OPINION
WOOD, Chief Judge.
These appeals involve the constitutionality of § 23-1-26, N.M.S.A.1953 (Supp.1975) and the applicability of that statute to the contentions in this case. We discuss: (1) title of the act; (2) special legislation and equal protection; (3) due process; and (4) application of the statute to the contentions of the parties.
The terminal building of the Albuquerque Airport was substantially completed on November 12, 1965. Patrick Howell, seven years of age, collided with a glass door or window on the observation deck of the building while walking between sections of the observation deck. The incident occurred on January 1, 1976. Suit for damages based on personal injuries was filed on July 14, 1976. The defendants are the City of Albuquerque, owner of the building; Universal (Universal Constructors, Inc.), the contractor who built the observation deck; Burk, the architect who designed the observation deck; and PPG (PPG Industries, Inc.) who manufactured and sold the glass, and, from the showing in this record, also installed the glass.
Albuquerque cross-claimed against Universal, Burk and PPG. Universal cross-claimed against Albuquerque and PPG. Burk cross-claimed against Albuquerque. PPG did not cross-claim.
All defendants, except Albuquerque, moved for summary judgment on the complaint and the cross-claims. The trial court’s rulings on these motions are the basis for these appeals, all of which are interlocutory. The trial court ruled that § 23-1-26, supra, was constitutional. The trial court granted some, but not all, of the motions for summary judgment, applying the ten-year limitation period of § 23-1-26, supra.
Section 23-1-26, supra, reads:
“Construction projects — Limitation on actions for defective or unsafe conditions. — No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of a physical improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages so sustained, against any person performing or furnishing the construction or the design, planning, supervision, inspection or administration of construction of such improvement to real property, and on account of such activity, shall be brought after ten [10] years from the date of substantial completion of such improvement; provided this limitation shall not apply to any action based on a contract, warranty or guarantee which contains express terms inconsistent herewith. The date of substantial completion shall mean the date when construction is sufficiently completed so that the owner can occupy or use the improvement for the purpose for which it was intended, or the date on which the owner does so occupy or use the improvement, or the date established by the contractor as the date of substantial completion, whichever date occurs last.”
Title of the Act
N.M.Const., Art. IV, § 16 states in part:
“The subject of every bill shall be clearly expressed in its title, and no bill embracing more than one subject shall be passed except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification or revision of the laws; but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in its title, only so much of the act as is not so expressed shall be void.”
Plaintiff contends that the subject of § 23-1-26, supra, was not clearly expressed in the title. The title reads:
“RELATING TO CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS; AND PROVIDING FOR A LIMITATION ON ACTIONS FOR DEFECTIVE OR UNSAFE CONDITIONS ON CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.”
The legal test is whether the title fairly gives reasonable notice of the subject matter of the statute. Martinez v. Jaramillo, 86 N.M. 506, 525 P.2d 866 (1974); Bureau of Revenue v. Dale F. Bellamah Corporation, 82 N.M. 13, 474 P.2d 499 (1970).
Plaintiff asserts that reasonable notice of the subject matter is not given in the title. Section 23-1-26, supra, states that no action shall be brought after ten years from the date of substantial completion. By its terms, the statute provides that after the specified time has elapsed there is no cause of action. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972). Plaintiff asserts that a no action statute is not a statute of limitations. Because the title refers to “limitation on actions”, the contention is that the title fails to give reasonable notice of the subject matter. Bagby Elevator and Electric Company, Inc. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So.2d 306 (1974) so held. Bagby does not state New Mexico law.
“Subject” in N.M.Const., Art. IV, § 16 is to be given a broad and extended meaning so as to authorize the Legislature to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection. State v. Romero, 86 N.M. 99, 519 P.2d 1180 (Ct.App.1974). The no action provision in § 23-1-26, supra, literally is a limitation on actions that may be brought. The reference in the title to “limitation on actions” logically and naturally connects with the no action provision of the statute. The title provides reasonable notice of the subject matter and does not violate N.M.Const., Art. IV, § 16.
Special Legislation and Equal Protection
N.M.Const. Art. IV, § 24 pertains to special legislation. Special laws are prohibited in the areas of special immunity and limitations on actions. This constitutional ban on special legislation does not prohibit legislation classifying the subjects or objects of legislation; almost every matter of public concern is divisible; such division is necessary to methodical legislation. State v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 20 N.M. 562, 151 P. 305 (1915).
