NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 24, 2025
S25A0360. QUINTANAR v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Abraham Quintanar appeals his convictions for felony murder
and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Marcus
Gilead and the attempted armed robbery of Ciavy Wiles. 1 Quintanar
1 The crimes occurred on February 10, 2020. On December 4, 2020, a
Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Quintanar, Miguel Angel Gonzalez, and Sebastian Resendiz-Garcia for two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Quintanar alone was charged with possession of a handgun by a person under the age of 18 years. Quintanar was tried separately at a jury trial that ended on February 29, 2024, and he was found guilty on all counts. On March 4, 2024, Quintanar was sentenced to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder predicated on the aggravated assault of Gilead, a consecutive five-year prison term for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, concurrent 20-year prison terms for the aggravated assault and attempted armed robbery of Wiles, and a concurrent 12-month prison term for possession of a handgun by a person under the age of 18 years. The other felony murder count was vacated by operation of law, and the remaining counts were merged into the felony murder for which Quintanar was sentenced. We have identified a sentencing error that we correct in Division 7. Quintanar filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended contends that the trial court erred by admitting his custodial
statement, admitting testimony about a video recording that was
not introduced into evidence, refusing to allow certain impeachment
of a witness, and failing to give requested jury charges related to
justification and mutual combat. Quintanar also contends that
certain portions of the State’s closing argument amounted to plain
error and that the cumulative effect of the enumerated errors
prejudiced him. Although we vacate Quintanar’s conviction and
sentence for aggravated assault because it should have merged with
his conviction for attempted armed robbery, we otherwise affirm
Quintanar’s convictions for the reasons explained below.
The evidence presented at trial showed that co-indictees
Quintanar, Sebastian Resendiz-Garcia, and Miguel Angel Gonzalez
attempted to rob Gilead and Wiles at gunpoint, that Quintanar and
Gilead fought and struggled for control of Quintanar’s gun, and that
through new counsel on March 14 and September 3, 2024. The trial court denied Quintanar’s amended motion for new trial on September 16, 2024. Quintanar filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Quintanar then shot and killed Gilead.
On February 10, 2020, Quintanar, Resendiz-Garcia, and
Gonzalez planned to rob Gilead where he lived with his mother and
brother. The co-indictees understood that Gilead was a drug dealer
and in possession of drugs and money because Gonzalez had
purchased marijuana from him earlier in the day. Gonzalez paid
about $600 for three to four ounces of marijuana, which Gilead
retrieved from a duffel bag in his vehicle.
The three co-indictees drove to Gilead’s house but parked some
distance away. Wiles and Gilead were “hang[ing] out” in Gilead’s
car, parked in his driveway, and Wiles was watching a game on his
phone while Gilead dozed off. Each of the co-indictees possessed a
gun and wore a mask during the attempted robbery. At
approximately 8:00 p.m., two of them approached the driver’s side
of Gilead’s vehicle while Gilead was asleep in the driver’s seat, and
one co-indictee approached the passenger’s side while Wiles was in
the front passenger seat. The three co-indictees pointed their
firearms at Gilead and Wiles and knocked on the windows of both
3 sides of the car. Gilead picked up a machete that was in the car, but
Wiles told Gilead not to get the machete. The co-indictees forced
Gilead and Wiles out of the vehicle and asked where the bag of
marijuana was. Resendiz-Garcia began searching the vehicle.
After Wiles showed the co-indictee on his side of the vehicle he
had nothing in his pockets, a gunshot from Gilead’s side of the
vehicle distracted that co-indictee and gave Wiles an opportunity to
run away from the scene. Resendiz-Garcia heard a shot and fired his
9mm Taurus pistol as he fled, and Quintanar and Gonzalez also
discharged their firearms. Gilead struggled with Quintanar and
tried to disarm him, but Quintanar regained control of his gun and
shot at Gilead multiple times. After Quintanar fled, he disposed of
his weapon by throwing it into a sewer.
Gilead’s mother, who was inside the house, heard three
gunshots and opened her front door. She saw Gilead bent over, and
he kept telling his mother he felt tired. As Gilead moved towards his
mother, she could see a young man, whom Gilead’s mother later
identified as Gonzalez, holding a gun to Gilead’s back. Gilead’s
4 mother then put herself between them and, not knowing that Gilead
had already been shot, begged the man not to shoot. Gilead collapsed
onto the floor with blood on his chest, and the other man fled. Gilead
later died from a single gunshot that entered the front of his chest
and exited through his back.
