309 Ga. 736 FINAL COPY
S20A0826. PARKER v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
Vraimone Parker appeals his convictions for malice murder
and other offenses, following the shooting death of his aunt’s
boyfriend, Kwame Chubbs, and the non-fatal shooting of his aunt,
Eva Robinson.1 At trial, the jury rejected Parker’s defense that he
was not guilty by reason of insanity and also rejected the option of
1 Chubbs was killed on September 12, 2017. In December 2017, a Fulton
County grand jury returned an indictment charging Parker with malice murder, four counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm having previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or possession of a firearm. A jury found Parker guilty of all charges at an August 2018 trial. On August 10, 2018, the trial court sentenced Parker to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, a 20-year consecutive term of imprisonment for the aggravated assault of Robinson, and a 15-year consecutive term for possession of a firearm having previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or possession of a firearm; the other counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Parker filed a motion for new trial on August 13, 2018. Parker amended the motion on June 4 and July 29, 2019. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in an order entered on September 10, 2019. Parker filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s April 2020 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. finding him guilty but mentally ill. Parker argues on appeal that the
trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after a detective
commented on Parker’s silence; failing to grant a mistrial after the
trial court’s own expert witness testified that Parker knew what he
was doing at the time of the shooting; and imposing a discovery
sanction that precluded Parker’s expert witness from offering
particular testimony. He also argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective in handling issues related to Parker’s status as a
convicted felon. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motions for mistrial; Parker has shown no
harmful error as a result of the discovery sanction; and Parker has
not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by any deficient
performance of counsel, even where counsel’s performance is
considered along with the effect of the discovery sanction. We
therefore affirm.
The trial evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts
showed the following. Chubbs lived in Fulton County with his sister,
Sonda Franklin, and Chubbs’s estranged girlfriend, Robinson. On the afternoon of September 11, 2017, Parker, Robinson’s nephew
who recently had arrived from Florida, came to the home to visit.
Parker smoked marijuana and acted strangely that day.
Parker was “seeing stuff” that was not there, jumping from those
apparent hallucinations, and crying. Franklin claimed that she
declined to smoke Parker’s marijuana because it did not look like
the marijuana she usually smoked, although Robinson testified that
Franklin and Parker regularly shared the same marijuana.
Robinson did not smoke any of Parker’s marijuana. Parker spent the
night at Franklin’s house.
The following morning, Chubbs told Franklin when he left for
work that he was going to call and check on her because Parker had
been “acting weird to” him. Parker continued to act strangely that
day, apparently hallucinating and claiming that five other people
were “all at him at one time” and “the other Vraimone was telling
him to kill himself.” Parker had a gun, and Franklin and Robinson
exchanged text messages about attempting to take it away.
Robinson contacted Parker’s mother, sister, and cousin, seeking help dealing with Parker.
At some point that day, Parker and Robinson were on the front
porch. A passing car “spooked” Parker, and he went inside. Chubbs
arrived home from work, and Franklin called him back to her room
and reported that Parker’s mother was on her way to get Parker.
Chubbs asked Franklin for her gun, but she declined to give it to
him. Chubbs left the room, and Franklin heard gunshots less than
a minute later. Franklin ran out of her room and saw Parker shoot
Chubbs multiple times; Parker looked directly at Franklin as he shot
Chubbs in the head. Still out on the porch, Robinson felt a bullet
graze her leg. Chubbs was shot at least six times and died from a
gunshot wound to the head.
That night, police found Parker walking in the middle of a
highway nearby, talking on a cell phone. Parker had a pistol in his
waistband that later was determined to have fired the bullets
recovered from Chubbs’s body. Parker’s pistol had three separate
safeties. An arresting officer testified that he observed nothing out
of the ordinary in Parker’s behavior at the time of his arrest. At trial, the State introduced evidence of two prior felony
convictions of Parker in Ohio: a conviction for aggravated robbery
involving the use of a firearm, and a conviction for illegal conveyance
of a weapon or other prohibited item onto the grounds of a specified
government facility.
