Berdon, J.
The principal issue in this administrative appeal is whether the obligation of a town to appropriate sufficient funds to a local board of education to meet the minimum expenditure requirement (MER) of General Statutes § 10-262j has been met if the appropriation is sufficient to meet the MER alone but not [701]*701sufficient for other educational requirements.1 A hearing board of the defendant state board of education (state board), after an investigation and evidentiary hearing, determined that the plaintiffs, the city of New Haven and its board of finance (city), had failed to appropriate sufficient funds to the defendant New Haven board of education (New Haven board) to meet the MER for the 1990-91 school year. The state board consequently ordered the city to make available additional funds, and ordered the New Haven board to budget these funds appropriately. The city appealed to the Superior Court, which dismissed the appeal.2 The [702]*702city appealed from this judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
To place the issues raised by this case in their proper perspective, a review of the relationship between the state board of education, local boards of education and municipal governments is required. The constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § 1, provides: “There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.” This [703]*703command of the state constitution places the ultimate responsibility for the education of the children of Connecticut on the state. Murphy v. Board of Education, 167 Conn. 368, 372, 355 A.2d 265 (1974); West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 573, 295 A.2d 526 (1972).
The state’s responsibility for education is distributed through the following statutory framework. The state board is charged with “the broad and general power to supervise and control the educational interests of the state.” Board of Education v. Department of Education, 198 Conn. 445, 450, 503 A.2d 1147 (1986); General Statutes § 10-4 (a) (“[s]aid board shall have general supervision and control of the educational interests of the state, which interests shall include preschool, elementary and secondary education, special education, vocational education and adult education”).
General Statutes § 10-2203 delegates the duty to provide and administer public education to local and [704]*704regional boards of education. Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Furlong, 162 Conn. 390, 397, 294 A.2d 546 (1972). These local entities must, however, fulfill the educational interests of the state by meeting certain mandates. General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 10-4a.4 Public education mandates include the following: adequate and reasonable pupil transportation for those students who need transportation; General Statutes §§ 10-76d (e) (1) and 10-220; Waterford v. State Board of Education, 148 Conn. 238, 243, 169 A.2d 891 (1961); special education services sufficient to meet the individualized needs of certain children in the locality; see General Statutes §§ 10-76a through 10-76ee; Board of Education v. State Board of Education, 179 Conn. 694, 702, 427 A.2d 846 (1980); and the MER. If the local board of education fails or is unable to implement the educational interests of the state by carrying out these mandates, the state board may conduct an investigation, hold an administrative hearing pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, order appropriate remedial [705]*705steps, and, if necessary, enforce its order in the Superior Court. General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 10-4b.5
Because the state’s educational duties are delegated to local boards of education and the towns must provide some of the funding for education, the financial relationship between the local board of education and the municipal government, in particular the board of [706]*706finance of the town, is complex. See Fowler v. Enfield, 138 Conn. 521, 532, 86 A.2d 662 (1952). This court explained the financial relationship between these entities as follows: “Where a town board of education includes in the estimates it submits to a board of finance expenditures for a purpose which is not within statutory provisions imposing a duty upon it nor within one which vests it with a discretion to be independently exercised, the board of finance may, if in its judgment, considering not only the educational purpose to be served but also the financial condition of the town, it finds that the expenditure is not justified, decline to recommend an appropriation for it . . . where, however, the estimate is for an expenditure for a purpose [707]*707which the statutes make it the duty of the board of education to effectuate or they vest in the board of education a discretion to be independently exercised as to the carrying out of some purpose, the town board of finance has not the power to refuse to include any appropriation for it in the budget it submits and can reduce the estimate submitted by the board of education only when that estimate exceeds the amount reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, taking into consideration along with the educational needs of the town its financial condition and the other expenditures it must make. The board of finance in such a case must exercise its sound judgment in determining whether or to what extent the estimates of the board of education are larger than the sums reasonably necessary and if it properly exercises its discretion and the budget is approved by the town the board of education has no power to exceed the appropriations made. Thus . . . only when a board of education is acting directly and in a reasonable manner to fulfill a statutory duty can it accurately be said that it functions outside the established municipal governing structure. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to the giving of a blank check to boards of education to spend the money of the municipality without regard to economy, efficiency or other local needs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Furlong, supra, 398-99.
In 1977, this court determined that the then existing system of school financing, relying principally on local property taxes, produced great inequalities in violation of the state constitution. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 648-49, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton T). In Horton I, we reasoned that the state constitutional guarantee of free elementary and secondary education establishes a fundamental right. Id. Accordingly, we held that the equal protection clauses of the state con[708]*708stitution require the state to subsidize education in a manner that provides all students in Connecticut’s public elementary and secondary schools with “a substantially equal educational opportunity” by compensating for great discrepancies in local property tax revenues. Id.
