WILNER, Judge.
Maryland law requires any person having reason to believe that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect to make a fairly detailed report to either the local department of social services (DSS), which is a unit of the State Department of Human Resources and therefore a State agency, or an appropriate law enforcement agency. The law requires DSS, promptly after receiving such a report, to make a “thorough investigation” in order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the child. Part of that requirement is the directive that, if the report is of physical or sexual abuse, DSS must, within 24 hours, “see the child,” attempt to have an on-site interview with the child’s caretaker, and decide on the safety of the child.
The principal questions before us are whether (1) the statutory obligation to conduct a thorough investigation and take appropriate steps to protect the child creates a civil duty on the part of DSS to the child who is the subject of a report of abuse, and (2) if so, and subject to the State Tort Claims Act, liability exists on the part of the State or individual social workers if harm ensues to a child because of a negligent [175]*175breach of that duty. We shall answer both questions in the affirmative.
BACKGROUND
In an amended complaint filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, plaintiff, Eric Horridge, alleged that, between December, 1999, and February, 2000, he made eight reports to the St. Mary’s County DSS of physical abuse being inflicted on his nineteen-month-old son Collin by Collin’s mother or her boyfriend, that a neighbor also reported that Collin was being abused, that DSS failed to make a thorough investigation and take steps to protect Collin, as required by law, and that, as a result of that failure, Collin remained in mortal danger and, in fact, was beaten to death by his mother or her boyfriend eight days after the last report was made and ignored. The complaint charged the State and two DSS social workers, Briana Shirey and Deborah Walsh, "with negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress on Collin, and depriving Collin of his State Constitutional right to procedural and substantive due process, and it added a count against the State for negligent selection, supervision, and retention of Ms. Shirey and Ms. Walsh.
The court dismissed the complaint as failing to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Its decision was ultimately grounded on its conclusion that no duty was owed to Collin by any of the defendants and that, even if a duty were owed to him, the breach of that duty was not the proximate cause of the harm that ensued. Horridge appealed, and we granted certiorari prior to proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals.
Because the complaint was dismissed on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action, the issues before us are purely ones of law. We must assume the truth of all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those allegations. Adam-son v. Correctional Medical, 359 Md. 238, 246, 753 A.2d 501, 505 (2000); Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. [176]*176447, 474, 805 A.2d 372, 388 (2002). Accordingly, we shall recite as fact that which, at this point, is merely alleged.
Collin was born in Texas, in June, 1998, to plaintiff, Eric Horridge, and Tiffany Fairris. In October, 1999, Ms. Fairris moved to St. Mary’s County, Maryland, along with Collin, his three-year-old sister, Erica, and Ms. Fairris’s boyfriend, Daniel Fowkes. Plaintiff remained in Texas. In December, 1999, he reported to “Defendants” that Collin was being abused. That abuse, the complaint alleges, “arose out of a series of telephone conversations that [Horridge] had with Tiffany Fairris during which she would physically abuse Collin while threatening Eric Horridge with never seeing his son again.” The complaint does not indicate what, if anything, DSS did in response to that initial report. The two calls that are of particular importance were those that occurred later, in January and February, 2000.
On or about January 24, 2000, during the course of a telephone call to Maryland, Horridge “heard Collin screaming and crying in the background because Tiffany Fairris was hitting him and had pushed him into a wall.” He “immediately contacted the Defendants and provided them with detailed information about the physical injuries that Collin was suffering.” Horridge also informed the defendants that Fairris abused drugs in the children’s presence, that she became more abusive when under the influence of drugs and alcohol, that she had another child in Texas who had been abused while in her care, that a Texas court had restricted her right of visitation with that child, and that Fairris had threatened to abuse Collin in retaliation for Horridge having initiated custody proceedings in Texas.
On January 28, 2000 — four days after that call was received — the defendants “purported to conduct an on-site visit” with Collin, but, according to the amended complaint, failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the reported abuse. During the on-site visit, defendant Shirey observed circular bruising on Collin “that was consistent with the particulars of the abuse reported by [Horridge] to the Defendants, and which [177]*177was inconsistent with normal toddler play,” but Shirey declined to remove Collin from the home, have a doctor examine him, monitor the home environment, or take any other action to protect Collin. Instead, the defendants “purported to rely upon a statement, taken in the presence of the suspected abuser(s), from Collin, a nineteen-month-old toddler whose linguistic ability was limited to single words, in which he attributed his injuries to play activities.” On February 2, 2000, the Defendants closed the case without taking any further action.
