SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 19691 conferred upon every miner contracting pneumoconiosis — black lung disease 2 — the right to transfer from his existing position to another in a less dusty area of the mine for as long as necessary to arrest development of the disease.3 To encourage afflicted miners to do so, the Act featured a pay-maintenance provision entitling a transferring miner to “receive compensation for [his post-transfer] work at not less than the regular rate of pay received by him immediately prior to his transfer.” 4 The problem centrally posed in this case is the meaning to be ascribed to “regular rate of pay” in the instance of a miner who was recompensed at different rates for ¿lifferent types of work done during varying periods before transfer.
The Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals held that the statutory phrase refers to the miner’s classification rate — the rate due the miner by reason of his job [299]*299classification under the current wage agreement — notwithstanding frequent temporary assignments in a higher-paying position, when the miner did not endeavor to secure that position on a permanent basis.5 We conclude that “the regular rate of pay” is the dollar rate — the rate at which the miner was actually remunerated for the work he did — irrespective of his job classification.6 Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand the case for appropriate disposition.
I
The salient facts were stipulated by the parties.7 On January 25, 1971, petitioner Mullins was hired by Pocahontas Fuel Company for work as a miner in its Kepler Mine in Horsepen, Virginia.8 Three years later, Pocahontas closed the Kepler Mine but offered its complement of miners employment in other company mines with job openings.9 Mullins availed himself of this opportunity at the company’s Maitland Mine in McDowell County, West Virginia.10
At the .time of the Kepler Mine closure, Mullins was classified as a roof bolter under the collective bargaining agreement in effect.11 When Mullins arrived at the Maitland Mine, however, he was informed that all roof-bolter positions were filled.12 Mullins then signed on at less pay as a “general inside laborer”13 and began work on January 9, 1974.14
Mullins retained his job classification as a general inside laborer throughout the events leading to this litigation,15 but the company often gave him temporary assignments as a roof bolter. Between January 9 and June 17, 1974 — the date that was to assume considerable importance — Mullins worked 496 hours as a roof bolter and 208 hours as a general inside laborer.16 Though categorized continually as a general inside laborer, Mullins was compensated at the higher wage-rate of a roof bolter whenever he worked as such.17
On May 10, 1974, the company was formally notified that Mullins, by then a victim of pneumoconiosis, had decided to exercise his statutory right to transfer from his post at the face of the mine to another in a location more conducive to his health.18 On June 17, the move was effected,19 and shortly afterwards the present controversy arose. Although Mullins had worked and been paid as a roof bolter during more than seventy percent of the five months preceding his transfer,20 he was relegated to the reduced wage-rate of a general inside laborer after [300]*300the transfer.21 Both Mullins and his union felt that he was entitled to more, and a federal mine inspector agreed. Deeming the Act’s pay-maintenance provision a mandatory health standard, the inspector gave the company notice of a statutory violation.22
Before expiration of the time for abatement of the violation and before issuance of an order withdrawing miners,23 the company applied for administrative review of the violation notice. An administrative law judge considered the notice on the merits and vacated it on the ground that Mullins could legally claim only the pay rate of a general inside laborer.24 The Interior Board of Mine Operations appeals affirmed,25 and this petition for review followed.26
Mullins asserts that the mine inspector’s notice of violation was not then reviewable because miners had not been ordered to withdraw from the mine. Alternatively, Mullins argues that the Board erred in its holding on the rate of pay to which he was entitled after his transfer. Since the first contention was identical to one already before us in UMW v. Andrus (Carbon Fuel Co.),27 we held the instant case in abeyance pending our decision therein. We concluded in Carbon Fuel that a notice of violation of a mandatory health standard not posing imminent danger was not reviewable on its merits prior to issuance of an order withdrawing miners from the affected area.28 Shortly thereafter, another panel of the court decided Higgins v. Marshall29 which bears significantly on the rate-of-pay issue.30 For reasons now to be stated, we decline to give Carbon Fuel retroactive operation on the facts of this case.31 We then apply the rationale of Higgins toward our determination on post-transfer rate of pay.32
II
We first examine Mullins’ thesis that in consequence of our Carbon Fuel decision the Board lacked power to review the notice [301]*301of violation on the merits.33 As previously indicated, Carbon Fuel addressed the question whether the administrative review procedures of the 1969 Act34 permitted a ruling on the merits of a notice of violation before expiration of the period for abatement of the violation and issuance of a withdrawal order. After examination of the statutory language and its legislative history, we held that no such review was authorized “while miners continued to work in the affected area.” 35
We are greeted at the outset by the counterargument that Carbon Fuel has no importance in the case now before us.36 The statutory pay-maintenance injunction, it is urged, was not a “mandatory health or safety standard” within the meaning of the 1969 Act,37 and thus was not subject to enforcement through the mechanism of a violation notice.38 Both the administrative law judge 39 and the Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals40 rejected this argument, and so do we.
