FOURTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
May 15, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0555. LAWRENCE v. THE STATE.
MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
After a jury trial, Kendal Lawrence was convicted of rape and other offenses.
He appeals, challenging the exclusion of certain evidence and the effectiveness of his
trial counsel. But he has failed to show that the exclusion of evidence was reversible
error or that his counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial. So we
affirm.
1. Facts and procedural posture
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence presented at trial showed
that Lawrence and the victim lived together. On the date in question, Lawrence dragged the victim by her hair, slapped her face with his hands, choked her, threw her
to the ground, beat her head on the floor, detained her with handcuffs, yanked off her
pants, and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent. A medical
examination of the victim revealed injuries consistent with the reported sexual assault.
When Lawrence was later arrested, police found methamphetamine on his person.
The jury found Lawrence guilty of the charged offenses of rape, false
imprisonment, aggravated assault, family violence battery, and possession of
methamphetamine. The trial court imposed a life sentence, with 30 years to be served
in confinement and the remainder on probation. Lawrence moved for a new trial,
challenging, among other things, the effectiveness of his trial counsel and the
exclusion of evidence about prior sexual relations between Lawrence and the victim.
After a hearing at which Lawrence’s trial counsel testified, the trial court denied the
motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
2. OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2)
Lawrence enumerates that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of
prior “rough sex” between him and the victim that was admissible under OCGA § 24-
2 4-412 (b) (2). But Lawrence failed to comply with the mandatory procedure for
seeking to introduce such evidence.
Under Georgia’s rape-shield statute, OCGA § 24-4-412, “evidence of a
complaining witness’s past sexual behavior may not be introduced by any party at a
trial involving a prosecution for certain sexual crimes unless such evidence falls under
[a] specific exception contained in the statute itself.” White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 115
(1) (823 SE2d 794) (2019). OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2) contains such an exception,
“provid[ing] that the trial court may admit evidence of the victim’s prior sexual
conduct with the defendant if this evidence supports an inference that the defendant
could have reasonably believed that the victim consented [to the conduct alleged in
the prosecution].” Alvarez v. State, 378 Ga. App. 235, 243 (2) (925 SE2d 210) (2026)
(punctuation omitted). Such evidence may be admitted by “following the procedure
described in subsection (c) of [the rape-shield statute.]” OCGA § 24-4-412 (b). Under
the procedure set forth in subsection (c), if a party intends to offer such evidence,
“the party must: (A) File a motion that specifically describes the evidence and states
the purpose for which it is to be offered; and (B) Do so at least three days before trial
3 unless the court, for good cause, sets a different date[.]” OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) (1)
(emphasis supplied).
Lawrence has not claimed, let alone shown by the record, that he ever filed such
a motion specifically describing the evidence and stating its purpose. And although it
is not our role to cull the record on behalf of a party, a review of the record has not
revealed that such a motion was filed. Lawrence has thus failed to show that he
complied with the mandatory procedure under OCGA § 21-4-412 (c) for invoking
OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2)’s exception to the rape-shield statute’s exclusion of
evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior. See Gallegos-Munoz v. State, 319 Ga.
803, 811 (2) (b) (906 SE2d 711) (2024) (“the focus of Georgia’s rape-shield statute
continues to be the exclusion of evidence concerning the past sexual behavior of the
complaining witness”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed, as Lawrence
concedes in his brief, OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) prescribes a clear procedure for admitting
evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct and his failure to file such a motion
“forfeited review[.]”
Moreover, we note that in his appellate brief, Lawrence has not described any
specific evidence or anticipated testimony that was excluded, and instead has simply
4 made a general reference to evidence of rough sex. See Hicks v. State, 337 Ga. App.
567, 569 (1) (788 SE2d 502) (2016) (appellant claiming error regarding prior
statements did not show reversible error where he failed to identify any such specific
statements in his appellate brief); Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37, 41 (2) (699 SE2d
363) (2010) (this court cannot determine the propriety of the trial court’s ruling
without a proffer of a definite sort of the excluded evidence or testimony). For the
foregoing reasons, Lawrence has failed to show reversible error.
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Lawrence claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a
continuance to investigate a prior allegation of sexual assault made by the victim and
in failing to follow the procedure of OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) to introduce evidence of
that prior allegation. To succeed on these claims, Lawrence “must show both that his
counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced his defense.”
Huber v. State, 319 Ga. 78, 84 (2) (901 SE2d 149) (2024). If he “fails to make a
sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the prejudice prong, we need not
address the other prong.” Id. “To show prejudice, [Lawrence] must demonstrate that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s [alleged] deficiency, the
5 result of the trial would have been different. The likelihood of a different result must
be substantial, not just conceivable.” McNeal v. State, 363 Ga. App. 417, 422 (4) (867
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FOURTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
May 15, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0555. LAWRENCE v. THE STATE.
MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.
After a jury trial, Kendal Lawrence was convicted of rape and other offenses.
He appeals, challenging the exclusion of certain evidence and the effectiveness of his
trial counsel. But he has failed to show that the exclusion of evidence was reversible
error or that his counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial. So we
affirm.
1. Facts and procedural posture
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence presented at trial showed
that Lawrence and the victim lived together. On the date in question, Lawrence dragged the victim by her hair, slapped her face with his hands, choked her, threw her
to the ground, beat her head on the floor, detained her with handcuffs, yanked off her
pants, and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent. A medical
examination of the victim revealed injuries consistent with the reported sexual assault.
When Lawrence was later arrested, police found methamphetamine on his person.
The jury found Lawrence guilty of the charged offenses of rape, false
imprisonment, aggravated assault, family violence battery, and possession of
methamphetamine. The trial court imposed a life sentence, with 30 years to be served
in confinement and the remainder on probation. Lawrence moved for a new trial,
challenging, among other things, the effectiveness of his trial counsel and the
exclusion of evidence about prior sexual relations between Lawrence and the victim.
After a hearing at which Lawrence’s trial counsel testified, the trial court denied the
motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
2. OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2)
Lawrence enumerates that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of
prior “rough sex” between him and the victim that was admissible under OCGA § 24-
2 4-412 (b) (2). But Lawrence failed to comply with the mandatory procedure for
seeking to introduce such evidence.
Under Georgia’s rape-shield statute, OCGA § 24-4-412, “evidence of a
complaining witness’s past sexual behavior may not be introduced by any party at a
trial involving a prosecution for certain sexual crimes unless such evidence falls under
[a] specific exception contained in the statute itself.” White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 115
(1) (823 SE2d 794) (2019). OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2) contains such an exception,
“provid[ing] that the trial court may admit evidence of the victim’s prior sexual
conduct with the defendant if this evidence supports an inference that the defendant
could have reasonably believed that the victim consented [to the conduct alleged in
the prosecution].” Alvarez v. State, 378 Ga. App. 235, 243 (2) (925 SE2d 210) (2026)
(punctuation omitted). Such evidence may be admitted by “following the procedure
described in subsection (c) of [the rape-shield statute.]” OCGA § 24-4-412 (b). Under
the procedure set forth in subsection (c), if a party intends to offer such evidence,
“the party must: (A) File a motion that specifically describes the evidence and states
the purpose for which it is to be offered; and (B) Do so at least three days before trial
3 unless the court, for good cause, sets a different date[.]” OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) (1)
(emphasis supplied).
Lawrence has not claimed, let alone shown by the record, that he ever filed such
a motion specifically describing the evidence and stating its purpose. And although it
is not our role to cull the record on behalf of a party, a review of the record has not
revealed that such a motion was filed. Lawrence has thus failed to show that he
complied with the mandatory procedure under OCGA § 21-4-412 (c) for invoking
OCGA § 24-4-412 (b) (2)’s exception to the rape-shield statute’s exclusion of
evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior. See Gallegos-Munoz v. State, 319 Ga.
803, 811 (2) (b) (906 SE2d 711) (2024) (“the focus of Georgia’s rape-shield statute
continues to be the exclusion of evidence concerning the past sexual behavior of the
complaining witness”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed, as Lawrence
concedes in his brief, OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) prescribes a clear procedure for admitting
evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct and his failure to file such a motion
“forfeited review[.]”
Moreover, we note that in his appellate brief, Lawrence has not described any
specific evidence or anticipated testimony that was excluded, and instead has simply
4 made a general reference to evidence of rough sex. See Hicks v. State, 337 Ga. App.
567, 569 (1) (788 SE2d 502) (2016) (appellant claiming error regarding prior
statements did not show reversible error where he failed to identify any such specific
statements in his appellate brief); Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37, 41 (2) (699 SE2d
363) (2010) (this court cannot determine the propriety of the trial court’s ruling
without a proffer of a definite sort of the excluded evidence or testimony). For the
foregoing reasons, Lawrence has failed to show reversible error.
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Lawrence claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a
continuance to investigate a prior allegation of sexual assault made by the victim and
in failing to follow the procedure of OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) to introduce evidence of
that prior allegation. To succeed on these claims, Lawrence “must show both that his
counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced his defense.”
Huber v. State, 319 Ga. 78, 84 (2) (901 SE2d 149) (2024). If he “fails to make a
sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the prejudice prong, we need not
address the other prong.” Id. “To show prejudice, [Lawrence] must demonstrate that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s [alleged] deficiency, the
5 result of the trial would have been different. The likelihood of a different result must
be substantial, not just conceivable.” McNeal v. State, 363 Ga. App. 417, 422 (4) (867
SE2d 824) (2022) (citations and punctuation omitted). Because Lawrence has failed
to show that either of trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies was prejudicial to his defense,
his ineffective assistance claims fail.
