319 Ga. 78 FINAL COPY
S24A0170. HUBER v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Appellant Andrew Thomas Huber was convicted of felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault in relation to the shooting
death of Daniel Raburn.1 On appeal, Huber argues that the evidence
was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction, his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance on various grounds, and the
1 Raburn died on July 3, 2020. On May 28, 2021, a Laurens County grand
jury indicted Huber, as a party to the crimes, for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), and three counts of aggravated assault against Raburn (Counts 3-5). Huber’s accomplices Thomas Wayne Harper and Brandilee Nicole Woodard-Brady were separately indicted on the same charges. Prior to Huber’s trial, Harper was tried and convicted of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault, and Woodard-Brady entered a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter. At a trial from October 4 through 7, 2022, a jury found Huber not guilty of malice murder but guilty of all the remaining counts against him. The trial court sentenced Huber to life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder; the aggravated assault counts were merged for sentencing purposes. Huber filed a timely motion for new trial on October 28, 2022, which was thrice amended by new counsel on May 8, May 31, and June 9, 2023. Following a hearing on May 30, 2023, the trial court denied Huber’s motion for new trial, as amended, on August 3, 2023. Huber filed a timely notice of appeal on August 24, 2023, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2023 and thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury on simple
assault and voluntary manslaughter. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence at trial showed that Huber had been friends with Brandilee
Woodard-Brady for many years and was temporarily living with her
and her fiancé, Raburn. Raburn and Woodard-Brady’s relationship
was “rocky” and “toxic,” and she had previously gotten a temporary
protective order against him but later had it rescinded. Thomas
Harper was a mutual friend of Huber and Woodard-Brady, and
Harper had also occasionally spent time with Raburn but “didn’t
really know” him. On July 4, 2020, law enforcement officers arrived
at Raburn and Woodard-Brady’s house for a welfare check, where
officers found Raburn’s body lying in the yard with multiple
lacerations and abrasions and a gunshot wound to the head. Police
contacted Woodard-Brady that same day and questioned her at the
police station.
At the interview, Woodard-Brady told police that she “didn’t
2 know what had happened.” Detectives later questioned Woodard-
Brady again at her sister’s house, and at that point, she admitted
that she knew Huber and Harper had beat up Raburn but said “they
wasn’t supposed to kill him.” After Woodard-Brady was arrested,
she asked to speak to a detective again, and at that point, she
admitted that she had asked Huber and Harper over to the house to
“beat [Raburn’s] a**.” When police arrested Harper, they found a
gun at his residence, and Harper admitted at trial that he shot
Raburn with it. And when police arrested Huber and processed his
car, they found bloody clothes behind a speaker, and he admitted
that the bloody clothes were the clothes he was wearing when
Raburn was shot. DNA analysis revealed that the blood on Huber’s
clothes belonged to Raburn.
At trial, Woodard-Brady testified that on July 3, 2020, she and
Raburn got into a verbal altercation at their home and he pushed
her, so she texted Huber, “[b]eat his a**,” after which, Huber and
Harper came to the house. According to Woodard-Brady, she
remained in the house, but she saw Huber and Harper pull up,
3 heard “noises,” and “figured that [Huber and Harper] were beating
[Raburn] up.” She also stated that though she called Huber and
Harper over to beat up Raburn, she “wasn’t expecting them to go to
that extreme.” She testified that after the beating, she went outside
long enough to see Raburn lying on the ground and that “I thought
he had just — that he was either knocked out or passed out, I did
not know that he had been shot and killed.” She testified that after
Huber and Harper left, she also left and went to a friend’s house to
stay the night and that she never checked on Raburn or called 911.
According to her friend, when Woodard-Brady arrived, Woodard-
Brady immediately began drinking tequila from the bottle and
asked her friend to punch her in the face so that she had an alibi.
Woodard-Brady also admitted on direct examination that she had
pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in relation to Raburn’s
death. On cross-examination, Huber’s counsel elicited testimony
from Woodard-Brady that she regularly abused alcohol and drugs,
and that her “story changed each time” she talked to the police.
