[764]*764Dore, J.
This defamation case is before us on rehearing of this court's decision in Herron v. King Broadcasting Co., 109 Wn.2d 514, 746 P.2d 295 (1987). The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Don McGaffin and KING Broadcasting Co. on the issue of malice. We reaffirm our prior holding. A fair appraisal of the evidence submitted on summary judgment and of the plaintiff's arguments from that evidence clearly show that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment. The present opinion will clarify the grounds of our decision.
Facts
On December 1, 1978, Don McGaffin, a reporter for KING, wrote and delivered the following report which was broadcast on KING'S 5:30 p.m. newscast:
The Prosecutor's office in Pierce County has ... it has been confirmed that the FBI is being investigated by the Prosecutor's Office in Pierce County [sic]. The FBI agents are questioning the Chief Prosecutor, Don Herron, and his deputies about bail bond procedures. Bondsmen John Carbone and Ron Williams are two of the eight men arrested and charged by the Justice Department on racketeering charges this week. Carbone heavily contributed to Herron's election campaign four years ago and again in 1978. Also arrested for racketeering was Herron's close friend and vacation companion, Lamont Zemek. Zemek's ex-wife, Nina Zemak [sic], is Herron's long-time administrative aide. The FBI wants to know how Herron and the Pierce County Prosecutor's Office collected forfeited bail bonds, particularly from bondsmen Carbone and Williams. That was confirmed for KING-5 News today when Deputy Prosecutor Terry Sebring told me that he could not discuss bail bond matters. He said it would be inappropriate because his department is being questioned by the FBI and other Justice Department officials. This is the way . . . this is what the FBI is looking at. Let's say you get arrested and charged with a felony down in Pierce County. Sources inside the Sheriff's Department told KING-5 News today the jail officials will urge you to call Carbone's bail bonding company. Say bail is set at $10,000. You don't have the [765]*765$10,000. The bondsman, Carbone, for instance, will put up a bond ... a piece of paper ... for $10,000. You pay Carbone approximately $1,000 in fees. But if you skip town, then what happens? At that point the prosecutor is supposed to file a motion in court demanding that your $10,000 bond be forfeited to the county. The judge signs the order. The prosecutor is then supposed to serve notice on the bail bondsmen to produce the $10,000 which then goes into the Pierce County Treasurer's Office. That is what is supposed to happen, but if a prosecutor doesn't push the bail bondsman for forfeiture and he doesn't pay up, what happens? Do the judges know? Or check? No. The Clerk of the Court has no way of knowing. Records are organized in such a way that they can't know. Only the prosecutor knows. A deputy ... or . . . plus a deputy or two. KING-5 News has learned that only 18 times since 1975 has bail been collected on forfeiture in all of Pierce County Superior Court and only 4 of those cases were handled by the Carbone bail bonding company. Once in '75 . . . three times in 1977. Bail bondsmen were irritated at the former Pierce County Prosecutor, Ron Hendry, for pushing to collect those forfeited bail bonds monies. They contributed approximately half of all campaign money collected by Don Herron, who then beat Ron Hendry in 1974.
(Italics ours.) Herron's claim rests principally on the highlighted statement, which McGaffin conceded to be false in an affidavit submitted in support of summary judgment. Clerk's Papers, at 186.
McGaffin's investigation, on which he based his report, began with an anonymous telephone call informing him that the FBI was investigating possible improper bail bond procedures by the Pierce County Prosecutor's Office. McGaffin tried and failed to contact Prosecuting Attorney Herron. McGaffin did obtain an interview with Terry Sebring, a deputy prosecutor, who confirmed the existence of the investigation but refused to discuss the matter further. Sebring swore in his affidavit that McGaffin's response to this refusal was hostile. According to Sebring:
He then said with his face close to mine and lowered his voice, "You will regret doing this (indicating refusing to [766]*766answer his questions). I will get you (could have been 'fix you'). Just watch the news."