The question of special legislation involves the classification made by the Legislature. “If a statute is general in its application to a particular class of persons or things and to all of the class within like circumstances, it is a general law.” On the other hand, if the statute applies to less than a class of persons, it is special legislation. City of Raton v. Sproule, 78 N.M. 138, 429 P.2d 336 (1967).
Whether the classification in § 23-1-26, supra, is general or special involves the question of equal protection. Gruschus v. Bureau of Revenue, 74 N.M. 775, 399 P.2d 105 (1965) states:
“Equal protection does not prohibit classification for legislative purposes, provided that there is a rational and natural basis therefor, that it is based on a substantial difference between those to whom it does and those to whom it does not apply, and that it is so framed as to embrace equally all who may be in like circumstances and situations.”
Thus, if there is no violation of equal protection in this case, § 23-1-26, supra, is not special legislation. See Davy v. McNeill, 31 N.M. 7, 240 P. 482 (1925) where the two concepts are discussed jointly.
To answer the equal protection question we must consider the purpose of the statute. McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975).
The “no action” of § 23-1-26, supra, applies to actions “arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of a physical improvement to real property . . . .” It applies to actions “against any person performing or furnishing the construction or the design, planning, supervision, inspection or administration of construction of such improvement to real property, and on account of such activity . . . .” A general, but shorthand expression is that these statutory provisions refer to construction projects and builders. For convenience, we use this shorthand expression in the remainder of this first point.
The purpose of “no action” ten years after substantial completion of the construction project has a historical basis. The limited liability of the builder after the construction project has been completed and accepted by the owner was stated in Wood v. Sloan, 20 N.M. 127, 148 P. 507, L.R.A.1915E 766 (1915). In recent years, however, the liability of the builder has been expanded by judicial decision. This expansion appears in Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388, 356 P.2d 46 (1960); Baker v. Fryar, 77 N.M. 257, 421 P.2d 784 (1966); Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Construction Co., 79 N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968).
When did the builder become exposed to this expanded liability? The exposure came when the cause of action accrued. Section 23-1-1, N.M.S.A.1953. Generally, the cause of action does not accrue until injury occurs. Peralta v. Martinez, N.M., 564 P.2d 194 (Ct.App.1977). Since injury could occur years after the construction project had been completed, the builder was exposed to liability years after the action or event alleged to be the basis for requiring him to pay damages.
This increased exposure resulted from judicial decisions. Section 23-1-26, supra, is the legislative response. The Comment in XVIII Catholic U.L.Rev. 361 (1968-69), Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders — Blueprints for Non-action, states at 383-84:
“The legislative solution to these problems evidences a skepticism that the normal judicial process . . . adequately isolates the tenuous from the substantial claim; or that, even if just adjudication is possible, the burden of tenuous claims upon both court and defendant sufficiently vindicates the denial of a right of action altogether after a period of years.”
The purpose of § 23-1-26, supra, was to provide a reasonable measure of protection against the increased hazard to builders. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, supra; see Nevada Lakeshore Co., Inc. v. Diamond Electric, Inc., 89 Nev. 293, 511 P.2d 113 (1973).
There is no contention that a classification providing for no action arising out of defective or unsafe conditions of physical improvements to real property is an improper classification. Compare Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971). Thus, there is no equal protection claim based on classification of potential plaintiffs. In light of the historical background, any such claim would be meritless.
The improper classification claim goes to those who benefit from the no action provision. The beneficiaries are “any person performing or furnishing the construction or the design, planning, supervision, inspection or administration of construction of such improvement to real property, and on account of such activity . . . .” Under the statutory language, the owner or tenant of real property, or a materialman who does no more than manufacture or supply materials does not benefit from the statute. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Reeves v. Ille Electric Company, 551 P.2d 647 (Mont.1976).
The plaintiff, and Albuquerque, contend that owners, tenants and material-men are in the same situation as those covered by the statute; that there is no substantial difference between owners, tenants and materialmen and those covered by the statute. This is the basis of the equal protection and special legislation claims. These claims are supported by three decisions. Skinner v. Anderson, supra, held a statute similar to the New Mexico statute was special legislation because there was no reasonable basis for distinguishing between architects and contractors (covered by the statute), and owners, tenants and material-men (not covered by the statute). Kallas Millwork Corporation v. Square D Co., 66 Wis.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975) and Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (Hawaii 1973) follow Skinner v. Anderson, supra. We disagree with these decisions.
