NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 16, 2025
S25A0840. FELTON v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Joseph A. Felton appeals his convictions for malice
murder and other crimes related to the beating and stabbing death
of his wife, Sheray Felton.1 On appeal, Felton argues that his
convictions should be reversed based on the following contentions:
(1) Felton’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing
to request a jury charge on impeachment based on a witness’s bias
————————————————————— 1 Sheray was killed on or about March 13 to 15, 2014. On July 7, 2016, a
Henry County grand jury indicted Felton for the following counts: malice murder (Count 1); felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2); and aggravated assault (Count 3). Felton was tried from August 2 to 12, 2021, and the jury found Felton guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Felton to life without the possibility of parole on Count 1 (malice murder), and the remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Felton filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended through new counsel multiple times. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court denied the motion on December 11, 2024. Felton filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the April 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. for or against a party; (2) in four different instances at trial, the trial
court plainly erred by allowing witnesses to testify about testing
performed by other individuals and by allowing the admission of the
non-testifying individuals’ reports through these witnesses in
violation of Felton’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (3) the trial
court plainly erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence of
multiple knives found in Felton’s car at the time of his arrest
because the State failed to show a connection between the knives
and Sheray’s death; and (4) the cumulative harm of trial counsel’s
deficiency and the trial court’s errors requires reversal. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm Felton’s convictions and sentences.
2 The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that, on the night of March 14, 2014, Rosanna Mays, Sheray’s mother, and Josten Mays, Sheray’s 20-year-old son, who lived in the Chicago area, were scheduled to fly from Chicago to Atlanta to visit Sheray. Rosanna spoke to Sheray around 8:00 p.m. on March 13 — the night before the scheduled trip — and Sheray sounded “fine.” At 5:00 a.m. the next morning, Felton called Rosanna and told her that “Sheray was sick”; that he “had taken [Sheray] to the hospital”; and that they had returned home. Rosanna asked to speak to Sheray, and Felton told her that “Sheray was sleeping.” A couple hours later, Felton called Rosanna again, and when Rosanna asked to speak with Sheray, Felton told her Sheray was still “resting.” Around 11:30 a.m. on March 14, Rosanna received another call from Felton, and this time, he sounded “very angry and upset” and “was cursing.” Felton told Rosanna he had “looked in Sheray’s email” and “believed that Sheray had a boyfriend” and was cheating on him. Rosanna assured Felton that Sheray loved him and tried to calm him down, and Felton said he “would kill Sheray” if “she got a man” and hung up the phone. 2 Before leaving for Atlanta on the night of March 14, Rosanna
and Josten tried to reach Sheray, but she did not answer her phone
————————————————————— 2 At trial, Rosanna testified that this kind of jealous behavior was not
out of character for Felton. The record reflects that Sheray and Felton grew up in the Chicago area and dated briefly in high school. After reconnecting in 2011, Sheray and Felton were married and lived in Chicago. In 2013, Sheray moved to Georgia. At the time, Felton did not move with Sheray because the two were separated, but he later followed her to Georgia in late 2013. Rosanna testified that, when Sheray and Felton got back together “as adults,” Felton “was very controlling,” “clingy,” “jealous,” and “aggressive.” Additionally, Rosanna and Josten testified that they had observed Felton act violently towards Sheray and that he seemed “obsessed” with Sheray, calling her “constantly,” getting angry and jealous when she socialized or spent time with any other men — including Josten and other family members — and damaging
3 or respond to text messages. Rosanna and Josten landed at the
Atlanta airport around midnight on March 14, and while they were
“expecting to see [Sheray],” she was not there to meet them and did
not answer her phone, which increased their concern “that
something had happened” to her.3 They rented a car at the airport
and drove to the house Sheray shared with Felton in Henry County
(the “Felton residence”), arriving between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on
March 15. Rosanna and Josten rang the doorbell and knocked on the
front and back doors, but no one answered. They also noted that
Sheray’s two dogs — who usually had “free reign [sic] of the house”
and would start “barking” and “jumping up on the door” when
someone came to the house — were not by the door. Instead, the dogs
were “whining” somewhere inside the house. After noting that all
the doors to the house were locked, Rosanna called the police to
————————————————————— or destroying any of Sheray’s clothes that he thought were too “provocative.” One of Felton’s co-workers, who often drove Felton to work, testified that Felton had a “fixation” with Sheray and that she was “all he talked about.” 3 Rosanna testified that she spoke with Sheray “on a daily basis,” so her
inability to reach Sheray on March 14 was very concerning. Josten similarly testified that he spoke to Sheray “every day,” and he had never gone “that long without being able to contact her.” 4 request a welfare check. A police officer arrived around 5:00 a.m.,
and after checking the house, knocking on the doors, and observing
no signs of forced entry anywhere, he advised Rosanna and Josten
that he would need to wait “24 hours” prior to entering the home.