Harper testified that Woodard-Brady never contacted him to
4 come over and beat up Raburn. According to Harper, when he and
Huber arrived at Raburn and Woodard-Brady’s house, Raburn was
holding a wrench and Huber got out of the car and “exchanged
words” with Raburn before Raburn told Huber to “get that n****r
out of his yard,” which angered Harper, who exited the car. Raburn
then dropped the wrench and “got into an altercation” with Huber,
and the two men fought on the ground before Raburn got up,
“rushed” Harper, and tackled him, causing Harper’s gun to fall out
of his pocket. Harper said that he and Raburn then fought with each
other and “tussled over the gun” before Harper gained control of it
and shot Raburn as Raburn continued to hurl racial slurs at Harper;
Huber then drove Harper away. Harper further testified that
although Harper shot Raburn, Harper did not cause any other
“lacerations” or “indentations” on Raburn’s head, so Huber must
have caused those injuries.
Huber also testified at trial. According to Huber, on July 3,
Woodard-Brady texted him that Raburn was “acting unusual,” so he
told her he would come by and “check on them.” Huber drove Harper
5 to the house, and they went inside to speak with Woodard-Brady
before Huber walked back outside to talk to Raburn; Huber
described Raburn as “fine.” So, Huber went back inside, where he
saw Woodard-Brady and Harper kissing. Huber and Harper then
left, but later that day, Woodard-Brady called Huber, crying,
causing Huber to drive back to the house with Harper.
According to Huber, when he and Harper arrived back at the
house, Raburn was sitting in his car drinking a beer, and after he
saw them pull up, he got out of his car while holding a tire iron and
at one point, yelled, “[g]et that n****r out of my yard.” Huber and
Harper got out of Huber’s car, and a verbal altercation began
between Harper and Raburn. Harper asked Raburn why he would
need the tire iron, and Raburn said he didn’t and threw it down.
Huber testified that after he noticed Raburn and Harper were
“getting more heated,” Huber approached Raburn, and Huber and
Raburn began “tussl[ing]” and “rolled around in the grass,” as
Raburn was “trying to put [Huber] in a headlock.” Huber said that
he and Raburn “broke apart,” Raburn “calmed down a little bit,” and
6 Huber began to walk away, but as he walked toward his car, Huber
heard a “clink” and “froze” because he thought it might be somebody
getting hit with a bottle and it scared him. Huber testified that
“[a]fter that, out of my peripheral, I could see that Raburn stumbled
for, like, a second and then he turned around and rushed Harper”
and “got Harper on his back.” According to Huber, “they were
struggling over something in their hands,” and Harper yelled “get
him off of me, get him off of me,” so Huber grabbed Raburn and
pulled him off Harper. Huber testified that he then walked back to
his car, and that was when he heard a gunshot.2 Harper then ran
toward the car and told Huber to “get the F in the car,” so they both
got in, and Huber drove them away. As Huber drove them away,
Harper said “lights out” and told him “[t]he same thing could happen
to [Huber].” Huber dropped Harper off and did not go back to Raburn
and Woodard-Brady’s house. Neither Huber, Harper, nor Woodard-
Brady called 911 for help or to report the incident.
A neighbor who was in her home at the time of the incident
2 Huber testified that Harper “always toted a gun.”
7 testified that she heard voices arguing, including a man yelling
“b***h, did you call me a n****r,” followed by a loud noise, then a
woman screaming, and finally a car driving away.
1. Huber contends that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction for felony murder predicated
on aggravated assault. We disagree.
When this Court evaluates the constitutional sufficiency of the
evidence, “we review whether the evidence presented at trial, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, enabled the
jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crimes of which [he] was convicted.” Fitts v. State, 312 Ga. 134, 141
(3) (859 SE2d 79) (2021) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). “This limited review
leaves to the jury the resolution of conflicts in the evidence, the
weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and reasonable
inferences to be made from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Muse v.
State, 316 Ga. 639, 647 (2) (889 SE2d 885) (2023) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
8 “A person commits the offense of murder when, in the
commission of a felony, he or she causes the death of another human
being irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). “Felony murder
requires only that the defendant possessed the requisite criminal
intent to commit the underlying felony — in this case, aggravated
assault, which also does not require intent to kill.” Mathews v. State,
314 Ga. 360, 365 (1) (877 SE2d 188) (2022) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Under the relevant part of Georgia’s aggravated assault
statute, “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when
he or she assaults: . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object,
device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person,
is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA §
16-5-21 (a) (2).
OCGA § 16-2-20 (a) provides that “[e]very person concerned in
the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged
with and convicted of commission of the crime.” To obtain a
conviction of a person as a party to the crime, the State must prove
“that he intentionally aided or abetted in the commission of the
9 crimes or intentionally advised, encouraged, counseled, or procured
someone else to commit the crimes.” Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450,
453 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 692) (2020). “Conviction as a party to a crime
requires proof of a common criminal intent, which the jury may infer
from the defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct with
another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes.” Rooks v.
