312 Ga. 405 FINAL COPY
S21A0862. WOODS v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Presiding Justice.
After a 2013 jury trial, Alexander Woods III was convicted of
five counts of malice murder and given five consecutive life
sentences in connection with the 2004 shooting deaths of four
members of the Resendez family and their housekeeper. Woods’
motion for new trial was denied, and he appeals, enumerating nine
alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the
reasons stated below, we vacate the trial court’s order denying
Woods’ motion for new trial, and we remand the case for the trial
court to rule in the first instance on the question of deficiency of trial
counsel and related evidentiary issues.
On November 8, 2004, three of the Resendez children and their
cousin arrived home from school to find the Resendez children’s
parents, Jaime and Katrina Resendez, shot to death in their home just outside the city of Moultrie in Colquitt County. The children
immediately left to seek help; sheriff’s deputies and EMTs arrived
and discovered a total of five victims in the house, including the
family housekeeper, Katrina’s mother, and the youngest Resendez
child, a toddler.
The investigation by the Colquitt County Sheriff’s Department
and the GBI initially led to Jerry Johnny Thompson, who was
involved in an extensive drug smuggling and dealing operation with
Jaime, and Thompson’s “muscle” or “enforcer,” Anthony “Amp”
Davis, as suspects.1 In 2006, Thompson was indicted for the
murders. In 2009, Thompson’s girlfriend, Yvonne Wilma Stover, also
was indicted. Then, on March 22, 2011, Woods was indicted on five
counts of malice murder, five counts of felony murder, and five
counts of aggravated assault. On November 21, 2011, Thompson
pled guilty and was sentenced to life in prison on one murder count,
with sentencing delayed on the four remaining counts pending his
1 In January 2005, Davis was shot to death and his body set on fire; at
the time of Woods’ trial, that murder was unsolved, and the record contains no further information about it. 2 testimony at Woods’ trial. Stover’s indictment remained pending at
the time of the trial.
I. The evidence presented at trial.
Woods was tried before a jury from May 6 to 10, 2013. At trial,
Thompson was the principal witness for the State and the only
witness to identify Woods directly as a participant in the crimes.
Thompson told the jury the following. Jaime was transporting
marijuana from Texas to Georgia for their supplier, Hector Valdez.
After several shipments were intercepted and seized by law
enforcement, resulting in Jaime’s owing large sums of money to
Valdez, Jaime stopped communicating with Valdez. Valdez
instructed Thompson to contact Jaime and convince him to call
Valdez, and Thompson planned to scare Jaime into calling Valdez
by sending Davis over to the house to threaten him. Thompson
contacted Davis, who told him he would need to bring his “homeboy”
with him to confront Jaime.
Thompson and Stover met Davis and his “homeboy,” whom
Thompson identified as Woods, at a gas station near the Resendez
3 home on the morning of the murders. Thompson did not know
Woods, but he later gave a description of Davis’ “homeboy” to the
police, assisted a forensic artist in preparing a sketch, and later
identified Woods in a lineup.2 Thompson gave the two men a bag
with two bullet-proof vests, an AK automatic rifle, and a Lorcin
pistol; led them to the Resendez house; and left them there.
Shortly afterward, Davis called Thompson and told him to
come back, telling him “there’s trouble . . . get back right now.”
Thompson returned to the house while Stover remained in the car,
and found Jaime lying on the floor, shot dead. Woods was “acting
crazy,” dragging the family’s housekeeper by her hair and holding a
pistol to her head, asking her “where the money’s at, where’s the
money at.” Thompson attempted to explain to Woods that dealers
“don’t keep money where we sleep,” but Woods did not listen.
Thompson also saw Woods take a distinctive gold necklace from
Jaime’s neck. Thompson contacted Stover by radio and instructed
2 While Stover also testified for the State, she was unable to identify
Woods as the man she saw with Davis. 4 her to leave. Shortly thereafter, Jaime’s wife and her mother walked
into the house, and Woods grabbed them and tried to get Thompson
to translate to tell them where the money was. At that point,
Thompson decided to leave and went outside to Davis’ SUV.
Thompson entered the SUV and “waited for a second,” and then
Davis and Woods came out and told Thompson to drive away. Woods
asked Davis if he had collected all his bullets, and Davis said he had,
and Woods said he had his. Then Davis said, “I wished you hadn’t of
did that to that baby,” and Woods responded that the child was
“going to grow up one day.” Davis said that he took about $2,000
from the Resendez house and divided that money with Woods. After
the men changed clothes at a nearby house, Thompson disposed of
the firearms in a swampy area. Sheriff’s deputies and GBI agents,
led to the scene by Thompson, located a Kalashnikov AK-47
automatic rifle and a magazine for a Lorcin pistol there; the pistol
itself was never found. Ballistic tests determined that a bullet and a
bullet fragment found at the scene were fired from the recovered
rifle and that other bullets and shell casings recovered at the scene
5 were fired from a Lorcin 9mm pistol.