A total of five shell casings were recovered at the scene: four
9mm casings and one .40-caliber casing. One 9mm casing was in the
driveway on the driver’s side of the vehicle; two 9mm shell casings
were in the bushes near the front door; one 9mm shell casing was
between the vehicle and garage door; and one .40-caliber shell casing
was in a driveway across the street. The four 9mm shell casings were
fired from the same gun. When Resendiz-Garcia was arrested at his
home, officers recovered a loaded brown Taurus 9mm handgun.
Other evidence discovered at the scene included a bullet hole in the
garage door, 1.4 pounds of marijuana in the garage, a black “sock
hat” and black ski mask in the yard, marijuana and a machete in
the vehicle, a black folding knife on the ground, and Gilead’s wallet
in the house containing $2,328 in cash.
5 Law enforcement learned from Resendiz-Garcia of Quintanar’s
and Gonzalez’s involvement in Gilead’s murder and took out
warrants for their arrest. On February 13, 2020, Officer Johnathon
Bucknor stopped a vehicle carrying Quintanar and others, and
Quintanar fled the scene, leaving a firearm behind. Law
enforcement eventually located Quintanar the next day and took
him into custody. During a police interview, Quintanar, who was 15
years old at the time, stated that he and his two co-indictees ran up
on the victims to commit the armed robbery; Quintanar initially
pointed a 9mm Jimenez firearm at the passenger; after Gilead got
out of the car, he “tackled” Quintanar and “grabbed the gun from
[him]”; Quintanar “thought [Gilead] was going to shoot me”; Gilead
“pistol-whipped” Quintanar five times and pointed the gun at him;
Quintanar grabbed the gun back, “wrestled” on the ground with
Gilead over the gun, regained control of it, and shot Gilead; Gilead’s
mother came out and said “don’t kill me; don’t kill him”; and –
contrary to the identification of Gonzalez by Gilead’s mother – only
she and Quintanar were still there with Gilead because Wiles and
6 the two co-indictees had left.
1. Quintanar contends that the admission of his custodial
statement to law enforcement officers after his arrest when he was
a minor was a violation of due process under the United States
Constitution because the statement was not voluntarily made. In
support of this contention, Quintanar complains that, before being
advised of the charges against him, Detective Dennis Hennelly told
him that he was going prison for the rest of his life “because you
want to say you were not there,” in reference to Gilead’s shooting.
Quintanar argues that Detective Hennelly was not simply informing
Quintanar of his potential sentence, but instead made the life
sentence a consequence of his statement rather than his charges,
and implied that he would not spend the rest of his life in prison if
he changed his statement.2 Quintanar also complains of his mother’s
2 Quintanar does not make a separate statutory argument that his confession was induced by a hope of benefit. Although Quintanar’s appellate brief references case law related to such statutory claims, he does not cite the relevant statute, OCGA § 24-8-824, which provides that, “[t]o make a confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”
7 absence for four hours and the officers’ repeated misrepresentations
that both of his co-indictees and the victim’s mother had identified
him when Resendiz-Garcia was the only one who had implicated
Quintanar treats the hope-of-benefit principle as auxiliary to his constitutional claim. This treatment is consistent with his failure to preserve the statutory issue in the trial court for ordinary appellate review. An objection to evidence on constitutional grounds does not preserve a related statutory ground for review. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 294 Ga. 86, 87-88 (2) (750 SE2d 347) (2013) (holding that objection to evidence on Confrontation Clause grounds does not preserve for review a hearsay objection to the same evidence). Quintanar preserved his contention that his custodial statement was involuntary in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. But he did not raise the statutory claim that his statement was induced by a hope of benefit or fear of injury in his written motion, at the pre- trial hearing on the motion, or when the statements were ultimately introduced into evidence. See Turner v. State, 287 Ga. 793, 794 (2) (700 SE2d 386) (2010) (similarly explaining that the appellant waived his claim based on the predecessor of OCGA § 24-8-824 even though he preserved his federal constitutional voluntariness claim). We have explained that statutory hope-of-benefit claims are distinguished from constitutional voluntariness claims, though our own decisions have sometimes conflated the two. See Matthews v. State, 311 Ga. 531, 542 (3) (b) (858 SE2d 718) (2021); State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 779 (3) (b) (770 SE2d 808) (2015). Yet, again, Quintanar makes no separate statutory argument. He does not make any argument that the portion of the statute requiring the statement to be voluntary – apart from the specified “hope of benefit” or “fear of injury” – means something more than the federal due- process voluntariness requirement. Nor does he argue that his statement was induced by hope of benefit or fear of injury as set forth in the statute. However, Quintanar does specifically rely on the principle that a promise falling short of a “hope of benefit,” “particularly if it is broken, could be one of the totality of circumstances that renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible as a violation of constitutional due process.” Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 871 (2) (d) (725 SE2d 320) (2012). Accordingly, we consider the circumstance of Detective Hennelly’s statement as part of our due-process analysis below. 8 Quintanar. We conclude that the trial court did not err in
determining that the totality of the circumstances showed that
Quintanar’s custodial statement was voluntary.
