Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton

284 U.S. 408, 52 S. Ct. 187, 76 L. Ed. 366, 1932 U.S. LEXIS 978
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 25, 1932
Docket185
StatusPublished
Cited by146 cases

This text of 284 U.S. 408 (Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 52 S. Ct. 187, 76 L. Ed. 366, 1932 U.S. LEXIS 978 (1932).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Butler

delivered' the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit in equity brought by petitioners in the District .Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to set aside as not in accordance with "law an. order of the deputy commissioner awarding .compensation to Gube under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1427, 33 U. S. C., § 900 et seq. The District Court dismissed the cause, 40 F. (2d) 530, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 48 F. (2d) 57.

February 17, 1928, Gube, while engaged in work for the steamboat company as a longshoreman upon a vessel in the navigable waters of the United States, suffered an injury to his left arm. He filed with the deputy commissioner a claim against the employer and insurer for compensation in accordance with the Act. The deputy commissioner . found that claimant’s average weekly wage amounted to $36.06; that as a result of the injury he suffered total disability for 34 weeks following and permanent partial impairment, amounting to 40 per. cent', of the use of his arm, and awarded compensation at -the weekly, rate of $24.04 for 146 weeks, amounting in all to $3,509.84.

*410 Petitioners maintain .that the award should be the full rate for 40 per cent, of 314, being 125.6 weeks, and that the amount allowed below is excessive by 20.4 weeks or $490.42. We are called on to determine, on the basis of the facts found, what amount the Act requires the employer to pay claimant. No other question is presented.

The pertinent provisions follow:

“ Sec. 8. Compensation for disability shall be paid to. the employee as follows: . . .
“(a) In case of total disability adjudged to be permanent 66% per centum of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during the continuance of such total disability. . . .
“(b) In case of disability total in character but temporary in quality 66% per centum of the average weekly wages shall be paid, to the employee during the continuanee thereof.
“(c) In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality the compensation shall be 66% per centum of the average weekly wages, and shall be paid to the employee as follows:
“(1) Arm lost, three hundred and twelve weeks’ com? pensation. . . .
“(18) Compensation for permanent total loss of use of a member shall be the same as for loss of the member.
“(19) Compensation for permanent partial loss or loss of use of a member may be for proportionate loss or loss of use of the member. . . .
“(22) In case of temporary total disability and permanent partial disability, both resulting from the same injury, if the temporary total disability continues for a longer period than the number of weeks set forth in the' following schedule, the period of temporary total disability in excess of such number of weeks shall be added. to the compensation period provided in subdivision (c) of this section: Arm, thirty-two weeks; .. . .
*411 In any case resulting in loss or partial loss of use.of arm . . . where the temporary total disability does not extend beyond the periods above mentioned for such injury, compensation shall be limited to the schedule contained in subdivision (c). . .

The award is based on a construction of the section in substance as follows: Subdivision (b) allows compensation for temporary total disability, during its continuance at the rate of two-thirds of the average weekly wage. Subdivision (c) allows for permanent partial loss of use of an arm compensation for 314 weeks at a rate that is the same proportion of two-thirds of the weekly wage as such partial disability is of the total use. (1), (18), (19), (22). Temporary total disability and permanent partial disability resulted from the same injury. The former continued 34 weeks,- being two weeks in excess of the healing period allowed by c (22). The computation was: $36.06 x% = $24104X34=$817.36 for temporary total disability of-' claimant. 312+2=314- 34=280 X $24.04 X .40=$2,692.48 for permanent partial disability of his arm.

The allowance for temporary total disability was for its duration, 34 weeks. That is not authorized. The period of allowance is definitely limited to 32 weeks, and the statute expressly authorizes enlargement of the specified compensation period, 312 weeks' by the excess of actual temporary total disability over the time limited for healing, and so here the added two weeks take the proportionate rate. (c) (1) (22).

The deputy commissioner did not apply the proportionate rate, $9,616, to the 280 weeks remaining but added to the 34 weeks 40 per cent, of 280 (being 112) and applied the full rate for 146 weeks. The total of the payments is the same in either case. The computation em-ployed shortens the statutory period and correspondingly increases the weekly payments. Petitioners raise no question as to that feature of . the award, and therefore *412 we need, not consider whether: it is consonant with the Act.

In support of their computation, petitioners call attention to the second paragraph of (c) (22), that in any case resulting in the loss or partial loss of the use of an arm, or other specified member, where the temporary total disability does not extend beyond the periods for which payments are required, compensation shall be limited to the schedule, (1) to (13), contained in subdivision (c). And they contend that if claimant had not been totally disabled for more than 32 weeks he would not have been entitled to any allowance at the full rate on account of the temporary total disability but only .to the proportionate rate for the entire period, or, according to the method of computation adopted, the full rate for the proportionate number of weeks. And they argue that it is inconsistent to hold that, merely because total disability continued two weeks in excess of the prescribed healing period, claimant was entitled to an allowance at the full rate for the period of total disability.

Petitioners’ construction, would produce incongruous results in many cases. Indeed a decision cited by them, Texas Employers’ Ins. Assn. v. Sheppeard, 32 F. (2d) 300, concretely illustrates such a result. On that basis, whenever the temporary total disability of an arm continued during the full time allowed for healing and the subsequent permanent partial loss of its use was not more than ten per cent., the injured employee would receive less than if ■ he had suffered only the temporary total disability. Thus petitioners’ construction would deny any allowance for the permanent injury. If in this case claimant’s permanent partial loss of use of his arm had not been more than ten per cent., petitioners’ calculation would give him. compensation for only 31.4 weeks whereas without any permanent disability he would be paid for 32 weeks. Similar inconsistencies would arise where an injury of any *413

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Bluebook (online)
284 U.S. 408, 52 S. Ct. 187, 76 L. Ed. 366, 1932 U.S. LEXIS 978, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baltimore-phila-steamboat-co-v-norton-scotus-1932.