On or about February 17, 2000, Fairris informed Horridge that she would abuse Collin in retaliation for his reports of abuse. Horridge immediately reported that threat to the defendants, but they refused to investigate it. Instead, Shirey accused Horridge of being a “disgruntled parent” and told him that “she did not care about his report because the case was closed.” Walsh instructed him “not to call back again with a report of abuse concerning [Collin].” Apart from Horridge’s complaints, “a concerned neighbor with personal knowledge of abuse or neglect of [Collin], also made a report, at a time or times to be determined, to DSS that [Collin] was being abused or neglected,” but the defendants essentially ignored that report as well.
On February 25, 2000, Collin was beaten to death by Fairris or her boyfriend, Fowkes. The autopsy revealed that Collin died from multiple blunt force injuries, including “multiple abrasions and contusions of varying ages, scalp hemorrhage, lacerations of the liver, contusions of the right lung, lacerations of the pancreas, lacerations of the mesent[e]ry and mesenteric lymph nodes [membranes that connect the intestines to the dorsal abdominal wall], hemorrhage within the soft tissues of the anterior mediastinum [the space containing the heart and viscera of the chest, other than the lungs], perirenal adipose, pelvic soft tissues, and within the anterior diaphragm, multiple serosal contusions of the bowel, pulmonary edema and congestion.” The autopsy also revealed “numerous and significant wounds on his body that were more than seven days old,” including wounds “that were circular in appearance; [178]*178wounds that are consistent with Collin being struck by an adult hand or knuckles and the reports by [Horridge] of physical abuse being inflicted on Collin by [Fairris or Fowkes].”
The nine-count amended complaint stated four counts of negligence — two against the State (DSS) and two against Shirey and Walsh. In Count I, against DSS, the complaint noted the requirements set forth in Maryland Code, §§ 5-702 through 5-706 of the Family Law Article and in implementing regulations of the Department of Human Resources that require DSS to make a thorough investigation of reports of child abuse and to render appropriate service in the best interest of the child. It alleged that those statutory and regulatory obligations were the basis of a duty that DSS owed to Collin, “because as a child in a home where suspected abuse had been reported he was a member of the class specifically protected by law.” DSS knew, the complaint said, from the reports by Horridge and the neighbor and from their own observations, that Fairris and Fowkes were harming Collin and that it was reasonably foreseeable that the abuse would continue. It breached its duty to Collin by (1) failing to protect him from known abuse, (2) failing to investigate reports of abuse properly and in compliance with statutory, administrative, and professional standards, (3) failing to provide services and follow-up monitoring after the initial home visit to minimize the risk of retaliatory abuse, (4) failing to properly investigate reports of abuse of Collin made after DSS had closed the case, and (5) failing to competently hire, train, and supervise Walsh and Shirey.
Count II charged DSS with negligence based on a special relationship with Collin. It averred that DSS knew that Collin faced a special danger of abuse and it had “specifically proclaimed by word and deed its intention to protect him against that danger,” that, having undertaken to do so, it “acquired an affirmative duty to do so in a reasonably competent fashion,” and, for the reasons noted in Count I, failed to carry out that duty. Counts III and IV charged Walsh and Shirey with gross negligence — with breaching their statutory [179]*179and common law special relationship duties to Collin willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard of Collin’s rights.
With an extreme paucity of supporting facts, Count V charged DSS with negligence in selecting, retaining, and supervising Walsh and Shirey. Apart from the allegations already noted, going to their negligence in pursuing the reports of abuse, Count V states only that DSS “knew or should have known by the exercise of diligence and reasonable care that Defendant[s] Shirey and Walsh were capable of inflicting harm upon Collin” and that it “failed to use proper care in selecting, supervising or retaining [them].” There are no averments regarding the professional qualifications of Shirey and Walsh, other than that they are licensed social workers; nor did Horridge allege the nature of any deficient supervision of them or how their selection and retention as employees was negligent.