“In determining whether a defendant’s statement was
voluntary as a matter of constitutional due process, a trial court
must consider the totality of the circumstances,” with the State
bearing the “burden of demonstrating the voluntariness of [the]
statement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Matthews v. State,
311 Ga. 531, 540 (3) (a) (858 SE2d 718) (2021) (citation and
punctuation omitted). See also Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 429 (3)
n.9 (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (noting that we have applied the “totality-
of-the-circumstances test in evaluating whether a juvenile’s
statement to law enforcement officials was voluntarily made as a
matter of due process”). “[P]roper application of a totality-of-the-
circumstances test mandates . . . inquiry into all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation.” Clark, 315 Ga. at 434 (3) (b) (citation
and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original) (citing cases
discussing the test in a variety of contexts). Thus, lists of specific
9 factors that we have previously considered “are neither required nor
exhaustive.” State v. Franklin, 318 Ga. 39, 42 (3) n.6 (897 SE2d 432)
(2024) (involving factors we have considered in determining whether
the statement made by an adult defendant while intoxicated or
under the influence of drugs was voluntary as a matter of
constitutional due process). See also Clark, 315 Ga. at 429 (3), 434-
435 (3) (b) & n.16 (stating that “any prescriptive or fixed list of
factors by its very nature risks undermining a totality-of-the-
circumstances test” and disapproving any language in prior cases
indicating that a specific nine-factor framework to determine
whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights is required or exclusive, as well as cases involving the issue of
whether a statement was voluntarily made as a matter of due
process).
As we recently clarified, however, “the totality-of-the-
circumstances standard we use to evaluate voluntariness claims
includes” the necessary predicate of coercive police activity.
Franklin, 318 Ga. at 42-43 (3) (relying on Colorado v. Connelly, 479
10 U. S. 157, 164-167 (107 SCt 515, 93LE2d 473) (1986)). “Coercive
police activity—such as excessively lengthy interrogation, physical
deprivation, and brutality—is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Dozier v. State, 306
Ga. 29, 36 (4) (c) (829 SE2d 131) (2019) (citations and punctuation
omitted). And “[i]t is well established that artifice and deception do
not render a statement involuntary so long as they are not
calculated to procure an untrue statement.” Drake v. State, 296 Ga.
286, 290 (3) (766 SE2d 447) (2014).
Generally, when reviewing the voluntariness of a defendant’s
statement, which is “a mixed question of fact and law, we accept the
trial court’s finding on disputed facts and credibility of witnesses
unless clearly erroneous but independently apply the law to the
facts.” Matthews, 311 Ga. at 540 (3) (a) (citation and punctuation
omitted).
We have previously explained that when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a suppression issue, an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record in the light most
11 favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court. In cases where some or all of the material facts are undisputed, we properly may take notice of the undisputed facts — even if the trial court did not — without interfering with the prerogative of the trial court to resolve disputes of material fact.
State v. Tripp, 320 Ga. 536, 547-548 (2) (910 SE2d 587) (2024)
(citation and punctuation omitted). “Such undisputed facts include,
among other things, those which definitively can be ascertained
exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and
presents no questions of credibility. Audio or video evidence may
match that description.” Franklin, 318 Ga. at 39 (1) n.1 (citation and
punctuation omitted). See also State v. Leverette, 320 Ga. 806, 809-
810 (2) (912 SE2d 533) (2025). Thus, the video recording of
Quintanar’s interview – which was admitted at the hearing on
Quintanar’s motion to suppress and at trial and was played for the
jury – may be considered to the extent that there is no dispute about
what happened or what words were said during the interview, while
any findings the trial court made in resolving disputes of material
fact must be reviewed for clear error. “Finally, we review de novo the
12 application of the facts to the law — that is, the trial court’s ultimate
conclusion whether, under all the circumstances, the defendant’s
statement was voluntary.” Tripp, 320 Ga. at 548 (2) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
The trial court here made no findings at the hearing on
Quintanar’s motion to suppress and subsequently issued a written
order finding, in relevant part, only that, “under the totality of
circumstances, [Quintanar’s] statement was voluntarily and freely
made[.]” The parties have not raised any dispute about the words
or the conduct occurring in the recorded interview or about any other
evidence related to the interview. Indeed, Quintanar states that the
evidence presented at the hearing “was not disputed” and that “the
controlling facts can be determined exclusively by reference to
evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of
credibility.”