State, 317 Ga. 743, 751 (2) (893 SE2d 899) (2023) (citation and
Thus, to prove Huber guilty of the charge of felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault, it was not necessary for the State
to prove that he personally hit, kicked, or shot Raburn so long as the
State proved that Huber was a party to the crimes. See Scoggins v.
State, 317 Ga. 832, 836-39 (1) (a)-(b) (896 SE2d 476) (2023) (even
where evidence did not conclusively establish which of two
defendants shot victim or had a weapon, evidence of a common
criminal intent, including defendant’s presence, companionship, and
conduct before and after the fatal shooting supported conviction as
a party to the crime of murder).
10 Here, the evidence showed that Woodard-Brady texted Huber
to come “beat [Raburn’s] a**” and that Huber then came to the
house. Huber also admitted at trial that Woodard-Brady had
requested Huber to come over and that she was crying, that Huber
drove Harper (whom Huber knew to always carry a gun) to the
house, and that Huber and Harper both engaged in a physical fight
with Raburn once they arrived. Moreover, Huber admitted that he
aided Harper during Harper’s fight with Raburn. And after Harper
shot and killed Raburn, Huber drove Harper away and never called
911. Huber’s clothes were also covered with Raburn’s blood despite
Huber’s claim that he was not near Raburn when Harper shot him.
Thus, the evidence supported Huber’s presence and active
participation before, during, and after the crimes.
We conclude that this evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, was sufficient as a matter of
constitutional due process to support Huber’s conviction for felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault, at least as a party to the
crimes. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 312 Ga. 602, 604-05 (2) (864 SE2d
11 31) (2021) (“even if someone else fired the fatal shot, it is clear that
[a]ppellant and that individual joined in the attack on the victim,”
and the jury was authorized to conclude that appellant was at least
a party to the crime of felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault (citation and punctuation omitted)); Griffin v. State, 292 Ga.
321, 322 (1) (737 SE2d 682) (2013) (“Although [appellant] argues his
admission that he hit [victim] was insufficient to convict him of
felony murder based on an aggravated assault, there was evidence
from which the jury was authorized to determine that he either
directly participated in or was a party to a crime of aggravated
assault which caused the death of another.”); Ellis v. State, 292 Ga.
276, 279 (1) (736 SE2d 412) (2013) (evidence was sufficient to
support appellant’s conviction as a party to the crime of felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault where “[e]ven if
[appellant] did not have the specific intent that [victim] be killed,
the crimes which he did intend were dangerous ones; by their
attendant circumstances, they created a foreseeable risk of death.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, this enumeration
12 of error fails.
2. Huber also contends that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance (a) by failing to request an instruction that in
assessing witness credibility, the jury was authorized to consider
negotiated pleas, leniency, or similar matters, or to request an
instruction on impeachment concerning a witness’s bias or motive;
and (b) by failing, on his cross-examination of Woodard-Brady, to
adduce evidence about the sentence she received in exchange for her
guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, the maximum sentence she
avoided, and the dismissal of the other counts against her. These
claims fail.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Huber must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient
and that such deficiency prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
(1984). To satisfy the deficiency prong, Huber must demonstrate
that his counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable
way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing
13 professional norms.” Bacon v. State, 316 Ga. 234, 239 (3) (887 SE2d
263) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). In doing so, Huber
must overcome “[a] strong presumption . . . that trial counsel’s
performance was reasonable and that counsel’s decisions and
choices at trial fell within the broad range of professional conduct as
assessed from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under
the specific circumstances of the case.” Id. (citation and punctuation
omitted). To establish prejudice, Huber “must prove that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s deficiency, the
result of the trial would have been different.” Bates v. State, 313 Ga.
57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022). And if Huber fails to make a
sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the prejudice prong,
we need not address the other prong. See Washington v. State, 313
Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022).
(a) Failure to Request Jury Instructions. Huber argues that his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request the
pattern jury instruction: “In assessing the credibility of a witness,
you may consider any possible motive in testifying, if shown. In that
14 regard you are authorized to consider any possible pending
prosecutions, negotiated pleas, grants of immunity or leniency, or
similar matters.” Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol.
II: Criminal Cases § 1.31.80. Separately, Huber argues that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury
charge on impeachment concerning a witness’s bias or motive.