The jury heard testimony about Parker’s mental health from a
State expert, a defense expert, and an expert the trial court
appointed to testify as a friend of the court under OCGA § 17-7-
130.1. The defense expert, Adriana Flores, testified that Parker was
psychotic at the time of the offense and likely met the criteria for
schizoaffective disorder bipolar type. Dr. Flores testified that
marijuana use did not explain Parker’s psychosis given that his
psychotic symptoms began well before the shooting and continued
for a period of time after his arrest. The State’s expert, Matthew
Norman, testified that Parker was psychotic on the day of the
shooting but his psychosis was best explained by substance abuse,
not schizoaffective disorder. The trial court’s expert, David
Halverson, testified that Parker did not suffer from a chronic psychotic illness but, rather, had experienced cannabis-induced
psychotic disorder.
1. Although Parker does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude
that the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to
authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979).2
2. Parker argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant
his request for a mistrial after a State’s witness improperly
commented on Parker’s silence.
At trial, a prosecutor asked a detective what she observed when
she served Parker with warrants for his arrest. The detective
replied, “He didn’t speak. He didn’t say anything —.” The defense
2 We remind litigants that the Court will end its practice of considering
sufficiency sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases docketed to the term of court that begins in December 2020. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 399 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). The Court began assigning cases to the December term on August 3, 2020. made a motion for a mistrial on the basis that the remark was an
improper comment on Parker’s silence. The motion was denied, but
the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the comment.
“Whether to grant a mistrial is within the trial court’s
discretion, which an appellate court will not disturb unless there is
a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right
to a fair trial.” Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 750, 755 (3) (827 SE2d 879)
(2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, even assuming the testimony was a comment on [Parker’s] silence, the comment was non-responsive and made in passing. Further, juries are presumed to follow curative instructions in the absence of proof to the contrary. [Parker] has provided no evidence that the jury disregarded the court’s instruction and therefore this allegation of error cannot be sustained.
Id.
3. Parker argues that the trial court committed reversible
error when it failed to grant his motion for mistrial after the trial
court’s expert witness offered his conclusion on Parker’s mental
state and culpability in the presence of the jury. We disagree.
Although this enumeration of error primarily concerns the testimony of the court’s expert witness, we begin with some
background about the testimony of the defense expert who testified
first. On direct examination, the defense expert, Dr. Flores, began
to testify that Parker was psychotic before, during, and after the
offense. Dr. Flores added that she concluded Parker was “unable to
differentiate —” before being interrupted by the State’s objection
that her testimony was “getting to the ultimate issue” in the case.
In response to the State’s objection, the defense argued that its
witness, Dr. Flores, should be able to testify that Parker did not
know right from wrong, one of the two bases for proving insanity
under Georgia law. See McElrath v. State, 308 Ga. 104, 106 (1) (b)
(839 SE2d 573) (2020). The trial court ruled that the experts could
not testify on that issue. Nonetheless, on cross-examination by the
State, Dr. Flores briefly suggested, before stopping herself, that
Parker met one of two possible definitions of insanity under Georgia
law. In particular, when asked by the State to recite the legal
standard for insanity in Georgia, Dr. Flores responded that it had
“two prongs.” She explained that “[o]ne prong” is that the person “was laboring under a delusion” that “overmastered their will,”
adding, “[t]he other one, which is the one that I am saying he meets,
is that the individual was — I thought I couldn’t testify about it.”
The prosecutor responded, “Well, I didn’t ask you about it. But you
testified anyway, didn’t you?” Defense counsel objected to the
prosecutor’s response as argumentative and on the basis that the
prosecutor had failed to allow Dr. Flores to complete her answer.
The trial court stated in a bench conference that Dr. Flores had
violated the court’s order by “indicat[ing] to the jury [which] prong
that she was moving under and what her finding was” and overruled
the defense objection. No curative instruction was requested by
either party or given by the trial court.