The video recording of Quintanar’s interview shows that police
officers slowly reviewed the waiver-of-rights forms for a juvenile,
Quintanar indicated he understood the forms, and he signed them.
13 Quintanar declined to continue without a parent, confirmed that he
would talk with officers if his mother was present, and gave them
her contact information. The interview was then suspended. About
two hours later, officers told Quintanar that they were still trying
to contact his mother. Quintanar asked what would happen if his
mother was not able to come to the police station that day. Officers
explained that, because he was being held on “adult charges,” they
would first “have to take you over to the jail, and you’re going to get
booked in, and then you’ll see a judge and then from there you’ll go
to our YDC [Youth Detention Center].” Quintanar asked whether
the interview would happen if his mother did not come, officers
explained it was his choice, and he said he would “go ahead with the
interview . . . I don’t really care.”
The officers left the interview room but later returned and
confirmed that Quintanar wanted to speak with them without his
mother present and understood all of the rights that had been
explained to him. Quintanar denied his presence and involvement
in a shooting with his friends. The officers told Quintanar that
14 Resendiz-Garcia and Gonzalez had told them everything they and
Quintanar did and that the victim’s mother gave a very good
description of Quintanar, but Quintanar continued to deny his
presence. Detective Hennelly later told Quintanar the story that
Resendiz-Garcia provided. Detective Hennelly stated he did not
believe Quintanar’s explanation that he was not at the crime scene.
Detective Hennelly stated that Quintanar was being charged as an
adult, his friends would testify against him, and “you are going to go
to jail for the rest of your f**king life for some bulls**t because you
want to say you weren’t there.”
Quintanar did not react or change his statement at that time.
Instead, he reviewed a document with his charges on it and had a
long discussion with Investigator Yayoi Huggins unrelated to the
shooting. Quintanar later said he was aware of the shooting because
he heard about it on the news, but he continued to insist he was not
there, and he told Investigator Huggins that they had the wrong
person. Investigator Huggins told Quintanar “everything you’re
saying now isn’t going to look good” because there were “three people
15 saying that it was you,” as well as other evidence, but Quintanar
remained silent and requested water, and Investigator Huggins left
the room.
When Investigator Huggins returned, she and Quintanar
discussed the visitation process at YDC, and Quintanar became
emotional when talking about his sisters. He asked when he would
be taken to jail, and Investigator Huggins said whenever he was
ready. Quintanar confirmed that he did not “have anything else to
say.” Investigator Huggins got up to leave, about four hours after
the interview had begun. As she grabbed the door handle, Quintanar
stopped her and said he was there when the shooting happened, “it
wasn’t supposed to go down like that but it did,” and “there, y’all got
me, I don’t give a f**k no more.” When Investigator Huggins asked
who came up with the idea, Quintanar said it was Resendiz-Garcia.
Quintanar then explained that, after Gilead and Wiles exited the
vehicle, Quintanar struggled with Gilead over his firearm, regained
control of it, and shot Gilead. At the hearing on Quintanar’s motion
to suppress those statements, both officers who interviewed
16 Quintanar gave testimony consistent with the video recording and
also testified that neither of them threatened him, coerced him, or
promised him anything for his cooperation.
Contrary to Quintanar’s specific arguments set forth above, the
trial court did not err by concluding that his statement was
voluntary. The officers did not talk to him without his mother
present until he agreed to speak with them after asking about what
would happen if she did not come. See Lester v. State, 310 Ga. 81, 88
(2) (849 SE2d 425) (2020) (The absence of a parent, especially when
the juvenile has acquiesced in nevertheless being interviewed, is
“merely one factor a trial court should consider in its totality-of-the-
circumstances evaluation of the voluntariness of a juvenile’s
statement.”), disapproved on other grounds in Clark, 315 Ga. at 435
(3) (b) n.16. And there is no evidence of the “hallmarks of coercive
police activity,” i.e., “excessively lengthy interrogation, physical
deprivation, [or] brutality.” See Drake, 296 Ga. at 291 (3) (citation
and punctuation omitted). To the extent that Detective Hennelly’s
statement about Quintanar going to prison for the rest of his life
17 “because you want to say you were not there” was artifice or
deception, it was not “calculated to procure an untrue statement.”