Rosanna and Josten waited in the car and continued trying to
reach Sheray. While they were waiting, Rosanna received a call from
Felton, who said he had “been checking on [Sheray] throughout the
night” and she was “fine.” He also said he was at work, but evidence
introduced at trial from his employer DHL showed that he had not
shown up for his 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. scheduled shifts on March
14, 15, and 16. Rosanna asked Felton to please hurry to the house,
explaining that she and Josten had been there “all night trying to
get in the house” and “Sheray ha[d]n’t answered the door.” Felton
said he would be home in 15 or 20 minutes. About an hour and a half
later, when Felton still had not shown up, Rosanna “called law
enforcement again.”
Henry County Police Officer Geoffrey Gravius arrived at the
Felton residence around 11:30 a.m. on March 15. Officer Gravius
5 testified that he was already familiar with this residence because he
had previously been dispatched there on January 1, 2014 in
response to “a 911 hang up.” According to Officer Gravius, on
January 1, he and another police officer arrived at the Felton
residence, and after knocking on the door and ringing the doorbell
multiple times, they eventually made contact with Sheray, who
called for help from an upstairs window. The officers learned that
Sheray had attempted to call 911 following a physical altercation
with Felton, who prevented her from completing the call and hid the
telephone from her. The officers observed “a visible bruise . . . on
[Sheray’s] right forearm” and “a small injury to her bottom lip,”
which Sheray said occurred when Felton “shov[ed]” a pair of shorts
“into her mouth.” The officers observed no visible injuries to Felton.
On March 15, when Officer Gravius arrived at the Felton
residence, Rosanna and Josten explained their concerns about
Sheray, and Officer Gravius attempted to make contact with
someone inside the house without success. Officer Gravius advised
6 Rosanna and Josten that he could not yet enter the house, as there
were no signs of a forced entry.
Rosanna and Josten then decided to force their way into the
house to check on Sheray, and Josten broke through one of the back
windows with a brick and “climbed inside.” As Josten walked toward
the front of the house, he saw a “smashed up TV” in the family room
and a “big desk ... blocking the front door,” which he moved to let
Rosanna inside. Rosanna and Josten were struck by a “foul odor” in
the house and discovered that Sheray’s two dogs and their puppies
had been confined — without food or water — to a bathroom and
another room downstairs, where the floors were covered with “dog
feces and urine.” Upstairs, Rosanna and Josten noticed that the
bathtub of the hallway bathroom was full of Sheray’s clothes and
other belongings; that there was “another smashed up TV” in the
master bedroom;4 and that, in the master bathroom, Sheray’s
clothes were all over the floor and inside the bathtub, and the sink
————————————————————— 4 According to Josten, when Felton lived with Sheray and Josten in Chicago, he had previously damaged televisions in their home when he got angry with Sheray. 7 was full of torn up “papers,” including Sheray’s diplomas, Josten’s
birth certificate, and Sheray’s Social Security card.
At that point, Rosanna called Officer Gravius to inform him
that she and Josten “had made forced entry into th[e] house” out of
concern for Sheray and that they found the house in disarray.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Gravius and another police officer
arrived, and after assessing the downstairs area of the house, the
officers went upstairs. In the master bathroom, the officers observed
what they believed to be a human leg underneath a large “pile of
clothing” in the “center of the floor.” After clearing the house and
obtaining a search warrant, the officers discovered Sheray’s body
under the pile of clothes on the bathroom floor. The Henry County
coroner pronounced Sheray dead at the scene.
The medical examiner testified that Sheray had “a minimum
of approximately 15 or so” “sharp force injuries” and “blunt force
injuries” to her head, including “a large wound complex of her face”
involving “the nose, the left eye, the left cheek, the forehead,” and
“the scalp”; “extensive facial fractures”; and a “collapsed” eye.