Counts VI and VII attempted to plead State Constitutional torts — a violation of Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The theory of those Counts was that Collin had a Constitutionally protected property and liberty interest in the protection afforded him by the statutory and regulatory requirements previously noted and thus had a legitimate entitlement to receive the protective services mandated by those requirements — proper monitoring and supervision of his home, access to the courts for protection, truthful and accurate reporting of abuse to interested persons, and proper investigation of reported child abuse — all of which were denied him by the defendants, who were State actors. Count VIII charged DSS and the two social workers with intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon Collin by their “callous indifference” in refusing to take appropriate action in light of the reports they had received.
With respect to these eight counts, Horridge was apparently suing as the personal representative of Collin’s estate, to recover for the tortious conduct committed against Collin. In Count IX, Horridge sued on his own behalf for the wrongful [180]*180death of Collin. He incorporated into that count all of the allegations previously pled.
In this appeal, Horridge has abandoned all but Counts I, II, and V — the negligence actions against the State (DSS). He urges that DSS did have a duty to protect Collin, once it received a credible report that the child was being abused, that the Circuit Court erred in deciding proximate cause on a motion to dismiss, and that the allegations of negligent supervision were sufficient to state a cause of action.
DISCUSSION
Negligent Supervision
In Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. v. Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 262, 29 A. 994, 995 (1894), we concluded that an employer owes a duty to its employees to use “reasonable care and caution in the selection of competent fellow servants, and in the retention in his service of none but those who are,” and that, if the employer fails in that duty and “an injury is occasioned by the negligence of an incompetent or careless servant,” the employer is liable to the injured employee “not for the mere negligent act or omission of the incompetent or careless servant, but for his own negligence in not discharging his own duty towards the injured servant.” In Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 166-67, 395 A.2d 480, 483-84 (1978), we extended that duty, and liability, to the public generally — not just to co-employees — at least with respect to the selection of employees who were expected to have contact with the public. We there quoted with approval the pronouncement from Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C.1951):
“One dealing with the public is bound to use reasonable care to select employees competent and fit for the work assigned to them and to refrain from retaining the services of an unfit employee. When an employer neglects this duty and as a result injury is occasioned to a third person, the employer may be liable even though the injury was brought [181]*181about by the willful act of the employee beyond the scope of his employment.”
Evans, supra, at 166, 395 A.2d at 483.
Our own conclusion in Evans was that, “[wjhere an employee is expected to come into contact with the public ... it has been held that the employer must make some reasonable inquiry before hiring or retaining the employee to ascertain his fitness, or the employer must otherwise have some basis for believing that he can rely on the employee.... The nature and extent of the inquiry that is needed will naturally vary with the circumstances.” Id. at 166-67, 395 A.2d at 484. There is a rebuttable presumption that an employer has used due care in hiring the employee. Id. at 165, 395 A.2d at 483, citing Norfolk & Western Railroad Co., supra, 79 Md. at 263, 29 A. at 996. See also Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Comm,’n, 304 Md. 705, 501 A.2d 35 (1985); Henley v. Prince George’s County, 305 Md. 320, 503 A.2d 1333 (1986).
We have already recounted the allegations in the amended complaint in support of the negligent selection, training, and retention count. They are woefully inadequate to state a cause of action. There are no allegations that Shirey and Walsh were professionally or personally unqualified for the positions they held or that, if they were unqualified, DSS was or should have been aware of that fact. The only averment in that regard is that they were licensed social workers which, if anything, suggests that they were at least professionally qualified. There are no allegations that they had acted in an incompetent or unprofessional manner previously or that, if they had done so, DSS was or should have been aware of it. There are no allegations, other than bald, conclusory statements, that they were improperly trained or improperly supervised.
In Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21, 28, 690 A.2d 1000, 1003 (1997), we pointed out that, although we had abandoned the formalities of common law pleading, our Rules do require a pleading to “allege facts, if proven true, sufficient to support each and every element of the asserted claim.” Maryland [182]*182Rule 2-303(b) requires a pleading to contain “such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader’s entitlement to relief or ground of defense.” We confirmed in Scott that, in a negligence action, a complaint must “allege, with certainty and definiteness, facts and circumstances sufficient to set forth (a) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (b) a breach of that duty and (c) injury proximately resulting from that breach.” Id. at 28, 690 A.2d at 1003, quoting from Read Drug & Chemical Co. v. Colwill Constr. Co., 250 Md. 406, 412, 243 A.2d 548, 553 (1968). Merely stating that a duty existed, or that it was breached, or that the breach caused the injury does not suffice, and that is all that appears in the complaint with respect to Count V. That count was properly dismissed.
Negligence: Duty
As noted, the actions against Shirey and Walsh personally, based on allegations of gross negligence, are not pursued in this appeal. Because the St. Mary’s County DSS is a State agency and Shirey and Walsh are State personnel (see Walker v. Human Resources, 379 Md. 407, 842 A.2d 53 (2004)), any action for simple negligence is properly brought against the State under the State Tort Claims Act (Maryland Code, title 12, subtitle 1 of the State Government Article).
The elements of a cause of action in negligence are well-established. To state a claim, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.” Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 582, 831 A.2d 18, 26 (2003), quoting from Muthukumarana v. Montgomery Co., supra, 370 Md. at 486, 805 A.2d at 395. As noted in Remsburg, 376 Md. at 582, 831 A.2d at 26, we have adopted Prosser and Keeton’s characterization of “duty” as “an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another,” and, in determining whether a duty exists, have considered such things as,
[183]*183“the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”
Id. at 583, 831 A.2d at 26, quoting from Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Co., 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986), quoting, in turn, from Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (1976). In Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 534, 515 A.2d 756, 759 (1986), we consolidated some of that into two considerations: “the nature of the harm likely to result from a failure to exercise due care, and the relationship that exists between the parties.” See also Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 714-15, 697 A.2d 1371, 1375-76 (1997).
As a general proposition, “a private person is under no special duty to protect another from criminal acts by a third person, in the absence of statutes, or of a special relationship.” Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1976); Valentine v. On Target, 353 Md. 544, 551-52, 727 A.2d 947, 950 (1999). Horridge has pled both — a duty imposed by statute (Count I) and a duty imposed by virtue of a special relationship (Count II), but we need deal only with the statutory context pled in Count I.
The relevant statutes are those contained in title 5, subtitle 7 of the Family Law Article (FL), §§ 5-701 through 5-714. In the law itself, the Legislature declared that the purpose of that subtitle, captioned “Child Abuse and Neglect,” was “to protect children who have been the subject of abuse or neglect by: (1) mandating the reporting of any suspected abuse or neglect; (2) giving immunity to any individual who reports, in good faith, a suspected incident of abuse or neglect; (3) requiring prompt investigation of each reported suspected [184]*184incident of abuse or neglect; (4) causing immediate, cooperative efforts by the responsible agencies on behalf of children who have been the subject of reports of abuse or neglect; and (5) requiring each local department [of social services] to give the appropriate service in the best interest of the abused or neglected child.” (Emphasis added). FL § 5-702.
To achieve that purpose, FL §§ 5-704 and 5-705 require anyone who has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect to notify either DSS or the appropriate law enforcement agency. The report may be oral or in writing and, insofar as reasonably possible, it must include the name, age, and home address of the child, the name and home address of the child’s parent or other person responsible for the child, the whereabouts of the child, the nature and extent of the abuse or neglect, and any other information that would help determine the cause of the abuse or neglect and the identity of the person responsible for it. See FL §§ 5-704(c) and 5-705(d). The report, in other words, must be specific, so that the recipient can identify and locate the child and have some basis for launching an investigation. To encourage persons to make these reports, § 5-708 provides immunity from both civil liability and criminal penalty for any person who makes or participates in making such a report.