See id. at 290 (3). Moreover, although the officers lied about the
evidence against Quintanar, they “did nothing to suggest that a
confession would not be used against [him].” Matthews, 311 Ga. at
541 (3) (a). Absent evidence of coercive police conduct, and
considering all of the circumstances here, including the officers’
testimony and our de novo review of the entire video recording, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that
Quintanar’s statement was voluntary as a matter of constitutional
due process. See Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 869 (4) (849 SE2d 191)
(2020) (“Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding
[the appellant’s] custodial statement, including the detectives’
testimony concerning [his] demeanor, conduct, and responses to
their questions during the interview, as well as our de novo review
of the video recording of the interview, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in finding that [the appellant’s] statement was
voluntarily made.”).
18 2. Quintanar contends that the trial court violated the best-
evidence rule3 when it admitted Officer Bucknor’s testimony about
a body-camera video recording of his attempted traffic stop of
Quintanar’s vehicle even though the recording was not introduced
into evidence. Because it is highly probable that the alleged violation
of the best-evidence rule did not contribute to the verdict, there is no
reversible error.
An erroneous evidentiary ruling, without more, does not
require reversal if it was harmless. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Error
shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]”). “In
determining whether the error was harmless, we review the record
de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable
jurors to have done so. The test for determining nonconstitutional
3 The best-evidence rule provides that, “[t]o prove the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph shall be required.” OCGA § 24-10-1002. Thus, proving the contents of a video recording “generally requires a party to admit the original recording.” Render v. State, 320 Ga. 890, 899 (3) (912 SE2d 679) (2025). However, the original will not be required in certain specified circumstances. See OCGA §§ 24-10-1004, 24-10-1007. 19 harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict.” Clarke v. State, 308 Ga. 630, 634 (2) (842
SE2d 863) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).
In this case, Officer Bucknor testified on direct examination
that he received information that Quintanar was in a certain vehicle
in a particular location and was a “skinny male with almost bright
orange hair, light auburn-type color hair, short.” Bucknor
subsequently stopped the described vehicle after dark in a well-lit
parking lot. Four people were in the vehicle, and Bucknor identified
Quintanar as the person who exited the rear passenger-side door
and ran away. A loaded firearm was found under the front passenger
seat, accessible from the rear seat on that side. Quintanar was
wearing a hoodie, and Bucknor did not see his face, but the hoodie
came off, and Bucknor identified Quintanar based on observation of
his “clearly dyed” orange hair. During cross-examination, Officer
Bucknor testified that there was video from a body-worn camera
that showed what happened. When defense counsel asked to see it,
the prosecutor said, “we hadn’t planned to play it, but we can.” After
20 admitting the firearm and bullets over defense counsel’s objection,
the trial court ruled that either party could play the body-camera
video, and defense counsel said, “It’s their prerogative. I’d be
delighted to see it if they wish to show it to us.”
During redirect examination, Bucknor testified he watched the
body-camera video in preparation for court, the prosecutor asked if
he was “able to see Mr. Quintanar’s orange hair in the body camera,”
and Bucknor responded affirmatively. Quintanar objected that the
“body camera will speak for itself.” The prosecutor responded that
she was “asking about his foundation for his testimony in terms of
being able to recognize” Quintanar’s picture on another exhibit. The
trial court overruled the objection, and the prosecutor said it would
take 10 or 15 minutes to pull up the body-camera video. Neither the
State nor Quintanar ever introduced the video despite its
availability. 4
4 The District Attorney claims that Quintanar waived this issue because
he never attempted to play the video recording and instead suggested that the prosecution play it and argued to the jury that neither the recording nor the testimony of any of the other three persons in the vehicle was ever presented.
21 Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted Officer Bucknor’s testimony on redirect
examination over Quintanar’s objection, the error was harmless.