The 1969 Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to develop mandatory health and safety standards for the protection of miners,41 and that the Secretary subsequently did.42
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SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 19691 conferred upon every miner contracting pneumoconiosis — black lung disease 2 — the right to transfer from his existing position to another in a less dusty area of the mine for as long as necessary to arrest development of the disease.3 To encourage afflicted miners to do so, the Act featured a pay-maintenance provision entitling a transferring miner to “receive compensation for [his post-transfer] work at not less than the regular rate of pay received by him immediately prior to his transfer.” 4 The problem centrally posed in this case is the meaning to be ascribed to “regular rate of pay” in the instance of a miner who was recompensed at different rates for ¿lifferent types of work done during varying periods before transfer.
The Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals held that the statutory phrase refers to the miner’s classification rate — the rate due the miner by reason of his job [299]*299classification under the current wage agreement — notwithstanding frequent temporary assignments in a higher-paying position, when the miner did not endeavor to secure that position on a permanent basis.5 We conclude that “the regular rate of pay” is the dollar rate — the rate at which the miner was actually remunerated for the work he did — irrespective of his job classification.6 Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand the case for appropriate disposition.
I
The salient facts were stipulated by the parties.7 On January 25, 1971, petitioner Mullins was hired by Pocahontas Fuel Company for work as a miner in its Kepler Mine in Horsepen, Virginia.8 Three years later, Pocahontas closed the Kepler Mine but offered its complement of miners employment in other company mines with job openings.9 Mullins availed himself of this opportunity at the company’s Maitland Mine in McDowell County, West Virginia.10
At the .time of the Kepler Mine closure, Mullins was classified as a roof bolter under the collective bargaining agreement in effect.11 When Mullins arrived at the Maitland Mine, however, he was informed that all roof-bolter positions were filled.12 Mullins then signed on at less pay as a “general inside laborer”13 and began work on January 9, 1974.14
Mullins retained his job classification as a general inside laborer throughout the events leading to this litigation,15 but the company often gave him temporary assignments as a roof bolter. Between January 9 and June 17, 1974 — the date that was to assume considerable importance — Mullins worked 496 hours as a roof bolter and 208 hours as a general inside laborer.16 Though categorized continually as a general inside laborer, Mullins was compensated at the higher wage-rate of a roof bolter whenever he worked as such.17
On May 10, 1974, the company was formally notified that Mullins, by then a victim of pneumoconiosis, had decided to exercise his statutory right to transfer from his post at the face of the mine to another in a location more conducive to his health.18 On June 17, the move was effected,19 and shortly afterwards the present controversy arose. Although Mullins had worked and been paid as a roof bolter during more than seventy percent of the five months preceding his transfer,20 he was relegated to the reduced wage-rate of a general inside laborer after [300]*300the transfer.21 Both Mullins and his union felt that he was entitled to more, and a federal mine inspector agreed. Deeming the Act’s pay-maintenance provision a mandatory health standard, the inspector gave the company notice of a statutory violation.22
Before expiration of the time for abatement of the violation and before issuance of an order withdrawing miners,23 the company applied for administrative review of the violation notice. An administrative law judge considered the notice on the merits and vacated it on the ground that Mullins could legally claim only the pay rate of a general inside laborer.24 The Interior Board of Mine Operations appeals affirmed,25 and this petition for review followed.26