8 Additionally, Sheray suffered “five sharp wounds of her torso” in the
chest and shoulder areas, one of which “struck the liver”; a four-inch
“sharp force injury” to her “left wrist”; and a “sharp forced injury of
her medial left lower leg below the knee,” which was “three and a
half inches in length.” The medical examiner concluded that
Sheray’s cause of death was “blunt and sharp force trauma of the
head, torso and extremities.”
On the late afternoon of March 15, Henry County Police
detectives conducted a search of the Felton residence. One of the
detectives testified that, during their search, they smelled gasoline
in both upstairs bathrooms and noted the presence of liquid inside
the bathtubs where Sheray’s clothing and belongings had been
discarded. This liquid later tested positive for gasoline. Additionally,
detectives collected, among other items, the following: (1) a hammer
with suspected blood on it from the desk that had been blocking the
front door; (2) a pair of scissors with suspected blood on it, a red-
handled knife with a broken blade with suspected blood on it, and a
pair of gloves — similar to gloves worn by DHL employees — with
9 suspected blood on them from the master bathroom; and (3) from the
kitchen, a red sheath for the broken, red-handled knife and an
orange sheath without a corresponding knife. At trial, the medical
examiner testified that the large “blunt force” injury to Sheray’s face
was “consistent with being produced by a blunt object like a
hammer,” and the “sharp force injur[ies]” and “incisions” to her head
and torso were “consistent with something sharp like a knife or
scissors.” The GBI later conducted testing of the hammer and the
broken, red-handled knife and determined that these items were
positive for blood and matched Sheray’s DNA.
On March 15, detectives discovered that Sheray’s black 2005
Chrysler 300 was missing from the residence and that Felton’s
current whereabouts were unknown. After discovering that the cell
phone Felton used to call Rosanna on March 14 and 15 was
registered to Sheray, detectives submitted an “exigent request” to
the cell phone service provider for the corresponding cell phone
records. Upon receiving those records and reviewing the call location
data and online mapping programs, detectives determined that,
10 between the early morning of March 14 and the afternoon of March
15, Felton’s cell phone traveled from Georgia to northern Michigan
and then traveled south to Chicago, Illinois, where it stopped.
At trial, two of Felton’s cousins, Kevin and Steve Strickland,
testified that Felton showed up “out of the blue” at Kevin’s house in
Chicago on the afternoon of March 15. Felton told his cousins that
“Dee Dee” — which was Felton’s nickname for Sheray — was “dead”;
that she had fallen “down the stairs”; and that he “put her in the
bed,” hoping she would “wake up.” When Steve asked why Felton
did not call anyone for help, Felton responded that “[n]obody would
believe [him],” and he wanted to “kill[] himself.”
At 2:55 a.m. on March 16, Felton called Rosanna and told her
“[h]ow much he loved Sheray” and that he was “sorry.” Rosanna
asked Felton why he killed Sheray, and he said, “You won’t see me
no more I’m going to kill myself too. You won’t ever see me again.”
Felton also called one of his co-workers from DHL, who testified that
he spoke to Felton around lunchtime on March 16, and Felton said
Sheray “was in a better place now”; that she “wasn’t suffering”; and
11 that Felton was “going to join her.” Felton told his co-worker that
Sheray had been “making plans to leave him,” but he “took control
of the situation” and was getting ready “to kill himself.”
Around 1:00 p.m. on March 16, Officer Angela Smith with the
Chicago Police Department received a call regarding a “wanted
individual” — later determined to be Felton — who was “involved in
a chase” with local police officers and the Illinois State Patrol. Felton
was reportedly driving a 2005 black Chrysler 300. Officer Smith
encountered Felton as he drove into the city on Lakeshore Drive.
Officer Smith testified that “it was gridlock” at the time, and
“multiple squad cars” were pursuing Felton, yelling for him to “stop,”
show his hands, and “exit his vehicle.” According to Officer Smith,
Felton did not stop, despite directives from law enforcement, and
when his car slowed because of the gridlock around him, “he began
to ram the cars, attempting to evade the police.” When Felton was
able to “squeeze his way out,” he drove “towards” Officer Smith, who
discharged her weapon, but Felton “continued flight” at “a high rate
of speed,” ultimately “T-boning another squad car” and “disabl[ing]
12 both vehicles.” Law enforcement officers immediately surrounded
Felton’s car and gave him “multiple orders to exit his vehicle,” but
“he failed to comply.”