Both Woods’ sister and his girlfriend at the time testified that
Woods did not have a car or a phone, and usually had very little
money.3 On the day of the murders, however, Woods had a large,
unexplained amount of loose cash and gave some to his girlfriend to
get her nails done. A friend of Woods testified that in August 2011,
Woods called him and asked him to tell Woods’ girlfriend to “get rid
of that necklace” because that was “all they had on him.” The State
also introduced telephone records showing calls on the morning of
the murders made between Thompson, Davis, and a telephone
number associated with Woods.4
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and on May
3 The custodian of records for a local business testified that Woods had
recently begun working for the company but had not received his first paycheck at the time of the murders. 4 Woods did not have a telephone. The custodian of records for Woods’
employer testified that Woods provided two contact telephone numbers on his employment application, including a telephone number later identified as Woods’ girlfriend’s mother’s landline number. Woods’ girlfriend and her mother testified that they did not place or receive the calls between that number, Thompson, and Davis on the morning of the murders. Woods’ girlfriend further testified that Woods used the phone and that Davis had called that number in the past looking for Woods. 6 10, 2013, Woods was sentenced to serve five consecutive life terms
in prison. On May 14, 2013, Thompson was sentenced to life
imprisonment on the remaining four murder counts in his
indictment, to run concurrently with the original life sentence
imposed in 2011. In October 2013, Stover pled guilty to five counts
of aggravated assault as a lesser included offense of felony murder
and was sentenced to serve nine years of a 20-year sentence in
prison, with the balance on probation, concurrently on all five
counts.
2. The motion for new trial.
Woods filed a timely motion for new trial asserting numerous
claims of error. He raised nine different instances of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, including counsel’s alleged failure to
adequately cross-examine the witnesses against him and to
investigate or call exculpatory witnesses.5 Among other claims,
5 Woods’ other allegations of ineffective assistance, which he also asserts
on appeal, included counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate cross-examination of Stover, failure to raise certain objections, and preemptive introduction of evidence of Woods’ prior bad acts. 7 Woods asserted in his motion for new trial, and continues to assert
on appeal, that his trial counsel were deficient in failing to use a
wide range of materials to impeach or discredit Thompson, including
the State’s death penalty notice with respect to Thompson’s
indictment and the possibility of its withdrawal in exchange for
Thompson’s testimony; Thompson’s alleged written and oral
confessions to the murders that did not mention or identify Woods
as a party to the crimes; his alleged prior inconsistent statements to
investigators and others regarding the facts and circumstances of
the murders; his apparent attempt to create an alibi for the time of
Davis’ murder; his alleged inconsistencies in his identification of
Woods; his alleged pretrial attempts to influence Stover’s testimony;
and his prior alleged violence and threats of violence against various
individuals, including Stover, a federal prosecutor, and others who
testified or gave statements to investigators. Woods asserted in his
motion for new trial that this evidence, especially when considered
cumulatively, called Thompson’s trial testimony into such question
that the jury most likely would have rejected his testimony
8 altogether had counsel employed the evidence at trial, thus creating
a reasonable probability of prejudice from counsel’s deficiencies,
particularly in light of the weakness of other evidentiary support for
the verdicts.
At the 2019 hearing on Woods’ motion for new trial, at which
both of his trial counsel testified, Woods’ appellate counsel examined
trial counsel regarding witness statements, GBI investigatory
reports, jail call records, and other documents pertaining to the
initial investigation of Thompson in 2004 and 2005 (“the Thompson
documents”). These documents, however, were never authenticated
during the hearing. The State objected to the introduction of the
Thompson documents not only because they were hearsay but also
because they had not been authenticated. After some discussion,
during which the State repeated its authentication argument, the
trial court sustained the objection to the Thompson documents, but
without specifying the basis for its decision.
Woods’ trial attorneys were the only witnesses at the hearing,
and both testified that they had never seen the Thompson
9 documents before; Woods’ lead counsel ultimately testified that he
did not believe the State ever produced the documents to the defense
in discovery: “Well, here’s the thing I’m having a problem with.