Bucknor’s testimony on redirect examination about what he saw on
the video recording was cumulative of his prior eyewitness
identification testimony based on his personal observation of the
traffic stop, to which Quintanar did not object. The evidence against
Quintanar, including his confession, was strong. And the challenged
testimony was relevant only to show that Quintanar fled from a
traffic stop just three days after the murder. Moreover, Quintanar
was able to argue to the jury that the identification of him at the
traffic stop was unreliable because neither the recording nor the
testimony of any of the other three persons in the vehicle was ever
presented. Under these circumstances, we conclude that it is highly
probable that any error in the admission of Officer Bucknor’s
testimony about what he saw on the video recording did not
However, we need not definitively decide whether Quintanar waived this issue. Instead, we assume, only for purposes of this appeal, that Quintanar did not waive this issue but preserved it for ordinary review. 22 contribute to the verdict. See Madera v. State, 318 Ga. 593, 596 (2)
(899 SE2d 132) (2024) (“It is well settled . . . that the erroneous
admission of evidence that is merely cumulative of other properly
admitted evidence is generally harmless, particularly where the
evidence of the defendant’s guilt is strong.”). Cf. Render v. State, 320
Ga. 890, 901 (4) (912 SE2d 679) (2025) (assuming without deciding
on plain-error review that certain accomplice testimony was a clear
and obvious error under the best-evidence rule, and concluding that
the appellant did not show prejudice because the challenged
testimony was relevant only to show that he had been with an
accomplice inside the vehicle used in the crime on the day after the
shooting and the testimony was cumulative of the accomplice’s
separate testimony from personal experience.).
3. Quintanar contends that the trial court wrongfully
prevented him from fully cross-examining Resendiz-Garcia about
the reduced sentence Resendiz-Garcia received in exchange for his
testimony. Quintanar asserts that this ruling violated his right to
confront witnesses against him under the federal and state
23 constitutions and his right to a thorough and sifting cross-
examination. We see no reversible error.
Criminal defendants are entitled to confront witnesses against
them and to a thorough and sifting cross-examination. See U.S.
Const. Amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him[.]”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIV (“Every person
charged with an offense against the laws of this state . . . shall be
confronted with the witnesses testifying against such person.”);
OCGA § 24-6-611 (b) (“The right of a thorough and sifting cross-
examination shall belong to every party as to the witnesses called
against the party.”). That can include the right to ask a testifying
co-defendant about any benefit he received in exchange for his
testimony, including a change in when the witness could become
eligible for parole. See Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 750, 754 (2) (d) (827
SE2d 879) (2019); Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 341-343 (2) (698
SE2d 301) (2010). But the right to cross-examination is not
unlimited, and the trial court has discretion to limit it. See Manley,
24 287 Ga. at 340 (2).
In this case, Resendiz-Garcia testified that he was originally
charged with murder, which he knew carried a life sentence, but
that he later pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter in
return for his testimony and was sentenced to 40 years, with 20
years to be served in prison. He also conceded that he would not have
received the plea deal if he had admitted that he was the shooter.
On cross-examination, defense counsel tried to establish whether
Resendiz-Garcia knew that, had he received a life sentence, he
would have to serve 30 years before being eligible for parole. The
State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.
Quintanar now argues that his cross-examination was unfairly
limited because he was not allowed to fully explore exactly what
Resendiz-Garcia understood about the different possibilities for
parole under his original charges versus under his plea deal. But
even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting
cross-examination in that way, the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 616 (4) (878 SE2d
25 505) (2022) (“A constitutional error is harmless when the State
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute
to the verdict, such as when the evidence at issue is cumulative of
other properly-admitted evidence or when the evidence against the
defendant is overwhelming.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
The jury heard about Resendiz-Garcia’s original charges and
his reduced charges. The jury heard that he got the plea deal in
exchange for his testimony. The possibility that the jury would have
reached a different verdict if it heard a little more about exactly
what Resendiz-Garcia understood about the details of the parole
system is small. That is especially so given the strong evidence of
Quintanar’s guilt. For these reasons, any error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. See Jones, 305 Ga. at 754 (2) (d) (holding that
any error in limiting the appellant’s cross-examination on the issue
of parole eligibility was harmless, in light of the strength of the
evidence against him and substantial testimony from his accomplice
“concerning the favorable plea deal resulting in a major reduction in
the sentences [she] faced, thereby establishing [her] potential bias
26 toward the State”); Manley, 287 Ga. at 343 (2) (holding that trial
court erred in excluding evidence of changes in eligibility of a State’s
witness for parole resulting from her plea and sentencing deal, but
that the error was harmless because the appellants “were allowed to
extensively cross-examine [the witness] about her potential bias
flowing from her plea deal with the State which reduced her possible
sentence of life imprisonment to only a six-year sentence”).
4. Quintanar contends that the trial court erred by failing to
give his requests to charge the jury on the exercise of self-defense
while in the commission of a felony and on mutual combat. Although
Quintanar did request both charges and made timely objections to
their omission, the evidence in this case did not authorize either of
his requested jury instructions.