Mullins asserts that the mine inspector’s notice of violation was not then reviewable because miners had not been ordered to withdraw from the mine. Alternatively, Mullins argues that the Board erred in its holding on the rate of pay to which he was entitled after his transfer. Since the first contention was identical to one already before us in UMW v. Andrus (Carbon Fuel Co.),27 we held the instant case in abeyance pending our decision therein. We concluded in Carbon Fuel that a notice of violation of a mandatory health standard not posing imminent danger was not reviewable on its merits prior to issuance of an order withdrawing miners from the affected area.28 Shortly thereafter, another panel of the court decided Higgins v. Marshall29 which bears significantly on the rate-of-pay issue.30 For reasons now to be stated, we decline to give Carbon Fuel retroactive operation on the facts of this case.31 We then apply the rationale of Higgins toward our determination on post-transfer rate of pay.32
II
We first examine Mullins’ thesis that in consequence of our Carbon Fuel decision the Board lacked power to review the notice [301]*301of violation on the merits.33 As previously indicated, Carbon Fuel addressed the question whether the administrative review procedures of the 1969 Act34 permitted a ruling on the merits of a notice of violation before expiration of the period for abatement of the violation and issuance of a withdrawal order. After examination of the statutory language and its legislative history, we held that no such review was authorized “while miners continued to work in the affected area.” 35
We are greeted at the outset by the counterargument that Carbon Fuel has no importance in the case now before us.36 The statutory pay-maintenance injunction, it is urged, was not a “mandatory health or safety standard” within the meaning of the 1969 Act,37 and thus was not subject to enforcement through the mechanism of a violation notice.38 Both the administrative law judge 39 and the Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals40 rejected this argument, and so do we.
The 1969 Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to develop mandatory health and safety standards for the protection of miners,41 and that the Secretary subsequently did.42 Additionally, the Act explicitly constituted the provisions of certain designated sections “interim mandatory health standards applicable to all underground coal mines until superseded in whole or in part by improved mandatory health standards promulgated by the Secretary,” 43 and specified that they “shall be enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as any mandatory health standard promulgated. ...” 44 The pay-maintenance section is included in the statutory enumeration of those to be so treated.45 We have not been referred to, nor after a diligent search have we found, any mandatory health standard formulated by the Secretary purporting to supersede the maintenance section in any wise. On the contrary, the Secretary’s regulations have expressly and consistently incorporated both the transfer and pay-maintenance provisions46 and have called for [302]*302their enforcement through the notice-of-violation procedure.47 It follows that any transgression of the pay-maintenance mandate presented an occasion fully appropriate for issuance of a violation notice. And while with statutory language so clear we need not look further for guidance,48 we note that the legislative history unmistakably supports this result.49
The more troublesome question is whether our holding in Carbon Fuel governs the situation at hand and compels us to set the Board’s decision aside. The administrative law judge reviewed the merits of the viola-Won notice during the abatement period and before any withdrawal order issued;50 the Board, affirming the judge’s outcome, upheld the timing of his exercise of that jurisdiction.51 We think Carbon Fuel has no proper role in the special circumstances here.
We realize, of course, that judicial decisions normally are to be applied retroactively.52 Cases pending when prior law is judicially altered ordinarily are to be adjudged by the revised standard53 — whether the change was constitutional, statutory or ju[303]*303dicial in character,54 and regardless of whether the intervening legal doctrine was expressly made applicable to such cases.55 The rule is not absolute, however, and ofttimes judicial pronouncements, even on noncriminal subjects, have been denied retrospective operation.56
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,57 the Supreme Court offered valuable guidance in this area by identifying three factors generally to be considered in dealing with problems of retroactivity:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.... Second, it has been stressed that “we must . .. weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” .... Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[wjhere a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” 58
It goes without saying that Carbon Fuel is not to be utilized indiscriminately, but only after adequate evaluation of these factors as they may bear relevance in the particular case.
