Haskell/Davis Joint Venture v. TAKRAF USA, Inc.

District Court, D. Alaska·Decided December 5, 2022·No. 3:20-cv-00234·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

HASKELL/DAVIS JOINT VENTURE,

Plaintiff, v.

TAKRAF USA, INC., and NORTH AMERICAN SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 4:20-cv-234-SLG Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS Before the Court at Docket 67 is Defendants’ Motion for Fees and Costs. The motion is opposed.1 Oral argument was not requested and is not deemed necessary. For the reasons described herein, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND In its orders at Dockets 55 and 64, the Court imposed Rule 37 discovery sanctions on Plaintiff Haskell/Davis Joint Venture (“HDJV”) for several improper Rule 26 disclosures relating to HDJV’s expert witness Dave Ganz.2 Relevant here, the Court: (1) ordered HDJV to “pay Defendants’ reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in filing their Motion to Exclude Supplemental Expert Disclosures of

1 Docket 68 (Opposition). 2 See also Docket 59 (Minute entry for hearing on appropriate sanctions). Dave L. Ganz at Docket 37 and the associated reply”; and (2) allowed Defendants to conduct a further 2-hour deposition of Mr. Ganz, with HDJV being responsible

for “all reasonable fees and costs incurred by Defendants associated with this deposition, not to exceed a total of three hours of Defendants’ attorney time and three hours of Defendants’ expert’s time (including the time spent at the deposition).”3 Defendants now seek a total of $26,854.50 in attorney’s fees and $1,509.10 in costs.4 According to the declaration of Defendants’ counsel and supporting

exhibits, Defendants’ fees comprise $25,429.50 for 80.45 hours of attorney and paralegal time spent drafting their motion to exclude and its associated reply, plus $1,425.00 for their three hours of deposition time.5 Defendants’ counsel’s declaration lists the following individual totals: • R. Page (attorney): 27.1 hours at $475 per hour;

• J. Peck (attorney): 3.4 hours at $375 per hour; • H. Tilley (attorney): 41.95 hours at $260 per hour; and • R. Culhane (paralegal): 8 hours at $225 per hour.6

3 Docket 64 at 2. 4 Docket 67 at 4. 5 Docket 67 at 4; Docket 67-1 at ¶¶ 5, 11, 12–13 (Decl. of Reid Page); see also Docket 67-2 (Third Party Invoices); Docket 67-3 (Redacted Billable Hour Invoice). 6 Docket 67-1 at 9, ¶ 13. Defendants’ declaration does not distinguish between hours spent on

Case No. 4:20-cv-00234-SLG, Haskell/Davis J.V. v. TAKRAF USA, Inc., et al. Defendants’ costs represent expenses incurred in connection with Mr. Ganz’s second deposition.7

LEGAL STANDARDS Under Rule 37(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a party fails to comply with Rule 26’s disclosure requirements, a district court may, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard, impose sanctions on the offending party.8 These sanctions may include, among other things, an “order [of] payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.”9

To determine the appropriate amount for an award of attorney’s fees, district courts in the Ninth Circuit use the “lodestar method,” which involves “multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the [matter] by a reasonable hourly rate.”10 “In determining the appropriate number of hours to be included in a lodestar calculation, the district court should exclude hours ‘that are

the motion to exclude and hours spent on the deposition. See id. 7 Docket 67-1 at ¶ 8. 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A). 10 Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). The Ninth Circuit’s published decisions on this point have involved fee awards issued pursuant to specific statutes, not Rule 37 sanctions, but district courts often apply their holdings to Rule 37 fee awards, too. See, e.g., Netlist Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 341 F.R.D. 650, 674–75 (C.D. Cal. 2022).

Case No. 4:20-cv-00234-SLG, Haskell/Davis J.V. v. TAKRAF USA, Inc., et al. excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’”11 Courts need not embark on a line-by-line evaluation of a party’s legal invoices; instead, they have authority to make an across-the-board percentage cut in the hours claimed to “trim[] the fat.”12

But in doing so, a district court must provide a “concise but clear explanation” of its reasons for the fee award.”13 After a district court calculates the lodestar figure, it then assesses “whether it is necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure on the basis

of the Kerr factors that are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.”14 Because the lodestar method is “strong[ly] presum[ed]” to be reasonable, further adjustments “are proper only in certain ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases.”15

11 McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). 12 Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 13 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; accord Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); Gates, 987 F.2d at 1402. 14 Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996), amended on denial of reh’g, 108 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1997). The Kerr factors are: “(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.” Id. at 363 n.8 (quoting Kerr v. Screen Actors Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975)). 15 Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564–65 (1986) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 899 (1984)); see also Morales, 96 F.3d at 564 n.8

Case No. 4:20-cv-00234-SLG, Haskell/Davis J.V. v. TAKRAF USA, Inc., et al. DISCUSSION Defendants assert that their request is a reasonable lodestar calculation,

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Related

Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Blum v. Stenson
465 U.S. 886 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Martin Gonzalez, Sr. v. City of Maywood
729 F.3d 1196 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
McCown v. City of Fontana
565 F.3d 1097 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc.
523 F.3d 973 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Harris v. Marhoefer
24 F.3d 16 (Ninth Circuit, 1994)
Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.
526 F.2d 67 (Ninth Circuit, 1975)
Gates v. Deukmejian
987 F.2d 1392 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)