The trial court in Horton I did not order a remedy. This court upheld the trial court’s “decision to retain jurisdiction while the General Assembly was afforded an opportunity to take responsive legislative action. . . . The legislature in 1979 enacted, and in subsequent years amended, a plan intended to achieve equity in educational financing. Public Acts 1979, Nos. 79-128, 79-558; see General Statutes §§ 10-76f, 10-76g; §§ 10-261 through 10-263a; §§ 10-266m through 10-280a.” Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 26, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton III).6 In Horton III, this court upheld this new legislative scheme for educational financing, describing it as having “two principal components: (1) the guaranteed tax base grant formula (GTB) and (2) the minimum expenditure requirement (MER). The GTB formula is a plan of state grants designed to provide towns with a state-guaranteed tax base for the financing of public school education. It is designed to distribute equitably state aid to towns that establish their eligibility through the MER, a formula that sets the minimum acceptable level of per pupil town expenditures.” Id., 28-29. Although the statutory scheme has been revised from time to time since the decision in Horton HI; see, e.g., Public Acts 1989, No. 89-124; Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 1991, No. 91-7; these two basic components continue to form the basis of the school financing scheme in Connecticut.
[709]*709The MER component of the school financing scheme requires that each school system fund its “regular program expenditures”; General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 10-262f (17);7 at a minimum level set by statutory formula in order to ensure that students having no special needs receive a minimally adequate education. General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 10-262j.8 To ensure [710]*710that the MER calculation accurately reflects educational expenditures on children with no special needs, certain expenditures do not count toward the MER. General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 10-262f (17). These expenditures include, among others, special education, pupil transportation, land and capital expenditures, and adult education, and will be referred to as “MER-ineligible” for the purposes of this opinion. Expenditures that count toward the MER are referred to as “MER-eligible.”
[711]*711The following facts are not in dispute. Every year, the state department of education, the administrative arm of the state board, distributes an “E DO 14 form” to the superintendent of schools for each local or regional school board. The data provided on these forms enable the department of education to ensure that the MER is met by each regional and local school board. In January or February of 1990, Dr. John Dow, Jr., Ph.D, superintendent of the New Haven schools, com[712]*712pleted and returned New Haven’s form to the department of education. The form indicated that projected figures for the 1990-91 school year would satisfy the MER for that year.
Thereafter, the New Haven board submitted to the city its formal budget request of approximately 116 million dollars for the 1990-91 school year. The city, acting through its board of finance, appropriated approximately ninety-six million dollars. The New Haven board revised its budget so that the MER, projected at approximately eighty-four million dollars, was met but special education was inadequately funded. On June 15, 1990, Dow indicated by letter to the department of education that the 1990-91 budget as projected was insufficient to fund special education adequately, and he indicated specific cuts that were anticipated. Commissioner of education Gerald Tirozzi of the department of education responded by letter of June 20, 1990, stating: “The obligation to provide appropriate special education services to each eligible student is manifest in both state and federal law,” and therefore “[t]he New Haven board should construct a budget reflecting reasonable expenditures for appropriate special education services, regardless of the impact upon the state mandated [MER].”
The New Haven board then submitted another budget, which although meeting special education mandates, projected a MER shortfall of $4,075,854. When the state board received a report concerning this proposed budget, Tirozzi recommended that the state board adopt a resolution initiating a § 10-4b complaint against the New Haven board for its projected failure to meet the MER.
On June 27, 1990, the state board, acting pursuant to its authority under § 10-4b, initiated a complaint, naming the New Haven board and the city as respon[713]*713dents. An investigative team reviewed conflicting figures presented by the New Haven board and the city, and met with representatives from all three parties to attempt to reconcile the differences. The team recalculated the projected MER shortfall at $2,056,930.
On September 26 and October 1, 1990, the state board held a § 10-4b administrative hearing, presided over by a three member panel. After this evidentiary hearing, the panel issued a “proposal for a decision” which found a MER shortfall of $2,056,930. Subsequently, the full state board rendered its final decision, ratifying this finding, and ordered the city to provide assurances that an additional $2,056,930 would be provided to the New Haven board. The state board also ordered the New Haven board to submit a plan detailing the manner in which it would spend these additional moneys on MER-eligible activities.
“The standard of judicial review of administrative agency rulings is well established.” Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 712, 629 A.2d 333 (1993); Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 261, 579 A.2d 505 (1990). Under General Statutes § 4-183 (j), “[t]he court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” The reviewing court “ ‘may not retry the case or substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact. . . . Rather, an agency’s factual [714]*714and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts. . . .’” Tomlinson v. Board of Education, supra, 713. We also afford deference to the state board’s construction of the public education statutes at issue in this appeal because the state board is the agency charged with the enforcement of these statutes. Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 354, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993). “ ‘On the other hand, it is the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law.’ ” Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 262.