You’re asking questions about stuff that I don’t know anything
about. I don’t remember all that being in the discovery.” He
reiterated this testimony throughout his examination, noting that
much of this material would have been generated in the 2004 and
2005 investigation of the murder charges against Thompson, not the
later investigation of Woods, and stating, “I can’t answer a question
about stuff I’ve never seen in my life.”6 Woods did not call any other
6 Lead trial counsel testified: “[W]hat I’m trying to say is, when [Woods’
file] got passed off to me from the public defender’s office [that previously represented Woods], that [the Thompson documents] would not have been in it. That would have been in [Thompson’s public defender]’s file up in Cordele. Not mine.” And during cross-examination by the State at the hearing, this exchange occurred between Woods’ lead trial counsel and the prosecutor: TRIAL COUNSEL: You heard my statement to his questions saying I do not recall that being in the discovery. This started out as a death-penalty case with Jerry Johnny Thompson, didn’t it? PROSECUTOR: Correct. TRIAL COUNSEL: Isn’t that where all those documents came from? PROSECUTOR: I would guess. I wasn’t part of that. TRIAL COUNSEL: I wasn’t part of that either. . . . I mean, I can’t answer a question about stuff I’ve never seen in my life. Woods’ co-counsel at trial similarly testified that he reviewed the entire file and that “I just don’t remember that in the discovery, sir.” 10 witnesses, such as the trial prosecutor or a lead investigator with
knowledge of the State’s investigative files, to identify the Thompson
documents or to establish whether they were produced to Woods’
trial counsel, and Woods’ counsel had no opportunity to cross-
examine any witnesses regarding them.
In its order denying Woods’ motion for new trial, the trial court
pretermitted the question of whether counsel were constitutionally
deficient, instead concluding only that Woods had failed to
demonstrate prejudice and thus had failed to establish the second
prong of the test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104
SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). The trial court also noted that,
although it had excluded the Thompson documents at the hearing
on Woods’ motion for new trial, it “hereby reconsiders said ruling
and admits the Defense exhibits 4 through 39 for the Motion for New
Trial as the Court finds that the documents are not hearsay and
shall be allowed to come into evidence for purposes of the Motion for
New Trial.” Again, however, the trial court made no ruling regarding
the State’s authentication objection.
11 3. Analysis.
(a) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
In his brief on appeal, Woods enumerates as error the claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised in his motion for new
trial. He also asserts cumulative prejudice under State v. Lane, 308
Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020).7 To prevail on his claims of ineffective
assistance, Woods must prove both that the performance of his
lawyers was professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced by
this deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687 (III). To
prove deficient performance, Woods must show that his attorneys
“performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering
all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional
norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3) (745 SE2d 637) (2013).
This requires that he “overcome the strong presumption that
7 While Woods relies on Lane in his brief, that decision announced a new
rule regarding the cumulative effect of a combination of certain trial court errors and deficiencies of counsel. See 308 Ga. at 17 (1). Woods enumerates no trial court error, arguing only the cumulative effect of multiple deficiencies on the part of his trial counsel, which has long been part of the Strickland analysis. See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811 (II) n.1 (642 SE2d 56) (2007), overruled on other grounds, Lane, 308 Ga. at 23 (Appx.). 12 counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable
professional conduct.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Marshall
v. State, 297 Ga. 445, 448 (2) (774 SE2d 675) (2015). And to prove
prejudice, Woods “must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694 (III) (B).
Ordinarily, “[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland
test is sufficient to defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is
not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733
(2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015). However, this Court must also consider
that “prejudice” is assessed based on the cumulative effect of all of
trial counsel’s deficiencies. Debelbot v. State, 305 Ga. 534, 544 (2)
(826 SE2d 129) (2019). “[I]t is the prejudice arising from counsel’s
errors that is constitutionally relevant, not that each individual
error by counsel should be considered in a vacuum.” (Citation and
13 punctuation omitted.) Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811 (II) n.1
(642 SE2d 56) (2007), overruled on other grounds, Lane, 308 Ga. at
23 (Appx.).
Here, the trial court assumed trial counsel’s deficiency,
concluding only that Woods had failed to show prejudice even if
counsel was deficient in all the instances alleged. A trial court does
not err in addressing only one prong of the Strickland test, provided
that its determination that the defendant has failed to satisfy that
prong is correct. See Smith, 296 Ga. at 733 (2). But here, by
assuming deficiency, the trial court assumed that all of Woods’
assertions with regard to the Thompson documents are true,
including that they are authentic and were available to his trial
counsel, and that trial counsel had no valid strategic reason not to
use them for impeachment. And the trial court also assumed the
validity of Woods’ other claims of deficiency unrelated to the
Thompson documents. In light of all these assumptions, Woods has
shown prejudice, at least as a cumulative result of all the
deficiencies he alleges, and the trial court therefore erred in
14 concluding otherwise.