The trial court’s expert, Dr. Halverson, testified later. When
asked by the prosecutor whether Parker was experiencing psychosis
at the time of the shooting, Dr. Halverson testified that Parker had
been psychotic, but not delusional, then added that Parker “was not
so impaired that he didn’t know what he was doing at the time —”
before being cut off by the trial court when Parker’s counsel objected. Parker moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the mistrial and
asked whether the defense wanted any type of curative instruction.
Defense counsel responded that the defendant did not waive his
motion for a mistrial but requested that the court instruct the jury
that Dr. Halverson “should not have testified to what he just said
and that they should disregard it, that the issue of whether a person
is criminally responsible or not lies within the exclusive province of
the jury, regardless of any testimony to the contrary, regardless of
any testimony to that issue.” The trial court then instructed the jury
as follows:
Neither this witness nor any witness should testify to what is considered the ultimate issue for the jury to determine, and that is whether or not the defendant was criminally responsible at the time he committed the alleged act. Any testimony by this witness in that regard in his last response should be totally disregarded by you. Experts can testify as to their diagnoses and their observations, but they are not to testify as to what mental intent, for instance, a person has at the time of committing a crime. That is exclusively for the jury to determine after hearing all of the evidence in the case. So I instruct you to disregard any testimony by this witness or any other with respect to whether or not a person — the defendant was acting at the time of the incident with criminal intent or not to commit the act.
The defense did not object to the form of the instruction.
Again, whether to grant a mistrial is a decision within the trial
court’s discretion that will not be reversed unless it is essential to
the preservation of the right to a fair trial. See Jones, 305 Ga. at 755
(3). Whether or not the remark of Dr. Halverson to which Parker
objected was admissible,3 we conclude that Parker has not shown
that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a mistrial.
Here, the testimony in question was unsolicited by the State, which
had merely asked if Parker was experiencing psychosis at the time
3 The District Attorney, but not the Attorney General, argues that the
testimony was admissible. We note that OCGA § 24-7-704 (b), which is similar to a federal rule of evidence, see Fed. R. Evid. 704 (b), provides that “[n]o expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of an accused in a criminal proceeding shall state an opinion or inference as to whether the accused did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto[,]” as “[s]uch ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.” The Eleventh Circuit has held under the federal rule that although psychiatric testimony may include the expert’s diagnosis, the characteristics of the particular mental disease or defect, and the expert’s opinion as to the defendant’s mental state and motivation at the time of the alleged crime, such testimony may not opine on whether the defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions. See United States v. Manley, 893 F2d 1221, 1223-1225 (11th Cir. 1990). of the shooting. The witness’s remark was cut off promptly, and the
trial court instructed the jury to disregard it. Although Parker
argues that the instruction was too unclear for the jury to know what
it was supposed to disregard,4 the corrective instruction referenced
the witness’s “last response.” And the trial court instructed the jury,
as Parker requested, that Dr. Halverson should not have testified as
to whether Parker was “criminally responsible” at the time of the
shooting, and Parker raised no objection to any of the language used
by the trial court. To the extent that the jury was confused as to
whether it could consider Dr. Halverson’s brief remark that Parker
“knew what he was doing” at the time of the shooting, any harm to
Parker from that testimony was mitigated by the defense expert’s
(also brief) remark suggesting that Parker met the definition of
4 In particular, Parker argues that the curative instruction was confusing because it told the jury that witnesses cannot testify about “criminal intent,” words not used by Dr. Halverson, but did not tell the jury that it could not consider Dr. Halverson’s statement as to whether Parker had mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. Parker contends that the curative instruction was confusing, particularly given that the court ultimately instructed the jury that “[c]riminal intent does not mean an intention to violate the law or to violate a penal statute, but means simply the intention to commit the act that is prohibited by the statute.” insanity, especially given that the trial court offered no curative
instruction to that remark. And the trial court specifically instructed
the jury prior to Dr. Halverson’s testimony that, by identifying him
as the trial court’s expert, the court was suggesting nothing about
his credibility or the weight the jury should give his testimony. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial. See
United States v. Signore, 780 Fed. Appx. 685, 691 (11th Cir. 2019)
(even if expert’s testimony defining Ponzi scheme as a “type of
investment fraud” were improper under Federal Rule of Evidence
704 (b), trial court did not err in denying mistrial where expert did
not directly state that any specific defendant engaged in fraud or
acted with intent to deceive and trial court gave multiple curative
instructions); Jones, 305 Ga. at 755 (3) (no reversible error in
denying mistrial, as “the comment was non-responsive and made in
passing,” and “juries are presumed to follow curative instructions in
the absence of proof to the contrary”); Torres v. State, 272 Ga. 389,
390-391 (2) (529 SE2d 883) (2000) (even assuming that admission of
expert testimony that appellant’s drug dealing evidenced his lack of an intellectual disability was error, no error in denial of motion for
mistrial because neither the witness nor the prosecution
intentionally injected appellant’s character in issue, and the trial
court struck the testimony, gave a curative instruction to the jury to
disregard it, and rebuked the prosecutor in the presence of the jury).