(a) Failure to seek continuance
Lawrence claims that trial counsel should have sought a continuance in order
to contact the person accused of the prior sexual assault and to develop evidence
showing that the allegation was false. But Lawrence has not identified any such
testimony or additional evidence that an investigation would have uncovered; and he
likewise failed to make such a showing at the motion for new trial hearing. See
Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 483-484 (IV) (b) (807 SE2d 350) (2017) (rejecting
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to seek a continuance to
interview a witness where defendant failed to show what evidence further
investigation would have uncovered). Indeed, at the hearing, Lawrence proffered no
possible testimony or evidence that might have been discovered with a continuance;
he did not question trial counsel about any such evidence; and instead, trial counsel
6 testified that he did not know what the response of the man accused of the prior
assault would have been.
Lawrence therefore has not made “any proffer whatever to show that the
testimony of such witness[] would have been relevant and favorable, and, thus, would
have resulted in a [reasonable probability of a] different verdict. Accordingly, even
assuming counsel’s deficiency in failing to request a continuance, there was no
showing of any resulting prejudice.” Wells v. State, 281 Ga. 253, 255 (2) (a) (637 SE2d
8) (2006) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174,
180 (3) (b) (702 SE2d 415) (2010) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim for failure to
request a continuance to investigate where appellant presented no evidence of a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different
if counsel had sought a continuance).
(b) Failure to follow OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) procedure
Lawrence contends that his trial counsel should have followed the procedure
under OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) by filing a motion to seek admission of evidence of the
prior sexual assault allegation. But once again, Lawrence has made no showing of
precisely what evidence counsel should have sought to introduce in such a motion.
7 While he refers to a police report of the incident, he has not cited any specific
statements or evidence in the report that would have been admissible and he has not
pointed to such evidence in the appellate record. Likewise, at the motion for new trial
hearing, Lawrence made no proffer of any specific parts of the report that might have
been admissible, did not ask trial counsel about any specific parts of the report that he
could have sought to admit in an OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) motion, and never even asked
counsel to explain why he did not file such a motion regarding the report. Without a
definite proffer of such evidence, Lawrence has failed to show prejudice from
counsel’s failure to file such a motion and instead relies on mere speculation about
whether there is a reasonable probability that there exists some relevant and admissible
evidence which, had counsel filed a motion, the trial court would have admitted.
“[S]uch speculation is insufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance.” Reyes-
Castro v. State, 352 Ga. App. 48, 62 (1) (b) (833 SE2d 735) (2019). See also Lawson v.
State, 280 Ga. App. 870, 873-874 (2) (f) (635 SE2d 259) (2006) (claim of ineffective
assistance for failure to discover purported evidence was based on “rank
speculation”); Dye v. State, 266 Ga. App. 825, 827 (2) (a) (598 SE2d 95)
8 (2004)(speculation that raises no more than a mere possibility is legally insufficient
to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
Moreover, we note that at the outset of the trial, counsel actually sought to
introduce the report as evidence of a prior accusation by the victim while arguing
against the state’s request to exclude it under the rape-shield statute. See Gallegos-
Munoz, supra at 812 (2) (c) (“the rape-shield statute, OCGA § 24-4-412 . . ., does not
categorically bar prior-accusation evidence”). The trial court granted the state’s
request to exclude the report, but Lawrence has not set forth an enumeration of error
regarding this ruling on appeal. Instead, Lawrence posits that counsel was ineffective
because the court would have ruled differently if counsel had filed a motion under
OCGA § 24-4-412 (c). But he has not shown a reasonable probability of such a
different outcome, having failed at the new trial hearing to ask trial counsel what he
would have argued differently to the court in such a motion. Thus, Lawrence’s
conclusion that the trial court likely would have made a different ruling if counsel had
complied with OCGA § 24-4-412 (c) is mere speculation. See Reyes-Castro, supra.
(c) Cumulative prejudice
9 We also consider whether Lawrence is entitled to a new trial based on
cumulative prejudice. See Woods v. State, 312 Ga. 405, 411 (3) (a) (862 SE2d 526)
(2021) (it is the prejudice arising from counsel’s errors that is constitutionally
relevant, not each individual error considered in a vacuum). “Here, the cumulative
prejudice from any assumed deficiencies discussed [above] is insufficient to show a
reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different in
the absence of the alleged deficiencies.” Bates v. State, 313 Ga. 57, 69 (3) (867 SE2d
140) (2022).
Judgment affirmed. Watkins and Padgett, JJ., concur.