But the trial court gave the suggested pattern jury instructions
on credibility of witnesses; witness, attacked; witness, impeached;
prior statements; single witness; accomplice corroboration;
presumption of innocence; the State’s burden of proof; mere
presence; and grave suspicion — including that in deciding witness
credibility,
you may consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts about which they testify, the nature of the facts about which they testify, the probability or improbability of a testimony, their interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case, and their personal creditability [sic] as you observe it.
See Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal
Cases § 1.31.10. Because we have held that these instructions
15 adequately covered the concept set out in Pattern Instruction §
1.31.80, the failure to request that charge is not deficient. See
Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 902 (5) (a) (873 SE2d 185) (2022)
(“[T]he trial court adequately covered [Pattern Instruction § 1.31.80]
in the instructions it gave the jury on witness credibility and
impeachment.”). Similarly, we have held that the instructions given
by the trial court sufficiently covered the concept of impeachment by
showing bias or motive. See Lee v. State, 281 Ga. 776, 777-78 (3) (642
SE2d 835) (2007) (trial court’s instruction that the jury is “the
arbiter of each witness’s credibility and that it should give
consideration to each witness’s interest or lack thereof in the
outcome of the case . . . adequately covered the possible motive,
interest, or bias of the State’s witnesses,” and therefore “trial
counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to request an
additional instruction”).
Huber argues on appeal that Lee and its progeny should be
overruled. But this argument does not support his ineffective
assistance claim since “there is no general duty on the part of
16 defense counsel to anticipate changes in the law.” Williams v.
Rudolph, 298 Ga. 86, 89 (777 SE2d 472) (2015) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Accordingly, Huber has not shown that his
counsel was deficient in this respect, and this claim fails.
(b) Cross-Examination of Woodard-Brady. Huber
acknowledges that the jury heard evidence that Woodard-Brady
pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter but argues that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing, on his cross-
examination of Woodard-Brady, to adduce evidence about the
sentence she received in exchange for her guilty plea, the maximum
sentence she avoided for murder and three counts of aggravated
assault, and the dismissal of those counts, which Huber contends
was relevant to Woodard-Brady’s bias and motive to testify against
Huber.
Pretermitting whether counsel was deficient in failing to elicit
the penalties that Woodard-Brady faced before pleading guilty, we
conclude that Huber has not met his burden of demonstrating that
he was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency. The evidence against
17 Huber was strong. Huber admitted at trial that he went over to
Woodard-Brady’s house on the day of the murder, that Huber and
Harper together fought Raburn, that Harper asked Huber to help
him pull Raburn off him during the fight, and that subsequently
Harper shot Raburn. Even though Huber claimed to have walked
away and been by his car at the time of the shooting, Raburn’s blood
was found on Huber’s clothes. In contrast, although Woodard-Brady
claimed that she asked Huber to come over to beat Raburn, she also
testified that she did not witness the fight or the shooting.
Also, counsel attempted to impeach Woodard-Brady’s
credibility. As recognized by the trial court, the jury heard that
Woodard-Brady pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in
connection with her role in the shooting. Moreover, Woodard-Brady
acknowledged on direct examination that she “lied by omission,” and
Huber’s trial counsel further cross-examined her on that point by
having her admit on the stand that her “story changed each time”
she talked to the police. Given the foregoing, Huber has not
established a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to
18 further impeach Woodard-Brady by eliciting information about the
penalties that Woodard-Brady avoided by pleading guilty, the result
of his trial would have been different. See, e.g., Benton v. Hines, 306
Ga. 722, 725 (2) (832 SE2d 801) (2019) (counsel’s failure to elicit
evidence of witness’s maximum possible sentence did not prejudice
defendant where jury heard other details of witness’s plea deal, and
witness’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence, including
defendant’s own incriminating statement); McCoy v. State, 303 Ga.
141, 143 (2) (810 SE2d 487) (2018) (“In light of the strong evidence
of guilt, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the
trial would have been different had trial counsel utilized alternative
impeachment evidence.”). This claim therefore fails.
3. Conceding that his trial counsel did not object to the trial
court’s jury instructions on simple assault (as an element of
aggravated assault) and voluntary manslaughter, Huber contends
that the trial court plainly erred in its instructions to the jury on
these legal principles. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (“Failure to object in
accordance with subsection (a) of this Code section shall preclude
19 appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such
portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects
substantial rights of the parties. Such plain error may be considered
on appeal even if it was not brought to the court’s attention as
provided in subsection (a) of this Code section.”). Huber’s claims fail.