4. Parker argues that the trial court also erred when it, as a
discovery sanction, precluded Dr. Flores from testifying about one of
her meetings with Parker. We see no reversible error.
Before the August 2018 trial, the trial court ordered Dr. Flores
to produce a more complete expert report pursuant to OCGA § 17-
16-4 (b) (2)5 by July 17, 2018. Dr. Flores prepared a supplemental
5 That statute provides:
The defendant shall within ten days of timely compliance by the prosecuting attorney but no later than five days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the prosecuting attorney at a time agreed to by the parties or as ordered by the court to inspect and copy or photograph a report of any physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments, including a summary of the basis for the expert opinion rendered in the report, or copies thereof, if the defendant intends to introduce in evidence in the defense’s case-in-chief or rebuttal the results of the physical or mental examination or scientific test or experiment. If the report is oral or partially oral, the defendant shall reduce all relevant and material oral portions of such report report dated July 16, 2018. Dr. Flores later met with Parker for a
second time.6 After she mentioned this second meeting in her
testimony, the State objected to her testifying about the second
meeting on the basis that it had not been included in her expert
report. The trial court agreed with the State, ruling that Dr. Flores
could not testify about the second meeting, at least unless the State
brought it up on cross-examination, because the failure to advise the
State of facts the expert gathered prior to compiling her report
violated the discovery statute and the court’s order.
OCGA § 17-16-6 provides for exclusion of evidence as a sanction
for failures of both the State and defendants to comply with their
statutory discovery obligations in a criminal case.
Exclusion of evidence pursuant to OCGA § 17-16-6 is a particularly harsh sanction that should be imposed only where there is a showing of bad faith by the party that has failed to comply with its discovery obligation and
to writing and shall serve opposing counsel with such portions no later than five days prior to trial. Nothing in this Code section shall require the disclosure of any other material, note, or memorandum relating to the psychiatric or psychological treatment or therapy of any defendant or witness. 6 The trial court entered an order requiring jail staff to permit the second
visit between Dr. Flores and Parker. prejudice to the other party. We review a trial court’s order excluding evidence under OCGA § 17-16-6 for an abuse of discretion. We review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings under the statute as to bad faith and prejudice.
State v. Bryant, 307 Ga. 850, 853 (1) (838 SE2d 855) (2020) (citations
and punctuation omitted).
Parker argues that the trial court erred in ruling that Dr.
Flores could not testify about her second meeting with him, because
the court did not make findings of prejudice and bad faith pursuant
to OCGA § 17-16-6. But to obtain reversal based on any such error,
Parker must show that he was harmed by the ruling. See Green v.
State, 307 Ga. 171, 178 (4) (835 SE2d 238) (2019) (considering
whether exclusion under OCGA § 17-16-6 was harmful). This Parker
cannot do. Although Parker argues that the trial court’s exclusion of
Dr. Flores’s testimony regarding her second meeting with him
“conveyed to the jury that Dr. Flores’s opinion was based on less data
than it actually was based on,” the jury in fact heard that Dr. Flores
had two meetings with him. After the State sought to exclude Dr.
Flores’s testimony about the second meeting, Parker elicited Dr. Flores’s testimony outside the presence of the jury that the second
meeting involved her asking him questions based on the other
experts’ reports and that the second meeting did nothing to change
her opinion.7 Parker offers no argument about how this additional
testimony might have changed the outcome of the case.