“[W]hen we consider whether a defendant was prejudiced by
the alleged deficiency of trial counsel, we measure the evidence that
should have been — but was not — presented to the jury against the
totality of the evidence that was presented.” Debelbot, 305 Ga. at 543
(2). This requires us to consider the strength of the allegedly omitted
evidence, its importance in the context of the trial, and the relative
strength of the totality of the evidence.
First, as the only surviving eyewitness to the murders and the
only person to identify Woods as a participant, Thompson was
central to the State’s case. Therefore, significant impeachment
material in the Thompson documents that trial counsel deficiently
failed to employ was likely to have affected the jury’s evaluation of
the State’s principal witness, as well as the outcome of the trial. Cf.
Danforth v. Chapman, 297 Ga. 29, 31 (2) (771 SE2d 886) (2015) (in
context of analysis under Brady and Giglio,8 when defendant’s
8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963),
and Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 153 (92 SCt 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972). 15 cellmate was sole witness to testify that defendant confessed,
undisclosed evidence impeaching witness’ testimony was material to
defense and created reasonable probability that outcome of trial
would have been different).
Second, this would be a substantial amount of impeachment
evidence that was not, but should have been, presented to the jury.
For example, Thompson purportedly made oral and written
confessions to the crimes that did not identify Woods as a
participant. And evidence from the Thompson documents — such as
Thompson’s stated inability to identify Davis’ companion, his
repeated attempts to influence Stover’s testimony, and his multiple
statements regarding killing Jaime and others — could have been
used to impeach by contradiction Thompson’s positive identification
of Woods at trial, his testimony that he did not attempt to influence
Stover, and his testimony that he had never killed anyone. See
OCGA § 24-6-621 (“A witness may be impeached by disproving the
facts testified to by the witness.”). And, as Woods correctly argues,
the State’s death penalty notice, assuming it remained pending at
16 the time of Thompson’s testimony, would suggest that Thompson’s
testimony for the State was motivated by powerful self-interest.9
[T]he partiality of a witness may be exposed by proof that he hopes to benefit in related cases from his cooperation with the prosecution in this case. Such partiality is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Kinsman v. State, 259 Ga. 89,
91 (7) (b) (376 SE2d 845) (1989). The totality of the impeachment
evidence would be strong, even without considering the other
alleged deficiencies unrelated to the Thompson documents.
Third, we have declined to conclude that prejudice exists, even
while assuming trial counsel’s deficiency, when evidence of the
appellant’s guilt was “overwhelming” or “very strong.” See, e.g.,
Humphrey v. Riley, 291 Ga. 534, 544-545 (II) (K) (731 SE2d 740)
(2012) (combined effect of actual and assumed deficiencies did not
9 As Woods notes, Thompson testified on cross-examination at trial that
he already had been sentenced to “27 years federal time” and “five life sentences. What I say here can’t help — ain’t going to help me,” claiming that the only reason he was “[c]oming in here and identifying [Woods] and telling the truth about what happened is because he killed a baby. Okay? And he don’t need to go back out there in the world.” 17 show a reasonable probability of different outcome, in light of
overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt); Strother v. State, 305
Ga. 838, 848-849 (5) (828 SE2d 327) (2019) (need not decide question
of counsel’s deficiency when evidence of appellant’s guilt was “very
strong”); see also Parker v. State, 309 Ga. 736, 745-747 (5) (848 SE2d
117) (2020) (no reasonable probability of different outcome even
considering presumed harm from trial court error cumulatively with
presumed prejudice from deficient performance of counsel, when
evidence of guilt was “overwhelming”). But here, Thompson, an
admitted accomplice whose testimony had to be corroborated, see
OCGA § 24-14-8, was the only witness to identify Woods directly as
a participant in the murders.10 The evidence corroborating his
testimony consisted only of Woods’ possession of an unexplained
amount of cash, a reference to a necklace that was never identified
and never recovered, and telephone records showing calls between
Davis and Thompson and a landline telephone used by Woods but
owned and used by others. This additional evidence cannot be
10 The trial court instructed the jury on accomplice corroboration.
18 considered “overwhelming” or even “very strong” in comparison to
the testimony given by Thompson.11
[A] prejudice determination is necessarily affected by the quantity and quality of the evidence that was presented to the jury and that which should have been, and a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Debelbot, 305 Ga. at 543 (2).
For this Court to determine prejudice in the context of
Strickland, we must “review the record de novo and weigh the
evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153,
163 (2) (b) (829 SE2d 312) (2019).