As noted, § 5-706 requires DSS to respond to a report of abuse. Section 5-706(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[pjromptly after receiving a report of suspected abuse or neglect ... the local department or the appropriate law enforcement agency, or both, if jointly agreed on, shall make a thorough investigation of a report of suspected abuse to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the child or children.”1 (Emphasis added). Section 5-706(b) requires DSS, “[w]ithin 24 hours after receiving a report of suspected physi[185]*185cal or sexual abuse,” to “(1) see the child; (2) attempt to have an on-site interview with the child’s caretaker; (3) decide on the safety of the child, wherever the child is, and of other children in the household; and (4) decide on the safety of other children in the care or custody of the alleged abuser.” The investigation must include “a determination of the nature, extent, and cause of the abuse” and, if abuse is verified, a determination of the identity of the persons responsible for it, a determination of the name, age, and condition of any other child in the household, an evaluation of the parents and the home environment, and a determination of any other pertinent facts and any needed services. FL § 5-706(c).
To the extent possible, the investigation must be completed within ten days after receipt of the first notice of the suspected abuse. Within that 10-day period, DSS must make a preliminary report of its findings to the local State’s Attorney, and, within five business days after completion of the investigation, it must make a “complete written report of its findings” to the State’s Attorney. See FL § 5-706(g), (h), and (i). Based on its findings and any treatment plan, DSS is required to “render the appropriate services in the best interests of the child, including, when indicated, petitioning the juvenile court on behalf of the child for appropriate relief, including the added protection to the child that either commitment or custody would provide.” (Emphasis added). FL § 5-710. These statutory requirements are supplemented by regulations adopted by the Department of Human Resources. CO-MAR 07.02.07.05 requires DSS to establish a process for ensuring that a report of suspected child abuse from any source is immediately directed to its child protective service unit. It requires DSS to have staff on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to “receive and take appropriate action on reports of suspected child abuse” and to ensure that the public has “a means of access to staff who are on-call after normal office hours.” Upon receipt of a report of suspected child abuse, DSS must “[immediately notify the local law enforcement agency.” Only if the reported incident “does not meet the definition of child abuse or neglect defined in Regulation [186]*186.02B of this chapter” may DSS decline to initiate an investigation. COMAR 07.02.07.05E.2
As noted, the statute requires a report to contain certain specific information, and that is provided for as well in the regulations (COMAR 07.02.07.04D). If the report is deficient in that regard, COMAR 07.02.07.06 requires DSS to attempt to obtain the missing information from the reporting source. Thus, to the extent that any of the eight reports of abuse made by Horridge failed to contain relevant information, DSS was obliged to make inquiry of him to obtain that information.
The regulations concerning the investigation and any ensuing action are quite detailed and need not all be repeated. At least two more are particularly relevant, however. COMAR 07.02.07.07A requires DSS, during an investigation, to gather appropriate information to assess immediate safety and risk of maltreatment of children in the household, determine whether child abuse is “indicated, unsubstantiated, or ruled out,” determine whether “maltreatment, other than that initially reported, is indicated, unsubstantiated, or ruled out,” “determine what services, if any, are appropriate,” and determine if DSS should initiate shelter care or file a Child in Need of Assistance petition. COMAR 07.02.07.08, in conformance with FL § 5-706(b), requires DSS (or, by joint agreement between DSS and a law enforcement agency, a law enforcement officer) to initiate an on-site investigation, “see the alleged victim and determine if the health, safety, and well-being of the alleged victim require that the child be removed,” and take certain other designated action.
The defense that is usually raised by social service agencies in cases such as this, and the defense raised by DSS in this case, is what has become known as the “public duty doctrine,” [187]*187i.e., “when a statute or common law ‘imposes upon a public entity a duty to the public at large, and not a duty to a particular class of individuals, the duty is not one enforceable in tort.” Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, supra, 370 Md. at 486, 805 A.2d at 395, quoting from Dan B. Dobbs, The Law op Torts § 271 (2000). See also Williams v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 753 A.2d 41 (2000). Relying on Muthukumarana, Willow Tree v. Prince George’s County, 85 Md.App. 508, 584 A.2d 157 (1991), and Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985), DSS urges that, “[a'jbsent an express intent by the Legislature to create such a duty, there was no duty owed to Collin individually.” Any contrary ruling, it fears, would make DSS a “guarantor of a particular child’s safety.” As have other courts around the country, we reject that argument. The cases cited are not on point; the Legislature, in our view, luis created a duty flowing to children specifically identified to DSS as being the subject of suspected abuse, and recognition of that duty would not make DSS a guarantor of the safety of those children or any other.
