she did not know about the
recording until the second day of trial when Detective Howard
mentioned it during a conversation; the prosecutor said she
immediately let defense counsel know and suggested as a remedy
that the recording not be played. Defense counsel noted in response
that Platt’s statements were not the same during the two interviews,
as he did not inculpate himself in the first interview. Defense
counsel later observed that this was the second piece of evidence
that was not timely disclosed. In response, the prosecutor said she
did not want to “start all over again. But if the Court feels that’s the
thing to do out of fairness, then the State’s really not . . . .” The trial
court denied the motion before the prosecutor finished her
statement.
Responding to the continuance request, the prosecutor did not
object to giving defense counsel the rest of the day to review the
recording, but preferred to break for just three hours because the
prosecutor had planned to call a witness who was traveling that day
16 and wanted to get her “in and out.” The court asked if the jury
should hear “the truth about all this,” and defense counsel said, “we
have to . . . I don’t see how we can’t tell them, you know, that now
there’s two pieces of evidence.” After confirming that counsel had
listened to the recording, the trial court denied a continuance.
The recordings of both interviews were ultimately played for
the jury during Detective Howard’s testimony. As captured in the
recording of the first interview, Platt admitted to being in Tapco
during the robbery and seeing parts of it from a nearby mobile home,
but he denied being involved or knowing who shot Jones. During
cross-examination, Platt elicited testimony that Detective Howard
had previously testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing that Platt
never denied being involved in the robbery.
Platt argues on appeal that the State’s failure to advise him
that his first interview was recorded and provide him a copy of that
recording violated OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (1), and that a mistrial was
warranted under the remedies available under OCGA § 17-16-6
because he showed that the State acted in bad faith and he was
17 prejudiced as a result. For its part, the State does not dispute that
it violated OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (1) by failing to advise Platt that the
first interview was recorded and allow him to inspect or copy it in
advance of trial. Instead, the State argues that the trial court’s
remedial actions were adequate under OCGA § 17-16-6.
As stated above, a trial court has broad discretion to grant or
deny a mistrial. This discretion also applies to whether to grant a
mistrial as a remedy under OCGA § 17-16-6. See Tubbs v. State, 276
Ga. 751, 753-754 (3) (583 SE2d 853) (2003). A court also has the
discretion to grant a continuance as a remedy for a violation of
OCGA § 17-16-6. Id. at 753-754 (2), (3). As explained above, we will
not overturn a trial court’s decision to deny a mistrial unless a
mistrial was essential to preserve the right to a fair trial. And to
obtain a new trial from the improper denial of a continuance request,
a defendant must show harm. See Harris v. State, 309 Ga. 599, 609
(3) (847 SE2d 563) (2020). Platt has failed to make these showings.
(i) A mistrial was not essential to preserve Platt’s right to a fair trial.
18 Platt argues that he was prejudiced by the late disclosure
because he had referenced the fact that the first interview was not
recorded in his opening statement. But Platt does not show how the
late disclosure harmed him.
He first argues that he was prejudiced because he referred to
the first interview in his opening statement and it formed the basis
of his defense. But he referred to that interview to suggest that he
did not initially admit participating in the crime and made his
admission during the second interview only as a result of fear after
spending a night in jail. The recording of that first interview only
bolstered this argument. In that recording, Platt admits to being in
Tapco during the robbery and knowing about it, but he denied being
involved or knowing who shot Jones. The recording thus supported,
rather than undermined, Platt’s opening statement where he
suggested that his confession in the second interview was not
truthful.
Platt next argues that he was prejudiced because Detective
Howard testified at the motions hearing that Platt’s statements in
19 the two interviews were consistent. But Platt was able to use the
recording to impeach Detective Howard’s credibility by showing that
Detective Howard’s prior testimony was not accurate, and he has
not shown how an earlier disclosure would have made any difference
in this respect.
Platt also argues that he was prejudiced by the untimely
disclosure because he had to question three of the State’s most
important witnesses without a “correct” version of events as relayed
in the first interview. But this claim is vague and unsupported. Platt
does not identify which witnesses he considers to be “most
important.” But more importantly, he does not show how he would
have examined these witnesses differently had the recording been
disclosed sooner.5
Platt contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s
5 In one part of his brief, Platt notes that the State called five witnesses
after lunch (after he listened to the recording), lists four witnesses (“Detective Snider, a GBI crime lab tools examiner, Plair, and Detective Howard”), and then states “the newly-disclosed recording impacted all three.” Even assuming Platt was referring to Detective Snider, Detective Howard, and Plair as the “three most important” witnesses, he does not explain what line of questioning he would have pursued had he known about the recording sooner. And as discussed, he was able to use the recording to impeach Detective Howard. 20 failure to “remedy the situation with the jury” despite having
“promised” to do so.6 In support of this argument, Platt relies on Lee
v. State, 306 Ga. 663 (832 SE2d 851) (2019), where this Court stated
that a trial court acts within its discretion to deny a motion for
mistrial “when it provides adequate curative instructions to the jury
to cure any prejudice stemming from the introduction of improper
evidence.” Id. at 669 (4). But as already made clear, Platt has
demonstrated no prejudice resulting from the late disclosure of the
recording; instead, the recording seemed to help his defense and he
has not shown any harm from the delayed disclosure.
Platt next relies on the State’s apparent lack of opposition to a
mistrial as evidence that the trial court should have granted one.