To the extent that Parker means to argue that the ruling
prevented Dr. Flores from telling the jury something more about the
substance of the second meeting, his argument fails because he has
not shown what additional testimony Dr. Flores would have offered
had the trial court ruled differently. Parker made no attempt to
make the substance of any such additional testimony known to the
trial court — via the expert’s proffer or otherwise — and thus this
argument is not subject to ordinary appellate review. See Walker v.
State, 301 Ga. 482, 487 (3) (801 SE2d 804) (2017) (citing OCGA § 24-
1-103 (a) (2)). And this failure to make the substance of any
7 Parker’s counsel prefaced her question to Dr. Flores by explaining to
the trial court that if it were “inclined to refuse to allow her to testify about [the second meeting], then I guess we need to know what the difference is between” what was discussed at the two meetings. additional testimony known to the trial court dooms any claim of
plain error, as Parker cannot show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for the trial court’s discovery sanction, the
outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to him. See id.
at 488 (3). Parker cannot obtain reversal of his convictions on this
ground.
5. Finally, Parker argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective in several respects related to the State’s introduction of
evidence that he was a convicted felon at the time of the shooting.
We conclude that Parker has not shown that any deficient
performance of counsel prejudiced his defense.
Parker was charged with one count of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon and one count of possession of a firearm by
someone previously having been convicted of a felony involving the
use or possession of a firearm. As noted above, the State introduced
at trial two exhibits showing Parker’s prior felony convictions.
State’s Exhibit 120 was a certified conviction for aggravated
robbery, including the specification that Parker had used a firearm in committing the offense. The exhibit also showed that Parker had
been indicted for two counts of kidnapping and one count of
aggravated burglary and that those counts had been nolle prossed.
State’s Exhibit 121 showed that Parker was convicted of illegal
conveyance of weapons or prohibited items onto the grounds of one
of several specified government facilities; the exhibit included an
indictment alleging that he had conveyed a “drug of abuse” into the
facility, and a sentencing order showing that he had received a 30-
month prison sentence.
Parker argues that trial counsel performed deficiently by
failing to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon and that he
previously had been convicted of a felony involving the use or
possession of a firearm. Parker argues that counsel at least should
have sought redaction of irrelevant allegations of conduct for which
Parker was not convicted, specifically the two counts of kidnapping
and one count of aggravated burglary in State’s Exhibit 120.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Parker must show both that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d
674) (1984). “To establish deficient performance, [Parker] must
overcome the strong presumption that his . . . counsel’s conduct falls
within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct and show
that his counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way” in
the light of all of the circumstances. Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733
(2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To
establish prejudice, Parker must show that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694. Parker must prove both prongs of the Strickland test, and if
he fails to prove one prong, “it is not incumbent upon this Court to
examine the other prong.” Smith, 296 Ga. at 733 (2) (citation and
punctuation omitted). In reviewing either component of the inquiry,
all factual findings by the trial court will be affirmed unless clearly
erroneous. See id. We conclude that even if trial counsel performed
deficiently in failing to stipulate to Parker’s status as a convicted felon who had committed a felony involving a firearm, Parker has
not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome if counsel
had so stipulated.
We have held that a trial court may abuse its discretion in
failing to allow a defendant to stipulate to his status as a convicted
felon “where a defendant’s prior conviction is of the nature likely to
inflame the jury’s passions and raise the risk of a conviction based
on improper considerations, and . . . the purpose of the evidence is
solely to prove the defendant’s status as a convicted felon.” Moore v.