The record shows a reasonable probability that the result of the
11 Counsel for the State conceded at oral argument that, had the jury
rejected Thompson’s testimony, the remaining evidence would “probably not” have been sufficient for the State to obtain a conviction. Moreover, in its order denying Woods’ motion for new trial, the trial court, in considering the quantum of evidence corroborating Thompson’s accomplice testimony, observed, “While the Court agrees that this is not overwhelming direct evidence . . . , this testimony was slight evidence and that is all the law requires for corroboration and legal sufficiency.” While this comment was made in a different context, it still suggests a “reasonable probability” that the remaining evidence, had the jury disbelieved Thompson’s testimony, was not strong.
19 proceeding would have been different if counsel was in fact deficient
in failing to use all of the Thompson documents in cross-
examination, as well as deficient in the other ways alleged by Woods,
and constitutes cumulative prejudice under Strickland and
Schofield.12 The question of trial counsel’s deficiency therefore
requires a determination of the authenticity and provenance of the
Thompson documents, and allowing the parties to present testimony
and evidence to explore fully any admissible documents. This must
be addressed in the first instance by the trial court. See Debelbot,
305 Ga. at 541-542 (2) (in absence of necessary fact and credibility
findings by trial court, this Court cannot undertake a Strickland
analysis). We therefore vacate the trial court’s order denying Woods’
motion for new trial and remand for further findings as detailed
below.
(b) Authentication and related issues.
On remand, the trial court must directly address the Thompson
12 We express no opinion regarding whether the cumulative effect of fewer than all the alleged deficiencies would result in prejudice sufficient to meet the Strickland standard. 20 documents’ authentication, admissibility, and pertinence to the
alleged deficient performance of trial counsel — questions that are
central to Woods’ claims. In reversing its exclusion of the Thompson
documents from the record, the trial concluded that “the documents
are not hearsay.” But it never considered the documents’
authentication, an objection that was raised by the State at the
hearing. Nor did the trial court consider the related questions of the
whereabouts or custodian of the Thompson documents between the
time of the State’s investigation of Thompson and the time of Woods’
prosecution; whether the documents were part of Woods’ (as opposed
to Thompson’s) file; or whether they were provided to Woods’ trial
counsel. See generally McDowell v. State, 309 Ga. 504, 506-507 (2)
(847 SE2d 309) (2020) (explaining authentication, including
identification and chain of custody); Kilpatrick v. State, 308 Ga. 194,
198-199 (4) (839 SE2d 551) (2020) (authentication of phone records
by testimony regarding procedures used by law enforcement to
obtain them); see also State v. Smith, 299 Ga. 901, 902 (1) (792 SE2d
677) (2016) (trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding exhibit
21 when police investigator did not authenticate it). As noted above,
these findings are likely to bear directly upon the question of trial
counsel’s deficiency, and potentially upon trial counsel’s credibility,
which the trial court must determine in the first instance. See Gray
v. State, 309 Ga. 850, 855 (2) (b) (848 SE2d 870) (2020).13
(c) Conclusion.
We therefore vacate the trial court’s order denying Woods’
motion for new trial and remand for the trial court to hold a hearing,
at which the parties may present evidence and argument, in order
for the trial court to: (1) determine the admissibility of the
Thompson documents, including their authenticity and provenance;
(2) allow the parties to elicit testimony and make argument
concerning such matters as whether those documents determined to
be authentic and admissible were provided to Woods’ trial counsel
before the 2013 trial, and if so, why trial counsel did not use them;
13 We note that Woods has not raised a claim that his trial counsel failed
to properly investigate to find the Thompson documents or that the State suppressed the documents in violation of due process under Brady or Giglio. See generally State v. Thomas, 311 Ga. 407, 413-414 (3) (858 SE2d 52) (2021). 22 (3) determine whether, in light of those findings, Woods’ trial
counsel were constitutionally deficient under Strickland; and (4) if
trial counsel are held to have performed deficiently, including with
respect to those allegations not related to the Thompson documents,
make an appropriate prejudice analysis under Strickland and
Schofield. The trial court shall enter an order making these rulings,
which may then be appealed to this Court.14
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
14 Nothing said in this Court’s opinion should be considered a prejudgment or statement of expectation regarding the merits of the issues to be determined by the trial court. 23 Decided August 24, 2021 — Reconsideration denied
September 21, 2021.
Murder. Colquitt Superior Court. Before Judge Moulton,
Senior Judge.
Jason M. McLendon, Matthew K. Winchester, for
appellant.
Bradfield M. Shealy, District Attorney, James B.
Threlkeld, Michelle T. Harrison, Assistant District Attorneys;
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for
appellee.