Platt seems to focus on the prosecutor’s response to whether it
requested the court deny the motion for mistrial. The prosecutor did
not finish her sentence before the trial court denied the motion, so it
is not entirely clear what position the prosecutor was taking. But
6 In his brief, Platt cites the trial court’s question about whether it should
tell the jury the “truth” about the recording, but there is nothing in this exchange to show that it promised some sort of curative instruction. 21 even if the prosecutor’s statement is read as an apparent lack of
objection, this does not establish that a mistrial was necessary. At
most, the prosecutor’s statements show her acknowledgment of the
fact that the court could grant a mistrial; those statements fell short
of showing that the court was required to grant one. See Hightower
v. State, 315 Ga. 399, 404 (2) (883 SE2d 335) (2023) (simply because
“reasonable” minds may differ about whether other alternatives are
proper is not dispositive of whether a trial court abused its discretion
in deciding whether to grant a mistrial). We conclude that Platt has
failed to show that a mistrial was necessary to preserve his right to
a fair trial.
(ii) Even if the court abused its discretion in denying Platt a continuance, he has not shown harm to warrant a new trial.
Platt alternatively argues that the trial court should have at
least granted his unopposed request for a continuance. But even if
the trial court abused its discretion in denying that request, Platt
cannot obtain a new trial unless he shows harm. See Harris, 309 Ga.
at 609 (3). Platt argues that he needed more time to study the
22 recording and prepare, but he makes no showing how additional
time would have benefitted him. See Phoenix v. State, 304 Ga. 785,
789 (2) (822 SE2d 195) (2018) (“To show harm, a party is required to
specifically identify what other evidence or witnesses he would have
put forth in his defense if his counsel had been given more time to
prepare; speculation and conjecture are not enough.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). Moreover, as discussed above, Platt
demonstrated no prejudice from the untimely disclosure of the
recording, as the recording seemed to help, rather than harm, Platt’s
defense. Because Platt has failed to show how any additional time
to prepare harmed him, this argument fails.7
3. Platt argues that the prosecutor violated OCGA § 17-8-75 by
“identifying” him for three witnesses, and the trial court erred by
failing to take some curative action. From a review of the record, it
appears that the witnesses had an obstructed view of the defense
table where Platt was sitting, and the prosecutor attempted to point
7 Although the claims of untimely disclosure do not warrant reversal, we
do not condone the State’s failure to comply with its legal obligations. 23 out Platt’s location in the courtroom. The prosecutor did nothing
more than say where Platt was located.
OCGA § 17-8-75 provides:
Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the prosecuting attorney is the offender.
We are dubious that the prosecutor’s actions were “statements
of prejudicial matters” triggering a requirement for the trial court to
take curative action under OCGA § 17-8-75. The jury was no doubt
well aware that Platt was on trial and was sitting at the defense
table. There is no indication that the prosecutor did anything more
than to make sure witnesses knew where Platt was.
But even if this amounted to a violation of OCGA § 17-8-75,
any error in failing to prevent the prosecutor from making continued
“identifications” of Platt or issuing a curative instruction was
harmless.
24 [A] trial court’s error in not fulfilling its duty under OCGA § 17-8-75 is subject to harmless error analysis. For nonconstitutional harmless error, the State has the burden to show that it was highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
Caldwell v. State, 313 Ga. 640, 648 (2) (872 SE2d 712) (2022)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
Here, any error was harmless given the strong evidence of
Platt’s guilt. Even setting aside Platt’s second recorded interview in
which he admitted participating in the armed robbery, other
evidence showed that Platt shot Jones or, at the very least,
participated in the armed robbery. Plair testified that Platt said he
shot the victim during a robbery when Platt’s face covering fell off
and allowed the victim to see Platt. Bruce Coleman also heard
Duncan and Bond talk on the day of the shooting about planning a
“lick,” or robbery, and when he saw them afterward, he heard from
Platt and Bond that they carried out the robbery and “probably”
killed someone. Miriam Brown and Platt’s sister testified that on the
day of the shooting, Platt, Duncan, Bond, and Plair were playing
with a gun and wearing clothing that was later recovered from the
25 same field where a safe appearing to belong to the victim was also
found. Given the strength of the evidence, and the jury’s awareness
that Platt was on trial and was sitting at the defense table, it is
highly probable that the prosecutor’s actions in pointing out Platt as
the defendant to witnesses did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.
4. Platt next argues that the cumulative prejudice from the
trial court’s errors warranted a new trial. We disagree.
To establish cumulative error, Platt must establish that “at
least two errors were committed in the course of the trial and
considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors
so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied [him] a
fundamentally fair trial.” Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 567-568 (6) (883
SE2d 773) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Above, we
assume, without deciding, that the trial court may have erred in
failing to grant Platt a continuance related to the State’s untimely
disclosure that Platt’s first custodial interview had been recorded
and in failing to take some curative action with respect to the
prosecutor’s identification of Platt to witnesses. As explained above,
26 these errors produced very little, if any, harm. Therefore, given the
strength of the evidence, even if these assumed errors could be
considered cumulatively, the cumulative prejudice did not deny
Platt a fair trial.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided April 30, 2024.
Murder. Liberty Superior Court. Before Judge Cheney.
Rouse & Copeland, Amy L. Copeland, for appellant.
Billy J. Nelson, Jr., District Attorney, Melissa L. Poole,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan
H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Matthew B. Crowder,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.