While both those covered and those not covered by the statute may be exposed to claims years after the construction project was completed, there is a difference in the problems of defending such claims. Architectural plans may have been discarded, copies of building codes in force at the time of construction may no longer be in existence, persons individually involved in the construction project may be deceased or may not be located. Due to the lapse of time, those persons covered by the statute may find it impossible to assert a reasonable defense.
Those covered by the statute have no control over the real estate improvement once it is completed and turned over to the owner. The owner or tenant may permit unsafe conditions to develop, or use the premises for a purpose for which it was not designed, or make defective alterations which may appear to be a part of the original construction. See Grissom v. North American Aviation, Inc., 326 F.Supp. 465 (D.C.Fla.1971).
We have previously pointed out that § 23-1-26, supra, is a legislative response to the expanded liability imposed on those engaged in construction projects by judicial decisions. Liability of owners and occupiers of land has a different historical background. Such liability is not new. Compare the liability of the owner or occupier of land as stated in Chavez v. Torlina, 15 N.M. 53, 99 P. 690 (1909) with the liability of a contractor as stated in Wood v. Sloan, supra, which was decided six years later.
The difficulties of those covered by the statute in providing a reasonable defense to a claim made years after the construction project was completed, the absence of control of the premises by those covered by the statute, and the historical difference in liability between owners and occupiers of land and those covered by the statute provide a reasonable basis for excluding owners and tenants from the benefits of the statute.
There is also a reasonable basis for distinguishing between materialmen and persons covered by the statute. That reasonable basis lies in the work performed. “The manufacturer makes standard goods and develops standard processes. Defects are harder to find in the contractor’s special jobs.” 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts (1956), page 1043. “. . . [T]he legislature could reasonably have concluded that evidentiary problems facing the architect and contractor are greater than those facing the materialmen.” Comment, Catholic U.L.Rev., supra, at page 371.
We hold there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing between those covered by the statute and owners, tenants and materialmen. The legislative classification does not offend the equal protection requirement. Section 23-1-26, supra, is not special legislation. Apart from Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, supra, the following decisions provide little or no explanation for the result reached. Yet, the decisions accord with our view that there is no equal protection violation and that the statute is not special legislation. Carter v. Hartenstein, supra; Regents of U. of Calif, v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 59 Cal.App.3d 675, 131 Cal.Rptr. 112 (1976); Reeves v. Ille Electric Company, supra; Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 341 A.2d 184, 234 Pa. Super. 441 (1975); Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); Yakima Fruit & Cold Stor. Co. v. Central Heat. & P. Co., 81 Wash.2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
Due Process
Albuquerque’s amended application for an interlocutory appeal asserted that § 23-1-26, supra, violated due process “in that it bars the appellant’s causes of action before they have accrued.” We have previously pointed out that under § 23-1-1, supra, plaintiff’s claim accrued at the time of injury. Under § 23-1-8, N.M.S.A.1953, plaintiff would have had three years from January 1, 1976 in which to bring suit. However, § 23-1-26, supra, is “entirely unrelated to the accrual of any cause of action.” Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, supra.
Section 23-1-26, supra, provides no action is to be brought ten years after substantial completion of the construction project. The ten years expired on November 12, 1975; the ten years expired prior to the date of injury. Thus, plaintiff’s complaint is that he had no cause of action at the time of the injury and due process is violated because § 23-1-26, supra, deprives him of a cause of action.
We do not have a situation where a specific constitutional provision pertains to the preservation of remedies. Compare, Josephs v. Burns, supra, with Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.1973). Nor do we have a situation involving any vested right; plaintiff had no right to damages when § 23-1-26, supra, was enacted in 1967. See Rubalcava v. Garst, 53 N.M. 295, 206 P.2d 1154 (1949); compare N.M.Const., Art. IV, § 34.
The applicable rule is “that the Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object.” Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929). See Smith v. Allen-Bradley Company, 371 F.Supp. 698 (D.C.Va.1974); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, supra; Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., supra. The legislative purpose in enacting § 23-1-26, supra, was to provide a measure of protection against claims arising years after the construction was substantially completed. This is a permissible legislative object.