We recognized in Muthukumarana that the “public duty” doctrine “has no application when the court concludes that a statute or court order has created a special duty or specific obligation to a particular class of persons rather than to the public at large.” 370 Md. at 487, 805 A.2d at 396, quoting from Dan D. Dobbs, supra, § 271. That case dealt with whether 911 operators and supervisors were liable in tort for negligence in failing to respond properly to emergency calls. We concluded that their duty was to the public at large, not to anyone in particular, and that, unless it could be shown that the 911 employee “affirmatively acted to protect or assist the specific individual, or a specific group of individuals like the individual in need of assistance,” thereby inducing a specific reliance, no tort duty existed. Id at 496, 805 A.2d at 401. In large part, that conclusion was based on the often imprecise or unclear information given to the 911 operators, upon which they must act instantaneously. Id at 491, 805 A.2d at 398. That is less of a problem -with respect to reports of child abuse. For one thing, if the report is unclear or incomplete, [188]*188as it often may be, DSS has a regulatory duty to clarify the information. More important, it is usually dealing with reports of abuse that have already occurred, and it has 24 hours to deal with the report; the report of an on-going incident of abuse, that needs a more immediate response, is more likely to go to 911 or a police agency.
Willow Tree v. Prince George’s County, supra, 85 Md.App. 508, 584 A.2d 157, dealt with whether a county that had established general safety regulations for day care centers could be held liable to the parents of a child who was killed while using playground equipment that was allegedly unsafe and in violation of the safety regulations. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that there was no special duty on the part of the State to the child, merely from the adoption of safety regulations. That is a far cry from what we have here, which is true as well with Lamb v. Hopkins, supra, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297. The question there was whether probation officers who failed to seek the revocation of probation of an individual though aware that the individual had committed a number of drunk driving offenses during the probationary period, was liable in tort to the parents of a child severely injured by the probationer while driving intoxicated. The theory of asserted liability was that the defendants, having taken charge of the probationer, had a special duty under the principles enunciated in §§ 314-319 of the Restatement (Second) or Torts (1965) to prevent that person from harming others and that it had a statutory duty to report violations to the court. The statutory duty, we held, was to the court, not to anyone else.3
[189]*189The duties imposed on DSS by FL § 5-706 and the implementing regulations of the Department of Human Resources are far more specific and focused. They require a prompt investigation of each reported incident of child abuse. The duty to act is mandatory; the steps to be taken are clearly delineated; and, most important, the statute makes clear in several places that the sole and specific objective of the requirement is the protection of a specific class of children— those identified in or identifiable from specific reports made to [190]*190DSS and those also found in the home or in the care or custody of the alleged abuser. This is not an obligation that runs to everyone in general and no one in particular. It runs to an identified or identifiable child or discrete group of children.
Most every other court that has considered this issue in the context of similarly worded statutes or regulations has arrived at that conclusion. In Brodie v. Summit Cty. Children Servs. Bd., 51 Ohio St.3d 112, 554 N.E.2d 1301 (1990), the Ohio equivalent of DSS, sued for,failure to investigate reports of child abuse inflicted on an identified victim, raised the defense that the statutory obligation, similar to that embodied in FL § 5-706, ran to the public generally and did not create any duty to protect the specific child. The court rejected that defense:
“We conclude that in view of the General Assembly’s express intent that children services agencies take responsibility for investigating and proceeding with appropriate action to prevent further child abuse or neglect in specific, individual cases, the public duty doctrine does not apply as a defense against an allegation that a particular child did not receive the benefit of their action as a result of the agency’s negligence. We hold that a children services board and its agents have a duty to investigate and report their findings as required by [the Ohio equivalent to FL § 5-706] when a specific child is identified as abused or neglected, and the public duty doctrine may not be raised as a defense for agency failure to comply with such statutory requirements.”
Id. at 1308.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached the same result, for the same reason, in Turner v. District of Columbia, supra, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C.1987). As in this case, the DSS equivalent was sued for failure to respond to a report of child abuse. Rejecting the “public duty” defense, the court observed:
“The Child Abuse Prevention Act imposes upon certain public officials specific duties and responsibilities which are intended to protect a narrowly defined and otherwise help[191]*191less class of persons: abused and neglected children. When CPS [DSS] employees are negligent in carrying out these responsibilities, that statutorily protected class suffers in a way uniquely different from the public at large.”