To beg^n with, Carbon Fuel not only addressed a question of first impression in this court but it also overturned the agency’s construction of the 1969 Act’s administrative-review provisions. The Department of the Interior had theretofore proceeded on the assumption that at least to some extent a notice of violation could permissibly be examined on its merits before promulgation of a withdrawal order.59 Casual statements in two judicial opinions arguably implied the validity of that practice,60 and two other opinions, without close analysis, seemingly had accepted it61 — references which in Car[304]*304bon Fuel we found unconvincing.62 There was nothing of which we have become aware that might have served as an omen of the new interpretation that Carbon Fuel was to inaugurate.63
Nor is retroactive application of Carbon Fuel counseled when we balance the pros and cons of the present case in accordance with Chevron Oil’s second criterion. Our study in Carbon Fuel of the text and legislative history of the 1969 administrative-review provisions netted a congressional purpose to bar the frequently lengthy merits review of a violation notice at a time when miners remained exposed to conditions possibly violative of the Act’s mandatory health or safety standards.64 That objective cannot be served by imparting retrospectivity to Carbon Fuel here. Mullins has transferred from his post at the mineface.65 There are no other cases pending under the 1969 notice-review provisions.66 New statutory machinery for present and future enforcement of the standards is in place.67 The Act’s health-saving mission would not be furthered by insistence upon compliance herein with the old violation-notice procedure.
The case against retroactivity becomes even clearer when we consider the third Chevron Oil factor — the “injustice or hardship” of such an application. Both, we believe, would be almost inevitably the consequences here. At stake is the meaning of a statutory provision — the pay-maintenance mandate — not heretofore construed definitively for situations of the type confronting us. That question has already once run the gamut of administrative consideration, and is here for authoritative solution by the court. A remand of the problem simply because of prematurity of the Board’s decision would risk not only a mere duplication of the administrative interpretation but also a need for the parties to return here for this court’s view. That sort of delay could hardly benefit the litigants; more importantly, it would run counter to the announced statutory goal of urgently-needed protection for an untold number of miners who, unlike Mullins, have yet to make up their own minds on position transfer.68
[305]*305On past occasions, when a decision of the court has drastically affected the nature of administrative proceedings, we have declined to apply the newly-announced procedural rule to pending cases if to do so would result in substantial injustice.69 And when, as here, the issue prompting an appeal likely would not be finally settled on a remand, but only pretermitted for judicial treatment after completion of repetitive administrative proceedings, we see no reason to embrace retroactivity.70
Ill
The several events precipitating the rate-of-pay controversy may usefully be recounted. Though hired at the Maitland Mine as a general interior laborer, for five months Mullins served variously in that capacity and — predominantly—as a roof bolter, at the rates of compensation respectively established for those types of work.71 Then, as a victim of black lung disease, Mullins exercised his statutory option to transfer to another position in a more favorable atmosphere of the mine,72 and thus became entitled to “receive compensation for [his post-transfer] work at not less than the regular rate of pay received by him immediately prior to his transfer.”73 The question is whether Mullins’ post-transfer wage rate was to be pegged at the level accorded his job classification, or rather at some higher level dictated by the amount he actually earned.