To show plain error, Huber “must demonstrate that the
instructional error was not affirmatively waived, was obvious
beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the
proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. Satisfying all four prongs of this
standard is difficult, as it should be.” Rice v. State, 311 Ga. 620, 623
(1) (857 SE2d 230) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). And
this Court does not have to analyze all elements of the plain-error
test where an appellant fails to establish any one of them. See Lewis
v. State, 311 Ga. 650, 665 (4) (859 SE2d 1) (2021).
(a) Simple Assault. As part of its instruction on aggravated
assault, the trial court instructed the jury on simple assault, stating:
“To prove assault, the State does not have to prove that the other
20 person was actually injured. However, the State must prove that the
defendant attempted to cause a violent injury to the person and/or
committed an act that placed the person in reasonable apprehension
or fear of immediately receiving a violent injury.” Although not
entirely clear, Huber seems to argue that based on the allegations
of the indictment, the trial court should have only instructed the
jury on simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), which provides
that a person commits the offense of simple assault when he
“[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another,” such
that the trial court’s additional charge defining an assault as an
action that places “the person in reasonable apprehension or fear of
immediately receiving a violent injury” misstated the law.
However, Huber was charged with aggravated assault by
attempting to commit a violent injury in Counts 3 and 4 and with
aggravated assault by committing an act which places another in
reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury in Count 5,3 so
3 Regarding the aggravated assault counts of Huber’s indictment, Count
3 charged him with “mak[ing] an assault upon the person of Daniel Hugh
21 the trial court properly gave the suggested pattern jury instructions
concerning assault based on the allegations and evidence presented
in the case. See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (“A person commits the offense
of simple assault when he or she either: (1) Attempts to commit a
violent injury to the person of another; or (2) Commits an act which
places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving
a violent injury.”); Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions,
Vol. II: Criminal Cases § 2.20.21 (“For aggravated assault, the State
must prove that the Defendant: 1. assaulted another person 2. (with
a deadly weapon) (with an offensive weapon). To prove assault, the
State does not have to prove that the other person was actually
injured. However, the State must prove that the Defendant
(attempted to cause a violent injury to the person) (committed an act
Raburn with a firearm, a deadly weapon in the manner used, by intentionally shooting said victim in an attempt to commit a violent injury upon said person”; Count 4 charged Huber with “mak[ing] an assault upon the person of Daniel Hugh Raburn with the hands and feet of said accused, deadly weapons in the manner used, by intentionally striking said victim in an attempt to commit a violent injury upon said person”; and Count 5 charged Huber with “mak[ing] an assault upon the person of Daniel Hugh Raburn with the hands and feet of said accused, deadly weapons in the manner used, by placing the said victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury by intentionally striking said victim.” 22 that placed the person in reasonable apprehension or fear of
immediately receiving a violent injury).”). There was no error, plain
or otherwise, and Huber’s argument fails.
(b) Voluntary Manslaughter. Huber argues that the jury
charge on voluntary manslaughter was plain error because by
referring only to “the defendant,” the trial court failed to also
instruct the jury that Harper could have been provoked by Raburn’s
words to a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion and if Harper
was so provoked, Huber would have been also because Huber had
been charged as a party to the crimes.
However, not only did the trial court instruct the jury on
voluntary manslaughter at Huber’s request, it gave the charge
requested by Huber—which was the suggested pattern jury
instruction and which referred to “the defendant,” rather than
“Harper”—verbatim. See Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury
Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases §§ 2.10.40-42. And when an
appellant has invited an alleged error, it constitutes an affirmative
waiver under plain-error review, thus providing no basis for
23 reversal. Shank v. State, 290 Ga. 844, 845 (2) (725 SE2d 246) (2012);
see also Vasquez v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 229 (2) (c) (830 SE2d 143)
(2019) (“An affirmative waiver may occur, for example, when a
defendant . . . explicitly requests a jury instruction that he later
argues on appeal should not have been given.”); Shaw v. State, 292
Ga. 871, 873 (2) n.3 (742 SE2d 707) (2013) (under plain error review,
“reversal is not warranted if the error was invited by the appellant”).
Huber’s claim therefore fails at the first prong of the plain error test.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided April 30, 2024 — Reconsideration denied May 29, 2024.
Murder. Laurens Superior Court. Before Judge Green.
Frances C. Kuo, for appellant.
L. Craig Fraser, District Attorney, Cheryl B. Hightower,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Clint C.
Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.