Chicago Police Detective Hector Matias testified that he was
called to the scene to try to communicate with Felton. According to
Detective Matias, he was able to reach Felton on his cell phone, and
they spoke for several hours. Felton told Detective Matias that he
did not want to come out of the car; that he had “several knives”; and
that he wanted to “kill himself.” As the call continued, Felton agreed
to throw a few of the knives out of the car at Detective Matias’s
request, but Felton continued “threatening suicide.” Detective
Matias testified that, “towards the end of the evening, [Felton]
started to cut his wrists,”5 and he began to “shut down” and
“apologize[d] for his wife.” Felton then hung up the phone and would
not answer Detective Matias’s phone calls. At that point, “SWAT
————————————————————— 5 One of the detectives positioned near the car could see that Felton was
“making movements across his wrists” with a knife. Two of Felton’s friends testified that Felton called them during this timeframe, and he told them that “he was stabbing himself.”
13 [took] over,” and the SWAT team was eventually “able to get [Felton]
out of the car” and give him medical attention.
After transporting Felton to the hospital and acquiring a
search warrant, Chicago Police Department investigators collected
a number of items from inside the Chrysler 300, including a black,
serrated kitchen knife and purple, green, and orange-handled
knives, which Henry County Police detectives later determined to be
“from the same set” as the broken, red-handled knife found in the
master bathroom and the red and orange sheaths found in the
kitchen of the Felton residence. While in Chicago, Felton was
arrested for Sheray’s murder and transported to Georgia.
1. Felton first contends that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because, at trial, his counsel failed to request a written
jury charge on impeachment based on a witness’s bias for or against
a party.6 Felton claims that such a charge was necessary in this case
because the State presented testimony demonstrating the prior
————————————————————— 6 This charge does not appear in the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, and in his brief, Felton does not specify what language should have been included in such a charge. 14 difficulties between Sheray and Felton, the contentious nature of
their relationship, and the negative opinions Rosanna and Josten
held about Felton and his treatment of Sheray.
To prevail on his claim of ineffectiveness, Felton “generally
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance resulted in prejudice” to him. Moss v. State,
311 Ga. 123, 126 (2021) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US
668, 687–95 (1984)). If Felton “fails to meet his ... burden of proving
either prong of the Strickland test” — either deficiency or prejudice
— this Court “does not have to examine the other prong.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted). Because Felton has failed to meet his
burden of showing that his trial counsel was constitutionally
deficient by failing to request a separate impeachment for bias
charge, we need not decide the prejudice prong of the Strickland test
here. See id.
With respect to deficiency, we have said that for a defendant to
prove that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, he “must
show that his counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way
15 considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing
professional norms.” Nesbit v. State, 321 Ga. 240, 246–47 (2025)
(quotation marks omitted). “Under Strickland, decisions on requests
to charge involve trial tactics to which we must afford substantial
latitude, and they provide no grounds for reversal unless such
tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable that no competent
attorney would have chosen them.” Fuller v. State, 316 Ga. 127, 132
(2023) (quotation marks omitted).
At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Felton’s appellate counsel
asked his trial counsel whether “there was a reason [he] didn’t
request a written jury instruction on impeachment [of a] witness by
showing evidence of bias [of] a witness,” and Felton’s trial counsel
responded that, in this case, he only requested the pattern jury
instructions, which do not include such a charge. Felton’s trial
counsel further explained that he “usually do[es]n’t go outside of the
suggested patterns unless there’s a clear and obvious issue that
doesn’t appear in the ... pattern instructions,” and based on the
evidence presented in this case, he did not determine it was
16 necessary to seek any charges outside the suggested pattern jury
instructions.
Additionally, at trial, the trial court charged the jury on the
credibility of witnesses and a witness’s interest or lack of interest,
specifically instructing the jury as follows:
You, the jury, must determine the credibility of the witnesses. In deciding this[,] you may consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witness’s manner of testifying, their intelligence and means and opportunity of knowing the facts of which they testify, the nature of the facts about which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case, and their personal credibility as you observe it.
And we have held that these “instructions given by the trial court
sufficiently covered the concept of impeachment by showing bias or
motive.” Huber v. State, 319 Ga. 78, 85 (2024).