Inherent in the arguments of plaintiff and Albuquerque is the contention that § 23-1-26, supra, is unjust because it deprives an injured person of a remedy. It is not our function to question the social or economic policy which underlies the statute; our function is to determine whether it is unconstitutional. McGeehan v. Bunch, supra.
The trial court correctly ruled that § 23-1-26, supra, was constitutional.
Application of the Statute
1. Section 23-1-10, N.M.S.A.1953 states that “[t]he times limited for the bringing of actions by the preceding provisions of this chapter shall, in favor of minors ... be extended . . . .” Plaintiff asserts that this provision applies in favor of the minor in this case and that the ten-year provision in § 23-1-26, supra, is not applicable. We disagree. Section 23-1-26, supra, is not a part of “this chapter” referred to in § 23-1-10, supra. See also § 23-1-17, N.M.S.A.1953. Noriega v. City of Albuquerque, 86 N.M. 294, 523 P.2d 29 (Ct.App.1974) is contrary to plaintiff’s contention.
2. The summary judgment went to all contentions raised in the complaint and the cross-claims “with the exception of the claims of negligent maintenance set forth in Paragraph XI of Count I and negligent failure to warn set forth in Paragraph XIII of Count I of the Plaintiffs’ complaint, as well as the Crossclaims based upon such allegations.” Paragraph XI alleged that all defendants had a duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition for invitees. Paragraph XIII alleged that all defendants failed to warn plaintiff of the location and danger of the glass.
The reason the negligent maintenance and negligent failure to warn claims were excepted from the summary judgment was “an insufficient record ... to determine whether . . . [this claimed negligence] occurred after the substantial completion of the airport and within ten years of the date the Complaint was filed
Universal and Burk contend the trial court erred in exempting these claims from the summary judgment; no other party raises this claim. The showing in this record is that Universal and Burk were involved with the glass as the general contractor and architect. To the extent the claims of negligent maintenance and negligent failure to warn, whether in the complaint or by cross-claim, are asserted against Universal and Burk in their capacity as general contractor and architect in designing, planning or performing the construction, in supervising the construction or in administering the construction, the claims come within § 23-1-26, supra. We do not read the summary judgment as being contrary to this view.
However, the summary judgment states that the record is insufficient to determine whether the negligent maintenance and negligent failure to warn occurred after substantial completion and within ten years of the date the complaint was filed. This phraseology suggests that when the negligence occurred is of significance, and that the type of negligence is also of significance. Thus, Albuquerque contends that § 23-1-26, supra, applies only to negligence which occurred prior to substantial completion and that Universal had a duty to warn if it learned of the danger after the terminal building was constructed.
Section 23-1-26, supra, is not worded in terms of when the negligence occurred. It does not matter if the negligence occurred before there was substantial completion, during the ten years after substantial completion or more than ten years after substantial completion. The statute states that no action shall be brought ten years after the date of substantial completion.
Section 23-1-26, supra, is not worded in terms of type of negligence. It states that “no action” is to be brought ten years after the date of substantial completion “arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of a physical improvement to real property”. The “no action” applies to any duty of Universal or Burk to warn, regardless of when Universal or Burk learned of the danger, if the duty to warn arose out of a defective or unsafe condition of the improvement to real property. Compare the claim of negligent failure to warn or repair rejected in Josephs v. Burns, supra.
To the extent that claims of negligent maintenance and negligent failure to warn are asserted against Universal and Burk, and those claims arise out of defective or unsafe conditions of the improvements designed and supervised by Burk and constructed by Universal, these claims should not have been exempted from the summary judgments granted Universal and Burk. The claims of negligent maintenance and negligent failure to warn which are asserted against Universal and Burk arise out of the alleged defective or unsafe condition of the glass and thus are based on alleged defective or unsafe condition of the improvement to real property. The trial court erred in exempting these claims from the summary judgment entered in favor of Universal and Burk.