The principal issue in this appeal, as we previously noted, is whether the city exhausted its obligation to fund the MER adequately when it appropriated a dollar amount sufficient to meet the MER but not sufficient to meet the MER and other mandated programs.9 The city points out that its overall appropriation of ninety-six million dollars to the New Haven board was in excess of the MER. The city claims that, because it intended eighty-four million of the ninety-six million dollars appropriated to fund the MER, the New Haven board was required to budget that part of its appropriation in that specific manner, and that it was the board’s responsibility to meet other federal and state mandates with the remaining twelve million dollars.
In its second, related, claim, the city argues that it should not have had the burden to demonstrate inaccuracies in the budget or budget items that constituted abuses of discretion, but, instead, that the New Haven board should have had the responsibility to “reallocate or reduce expenditures to meet the City’s overall appropriation.” These first two claims are analyzed together [715]*715because each would place a higher standard of review on the actions of the New Haven board than the abuse of discretion standard applied by the state board.10
The city’s argument cannot be reconciled with our prior interpretations of General Statutes §§ 10-220 and 10-222.* 11 Under § 10-222, local and regional boards of education are to prepare an itemized estimate of the [716]*716cost of maintenance of public schools for the ensuing year and submit the estimate to the board of finance, as the New Haven board did in the present case. Subsequently, “[t]he money appropriated by any municipality for the maintenance of public schools shall be expended by and in the discretion of the board of education” with the proviso that the board’s expenditures “shall not exceed the appropriation made by the municipality.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 10-222 (a). Therefore, once an appropriation is made by a board of finance to a board of education, the manner in which it is expended is within the sound discretion of the school board. Baston v. Ricci, 174 Conn. 522, 528, 391 A.2d 161 (1978); West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 573, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Furlong, 162 Conn. 390, 398, 294 A.2d 546 (1972); Board of Education v. Ellington, 151 Conn. 1, 9, 193 A.2d 466 (1963). “A town board of education is an agency of the state in charge of education in the town, and broad powers are granted it by the legislature to that end. In the exercise of those powers or in the incurring of expense necessitated thereby to be paid by the town, the board of education is beyond control by the town or any of its officers except as limitations are found in statutory provisions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. Ellington, supra, 6.
The city, however, claims that the creation of the MER imposed a new limit on the “otherwise broad discretion [of school boards] to spend monies actually appropriated.” To support its claim, the city directs our attention to two statutes. Section 10-222 provides that a school board may not spend beyond its appropriation. Section 10-4b (b) provides that the state board “may not order an increase in the regular program expenditures [MER-eligible expenditures] ... of such local or regional board of education if such expenditures are [717]*717in an amount at least equal to the [MER]. . . provided that an increase in expenditures may be ordered in accordance with section 10-76d.” In advancing its claim, the city characterizes the “provided” clause of § 10-4b (b) as requiring the state board to order increases in special education expenditures only in accordance with General Statutes § 10-76d.12 The city asserts that these provisions have been “circumvented” in the present case.
We initially note that the New Haven board did not spend more than its appropriation at any time, and the state board neither ordered an increase in MER-eligible expenditures beyond that required nor ordered any increases in special education funding. Therefore, we will analyze the city’s claim as an argument that the spirit of these provisions was undermined by the procedure used by the state board in this case.
We are not insensitive to the city’s concerns. Indeed, these concerns were recognized by the state board when it stated in its written decision that it would not be party to a deliberate strategic underfunding of MER by a local board of education with the purpose of [718]*718extracting an order from the state board for additional funds.13 The city, however, points to nothing in the language of the statutes, and cites no legislative history, to support its argument that the traditional spending discretion of school boards has been altered or abolished by the statutes enacted in response to Horton I. Furthermore, the city’s argument depends on its view that MER expenditures are “sacrosanct” and that therefore the local board may not use moneys intended by the city for the MER to fund other programs. The argument fails to recognize that the legislature also mandated the special education funding, adequate transportation and other mandates that constitute the MER-ineligible portion of the school board’s budget.14 [719]*719To construe the statutes that followed in the wake of Horton I as having the effect of eliminating the traditional discretion of school boards to formulate their budget “would constitute a radical departure from established policy. We will not infer that the legislature intended to enact a significant change in existing law without an unequivocally expressed manifestation of legislative intent.” Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 66, 566 A.2d 670 (1989); see Baston v. Ricci, supra, 528 (“The plaintiffs would have us read into [a statute] by construction a meaning not apparent in its language but which they contend was intended by the legislature. This we will not do. We are confined to the intention which is expressed in the words which the legislature has used.”).