(a) Quintanar’s argument regarding his request for a self-
defense instruction is difficult to follow. The jury was charged on the
lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, but, as Quintanar
conceded, the evidence did not warrant a jury instruction addressing
whether he acted in self-defense. Instead, the undisputed evidence
27 showed that Quintanar was one of the initial aggressors and was
committing a felony against Gilead. See OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (“A
person is not justified in using force . . . if he . . . [i]nitially provokes
the use of force against himself with the intent to use such force as
an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant;” if he “[i]s
attempting to commit [or] committing . . . a felony; or” if he “[w]as
the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement unless he
withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such
other person his intent to do so and the other, notwithstanding,
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force.”).
Kinlaw v. State, 317 Ga. 414, 423 (5) (893 SE2d 712) (2023) (“Indeed,
it would turn the law on its head to allow an armed aggressor, who
confronts an unarmed nonthreatening victim, to claim self-defense
when the victim is shot during the victim’s struggle to disarm the
aggressor.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Quintanar argues, however, that – because Gilead was
committing the drug-related felonies of possession with intent to
distribute marijuana and possession of more than one ounce of
28 marijuana and therefore, under OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2), would not
have been entitled to self-defense if he had killed one of the robbers
– the jury should have been charged that “a person is not justified
in using force if that person is attempting to commit, committing, or
fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony,”
especially when the prosecutor argued in closing that Gilead was
“defending himself” and was entitled to use “deadly force.”
Quintanar also argues that the omission of his requested self-
defense charge prevented the jury from finding the provocation
required to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Whether Gilead acted in self-defense is not relevant to
Quintanar’s culpability. Consistent with Kinlaw, and as Quintanar
concedes, he could not claim self-defense, regardless of whether
Gilead acted in self-defense. Similarly, Quintanar has not shown
how his level of culpability in any way depends on Gilead’s
hypothetical non-entitlement to self-defense. The jury was fully and
fairly instructed on voluntary manslaughter. Quintanar has failed
to explain how his request for an isolated instruction – on one aspect
29 of the victim’s non-entitlement to self-defense – was relevant to
whether Quintanar acted in response to a serious provocation. See
OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) (“A person commits the offense of voluntary
manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being
under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he
acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion
resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion
in a reasonable person[.]”); Shaw v. State, 301 Ga. 14, 20 (3) (799
SE2d 186) (2017) (“The provocation necessary to support a charge of
voluntary manslaughter is markedly different from that which will
support a self-defense claim.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Whether or not Gilead would have been legally entitled to claim self-
defense if he were the defendant has no bearing on whether his
actions to defend himself as the victim counted as a sudden and
severe provocation that could reduce Quintanar’s offense from
murder to voluntary manslaughter. See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). Nothing
in the definition of voluntary manslaughter requires that the
provocation be illegal or unjustified. Id.
30 Because there was not even slight evidence to support the
theory of Quintanar’s requested jury charge related to self-defense,
the trial court did not err in rejecting that requested charge. See
Bowman v. State, 317 Ga. 457, 461 (2) (a) (893 SE2d 735) (2023) (A
jury “instruction is authorized as long as slight evidence supports
the theory of the charge.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Munn
v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 722 (3) (873 SE2d 166) (2022) (“To authorize a
jury charge [on justification], there must be slight evidence
supporting the charge.”).
(b) As for the other request to charge, the evidence did not
warrant a jury instruction on mutual combat. “Mutual combat
occurs when there is combat between two persons as a result of a
sudden quarrel or such circumstances as indicate a purpose,
willingness, and intent on the part of both to engage mutually in a
fight.” Jones v. State, 319 Ga. 140, 147 (4) (902 SE2d 599) (2024)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Fighting to repel an unprovoked
attack “should not be confused with mutual combat.” Tidwell v.
State, 312 Ga. 459, 463 (1) (863 SE2d 127) (2021) (citation and
31 punctuation omitted). Quintanar argues that a mutual combat
instruction was supported by the evidence that Gilead picked up a
machete at first, tackled Quintanar, grabbed the gun, pistol-
whipped Quintanar, and wrestled with him. However, such evidence
of a violent struggle – involving Gilead’s fighting to repel an
unprovoked attack that began while he slept – did not constitute
even slight evidence to support a jury charge on mutual combat, as
that evidence did not show circumstances indicating an agreement,
willingness, or readiness on the part of both to engage mutually in
a fight. See Jones, 319 Ga. at 147 (4) (holding that trial court did not
err in failing to instruct the jury on mutual conduct where there was
evidence of a struggle but the appellant did not point to any evidence
of combat between him and the victim resulting from circumstances
indicating a “purpose, willingness, and intent on the part of both to
engage mutually in a fight” (citation and punctuation omitted));
Tidwell, 312 at 463 (1) (holding that trial court did not err in failing
to instruct the jury on mutual combat where “there [was] no
evidence of an agreement, willingness, or readiness to fight between
32 [the victim] and any of his attackers” and the evidence instead
showed that the victim “was ambushed” by the appellant and others
“while he slept” and that the victim later charged at them and tried
to hit them).