3. Plaintiff and Albuquerque complain of the summary judgment in favor of PPG; their contentions involve two questions.
Plaintiff’s complaint against PPG alleges strict liability, negligent design and implied warranty. Albuquerque’s cross-claim against PPG alleges express and implied warranty. The first question is whether these bases for liability are covered by § 23-1-26, supra. We have previously pointed out that the “no action” of § 23-1-26, supra, does not distinguish between types of negligence. Nor does § 23-1-26, supra, exclude strict liability claims. The statute does refer to warranty claims; it states the ten-year limitation “shall not apply to any action based on a contract, warranty or guarantee which contains express terms inconsistent herewith.” Neither plaintiff nor Albuquerque has demonstrated in this appeal that the warranties alleged contain express terms inconsistent with § 23-1-26, supra. It was their obligation to do so. Novak v. Dow, 82 N.M. 30, 474 P.2d 712 (Ct.App.1970). There is no showing that the trial court’s ruling on the bases for liability was error.
The complaint alleges that PPG manufactured, designed, sold and installed the glass. Albuquerque’s cross-claim alleges that PPG manufactured, sold and installed the glass. The second question is whether these activities are covered by § 23-1-26, supra. In our discussion of the equal protection issue, we pointed out that a materialman who does no more than manufacture or supply materials does not benefit from the statute. The statute, however, applies to “any person performing or furnishing the construction or the design . . . of construction”. The complaint alleges that PPG “designed glass products for use” at the terminal building. To the extent that PPG is sued as manufacturer or seller of the glass, PPG is not covered by the statute and the summary judgment in favor of PPG as to these claims was error. To the extent that PPG is sued as the designer or installer of the glass, PPG is covered by the statute and the summary judgment in its favor was correct.
PPG objects to an analysis of its activities, asserting that it has the protection of the statute because it was a member of the “construction team”. This approach disregards the statutory language. The benefits of § 23-1-26, supra, apply to “any person performing or furnishing the construction or the design, planning, supervision, inspection or administration of construction . and on account of such activity . . . .” (Our emphasis.) The statutory language requires an activity analysis.
4. In paragraph numbered 3 of this issue, we pointed out that warranties are covered by § 23-1-26, supra, unless the warranty contains “express terms” inconsistent with the statute. We also pointed out that there has been no showing, on appeal, that the warranties alleged contained any express terms inconsistent with the statute. Plaintiff contends that summary judgment was improper as to any warranties allegedly made by Universal, Burk or PPG because these defendants “did not address themselves 'to these facts and did not sustain their burden of proof in the Summary Judgment proceeding.” We do not know what contentions were raised in the trial court; there is no transcript of the proceedings at the motion hearing. Questions for review are established only by the record; it is the duty of a litigant seeking review to see that a record is properly prepared. Westland Development Co. v. Saavedra, 80 N.M. 615, 459 P.2d 141 (1969). The summary judgment states that the motions for summary judgment were heard, that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the counts where the warranties were pleaded. From the record we cannot say that the warranty claims were not presented to the trial court.
5. Universal cross-claimed against PPG, alleging an express contract of indemnification in which PPG agreed to hold Universal harmless from all claims resulting directly or indirectly from the performance of PPG’s subcontract. PPG contends on appeal that § 23-1-26, supra, applies to Universal’s indemnification claim. Universal moved to strike this portion of PPG’s brief, contending that Universal’s cross-claim against PPG was not considered by the trial court at the time of the summary judgment hearing. This is incorrect; Count II of this cross-claim was expressly ruled on in the summary judgment. The record is not clear whether Count I (the indemnification claim) was considered at the summary judgment hearing.
We grant Universal’s motion to strike, not on the basis that the indemnity claim was not before the trial court, but on the basis that it is not an issue in any of the interlocutory appeals. Rule 6(b)(2) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for Civil Cases requires the application for appeal to state the questions presented. The three parties applying for an interlocutory appeal were plaintiff, Albuquerque and Universal. None of the applications raised the indemnity issue. PPG did not seek an interlocutory appeal. Universal’s motion to strike is granted. In turn, PPG’s motion to strike Universal’s reply brief, filed contrary to this Court’s order‘granting Universal’s interlocutory appeal, is also granted.
Having affirmed the summary judgment in part and having reversed the summary judgment in part, the cause is remanded for entry of an amended summary judgment consistent with the views expressed herein. Plaintiff is to recover one-half of his appellate costs from PPG; other parties are to bear their own appellate costs, if any.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
HENDLEY, J., concurs. SUTIN, J., dissenting.