Clerk's Papers, at 262-63. This episode was corroborated by reporter Barbara Anderson and receptionist Maria Chan-trey, who were present at the scene.
McGaffin spoke with the Pierce County Superior Court Clerk who supplied him with the statistics used in his report, and a superior court judge, who discussed bail bond forfeitures.
McGaffin also looked at the records of Herron's campaign contributions as reported by the Public Disclosure Commission. The reports list the names of contributors and the amount given by each. The reports for Herron's 1974 campaign show that Herron's contributions totaled approximately $38,000. Only $825 was contributed by bail bondsmen.
McGaffin also interviewed former Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney Ron Hendry and one of Hendry's former deputies, Douglas McBroom. McGaffin could not recall whether he interviewed the two men before or after examining the records of the Public Disclosure Commission. McGaffin asserts that one of the two former prosecutors told him that approximately half of Herron's 1974 contributions came from bail bondsmen. Neither Hendry nor McBroom believes he made such a statement.
Hendry cannot recall whether he and McGaffin discussed bail bonds or bail bondsmen's contributions to Herron at all. He testified, however, that he was certain he did not tell McGaffin that approximately half Herron's contributions came from bail bondsmen.
Q. Would you have told Mr. McGaffin that over half the money collected by Mr. Herron in his campaign to defeat you was supplied by the bail bond interests of Pierce County?
A. No.
Q. Would you have said approximately under one-half?
A. No.
Q. Okay, why wouldn't you have used those words?
[767]*767A. My recollection from the campaign is that the bail bond contributions to Mr. Herron's campaign were in the neighborhood of $1,500.
Q. If Mr. McGaffin would have asked you how much you thought the bail bond interests would have contributed to Mr. Herron's campaign, what would you have told him? $1,500?
A. Yes.
Deposition of R. Hendry, at 21.
Hendry's deputy McBroom also does not remember the substance of his conversation with McGaffin. McBroom did testify however that he did not tell McGaffin that one-half of Herron's contributions came from bail bondsmen. McBroom testified: "I don't think that I probably, I'm sure I didn't know." Deposition of D. McBroom, at 21.
Herron sued KING and McGaffin for defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment to KING and McGaffin on the ground that no jury question was presented on the issue of material falsity. Clerk's Papers, at 5. This court reversed, holding that Herron had made a sufficient prima facie showing of material falsity to preclude summary judgment and that a jury question also was presented as to actual malice. KING and McGaffin moved for reconsideration and the court granted the motion.1
Standards Governing Review
In reviewing a denial or grant of summary judgment, this court applies the same standard as a trial court: construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court asks whether a reasonable jury [768]*768could find in favor of that party. If the answer is yes, the motion for summary judgment should be denied and the question should go to the jury. Wendle v. Farrow, 102 Wn.2d 380, 383, 686 P.2d 480 (1984).
The plaintiff alleging defamation must show four elements: falsity, an unprivileged communication, fault and damage. Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 486, 635 P.2d 1081 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982). If the plaintiff is a public figure and the defamation concerns his public duties, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with malice. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964). All the elements of defamation must be shown with convincing clarity. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 255-56, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wn.2d 37, 43, 515 P.2d 154 (1973).
The plaintiff responding to a motion for summary judgment in a defamation case must show that the jury could decide in his favor while applying the clear and convincing evidence standard. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra. The Court has expressly cautioned, however, that the clear and convincing evidence standard involved in defamation cases does not materially alter the normal standard for deciding motions for summary judgment. While the issue turns on what the jury could find, and while the court must keep in mind that the jury must base its decision on clear and convincing evidence, the evidence is still construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the motion is denied if the jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party.
Our holding that the clear-and-convincing standard of proof should be taken into account in ruling on summary judgment motions does not denigrate the role of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. [769]*769The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Neither do we suggest that the trial courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.
(Citation omitted.) Anderson, All U.S. at 255.
Applying these standards, we have determined that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment.