Id. at 668.
Noting that the question was whether, in that circumstance, a special relationship or special duty was created, the court relied on Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528, 675 P.2d 1347 (App.1983) and Florida First National Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So.2d 19 (Fla.App.1975) as “consistent with others throughout the country, holding that if a state agency is required by statute or regulation to take a particular action for the benefit of a particular class and fails to do so, or negligently does so, and the plaintiffs justifiably rely to their detriment on the agency’s duty to act, a cause of action in negligence will lie against the state or its agency.” Turner, 532 A.2d at 672.
In Jensen v. Anderson County DSS, 304 S.C. 195, 403 S.E.2d 615 (1991), the court concluded that the South Carolina equivalent of FL § 5-706 “imposes a special duty on the local child protection agency and its social workers to investigate and intervene in cases where child abuse has been reported.” Id. at 619. In reaching that conclusion, the court applied a six-part test to determine when a statutory special relationship exists: (1) an essential purpose of the statute is to protect against a particular kind of harm; (2) the statute, directly or indirectly, imposes on a specific public official a duty to guard against or not cause that harm; (3) the class of persons the statute intends to protect is identifiable before the fact; (4) the plaintiff is a person within the protected class; (5) the public officer knows or has reason to know the likelihood of harm to members of the class if he/she fails to do his/her duty; and (6) the officer is given sufficient authority to act in the circumstances or undertakes to act in the exercise of his/her office.
See also Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C.App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2, 8 (1988); Tyner v. DSHS, Child Protective Servs., 141 [192]*192Wash.2d 68, 1 P.3d 1148 (2000); M.W. v. DSHS, 149 Wash.2d 589, 70 P.3d 954, 957 (2003); Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1989); Dept. of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So.2d 258, 261-62 (Fla.1988); Alejo v. City of Alhambra, 75 Cal.App.4th 1180, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 768 (2000); Susan Lynn Abbott, Liability of the State and Its Employees for the Negligent Investigation of Child Abuse Reports, 10 Alaska L.Rev. 401, 405 (1993).
It is not necessary to adopt precisely the six-part test enunciated by the South Carolina court in Jensen, although the elements of that test are analytically relevant and consistent with the considerations we noted in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083, and Remsburg v. Montgomery, supra, 376 Md. 568, 583, 831 A.2d 18, 26. Clearly, the essential purpose of the statutory duties created by FL § 5-706 and the implementing regulations of the Department of Human Resources was to protect a specific class of children, identified or identifiable before the fact from statutorily mandated reports, from a specific kind of harm likely to occur if the statutory duty is ignored. DSS is given not just a specific duty to act in response to such a report but ample and detailed authority to do so.
In a Remsburg analysis, the foreseeability of harm arising from a failure to comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements is clear. The Department of Human Resources’ own statistics show that, in FY 2003, there were nearly 7,300 cases in Maryland in which there was an “indicated” finding of physical, mental, or sexual abuse or neglect of a child. Even more alarming, and relevant, is the most current report of the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, a unit of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which shows that, in CY 2002, approximately 1,400 children in the United States died of abuse or neglect, and that 76% of those fatalities involved children younger than four years of age. (See “statistical information” on the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information website at www.nccanch.acf.hhs.gov). The foreseeability of harm from agency inaction, once a facially reliable report of [193]*193abuse is made, may serve to establish as well the “close connection” between the negligent conduct and the injury ultimately suffered.
The legislative policy of preventing future harm to children already reported to have been abused is so abundantly clear as to be beyond cavil, and, given the statutory mandate to act and the general waiver of tort immunity when State employees fail to act in a reasonable way and harm ensues, we can see no great burden or consequence to regarding this existing statutory duty as a civil one from which tort liability may arise. We cannot conceive that the Legislature intended, when a child is killed or injured, at least in part because DSS fails to perform the duties clearly cast upon it to make a site visit within 24 hours and a thorough investigation, for the only sanction to be the placement of a reprimand in some social worker’s personnel file. The Legislature meant for DSS and its social workers to act immediately and aggressively when specific reports of abuse or neglect are made, and the best way to assure that is done is to find that they do have a special relationship with specific children identified in or, upon reasonable effort, identifiable from, facially reliable reports of abuse or neglect and, subject to the State Tort Claims Act, to make them liable if harm occurs because they fail in their mandated duty. The Circuit Court erred in finding, on the allegations of the amended complaint, that no duty, cognizable under Maryland tort law, existed.