State, 306 Ga. 532, 534 (2) (b) (832 SE2d 384) (2019) (citation and
punctuation omitted). But this Court has held that even violent
crimes, crimes involving firearms, and drug offenses were not likely
to inflame the jury’s passions in murder cases. See Stephens v. State,
307 Ga. 731, 739 (4) (838 SE2d 275) (2020) (trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied murder defendant’s request to stipulate
to prior felony conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute); Moore, 306 Ga. at 534-535 (2) (b) (conviction for
possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer unlikely to inflame the jury’s passions in trial for malice murder, aggravated
assault, and other offenses); Morris v. State, 297 Ga. 426, 428 (2)
(774 SE2d 665) (2015) (prior convictions for aggravated assault and
interference with government property were not likely to inflame
passions of jury in trial for malice murder, aggravated assault, and
other crimes, where evidence of convictions presented included only
the name of the crimes and the sentences received).
Parker has not shown that informing the jury that he had been
convicted of aggravated robbery and bringing a prohibited item into
a government facility, and that he had been charged with
kidnapping and aggravated burglary, likely inflamed the passions
of the jury, particularly in the light of the nature of the charges and
evidence against Parker. The evidence that Parker shot the victim
was overwhelming. Indeed, Parker’s counsel conceded in her closing
argument that Parker shot and killed Chubbs and that one of the
bullets he fired hit Robinson in the leg. This makes it particularly
unlikely that the evidence of Parker’s prior convictions affected the
outcome of the trial as to the offenses other than those specifically predicated on a prior conviction. See Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248,
252-253 (6) (a) (773 SE2d 254) (2015) (any error in counsel’s failure
to stipulate to convicted felon status, based on convictions for
aggravated assault and burglary, did not result in prejudice given
overwhelming evidence of his guilt); Hill v. State, 290 Ga. 493, 498
(6) (722 SE2d 708) (2012) (any error in trial court’s refusal to permit
defendant to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon, based on
conviction for aggravated assault, was harmless due to
overwhelming evidence of guilt). The prejudicial impact of the
kidnapping and burglary charges included in the documents
admitted at trial was low, given that the documents showed that
Parker had not been convicted of those crimes. Moreover, given that
Parker was charged with possession of a firearm having been
previously convicted of a felony involving a firearm, even if counsel
had offered a stipulation, and the trial court had accepted that
stipulation, the jury still would have heard that Parker previously
had been involved in a crime involving a firearm.
Parker nonetheless argues that the failure to stipulate was at odds with his defense that he could not tell the difference between
right and wrong on the day of the crime. He argues that allowing the
jury to see that he previously had been convicted of a violent crime,
including details beyond the mere fact of each conviction,
undermined that defense and the opinion of his expert witness. But
Parker defended the case against him on the basis that he was
criminally insane at the time of the crime as a result of a long-
running, chronic mental illness, offering evidence that he
manifested symptoms even in childhood. This suggested that any
mental illness that Parker may have had at the time of the crimes
of which he was convicted here was also present at the time of the
earlier crimes; accordingly, the evidence of the earlier crimes had
little bearing on whether he suffered from such mental illness. To
the extent that the prior convictions could indicate to a jury that
Parker was not mentally ill at the time he committed the prior
offenses, given that he was found criminally responsible for them,
nothing introduced at trial indicated that any mental health defense
was raised in the prior proceedings. Thus, there was no reason for the jury in this case to believe that the factfinders in those prior
proceedings considered and rejected such a defense. Accordingly,
any inference the prior convictions might support regarding
Parker’s prior mental health is too speculative and remote to
support reversal here.
Parker also argues that informing the jury that he had a drug-
related conviction was particularly prejudicial given the opinions of
the State and trial court experts that Parker’s psychosis was drug-
induced. But the evidence was strong that Parker had engaged in
illegal drug usage while staying at Franklin’s home. Evidence that
Parker had possessed drugs at the time of a prior offense did not
undermine the testimony of the defense expert that drug usage did
not explain Parker’s psychosis at the time of the shootings in this
case. Parker has not shown a reasonable probability that the
outcome of his case would have been different if counsel had
performed as he now wishes. Our conclusion remains the same even
if we consider the prejudice resulting from any deficient
performance by counsel cumulatively with any harm caused by the discovery sanction. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838 SE2d
808) (2020).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided September 8, 2020.
Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Ellerbe. Richard A. Grossman, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, David K. Getachew- Smith, Sr., Lyndsey H. Rudder, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.