The False Statements Altered the Sting of the Story
The defendants have conceded that the following statement is false: "They [bail bondsmen] contributed approximately half of all campaign money collected by Don Herron, who then beat Ron Hendry in 1974." Clerk's Papers, at 188; Clerk's Papers, at 186. This false statement altered the "sting" of the story, and it is actionable regardless of the other, true statements made in the story.
The trial court granted summary judgment to KING on the ground that the "sting" of McGaffin's report was true. The "sting" of a report is defined as the gist or substance of a report when considered as a whole. Where a report contains a mixture of true and false statements, a false statement (or statements) affects the "sting" of a report only when "significantly greater opprobrium" results from the report containing the falsehood than would result from the report without the falsehood. See Mark, at 496. In terms of the elements of defamation, Mark requires the plaintiff to show that the falsehood affects the "sting" of a report as part of his showing of damage. Mark, at 494-97.2
Judge Schumacher concluded that the "sting" of McGaffin's report was not affected by the statement that [770]*770"approximately half" of Herron's campaign contributions came from bail bondsmen.
The gist or the "sting" of the broadcast was that a prosecuting attorney was being investigated in respect to practices concerning bail bonds, that he had a close friend who was arrested with two local bondsmen, and that he had accepted substantial sums from a bondsman to finance election campaigns, all of which is conceded to be true. Whether bondsmen contributed "approximately half" of plaintiff's campaign money and whether one of them contributed "again in 1978" does not appear to make any appreciable difference in the impact of the broadcast.
(Italics omitted.) Clerk's Papers, at 5. This court reversed the trial court on this issue because it concluded that the statement that one-half of Herron's contributions came from bail bondsmen added a distinct and separate implication that Herron had "bargained away his ethics and integrity in exchange for campaign contributions." That added implication affected the "sting" of the report. Herron, at 523.
In their motion for reconsideration, KING and McGaffin argue that this court misconstrued Mark's requirement that the allegedly defaming statement should be considered as a whole. KING lists these true statements made in the broadcast:
a. The Pierce County Prosecutor's office was under investigation by the FBI;
b. The FBI agents were questioning the Chief Prosecutor, Don Herron, and his deputies about bail bond procedures;
c. Earlier that week, eight men were arrested and charged by the Justice Department on racketeering charges, and two of those arrested were bail bondsmen;
d. One of the arrested bondsmen, John Carbone, had contributed to Herron's election campaigns in 1974 and 1978;
e. One of the other arrested men, Lamont Zemek, was a close friend and vacation companion of Herron, and [771]*771Zemek's ex-wife, Nina Zemek, was a longtime administrative aide for Herron; and
f. Bail bondsmen were irritated at the former Pierce County Prosecutor, Ron Hendry, for pushing to collect forfeited bail bond moneys.
KING argues that these true statements are so damaging to the plaintiff that the additional untrue statement does not change the sting of the story, even though it might constitute an additional negative innuendo.
KING and the trial court both make the same fundamental error. Both interpret Mark's instruction to consider the defaming statement "as a whole” to mean this: In a true, negative story the addition of a further, false negative statement does not change the "sting" of the story because the story would be damaging in any case without the false statement. They conclude that the true statements contained in KING TV's report were so damaging to Herron that the additional untrue statement could not do further damage. This is not a correct reading of Mark.
First, the argument rests on the patently flawed premise that reporting true information harmful to a plaintiff's reputation is somehow a license to report a damaging falsehood in addition. It should be self-evident that Mark does not rest on any such premise.
Second, as noted, the "sting" inquiry introduced by Mark is part of the plaintiff's required showing of damage. The question is whether the false statement has resulted in damage which is distinct from that caused by true negative statements also contained in the same report. If it has not, then whatever damage the plaintiff has suffered does not amount to defamation because it is not solely attributable to the falsehood. In that case, the plaintiff has not made a prima facie case. If, however, the plaintiff can show that the damage resulting from the falsehood is a distinct result of the falsehood, then he has established that element of his prima facie case. Mark requires a court to consider the defamatory report as a whole because it is necessary to [772]*772determine whether or not the damage caused by the falsehood is distinct from the damage caused by the true statements in the report.