Proximate Cause
As an alternative ground for dismissing the amended complaint, the Circuit Court concluded that, as any negligence on DSS’s part was passive in nature and that the “moving and effective cause” of Collin’s death was the “active negligence [of his mother or her boyfriend] in beating Collin to death,” the DSS negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury. In so holding, the court misconstrued the nature of proximate cause in a case such as this one. Where the actionable duty is to protect another from harm, proximate [194]*194cause must be judged in terms of the foreseeability of such harm being inflicted.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses this issue in several sections. Section 442A makes clear that, “[w]here the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the foreseeable risk of harm through the intervention of another force, and is a substantial factor in causing the harm, such intervention is not a superseding cause.” Comment b. to that section notes:
“Where the negligence of the actor has created the risk of harm to another because of the likelihood of such intervention, the actor is not relieved of responsibility merely because the risk which he has created has in fact been fulfilled. The same is true where there is already some existing risk or possibility of the intervention, but the negligence of the actor has increased the risk of such intervention, or of harm if it occurs.”
Section 447, dealing with the negligence of intervening acts, provides, in relevant part, that the fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another “which the actor’s negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if ... the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act----” Finally, and most directly to the point, § 449 states:
“If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.”
Comment b. to that section explains:
“The happening of the very event the likelihood of which makes the actor’s conduct negligent and so subjects the actor to liability cannot relieve him from liability. The duty to refrain from the act committed or to do the act omitted is imposed to protect the other from this very danger. To deny recovery because the other’s exposure to the very risk [195]*195from which it was the purpose of the duty to protect him resulted in harm to him, would be to deprive the other of all protection and to make the duty a nullity.”
In Scott v. Watson, supra, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548, we adopted that approach in a generally analogous setting. Responding to certified questions from the U.S. District Court, we concluded that, although a landlord of an urban apartment complex had no common law special duty to its tenants to protect them from the criminal acts of third parties committed in the common areas within the landlord’s control, if the landlord knew or should have known of criminal activity against persons or property in the common areas, it had a duty to take reasonable measures, in view of the circumstances, to eliminate the conditions contributing to the criminal activity. We observed that a breach of that duty, alone, was not conclusive of actionable negligence, however — that proximate causation was also an element.
In that regard, we noted a split of authority as to whether, when such a duty was found, the landlord’s negligence constituted a proximate cause of a tenant’s injury at the hands of a third person’s criminal conduct. We decided to follow the approach of § 448 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and concluded that “[a] breach of duty by the defendant would result in his liability in the third party criminal activity context only if the breach enhanced the likelihood of the particular criminal activity which occurred.” Id. at 173, 359 A.2d at 556. This “enhanced risk” theory, which underlies §§ 442A, 447, and 449 of the Restatement as well, we held to be “a fair solution of the causation problem in this context.” Id. We confirm that view. The amended complaint sufficed to allege that the negligence of DSS and its social workers was a proximate cause of the injury ultimately inflicted on Collin by Fairris or Fowkes.
Caveat
In holding that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that no actionable duty existed on the part of DSS or that any negligence on its part was not a [196]*196proximate cause of Collin’s injury and death, we do not suggest that DSS is, in fact, liable in this case. Mr. Horridge will have to produce sufficient evidence to show that DSS negligently failed to comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. As part of that burden, he will have to establish that the investigation conducted was, indeed, negligently deficient or that, given the facts that a proper investigation revealed or would have revealed, DSS negligently failed to take action demanded by the circumstances. He will have to show, as well, that the injury suffered by Collin was a foreseeable consequence of the failure by DSS to perform its statutory obligations. The fact that a dreadful result ensued does not, of itself, mean that DSS failed in its duty.
JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON COUNT I OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE, ST. MARY’S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES.
CATHELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ., Dissent.