Because Felton’s trial counsel “articulated a reasonable
strategy in utilizing the pattern charge” after assessing the evidence
presented in this case, Fuller, 316 Ga. at 133, and because the bias
instruction was substantially covered by the instructions that were
given by the trial court, it was not objectively unreasonable to fail to
17 request the additional instruction. See Huber, 319 Ga. at 85
(concluding that trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction
on impeachment concerning a witness’s bias or motive was not
deficient performance because the instructions given by the trial
court sufficiently covered “the concept of impeachment by showing
bias or motive”). Accordingly, Felton has failed to show that his trial
counsel was deficient in this respect, and this claim fails.
2. Felton next contends that his rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
were violated by the testimony of several GBI analysts about the
conclusions of other non-testifying GBI analysts and by the
admission of reports generated by the non-testifying analysts. He
relies on the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Smith v. Arizona, which held that the trial testimony of an expert
witness who restated a non-testifying laboratory analyst’s factual
assertions in support of his own opinion testimony violated the
defendant’s Confrontation-Clause rights. See 602 US 779, 783–84,
795 (2024). The specific testimony and reports of which Felton
18 complains are as follows:
(a) At trial, GBI forensic biologist Ashley Hinkle testified as the
“peer reviewer” of the DNA testing, conclusions, and written report
of GBI forensic biologist Kimberly Turpin, who did not testify at
trial. Turpin conducted the “initial testing” of the orange-handled
knife found in Felton’s car and the gloves found in the master
bathroom of Sheray and Felton’s house, and she drafted the
corresponding report. Turpin determined that there were two DNA
profiles on the gloves; the major contributor was Sheray, and the
minor contributor was indeterminable. Turpin determined that the
DNA profile on the orange-handled knife matched “the DNA profile
of Joseph Felton.” At trial, Hinkle testified that, as “the peer
reviewer,” she “went back and checked [Turpin’s] data,” “her
methods, and “her notes,” and Hinkle “agreed with her conclusions.”
Turpin’s report was admitted into evidence at trial.
(b) In the second instance, GBI forensic biologist Emily
Schmidt testified as the “peer reviewer” of the DNA testing,
conclusions, and written report of GBI forensic biologist Tashika
19 Woodlum, who did not testify at trial because she was no longer
employed by the GBI. Woodlum conducted testing of a “cutting” of a
pair of shorts that were allegedly forced inside Sheray’s mouth
during that incident. Woodlum determined that the saliva on the
swab and the cutting from the shorts “matched” Sheray’s DNA. At
trial, Schmidt testified that the DNA analysis in this case and the
procedures followed were conducted “in an acceptable manner.”
Woodlum’s report was admitted into evidence at trial.
(c) In the third instance, GBI forensic serologist Melissa West
testified that she conducted chemical testing on the gloves found in
the master bathroom of Sheray and Felton’s house to determine
whether there was any blood present, and she concluded blood was
present on the gloves. West documented those findings in a report,
which was admitted at trial. West also peer-reviewed the testing,
conclusions, and written report of GBI forensic biologist Danielle
Gibbs, who did not testify at trial because she was no longer
employed by the GBI. Gibson tested the orange-handled knife found
in Felton’s car for the presence of blood, and her testing revealed
20 that the orange-handled knife was positive for blood. At trial, West
testified that, as “the peer reviewer,” she “reviewed all of [Gibson’s]
notes and ... reports to see that everything was done in an acceptable
manner and followed all policies and procedures.” West testified
that, based on what she observed and the notes, methods, and
information she reviewed from Gibson, “there was blood on that
orange knife.” Gibson’s report was admitted into evidence at trial.
(d) In the final instance, GBI forensic chemist Victoria
Oehrlein testified as the “peer reviewer” of the testing, conclusions,
and written report of GBI forensic chemist James Wadsworth, who
did not testify at trial. Wadsworth conducted testing of jars of liquid
found inside Felton’s vehicle after he was arrested and determined
that gasoline was present in those jars. Oehrlein also reviewed and
“reassess[ed]” Wadsworth’s “data and report” and issued her own
report, which supported Wadsworth’s findings and conclusions.
Oehrlein’s and Wadsworth’s reports were admitted into evidence at
trial.
21 (e) On appeal, Felton concedes that he did not object to the
testimony of these GBI witnesses or the admission of the GBI crime
lab reports at trial, and thus, we review these claims for plain error
only. See Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 668, 670 (2025). To establish
plain error, Felton “must point to an error that was not affirmatively
waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable
dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the
error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 670–71 (quotation marks
omitted).