If we analyze this case under the true logic of Mark, it is absolutely clear that the false statement contained in KING TV's report did alter the "sting" of the story. The statement that one-half of Herron's contributions came from bail bondsmen added a distinct and separate implication that Herron had bargained away his ethics and integrity in exchange for campaign contributions. None of the true statements in the KING TV report mitigated this falsehood. Furthermore, the damage inflicted by this falsehood was entirely distinct from that inflicted by the true statements contained in the report.
This can be explained by distinguishing this case from Mark. Mark arose out of the prosecution of a Medicaid fraud scheme. The prosecution was based in part on an audit that had indicated over $200,000 in fraudulent billings. The defendant (later the plaintiff in the defamation suit) Albert M. Mark was charged with grand larceny in an amount greater than $75 and was eventually convicted at trial of submitting invalid Medicaid claims totaling about $2,500. Seattle television station KOMO incorrectly reported that the fraud scheme involved $300,000 and $350,000 in false claims. Another station, KIRO, incorrectly reported that Mark was "charged" with defrauding the State of $200,000.
This court held that those false reports did not damage Mark and that he therefore could not establish a prima facie case of defamation. The court reasoned that the "sting" of the story was the report of the crime and that the defendants' inflating the amount involved did not alter that "sting".
[W]e think it apparent that the gist of the KIRO-TV and KOMO-TV reports was the arrest for Medicaid fraud involving large amounts of funds. No significantly greater opprobrium attaches to a statement that a person "bilked the state out of at least $300,000" . . . than to [773]*773one that he was charged with larceny based on an audit sample revealing "over $200,000 in fraud billing". . . . The inaccuracy, if any, does not alter the "sting" of the publication as a whole and does not have a materially different effect on a viewer, listener, or reader than that which the literal truth would produce.
Mark, at 496. In other words, it was the theft, not the amount of the theft, that constituted the story's sting. The damage to Mark came from being called a thief. Being called a major thief rather than a petty thief did not add a separate and distinct type of damage to the story. A thief is a thief. Therefore, the inflation of the amounts involved did not affect the "sting" of the story in Mark.
In concluding that the falsehood contained in McGaffin's story did not affect its "sting", Judge Schumacher drew a direct analogy to Mark and the other theft cases cited therein. He reasoned that, just as it was the theft and not the amount of the theft that formed the sting of the story in Mark, it was the bail bondsmen's contributing to Herron's campaign, not the amount of the contributions, that formed the sting of McGaffin's story.
That analogy is false. Mark is correct in concluding that the sting of the TV reports was in the report of the theft, not the amount. Any theft, no matter how large or small, is a culpable act. This case, however, involves political contributions, not theft. It is not the case that any contribution to a political campaign, no matter how large or small, is culpable. A large contribution may be a sign of corruption; a small contribution is not.
In the modern world of politics, campaign contributions are contributed by the rich and poor, the famous and infamous without inference of wrongdoing. A supporter of Prosecutor Herron who saw on KING TV that he had received $8253 in contributions to his campaign from bail [774]*774bondsmen would say "so what" and continue to support him. There is little or no sting to such a statement.
On the other hand, if that supporter heard that the prosecutor, who in many ways affects the incomes of both bail bondsmen and Pierce County by forfeiting or not forfeiting bail bonds, was receiving 50 percent of his campaign funds from the bail bondsmen, he would assume that Herron was dishonest and in the pocket of bail bondsmen.4 He would never again vote for such a public official, especially a prosecutor, who has so much discretion in administering justice and setting moral standards in the county; "50 percent of all his campaign contributions" is the sting. There is no sting to a group of businessmen such as bail bondsmen contributing $825 to Herron's campaign. The $825 constituted only 2 percent of all of Herron's contributions, not 50 percent. The latter statement, but not the former, implied that Herron had taken a bribe.