5. Quintanar contends that certain portions of the State’s
closing argument – telling the jury that the victim’s force was
justified 5 – amounted to plain error. But Quintanar made no
objection at trial to those portions of the State’s closing argument.
And it is well-settled that “we do not review unpreserved challenges
to closing arguments in non-death penalty cases, even for plain
error.” Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489, 494 (2) (b) (910 SE2d 173)
(2024) (citation and punctuation omitted). This claim therefore
presents nothing for review.
6. Quintanar finally contends that the cumulative effect of the
alleged errors prejudiced him and warrants a new trial. To establish
cumulative error, Quintanar “must establish that at least two errors
5 Quintanar specifically complains of the prosecutor’s statements that
Gilead was “defending himself,” “didn’t do anything wrong that night,” and was entitled to use “some kind of deadly force.” 33 were committed in the course of the trial and considered together
along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the
jury’s deliberation that they denied him a fundamentally fair trial.”
Platt v. State, 319 Ga. 1, 12 (4) (901 SE2d 114) (2024) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Although we have assumed two errors by the
trial court in the course of our analysis, we conclude that they do not
warrant a new trial here.
In Divisions 2 and 3 above, we assumed, without deciding, that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Officer Bucknor’s
testimony about what he saw on the video recording of his traffic
stop and that the trial court also abused its discretion by precluding
Quintanar from further cross-examination of Resendiz-Garcia about
potential disparities in his parole eligibility with and without his
plea deal. These assumed “errors addressed entirely different issues
in the case,” Pender v. State, 311 Ga. 98, 120 (6) (856 SE2d 302)
(2021), and, as explained above, they each produced very little, if
any, harm. The admission of Bucknor’s testimony about the video
recording was harmless for several reasons, including the fact that
34 it was cumulative of his own properly admitted prior testimony
based on personal observation. And the limitation on cross-
examination of Resendiz-Garcia about parole was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt for several reasons, including the admission of
substantial testimony from him about favorable aspects of his plea
deal.
Given the strength of the properly admitted evidence against
Quintanar, we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt6 that the
cumulative prejudice of the assumed errors did not deny him a fair
trial. See Platt, 319 Ga. at 12 (4) (holding that, because two assumed
“errors produced very little, if any, harm[,] . . . given the strength of
the evidence, even if these assumed errors could be considered
cumulatively, the cumulative prejudice did not deny [the appellant]
a fair trial”); Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 367 (7) (846 SE2d 57)
6 One assumed error in this case was partly constitutional in nature, and
the other one was not. As was true at the time of Pender, “[w]e have yet to decide how multiple standards for assessing prejudice may interact under cumulative review of different types of errors, and again we need not do so here, because [the appellant]’s claims of cumulative prejudice fail under even the higher standard implicated by these errors, which requires the State to prove that violations of [the appellant]’s right to confront witnesses were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 311 Ga. at 120 (6) (citation omitted). 35 (2020) (“[E]ven when considered as a whole under the most
demanding standard that applies to any of the alleged errors, the
cumulative prejudicial effect of the actual and assumed evidentiary
errors and counsel’s deficiencies is not sufficient to outweigh the
strength of the properly admitted evidence of the [a]ppellant’s guilt
. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the combined prejudicial effect of
the actual and assumed evidentiary errors and deficiencies by
counsel did not deprive the [a]ppellant of his right to a
fundamentally fair trial.”).
7. Quintanar does not raise the issue on appeal, but we have
identified a merger error in his sentencing. See Dixon v. State, 302
Ga. 691, 696-697 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017) (“We have the discretion
to correct merger errors sua sponte . . . because a merger error
results in an illegal and void judgment of conviction and sentence.”).
The count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against Wiles
should have been merged into the attempted armed robbery
conviction also involving Wiles. See Reeves v. State, 309 Ga. 645, 649
(4) (847 SE2d 551) (2020). See also Rice v. State, 311 Ga. 620, 625
36 (2) (857 SE2d 230) (2021). We therefore vacate Quintanar’s
conviction and sentence for aggravated assault.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.