The administrative law judge, concerned by a need to ascertain such a miner’s post-transfer rate of pay on the basis of the percentage of time the miner devoted to varying pre-transfer work assignments74 concluded that a “transfer[ring] miner is entitled to receive the rate of pay to which he had a right immediately prior to his transfer,”75 which in Mullins’ instance was [306]*306the rate of a general interior laborer.76 The Board arrived at the same result, but by an entirely different course of reasoning.77 The Board noted that “[d]uring the approximate 5-month period of Mullins’ employment in the Maitland Mine, there were five permanent roof bolter positions advertised, one of which (Apr. 2, 1974) went unfilled because there were no applicants.”78 The Board further noted that “[o]n May 28,1974 (more than 2 weeks after the operator had been advised by [the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration] of Mullins’ election to transfer to a non-face occupation), three additional permanent roof bolter positions were advertised;”79 and that although Mullins bid on one of these latter openings, he “was unsuccessful because another applicant had seniority rights over him.”80 Based on these developments, the Board concluded that
had Mullins been desirous of gaining a position in the Maitland Mine as a permanent roof bolter there were ample opportunities for him to make his intentions known. The facts further demonstrate that had Mullins been desirous of a permanent roof bolter position and had he bid on the Apr. 2, 1974 position, he would have been successful. It appears that only after he had elected to transfer to a non-face occupation in the mine did he make his desire for a permanent roof bolter position known.
The Board is of the opinion that this miner, having rejected the opportunity to obtain a permanent position of roof bolter commanding a higher rate of pay than his job classification as an inside laborer would support, should not now be entitled to the rights of a permanent roof bolter to be transferred with him to a non-face occupation in the mine.81
When reviewing factual determinations made administratively under the Act, we apply the substantial evidence test; 82 agency findings of that character are conclusive if supported, on the record considered as a whole, by evidence possessing that value.83 Questions of law, on the other hand, are ultimately for the courts to resolve.84 To be sure, we accord considerable [307]*307deference to an agency’s construction of its governing statute,85 but “this principle has no application where . . . the agency has misinterpreted its statutory mandate. In such cases of misinterpretation, it is our duty to correct the legal error of the agency.”86 Here, the Board’s decision was predicated upon a construction of the pay-maintenance provision that clashes with its interpretation by this court and, as well, with a fundamental purpose of the Act.
Two years ago, in Higgins v. Marshall,87 a panel majority held that a transferring miner could not claim post-transfer wage increases periodically accruing within his pre-transfer job classification. The miner-appellants there argued that the rate of pay statutorily demanded upon transfer is the miner’s job-classification rate rather than his dollar rate88 — “that the rate of pay is tied to the position rather than to a dollar amount received immediately prior to transfer.”89 Over a dissent vigorously espousing this reading,90 the majority found the language of the pay-maintenance section “simple and straightforward: a transferring miner is not to receive less compensation than he would have received had he not transferred, that is, not less than the monetary amount he is receiving ‘immediately prior to transfer.’ ”91 From the legislative history the majority gleaned “nothing to indicate that Congress meant to tie the compensation protection to the pay rate received by miners in the pre-transfer classification;”92 “[t]o so hold,” the majority declared, “would be to distort the clear meaning of the words of the statute.”93
While the Higgins court did not face the precise issue before us here, its construction of the governing statutory provision binds us to a holding that a transferring miner takes with him his regular dollar rate of pay, and not the job-classification rate for his vacated position, if the rate for the new position is lower.94 This means, of course, that Mullins’ entitlement was the rate of compensation he actually and regularly received immediately prior to his transfer, and not the lower rate of a general inside laborer. And there is more than just our obligation to honor Higgins to steer us to the same conclusion.
Courts must liberally construe remedial statutes in furtherance of enunciated legis[308]*308lative goals,95 and those who finalized the 1969 Act expected no less. The Conference Report expressly made known that “the managers intend that the Act be construed liberally when improved health or safety to miners will result.”96 Congress declared that the primary aim of the Act was to foster “the health and safety of [the coal industry’s] most precious resource — the miner.”97 We in turn must give the pay-maintenance mandate an interpretation promoting that end.