We conclude the following: that the obligation of the town to appropriate sufficient funds to a local board of education to meet the MER has not been met if the appropriation is sufficient to meet MER but insufficient [720]*720for other educational requirements; that the local board of education continues to have the discretion to allocate the appropriation made by the town between MER-eligible and MER-ineligible budgetary items; and that the state board correctly applied an abuse of discretion standard in its review of the New Haven board’s allocation of the city’s appropriation in order to determine whether there was a MER shortfall.
In view of our resolution of the principal issue, we hold that the state board correctly placed the burden of proof on the city to identify each MER-ineligible expenditure that constituted an abuse of discretion. When applying an abuse of discretion standard, a tribunal may appropriately place the burden of proof on the party seeking to challenge an exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 497-98, 123 A.2d 747 (1956).15
Having resolved the principal issue raised by this appeal, together with its collateral burden of proof issue, we now address the remaining claims raised by the city, which allege various abuses of discretion by the state board. In its third claim, the city argues that the state board improperly relied on a budget supplied by the superintendent rather than requiring actual evidence of MER underfunding. The city also argues in its fourth claim that the state board should not have compelled the city to pay the projected MER shortfall before the school year began, but rather the state board [721]*721should have waited until such point during the school year when it could ascertain with certainty that the MER had not been met. Because these claims are essentially the same, amounting to a general claim that the state board can act on a violation of law only after it occurs, we will analyze them together.
The city does not cite any statute or case in support of its theory that the regulatory power of the state board does not include the authority to act to prevent imminent statutory violations. The language of § 10-4b, the statute that authorized the state board to hold the hearing in this case, does not support the city’s theory. To the contrary, this statute requires the state board, upon complaint, to make a finding as to whether the local board of education “has failed or is unable to provide educational opportunities to meet the requirements of this section . . . .” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 10-4b (b) as amended by Public Acts 1989, No. 89-124, § 8. Under that same statute, the state board is authorized to order a local governmental body or its agent, such as the New Haven board of finance, “to take reasonable steps to comply with the requirements of said section 10-4a” if it finds that the local governmental body or its agent “is responsible for such failure or inability.” (Emphasis added.)
A reasonable interpretation of the language of § 10-4b is that the state board may act to prevent a violation of law before it occurs, as in this case, upon a finding of an “inability” to satisfy educational mandates due to insufficient funding, and it may also act upon a violation of law after it occurs, upon a “failure” to meet the statutory mandates. If the legislature intended to limit the authority of the state board so that it could address violations of law only subsequent to their occurrence, it need only have authorized the state board to act in response to a “failure” by a school board to fund the MER. The city would have us interpret the [722]*722word “inability,” however, so that it would have no meaning independent of the word “failure.” “[N]o word in a statute should be treated as superfluous or insignificant . . . and ... we strive to attach independent meaning to every phrase contained in a legislative enactment.” O’Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 215 Conn. 367, 372-73, 576 A.2d 469 (1990). We conclude that the state board is authorized by § 10-4b to act to prevent an imminent violation of educational mandates before its occurrence.
The city next argues that the trial court improperly upheld the state board’s acceptance of the New Haven board’s budget despite a claim that the New Haven board has a history of estimating expenditures inaccurately. The state board rejected this claim, stating in its decision that “[t]he evidence presented to us failed to demonstrate any discrepancy between the [New Haven board’s] actual intentions and the intentions reflected in the budget figures relied upon by the Commissioner. Furthermore, the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the [New Haven board’s] history of estimating its budget expenditures is such that the Board should not grant the figures which the Commissioner relied on any presumptive or probative value.” The trial court found “no evidence in the record” to support the city’s factual allegation, and the city points to nothing in the record on appeal to this court to support its claim. We conclude that the trial court properly held that the state board had not abused its discretion in this regard.
Finally, the city argues that the trial court relied on the superintendent’s representations with regard to the projected budget, without a clear affirmative ratification of the budget by the New Haven board. The state board rejected this claim, stating in its decision that “the evidence shows that the [New Haven board] has never insisted that the Superintendent submit the [723]*723ED014 to the Board for its review and approval prior to submission to the Commissioner. Under these circumstances we cannot conclude that the superintendent lacked the authority to develop and submit the information required on the ED014 without first getting the approval of the [New Haven board]. . . . [E]ven if the Superintendent did lack the necessary authority we would be forced to conclude from the participation of the [New Haven board] in the proceedings before us that [it] has ratified the Superintendent’s representations and made them its own.” In addition, Robert Brewer, of the department of education bureau of grants, testified at the state board hearing that it is a normal course of procedure for a superintendent to complete an EDO 14 form without express ratification by a board chairperson. On appeal, the city points to nothing in the record to support its claim that the state board abused its discretion by relying on the form submitted by the superintendent. We determine that the state board did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
We conclude that the state board of education did not abuse its discretion by ordering the city to provide an additional appropriation to the New Haven board in the amount of $2,056,930 so that the MER for the 1990-91 school year would be met.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.