When we review an asserted evidentiary error under the plain-
error standard, we apply the law existing at the time of the appeal,
see Watkins v. State, 320 Ga. 862, 872 (2025) (explaining that, under
plain-error review, “[t]he current law considered is the law at the
time of appellate review rather than at trial”) (quotation marks
omitted), and “[b]ecause Smith v. Arizona was decided before the
time of this appellate review, it is current law for purposes of this
22 analysis.” Id.7 However, here, we need not decide whether the trial
court committed clear or obvious error by admitting the testimonial
out-of-court statements and reports of non-testifying GBI witnesses
under Smith because Felton cannot meet the third prong of the
plain-error test to show that the admission of this evidence — which
primarily established that Felton’s blood was present on a knife
found in his vehicle and that Sheray’s DNA was present on a pair of
shorts recovered in the January 1, 2014 incident and on a pair of
gloves collected at the murder scene — affected his “substantial
rights,” particularly in light of the strong evidence of his guilt in this
case. See Jones v. State, 317 Ga. 466, 473 (2023) (holding that,
“[e]ven assuming ... it was clear error to admit” portions of the
appellant’s video-recorded interview at trial, “any error did not
affect [his] substantial rights” because the evidence “was harmless
in light of the substantial evidence of [his] guilt”). See also State v.
————————————————————— 7 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that “[a] State may not introduce the
testimonial out-of-court statements of a forensic analyst at trial, unless she is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior chance to cross-examine her,” and “[n]either may the State introduce those statements through a surrogate analyst who did not participate in their creation.” Smith, 602 US at 802–03. 23 Johnson, 305 Ga. 237, 240 (2019) (“The third prong of the plain error
test requires that the error must have affected the appellant’s
substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must
demonstrate that it likely affected the outcome of the trial court
proceedings.”).
The evidence of Felton’s guilt in this case was substantial and
included his own statements and admissions to multiple people,
strongly suggesting his guilt in causing Sheray’s death, as well as
evidence of (1) his aggressive and controlling behaviors towards
Sheray and his unreasonable fixation with Sheray; (2) his
dishonesty with Rosanna about Sheray’s sickness and his lies about
his whereabouts around the time of Sheray’s murder; (3) his threats
to kill Sheray if she was cheating on him; (4) his failure to report to
work as scheduled during the pertinent timeframe; (5) the lack of
any signs of forced entry into the Felton residence on March 15,
indicating that whoever caused Sheray’s death had ready access to
the house; (6) Felton’s flight to Chicago in Sheray’s car before
Sheray’s body was discovered; (7) Felton’s flight from law
24 enforcement officers in Chicago when they tried to stop his vehicle;
and (8) Felton’s possession of multiple knives in his vehicle in
Chicago, some of which he used to injure himself during the police
stand-off and some of which appeared to be part of the same set as
the broken, red-handled knife found in the master bathroom of the
Felton residence, which tested positive for Sheray’s blood.
In light of the strong evidence presented in this case, Felton
has not met his burden to show that, absent the admission of the
GBI analysts’ testimony and reports, a “reasonable probability”
exists that the “outcome of his trial would have been different.”
Johnson, 319 Ga. at 572. Accordingly, Felton’s claim of plain error
predicated on the admission of this evidence fails. See id.
3. Felton also contends that the trial court plainly erred by
permitting the State to introduce evidence that Felton possessed
several colored-handled knives inside his vehicle in Chicago because
the knives were “not intrinsic” and were “improper character
evidence”; that the State failed to show a probative connection
between the knives and Sheray’s death; and that the prejudicial
25 effect of this evidence substantially outweighed any probative
value.8 Felton concedes that he did not object to the admission of this
evidence at trial, and so, we review only for plain error.
As noted above, plain-error review consists of four prongs. See
Holloway, 320 Ga. at 670. We need not analyze all four prongs in this
case because Felton has failed to establish that the trial court clearly
or obviously erred in admitting the knife evidence, which — as
explained below — is intrinsic evidence, or that the probative value
of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect. See Roberts v. State, 315 Ga. 229, 238 (2022). We also need
not address Felton’s argument that evidence of his possession of
knives is improper character evidence because we conclude the
knives are intrinsic evidence and, thus, are not subject to OCGA §
24-4-404(b). See Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 24 (2021).
Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2)
————————————————————— 8 We read Felton’s argument as asserting that the evidence was inadmissible under OCGA §§ 24-4-403 and 24-4-404(b), although Felton cites neither statute in his brief. 26 necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. Evidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime is properly admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury. Evidence of other acts is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense if it forms an integral and natural part of the witness’s accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted. And this sort of intrinsic evidence remains admissible even if it incidentally places the defendant’s character at issue.
Heade, 312 Ga. at 24–25 (cleaned up). “[T]here is no brightline rule
regarding how close in time evidence must be to the charged
offenses, or requiring evidence to pertain directly to the victims of
the charged offenses, for that evidence to be admitted properly as
intrinsic evidence.” Harris v. State, 310 Ga. 372, 381 (2020).
Here, evidence showing that Felton was in possession of
multiple, colored-handled knives in Chicago — where he had fled in
Sheray’s vehicle shortly before her body was discovered and in which
he was arrested the next day — was intrinsic in this case because it
was “inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the
27 charged offense” and “form[ed] an integral and natural part” of the
“account of the crime.” Heade, 312 Ga. at 25. The evidence presented
at trial demonstrated that the knives with colored handles that
Felton had in the car with him when he was arrested appeared to
come from the same knife set as two items found at the scene: the
broken, red-handled knife that was found near Sheray’s body with
Sheray’s blood on it, and the orange knife sheath found in the
kitchen of the Felton residence, which appeared to match an orange-
handled knife that Felton had with him in the car. Thus, the knives
were “inextricably intertwined” with the evidence regarding
Sheray’s death by sharp-force wounds. White v. State, 307 Ga. 882,
889 (2020) (concluding that evidence of Appellant’s behavior within
several hours of the murder, including brandishing the murder
weapon while threatening to “take” someone’s life, “was integral” to
the account of “the events leading up to the killing” and was
“inextricably intertwined with the relevant evidence”). Moreover,
Felton’s possession and use of these knives to threaten the police
and his own life was connected to his flight after Sheray’s murder,
28 and “[e]vidence of flight is generally intrinsic” because it is evidence
of the defendant’s “consciousness of guilt.” Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga.
81, 89 (2022) (cleaned up).
However, evidence that is intrinsic must still satisfy OCGA §
24-4-403. See Heade, 312 Ga. at 27. Although “[r]elevant evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” OCGA § 24-
4-403, “[t]here is no mechanical solution for this balancing test,” and
“a trial court must undertake in each case a considered evaluation
of the proffered justification for the admission of such evidence and
make an independent determination.” Heade, 312 Ga. 26–27. And
“[w]e have explained that this balance should be struck in favor of
admissibility.” Id. at 27.
While evidence that Felton possessed multiple knives as he fled
from the crime scene was certainly prejudicial to Felton, “in a
criminal trial, inculpatory evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is
29 only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value
that the rule permits exclusion.” Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 337
(2017) (quotation marks omitted). And evidence that Felton
possessed these knives in his car when he was arrested was not — on
its own — unfairly prejudicial. See Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225, 232
(2022). Therefore, because evidence showing that Felton was in
possession of multiple, colored-handled knives at the time of his
arrest was properly admitted in this case, Felton cannot meet his
burden as to the second prong of plain-error review, and this claim
fails. See Williams, 315 Ga. at 495.
4. Finally, Felton argues, in reliance on State v. Lane, 308 Ga.
10 (2020), that the “cumulative effect of the evidence erroneously
admitted at trial ... prejudiced Felton and denied him a fair trial.”
We disagree.
“To establish cumulative error, a defendant must demonstrate
that at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial and
considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors
so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the petitioner a
30 fundamentally fair trial.” State v. Wood, 316 Ga. 811, 821 (2023)
(citing Lane, 306 Ga. at 21).
Here, even if the trial court erred by allowing certain GBI
analysts to testify about the conclusions of other non-testifying
analysts and by admitting the absent analyst’s reports, Felton’s
cumulative-error claim fails. See Wood, 316 Ga. at 822. As detailed
in Division 2, the other evidence presented against Felton was
overwhelming, and in light of this overwhelming evidence, Felton
“has not demonstrated that the prejudicial effect of ... the trial court
error denied him a fundamentally fair trial.” Wood, 316 Ga. at 822.
See also Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 568 (2023) (holding that the
appellant’s cumulative-error claim failed because the appellant did
not demonstrate that “the prejudicial effect of the assumed trial
court errors ... denied him a fundamentally fair trial, given the
strong evidence against him”). Accordingly, this final contention
also fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.