In utilizing the Higgins majority’s construction as the premise for holding that the transferring miner’s due is his regular dollar rate of pay, we adhere not only to precedent but also to the objective Congress had foremost in mind when it gave the Act birth. The Higgins majority stated the obvious when it observed that “by not having to take a pay cut upon transfer to a position which would ordinarily pay less, the miner is more likely to transfer to protect his health than he would be otherwise.”98 The incentive to transfer would be dampened, if indeed not seriously depressed, were miners with actual earnings above their classification rates required to drop back to their classification levels.
The text of the Act’s pay-maintenance requirement, and as well its legislative history, make crystal clear the will of Congress that a miner not be forced to endure a reduction in his accustomed rate of remuneration upon exercising his statutory right to transfer.99 We have encountered nothing indicative of a purpose to roll a transferring miner back to his classification rate when his pre-transfer dollar rate is more. As the case at bar illustrates, the pay rate for a miner’s particular job classification and his actual pay rate do not always coincide, and we are unwilling to presume that Congress was unaware of that. Nor are we disposed to undermine the beneficent effect of this legislation by adopting a repressive interpretation “that nowhere appears in the Act, that was never mentioned by Congress during the legislative process, that does not comport with the Congress’ intent, and that restricts the coverage of a remedial Act.”100
In this view of the pay-maintenance section, we find unacceptable the Board’s holding that Mullins’ claim was foreclosed by his failure to seek permanent assignment as a roof bolter.101 In the first place, the Board disregarded both the language and [309]*309the purpose of the Act when it ascribed decisional importance to the fact that Mullins did not apply for either of the roof bolter positions available before he made known his desire to transfer.102 The statutory right to pay maintenance is an inseparable incident of the statutory right to transfer;103 for miners afflicted by black lung disease, each right is indefeasible and unqualified.104 The Board cannot take away an ailing miner’s prerogative to transfer, and no more can it condition the pay-maintenance protection statutorily accompanying exercises of the transfer privilege. In denying Mullins his regular dollar rate simply because he had not sought to perpetuate that rate through elevation to a permanent roof-bolting job, the Board conjured up a prerequisite that Congress had not seen fit to interpose.105
The Board’s additional focus on Mullins’ similar behavior after his election to transfer encounters even further difficulty. The pay-maintenance section was designed to promote health-conserving transfers by eliminating fear of adverse economic consequence.106 That section defies a construction that would visit that very consequence upon a miner for failure to vie for a mine-face job after he has already opted to transfer to a nonface position.107 The right to transfer becomes absolute when a miner properly invokes it, and simultaneously the right to continuance of his level of pay accrues. No more is required of the miner to preserve either.108
Acceptance of Mullins’ position, we realize, will necessitate factual ascertainment in situations like his of just what a transferring miner’s “regular rate of pay” really is “immediately prior to transfer.”109 We have not lost sight of the administrative law judge’s observation that federal mine inspectors are not qualified to make such determinations when the miner has discharged pre-transfer work assignments in more than one pay category.110 We are not favored by an explanation of why, but in any event that perceived difficulty cannot justify use of the classification rate of pay as the “regular rate of pay.” We must reject a statutory interpretation — and surely one merely serving administrative convenience — when it flouts a legislative edict.111 Whatever the capabilities of mine inspectors themselves, certainly the Department of the Interior is equipped to make the necessary calculations, and in our view is required by the Act to do so. The Department is not at liberty to sidestep this statutory responsibility simply because “line drawing”112 may sometimes involve meticu[310]*310lous mathematical computations, and perhaps even hard choices.113
We hold that the phrase “regular rate of pay” in the pay-maintenance section means the rate at which the transferring miner was actually and regularly compensated when the transfer occurred.114 It follows that the Board erred as a matter of law in confining Mullins’ post-transfer compensation to the pay rate applicable to general inside laborers. As a miner exercising his statutory right to transfer to a new position in the Maitland Mine, Mullins became legally entitled to compensation for his post-transfer work at not less than the rate at which he was actually and regularly paid immediately prior to transfer.115 We reverse the order under review and remand the case to the Secretary116 for computation of the amount accordingly due Mullins.117
So ordered.