Because it had a distinct and separate damaging implication, the false statement in the KING TV report altered the "sting" of the story; it had a distinct and damaging implication not otherwise conveyed by the report. In terms of the elements of defamation, Herron did offer evidence from which a jury could conclude that he was damaged by the falsehood in McGaffin's report in a way that was distinct from any damage inflicted by the true statements in the report. The inflated figure, and that alone, suggested that Herron had sold his integrity as a public official. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that the "sting" of McGaffin's report was not affected by the false statement.
Herron Made out a Prima Facie Case of Malice
It is undisputed that Herron was a public figure. In order to maintain a defamation action, therefore, he must [775]*775be able to prove that McGaffin and KING acted with malice, and not merely negligently. Herron presented evidence from which a jury could conclude that McGaffin published a false statement with malice, specifically with reckless disregard for the statement's truth or falsity. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
Malice is defined as publishing a falsehood with actual knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964). There was no evidence offered to show that McGaffin had actual, subjective knowledge that the one-half figure was false. The question is whether there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that McGaffin acted with reckless disregard. The Supreme Court of the United States defined that term in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31, 20 L. Ed. 2d 262, 88 S. Ct. 1323 (1968).
"Reckless disregard," it is true, cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. ... In Garrison v. Louisiana, [379 U.S. 64, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125, 85 S. Ct. 209 (1964)] . . . the opinion emphasized the necessity for a showing that a false publication was made with a "high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity." Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, [388 U.S. 130, 153, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094, 87 S. Ct. 1975 (1967)], stated that evidence of either deliberate falsification or reckless publication "despite the publisher's awareness of probable falsity" was essential to recovery by public officials in defamation actions. These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.
(Citations omitted. Italics ours.) In order to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer evidence from which a [776]*776jury could conclude, under the clear and convincing standard, that the defendant acted with reckless disregard. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra.
Herron's evidence consists primarily of two facts. First, McGaffin claims that he was given the figure of one-half by the former prosecutor Hendry or his deputy McBroom. However, both Hendry and McBroom stated not only that they did not remember giving him that figure, but that they themselves never had such a belief, and therefore would not have said such a thing.
Hendry could not recall whether he and McGaffin discussed bail bonds or bail bondsmen's contributions to Herron at all. He testified, however, that he was certain he did not tell McGaffin that approximately half Herron's contributions came from bail bondsmen. Deposition of Ronald Hendry, at 21.
Hendry's deputy McBroom also could not remember the substance of his conversation with McGaffin. McBroom did testify however that he did not tell McGaffin that one-half of Herron's contributions came from bail bondsmen. Deposition of Douglas McBroom, at 21.
Construing this evidence in the light most favorable to Herron, the court must assume that McGaffin did not get the figure of one-half from either Hendry or McBroom.
Second, McGaffin admits that he did look at the records of the Public Disclosure Commission and that he identified those contributors who were bail bondsmen. Deposition of Don McGaffin, at 41. The bail bondsmen identified by McGaffin contributed only $825 to Herron's campaign, which McGaffin admitted he could have ascertained by simply adding up the figures. This was far less than one-half of Herron's total contributions; in fact it was only slightly more than 2 percent.
These two pieces of evidence are sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether McGaffin "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant, at 731. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Herron, McGaffin had no basis in fact for reporting the [777]*777one-half figure. Furthermore, his investigation actually uncovered facts which directly rebutted his false statement.
Failure to investigate is not sufficient to prove recklessness. Sullivan, at 287; St. Amant, at 733. Nor do mistakes made in the course of investigating a news story necessarily constitute recklessness. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 28 L. Ed. 2d 45, 91 S. Ct. 633 (1971). However, when a reporter does in fact conduct an investigation and his investigation does not support his false statement or brings to his attention facts which rebut the false statement, that is evidence from which a jury can infer reckless disregard.
A case directly on point is Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Pub'g Co., 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981). In Kuhn, the defendant newspaper had published a story that officials of the Greeley (Colorado) Department of Parks and Recreation had accepted season ski lift passes from the owners of two ski areas. Those two ski areas were later chosen by the officials for lucrative group ski lift ticket purchases by the department. The article implied that the department officials had chosen the ski areas because they personally had received free passes.
The reporter who wrote the story, John Seelmeyer, conducted an investigation which rebutted several of the false statements made in the article. For example, the season passes were given to the department, not to the officials personally, as reported. The story also contained information which simply had no basis in fact; for example, a dollar value for the business directed by the department to one of the ski areas.
The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed a Court of Appeals decision that summary judgment should have been granted for the defendant.
Here, a jury could reasonably find that the publication failed even to meet [the] generous standard [of Sullivan and St. Amant]. Seelmeyer admitted that he had no bases for most of his erroneous statements, and that he failed to take the time to corroborate allegations made in [778]*778the article, even though no particular urgency existed as to the time of publication. Actual malice may be inferred by the finder of fact if an investigation is grossly inadequate. In this context, a reporter's failure to pursue the most obvious available sources of possible corroboration or refutation may clearly and convincingly evidence a reckless disregard for the truth.
(Citations omitted.) Kuhn, at 319. See also Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
In another case on point, Green v. Northern Pub'g Co., 655 P.2d 736, 38 A.L.R.4th 817 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983), the defendant published a story which suggested that a prisoner, David Selberg, had died as a result of treatment in jail and that the plaintiff, a Dr. Green, was in part responsible for Selberg's death. In fact, an autopsy reported that Selberg had died of natural causes unrelated to his incarceration. Green offered evidence that the defendant's reporters were aware of the exonerating autopsy report. The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the reporters' knowledge of the autopsy report created an issue of material fact on reckless disregard.
McGaffin's report suffers from the same defects as those at issue in Kuhn and Green. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Herron, McGaffin's investigation provided no basis for his false statement and in fact revealed contrary evidence. This is more than a mere failure to investigate and more than a mere mistake. Since the jury could conclude that McGaffin acted with reckless disregard, Herron is entitled to a trial on the issue of malice.
In addition to the evidence which directly supports an inference of reckless disregard, the jury would also be entitled to consider McGaffin's threat addressed to Sebring.5 "Malice" for defamation purposes is entirely [779]*779distinct from simple hostility. McDonald v. Murray, 83 Wn.2d 17, 19, 515 P.2d 151 (1973). Nevertheless, it is well established that evidence of malice in the colloquial sense is at least relevant to malice in the legal sense. Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 258, 690 P.2d 610, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137, 145 (1984). This evidence bolsters the inference that McGaffin might have been reckless regarding the truth of his statements, and supports the conclusion that Herron succeeded in offering sufficient evidence of malice to go to the jury.
Conclusion
Herron presented sufficient evidence of damage and malice to reach the jury. The false statement that one-half of Herron's campaign contributions came from bail bondsmen was damaging in a way distinct from whatever harm might have resulted from McGaffin's true statements. The "sting" of McGaffin's story was greatly affected by the falsehood. To say that bail bondsmen had contributed $825 to Herron's campaign would hardly raise an eyebrow, but to say that bail bondsmen contributed 50 percent of all his contributions would mean to members of the public that their prosecutor was on the take and that bail bondsmen have him on their payroll. Herron offered sufficient evidence from which a jury might conclude that McGaffin acted with reckless disregard. Taken in the light most favorable to Herron, the evidence showed that McGaffin's false statement was not supported by his investigation and in fact contradicted its results. This, together with McGaffin's expressions of hostility, would support a jury verdict of actual malice, specifically reckless disregard of the truth and/or falsity of his statement.
[780]*780We therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for trial.
Callow, C.J., and Brachtenbach, Dolliver, and Smith, JJ., concur.